THE ORIENTAL INSTITUTE OF THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO

STUDIES IN ANCIENT ORIENTAL CIVILIZATION • NO. 42
THE ROAD TO KADESH

A HISTORICAL INTERPRETATION
OF THE BATTLE RELIEFS OF KING SETY I
AT KARNAK

BY WILLIAM J. MURNANE

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K J R

to whose friendship and generosity
this book and its author
owe so much
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PREFACE

A draft of this study was first written as a chapter of historical commentary, to accompany the Epigraphic Survey's publication of the battle reliefs of King Sety I at Karnak. As I worked on this project, however, I came to realize that the material demanded a more detailed treatment than that which I had originally planned. The wars of Sety I, after all, are but one episode in the long process of adjustment between the Egyptian and Hittite empires which would culminate, first in the Battle of Kadesh, then with the treaty enacted during Ramesses II's twenty-first regnal year. Proper understanding of this one stage of the conflict involves a host of other issues, many of them remote from the war monument at Karnak and even from Sety's own reign. The chapter was rewritten several times, with progressively more cumbersome footnotes, until finally, in the summer of 1983, it was completely reconceived and rewritten as a monograph. Many of the conclusions reached here are based on the documentation published in Chicago, Reliefs IV; and this book is still, to a great extent, a companion volume to that publication. But my primary aim has been to explore the significance of Sety I's wars, not only in his own time, but as part of the pattern of
THE ROAD TO KADESCH

Egyptian-Hittite relations which had been evolving since the
twilight years of the Eighteenth Dynasty. Many other
scholars have worked on these problems before me. They will
find their work reflected in my own, not always with full
agreement, but with constant and sincere gratitude.

I am happy to thank my colleagues, Egyptologists at the
Oriental Institute (Chicago) and at Chicago House
(Luxor)--in alphabetical order, Klaus Baer, Lanny Bell,
Janet H. Johnson, Charles C. Van Siclen III, Edward F.
Wente, and Frank J. Yurco--for reading the manuscript,
entire or in part, and for offering their criticism. I am
also grateful to Professor Alan R. Schulman (Queens College,
Flushing, New York) and Dr. Rolf Krauss (Ägyptisches Museum,
Berlin), both of whom read parts of the text with useful
results. A special debt of thanks goes to all those
scholars at the Oriental Institute in Chicago who graciously
gave of their time and expertise with the Akkadian, Hittite
and Hurrian sources: once again in alphabetical order, I am
indebted to Richard Beal, Gary Beckman, Robert Biggs, Gene
Gragg, Hans G. Güterbock, Silvin Košak, JoAnn Scurlock, and
Wilfrid Von Soldt for their advice. I am especially
grateful to Professor William L. Moran (Harvard University),
who took time away from his own translation of the Amarna
Letters to read my sixth appendix. The published text
of this book was produced using the TREATISE/SCRIPT text formatter on the IBM 3081D computer and XEROX 9700 printer at the University of Chicago Computation Center. The maps were drawn by W. Raymond Johnson; Katherine Rosich and Theresa Bicanic were immensely helpful at a crucial stage of the preparation of the manuscript; and Pamela Bruton, Paul Hoffman and Thomas Holland saw it into print--all of them working with their customary patience and skill. I could not have asked for better colleagues.

William J. Murnane

Chicago House
Luxor, Egypt
ABBREVIATIONS

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<tr>
<td>AA</td>
<td>Ägyptologische Abhandlungen. Wiesbaden, 1960-</td>
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<td>ASAE</td>
<td>Annales du Service des antiquités de l'Egypte. Cairo, 1900-</td>
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<td>BES</td>
<td>Bulletin of the Egyptological Seminar. New York, 1979-</td>
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<td>BiOr</td>
<td>Bibliotheca Orientalis. Leiden, 1943-</td>
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<th>BSFE</th>
<th>Bulletin de la Société française d'Égyptologie. Paris, 1949-</th>
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<td>Chicago, Reliefs</td>
<td>Epigraphic Survey. Reliefs and Inscriptions at Karnak I-IV. OIP 25, 35, 74, 107. Chicago, 1936-85. The fourth volume of the series is The Battle Reliefs of King Sety I.</td>
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<td>DF-IFAO</td>
<td>Documents de fouilles de l'Institut français d'archéologie orientale du Caire. Cairo, 1934-</td>
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JARCE  Journal of the American Research Center in Egypt. Boston, 1962-.


JEA  Journal of Egyptian Archaeology. London, 1914-.

JNES  Journal of Near Eastern Studies. Chicago, 1942-.


KUB  Keilschrifturkunden aus Boghazköi I-XXXIV. Berlin, 1921-44.
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<td>MÄS</td>
<td><em>Münchner ägyptologische Studien</em>. Berlin, 1962-.</td>
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| MDAIK              | *Mitteilungen des Deutschen archäologischen Instituts, Abteilung Kairo*. Cairo, 1930-.
| MIFAO              | Mémoire publiés par les membres de l'Institut français d'archéologie orientale au Caire. Cairo, 1902-.
| MIO                | *Mitteilungen des Instituts für Orientforschung*. Berlin, 1953-.
| OIP                | *Oriental Institute Publications*. Chicago, 1924-.
| OLZ                | *Orientalistische Literaturzeitung*. Leipzig, 1898-.
| Or.                | *Orientalia, new series*. Rome, 1932-.
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CHAPTER I

EGYPT'S RELATIONS WITH HATTI, FROM THE AMARNA PERIOD DOWN TO THE OPENING OF SETY I'S REIGN

Shortly after his accession to the throne of Egypt, Amenhotep IV received a letter from Shuppiluliuma I, king of the distant land of the Hittites.¹ The message was cordial, but the Hittite ruler was clearly piqued. Why, he wanted to know, had the new king not sent the customary gifts, as his father had been wont to do? "Nothing, O king, of what your father had formerly spoken did I in any way refuse; and [all] of what I asked of your father did your father in no way deny." Now that "Khuria" had seated himself on the throne of his ancestors--thus did the Hittite monarch address the Pharaoh, whose full throne name was in fact NEF-ER-KHEPRURE.²

"Neferkheprure"—he and Shuppiluliuma should exchange gifts and become good friends. And lest there be any doubt as to what was expected, the Hittite went on to enumerate a series of expensive presents he desired, before closing with a list of his own gifts—their values pointedly set down—which accompanied his letter to the king of Egypt.

Not thirty years after this effusion was written, the Hittite and Egyptian empires had entered into a bitter rivalry. Able at last to cope with the enemies that threatened their Anatolian homeland, the Hittites had emerged from nearly a century of obscurity and had toppled the empire of Mitanni. Hatti now took Mitanni's place as the ruling "superpower" in central Syria. In so doing, however, she ran afoul of Egypt, whose suzerainty over that area she was now in a position to menace. Yet, on the face of it, this was entirely an evitable conflict.

There is no compelling reason why the two powers could not have continued the comfortable arrangement which had existed between Egypt and Mitanni. After a time, in fact, this was precisely what they did. Before this could come to pass, however, the better part of a century had been spent in

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intermittent warfare and unremitting suspicion. A review of
Egyptian-Hittite relations in the early part of this period
will show not only how particular accidents of policy shaped
this state of affairs, but also the extent to which both
superpowers were manipulated by forces they believed
themselves able to control.

THE SELF-SERVING VASSAL STATES OF SYRIA

The balance of power in Syria was the first casualty of
Shuppiluliuma's protracted struggle with King Tushratta of
Mitanni. Local authorities who already faced a pervasive
social unrest now had to contend with a fundamental shift
in the system of obligations which had lasted, largely
unchanged, for the past two generations. The Hittites'
emergence as contenders for overlordship in Syria threatened
to disrupt the comparative tranquility made possible by the
friendship of the two other superpowers, Egypt and Mitanni.
As Mitanni's rival, Hatti only stood to gain by weakening
her enemy's hold on her vassals. The results were

3These events, and the chronology proposed for them here,
are discussed in Appendix 6 below, pp. 178-233.

4On the "SA.GAZ movement" in Syria, see Samuel D.
Waterhouse, "Syria in the Amarna Age: A Borderland between
Conflicting Empires" (Ph.D. diss., University of Michigan,
1965), pp. 192-99, with references, especially R. Borger,
"Das Problem der ‘Apiru," ZDPV 74 (1958):121-32; J. Bottéro,
Le problème des Habiru (Paris, 1954); Moshe Greenberg, The
Hab/piru (New Haven, 1955); and W. F. Albright, CAH III.2
111-15. C.f., however, M. B. Rowton, "Dimorphic Structure
(I am indebted to Caroline Livingood for this reference).
THE ROAD TO KADESH

predictable: in the Syrian principalities, kings and factions watched, schemed, and occasionally took action to ensure that their side, with the aid of one or another of the great powers, emerged with the winners.

But if the contest between Hatti and Mitanni was an ongoing source of anxiety, it was equally worrying to ponder how the Hittites would accommodate themselves in victory to the other superpower, Egypt. Governed by local city rulers under the supervision of Egyptian administrators, the territories of the Egyptian Empire abutted and, sometimes, even intermingled with those owing their fealty to the Mitannians. As a commercial power, Egypt would not welcome the disruption of ports and trading routes which Hittite pressure would effect within Syria, and particularly on such long-standing Egyptian affiliates as Ugarit. As the Mitannians became less able to sustain their position in Syria, moreover, Egypt was increasingly on call by those vassal states that wished either to avoid Hittite domination or, if possible, to maneuver themselves into a viable position between the great powers. Barring the resurgance of Mitanni, a reckoning between Egypt and Hatti might not be

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put off indefinitely. In the meantime, the prevailing conditions gave the Syrian princes room to maneuver. Mitannian weakness, and Egyptian reluctance to completely fill Mitanni's shoes, allowed enterprising rulers a freedom they would not have enjoyed otherwise: what could be seized during this disturbed period might accrue to one's permanent advantage by the time the Egyptians felt compelled to treat with this new colossus from the north.

An outstanding example of such opportunism is provided by the kings of Amurru, who owed their very political existence to the conditions just described. By exploiting social unrest in the cities, along with political and economic rivalries among their rulers, Abdi-Ashirta and his son Aziru waged an ultimately successful struggle to forge a major kingdom between the Orontes River and the Mediterranean Sea. The Amarna Letters are filled with denunciations which Amurru's enemies sent to the Pharaoh in Egypt. Self-serving though many of these complaints undoubtedly were, they consistently return to a theme that, in retrospect, seems hard to deny: that the Egyptians' military presence in Syria was not enough to preserve the status quo. This does not mean it was totally ineffectual. On the contrary, the

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Amarna Letters themselves reveal that Egypt could, when she chose, enforce her writ on the countries under her control. But Egyptian power, though it could overawe an Aziru at the height of his career, did not prevent him from consolidating the kingdom of Amurru—and this would have consequences that went far beyond the eclipse of a few local princes.

When Amurru first appears on the political map of Syria in the fourteenth century B.C., it is not as the unified country it was to become, but as a loose grouping of city states, each under its own ruler. Borrowing the term of a later age, Amurru was a geographical expression, easily controlled by the Egyptian Commissioner from his own headquarters in Sumur. This configuration would be completely transformed by Abdi-Ashirta and his successors. Reports from enemies such as Rib-Addi of Byblos show that much of the success they enjoyed came through their manipulation of the social, economic and political problems that manifested themselves throughout Syria in the Apiru, or SA.GAZ, movement (see n. 4 above). By itself, this alliance of dispossessed, marginal and frankly lawless elements of society was a powerful force for change in

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8 For the following, see Appendix 6 below, pp. 183-92.
Amurru. With the direction it now received from the house of Abdi-Ashirta, it proved irresistible. Both Abdi-Ashirta and Aziru, after him, showed themselves adept at playing factions against one another, within city states and among them. Neither man had much trouble in bringing all the principalities of Amurru under his control. But the ambition of the new dynasty ran wider still. A strong and independent kingdom of Amurru was incompatible with its current status in the Egyptian Empire—especially with its resident Commissioner at Sumur, on the coast, within easy reach of Egypt by sea. The house of Abdi-Ashirta thus made it its policy to dislodge the Commissioner and to keep him out by constituting itself as the defender of imperial interests in Amurru. Abdi-Ashirta's initial success was premature, for at his death the Egyptians re-established their direct hold on Sumur. Yet the process of Amurru's consolidation was only checked, not stopped altogether, and it was to be vigorously resumed by Aziru, the most dynamic of the "sons of Abdi-Ashirta" who shared power in Amurru after their father's death.

Aziru's success, after his father's failure, is commonly credited to Egyptian spinelessness or, at the very least, distraction on the part of the Pharaoh and his advisers.9

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This is certainly the impression created by the Amarna Letters written by Rib-Addi, the inveterate enemy of Abdi-Ashirta and his family; but other letters in the Amarna archive show matters in a different light. Through the rulers of vassal cities in Egyptian-held territory, the Pharaoh had a ready-made intelligence service (e.g., *EA* 151:49-51), and there is no doubt that he was kept informed of Aziru's activities from more than one source (e.g., *EA* 149:35-40). Aziru himself is seen to have been liable to being summoned before the Pharaoh to explain his conduct (*EA* 162, 164-67), and eventually he was obliged to go to Egypt and do just that. If Egypt's policy towards Amurru proved, in the end, to be wrong-headed, it was not for lack of information or the means to put it to use. Egypt had intervened in force at the end of Abdi-Ashirta's life, as we have seen; yet, oddly enough, the results were not unreservedly applauded even by Abdi-Ashirta's enemies. Indeed, the behavior of the sea-borne Egyptian force\(^1\) was itself the object of complaint: the murder of Abdi-Ashirta at their hands was viewed by Rib-Addi (no friend of Amurru's) as being out of order, and in another passage from the same letter (*EA* 101:27-29) he tells the Egyptian court

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been seen in more recent studies, notably C. Aldred, in *CAH* \(^3\) II.2 82-84; and cf. the references in n. 7 above.

\(^1\)See *EA* 101, with Waterhouse, "Syria in the Amarna Age," pp. 113-14; and cf. Albright, *CAH* \(^3\) II.2 104-7, on abuses of the Egyptian military establishment in Syria.
to "install a man (i.e., an Egyptian commissioner?) in each city, and don't let ships (alone) govern (?) Amurru!" This, in a nutshell, is the same prescription for tranquility in Syria that runs through all of Rib-Addi's letters to Egypt: Egyptian officials on the spot, backed up by strong local garrisons. The breakdown of this system encouraged such dangerous mavericks as Aziru. For that very reason, Rib-Addi inveighs against the policy--allegedly inspired by Egyptian military advisers--of paying subsidies to Aziru; for these, Rib-Addi warns, will only go directly as tribute to the "strong king," the increasingly mighty ruler of the Hittites (EA 126:62-66).

These last words were written either during or shortly after the "Great Syrian" war. The outcome of this campaign could not have failed to affect Egypt very deeply. Mitanni, her imperial ally for over two generations, was effectively gone, blasted into impotence by Shuppiluliuma's armies. Kadesh, an Egyptian vassal that had managed to get in the way, had also fallen to Hatti, and its king and leading citizens had been deported to Anatolia. These events by themselves would have sufficed to place the Egyptians on alert; but the unsettled state of Syria after the Hittites had retired also invited attention. Although Shuppiluliuma had installed his own, pro-Hittite supporters in the city

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11 See Appendix 6 below, pp. 199-208.
12 Ibid., pp. 236-39.
states he defeated, his hold on the territories of the former Mitannian Empire was far from secure. Besides, even in the conquered city-states there were groups who were still biding their time, hoping to reassert themselves with Egyptian help. Thus, sometime during the period that followed, the king of Qatna would write to Akhenaten, telling him that he and four neighboring rulers—including the "kings" in the Hittite vassal states of Niya and Nuhashshe—would support an Egyptian demarche, along with three or four kings in Mitanni who stood with the king of Egypt against the Hittites. In the same vein, somewhat earlier—either during the Great Syrian campaign or soon after it ended—the Egyptian king had already been urged to send an army quickly, so that the entire land of Nuhashshe might be taken for Egypt (EA 55:16-23). This advice the Pharaoh did not take. There is no indication in the Amarna Letters or elsewhere that the Egyptians fielded an army as an immediate reaction to the Hittite triumph in Syria. Very probably, Akhenaten and his advisers opted instead to let the dust settle, to see if the new power in northern Syria could be dealt with in some way that stopped short of all-out war.

This phase of Egypt's relations with the new Hittite Empire ended with the return to Syria of Aitakama, son of the deported king of Kadesh. Aitakama's enthusiastic

13 Ibid., pp. 186-87.
support of Hittite sovereignty, and his attempt to recruit or coerce his neighbors into the Hittites' camp, left the Egyptians in no doubt that Kadesh would not return docilely to the Egyptian alliance. Aitakama's protests of loyalty were not believed in Egypt, perhaps because he had tipped his hand too baldly to men who, like Akizzi of Qatna, were only too willing to report his Hittite bias to his lord, the Pharaoh.\(^1\) The fragmentary and one-sided documentation for this period does not present us with a clear picture of the Egyptians' response. But the Pharaoh's writ had been conspicuously flouted by a disloyal vassal who was attacking Egyptian affiliates in Upe, all in the name of his new masters, the Hittites. The Hittites, for their part, were not conspicuously anxious to disavow their eager new recruit: indeed, as will emerge later, they seemed inclined to back him up. Given the provocation, the Pharaoh's known disenchantment with Aitakama and the disposition of his neighbors in Syria, the option of direct military intervention would seem attractive—but we have no clear idea when, how, or even whether this was done. Evidence that Egypt fought a war in Syria against the Hittites during Akhenaten's reign has been seen in a number of decorated fragments from buildings constructed during the Amarna Period. Assuming these tableaux are not mere rhetorical displays, they could refer to this episode, but the material

\(^1\)Ibid., pp. 186-88.
demands further study. Most of the information that comes from the presumed scene of the fighting belongs to an early stage of the conflict, when Aitakama was establishing his bad faith towards Egypt by harassing Egyptian allies in Upe. In his own letter to the Pharaoh, however, Aitakama complains (EA 189 rto.:5-12) that Biriawaza, the principal Egyptian ally in Upe, had set Kadesh on fire. At about the same time, we hear of an Egyptian force that had been expected imminently in Syria. One of the cities making ready for its arrival was Beirut, where Rib-Addi was still in exile following his expulsion from Byblos (see EA 142:11-31)—yet we know that Rib-Addi eventually turned, in desperation, to his great enemy, Aziru, for assistance in regaining his kingdom (EA 162:7-21). The Egyptian force, obviously, had given Rib-Addi no satisfaction. Either it was never sent—in which case, the death of Akhenaten and the ensuing dynastic troubles in Egypt can be suspected as the cause—or alternatively, it was directed, not up the coast, against Amurru, but inland, to support Biriawaza in his struggle against Aitakama.

To be discussed by Professor Schulman in a forthcoming article on Akhenaten's "Hittite war"; for the present, see the references cited by him in JARCE 3 (1964):53-54; and in idem, "Ankhesenamun, Nofretity and the Amka Affair," JARCE 15 (1978):45-46.

See Appendix 6 below, pp. 210-218.
Aziru, meanwhile, had avoided becoming as thoroughly compromised as Aitakama. His strategy was to stay in Egypt's good graces while still keeping what he had managed to win during the easy freebooting days just before and after the Great Syrian war. Although Aziru was reported to be in contact with the Hittite court (EA 59:21-24), and had to defend himself against charges of receiving the Hittite king's envoys more favorably than the Pharaoh's (EA 161:46-53), his enemies did not succeed in branding him as a traitor to Egypt. Certainly his behavior, as it is described even by his enemies, does not seem to have been as overtly disloyal as Aitakama's: Aziru was out for himself, but he did not embark on any pro-Hittite crusade. Perhaps his carefully cultivated ties with high officials in Egypt (cf. EA 158, 164, 166) helped him as well. Already, around the time of the Great Syrian campaign, he had been receiving subsidies at the behest of Egypt's military establishment (EA 126:62-66), and he was urging on the Pharaoh his fitness to act as the representative of Egyptian interests in all Amurru (EA 157). That he should openly advocate a course that was so closely connected with his father's untimely end is not as surprising as it seems. To all

17 Ibid., p. 202 and n. 45.

18 Further evidence for these subsidies is found in one of Aziru's letters to the Pharaoh, in which he accuses Hotpe of misappropriating gold and silver which the king of Egypt had intended for Aziru's use (EA 161:41-46).
appearances, Abdi-Ashirta's murder had not been ordered by the Egyptian court, but came from an abuse of authority by the Pharaoh's officers in Syria, perhaps in league with local dissidents. Possession of Šumur, by itself, was apparently not a crime: Abdi-Ashirta had held on to it for some time prior to his demise, and Egyptian policy in other areas tended to favor strong local princes (e.g., Biriawaza in Upe) as agents for the Egyptian peace in Syria. When Aziru himself entered Šumur,19 the official reaction from Egypt was surprisingly mild—for Aziru then was only ordered to refortify the place, in earnest of his professed loyalty to the Pharaoh (EA 159-61).20

Aziru's successful finessing of the Egyptians is all the more notable for having been accomplished when he was probably guilty of at least technical disloyalty to Egypt. The facts, once again, are not clearly documented, but a good case can be made for Aziru's having entered into some sort of relationship with Shuppiluliuma before he made his irrevocable break with Egypt and passed finally into the Hittite camp. The most important evidence to this effect is in the preamble to the treaty that Aziru's grandson, Duppi-Teshup, made with Murshili II:

Aziru was your grandfather, Duppi-Teshup. He rebelled against my father, but submitted again to my father. When the kings of the Nuhasheshe lands

19See Appendix 6 below, pp. 186-88. 208.
20Ibid., p. 188, n. 23.
and kings of Kinza (= Kadesh) rebelled against my father, Aziru did not rebel. As he was bound by treaty, he remained bound by treaty. As my father fought against his enemies, in the same manner fought Aziru . . . . When my father became a god and I seated myself on the throne of my father, Aziru behaved towards me just as he had behaved towards my father. It happened that the Nuhashshe kings and the king of Kinza rebelled a second time against me. But Aziru, your grandfather, and DU-Teshup, your father, [did not take their side.] They remained loyal to me as their lord.21

The wording of the opening lines—Aziru "rebelled" but "submitted again" to Shuppiluliuma—implies that Aziru had violated a previous arrangement which he then made good by his final submission, when he concluded his well-known treaty with Hatti. His steadfast behavior during the rebellions of Kadesh and Nuhashshe is generally assigned to this later period, when Aziru was formally a Hittite vassal; and the first of these rebellions is dated by most scholars to the years of the "Hurrian War," toward the end of Shuppiluliuma's reign.22 But are these equations correct? What the treaty describes as Nuhashshe's second rebellion, in the time of Murshili II, was actually her third or perhaps even her fourth known revolt against Hittite suzerainty (see below, at nn. 52-53). To be sure, this was Nuhashshe's "second" revolt against the person of Murshili

21 Adapted from Goetze's translation in ANET2, p. 203.
22 E.g., Goetze, in CAH3 II.2 17.
II--but this description would not apply to Kadesh, which had not joined Nuhashshe on the first occasion she had defied Murshili. As a reflection of Hatti's past relations with both Kadesh and Nuhashshe, the account we find in Duppi-Teshup's treaty seems, at least, to be confused.

These problems, I believe, are illusory. What the text reports, I would maintain, is not the full tally of past revolts by Kadesh and Nuhashshe, but only those occasions when both parties had been caught out together. Thus the "second" revolt, under Murshili II, would be that of the king's ninth year, when "the Nuhashshe kings and the king of Kinza rebelled a second time, against me" (my italics); and the first rebellion, against Shuppiluliuma, would have been the Great Syrian war, when the kinglets of Nuhashshe, together with Shutatarra and Aitakama, the once and future kings of Kadesh, had all resisted the Hittite advance. Aziru would thus have reached his original understanding with Shuppiluliuma during the early stages of the Great Syrian war.

Aziru was certainly courting the Hittites at about this time. In a letter to Egypt (EA 161:46-53) he defends himself, rather lamely, for having entertained Hittite

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See Appendix 6 below, pp. 239-41. Favoring this interpretation is its avoidance of the special pleading that the conventional dating requires (e.g., in Waterhouse, "Syria in the Amarna Age," pp. 138-42) as well as its squaring a rebellion of Kadesh in the last years of Shuppiluliuma with Aitakama's survival into the reign of Murshili II.
envoys. It was probably at the same time that the citizens of Tunip were writing about Aziru to the Pharaoh (see EA 59:21-24), describing him as being in a position to obtain kingship over them from Hatti. Moreover, either during or shortly after the Great Syrian war, Aziru had been operating outside his normal bailiwick, either in Qatna or in Nuhashshe—in an area, at any rate, in which Hatti was engaged in fighting at about the same time, and which was being represented to Egypt as being ripe for rescue (EA 55).² We can only speculate as to the nature of this original "submission" by Aziru to the Hittite king. Perhaps he had visited Shuppiluliuma when the Hittite was tarrying in Alalakh, about the same time that Ugarit and Niya had submitted. Just as conceivably, though, this "submission" could have been a less formal affair, confined to a prudent coordination of Amurru's military maneuvers around the Hittites' planned assault on Qatna and Nuhashshe. This seems to be the likeliest of all arrangements Aziru could have reached with Shuppiluliuma at this time. At a later stage of the Great Syrian campaign, when Shuppiluliuma was occupying Nuhashshe, Aziru would be lumbered with the presence of Hotpe, an Egyptian imperial officer, and had to reassure the Egyptian court of his loyalty and good faith.

(EA 164-67). Amurru, in truth, was not yet ready to stake its future on the Hittites, who retired by the end of the year, leaving behind them a vacuum for Egypt to fill. Faced with a resurgence of Egyptian interest in Syria, Aziru found it prudent to slide back into his old alliance, maybe suffering no more than a tart reprimand (echoed in EA 161?) for his flirtation with the power of Hatti.

In the years following the Great Syrian war, with Egypt's attention now fixed on the Hittites, Aziru finally brought all of Amurru under his control. Like his father, he also strove to persuade his Egyptian overlord to let him, the king of Amurru, protect imperial interests in this area; and the Egyptians were now inclined to listen. Incidents such as the murder of Pawara, the Egyptian Commissioner in Šumur, underlined the cost of keeping Egyptian troops committed there when they might be better used elsewhere. Aziru's position was all the more credible for his enemies' inability to blame Pawara's murder on him: they could cite it only as an aggravated example of the sort of lawlessness which made a heightened Egyptian presence so desirable. The Egyptians, in the end, disagreed with this latter assessment--and, by all accounts, it was Pawara's successor who handed Šumur over to Aziru.25

25See Appendix 6 below, p. 187.
EGYPT AND HATTI DOWN TO SETY I'S REIGN

But the wily Amurrite had overplayed his hand. As reports of his questionable dealings with the deposed king of Byblos and with Egypt's enemy, Aitakama, began to crowd into the Egyptian court, Aziru came under increasingly skeptical scrutiny. Finally, after a series of delays, he was uncompromisingly ordered to present himself before the Pharaoh and explain his conduct in person. This was a test that Aziru could not refuse without breaking with Egypt, and one that he doubtless would not have accepted if submission to Hatti were a viable alternative: the Pharaoh himself stressed the extreme peril in which Aziru found himself at this juncture (EA 162:30-41). But Hatti, especially after the retirement of Hittite forces at the end of the Great Syrian campaign, was far away; and even if Aziru could successfully explain his "rebellion" to Shuppiluliuma, his change of allegiance would turn Amurru into a battleground for the superpowers. Far preferable was it to take his chances on a gamble he might hope to win, and to place himself in the hands of the Pharaoh.

Meanwhile, events in central Syria were moving in a direction that, unwittingly, would help bring Aziru into accord with Egypt. During Aziru's absence the Sutu people and the "kings" of Nuhashshe began to make inroads on Amurru, using the pretext that Aziru's brothers had sold him
into captivity and he would not return (EA 169:16-39). The absence of the ruling strongman, in other words, appeared to signal the breakup of the state he had created. At about the same time, Hittite forces appeared on Amurru's eastern border, raiding the country of Amki in the company of that well-known troublemaker Aitakama of Kadesh (EA 170:14-35; cf. EA 174-76, 363). At first glance, this expedition does not appear to have been directed against Amurru but on the adjoining stretch of country that was clearly recognized as being Egyptian territory.²⁶ Years later, Shuppiluliuma would send his troops into Amki a second time, in retaliation for an Egyptian attack on Kadesh. It is tempting to see this first raid in the same light, particularly in view of the high probability that Biriawaza, Egypt's chief vassal in Upe, had been acting against Aitakama on the Pharaoh's behalf (cf. EA 189). Yet there is more to this incident than the raid on the cities of Amki. EA 170, written to Aziru in Egypt by his brothers, describes how a second Hittite commander had entered Amki with 90,000 troops, and it implies that an attack on Amurru was expected from

Nuhashshe as well as from Amki itself. The numbers (even if they have been inflated in the telling) seem excessive for a mere raiding party; and given Nuhashshe's known hostility to Aziru's brothers shortly before this, all the circumstances suggest that a serious offensive was about to begin.

What these isolated facts suggest is that Aziru's enemies had found and seized their moment. From past experience they knew what a united kingdom of Amurru could do under Aziru's leadership. His absence now offered them the opportunity they needed to undo his work. Their plan, both in timing and strategy, had every chance of success. Hatti would be drawn in by the plausible bogeyman of Amurru in league with Egypt and aligned against Hittite vassals who were already under pressure from Biriawaza. Aziru's relapse into the Egyptians' service had already defined him as a "rebel" to Hatti. Now that he was a virtual prisoner in Egypt, it was only logical to discount still further the effectiveness he might have had as a Hittite agent in Syria. To move against Amurru now, before the Egyptians decided whether to depose Aziru or back him up, suited both the Hittites' and their vassals' immediate aims. Both Egypt and Hatti, in fact, were to be persuaded that their own best interests lay in giving these Syrian princes what they wanted. On one front, Amurru's only effective leader would be branded as a traitor and meet his death in Egypt. On the other, a coalition of Hittites and Syrian princes would join
to push the effective borders of Amurru well to the west of
the Litani and Orontes rivers. The enemies of the house of
Abdi-Ashirta seemed poised, at last, for victory. "

Amurru, however, was not to fall so easily. Already
there had existed in Egypt a body of opinion that saw Aziru
as a useful strongman, one who could be encouraged to look
after Egyptian imperial interests if allowed to pursue his
own. This same self-interest, it is true, also made him
suspect—but to what degree? This was the decision that
the Hittites' raid on Amki now forced on the Pharaoh and his
advisers. To get rid of Aziru would then oblige Egypt to
interfere directly in Amurru, to extend her own military
establishment beyond its preferred limits with unpredictable
results, perhaps even the breakup of Amurru and still more
defections to Hatti. To trust Aziru was to gamble on the
one man who had shown himself resourceful enough to unite
Amurru under his rule. Egypt chose Aziru. If the Pharaoh
meant to enjoy the advantages of relying on a powerful
proxy, he now had little choice but to countenance a strong
kingdom of Amurru; and Aziru, now that Hatti was in league
with his enemies, had every reason to ally himself with a
power whose interests marched with his own. Aziru's return
to Amurru signals the triumph of a faction that believed

"Following the interpretation of Klengel, *Geschichte
Syriens* II 279-85. For the chronology of these events, see
Appendix 6 below, pp. 215-21; and for intrigues against
Aziru see *EA* 140 (letter from Ilirabih of Byblos, a former
ally of Aziru's, to the Pharaoh)."
Egypt could achieve her imperial goals by encouraging local dynasties, investing her own resources only as they seemed to be needed. This policy, however, could be applied successfully only if Egypt possessed a military establishment strong enough, and a sufficiently credible military presence in Syria itself, to compel obedience. Only the current reality of this premise made it possible for the Egyptians to allow Aziru's return, since otherwise it is hard to see how he could be kept from defecting at once to the Hittites. Amurru's continued loyalty was hostage, moreover, not only to Egypt's military commitment to Syria, but to the Hittites' ability to match it. The Pharaoh's decision to trust Aziru makes the best sense if Egypt were still the preponderant power in Syria. Once Hatti could command a solid power base in northern Syria, however, the independence that Egypt had allowed Aziru in her own interest would make it possible for him to change sides once again.

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This rationale underlines the interpretation, followed here, of Klengel, *Geschichte Syriens* II 288-93, as against the model required by the alleged identity of the Amki Campaign of *EA* 170 with the raid mentioned in the Deeds, which would have Aziru passing from his captivity in Egypt directly into the Hittite camp (thus, for example, Waterhouse, "Syria in the Amarna Age," pp. 132-39).
THE ROAD TO KADESH

THE AFFAIR OF THE EGYPTIAN QUEEN

The next time the superpowers clashed, it was once again over Kadesh: Egypt had never conceded the loss of her former vassal to the Hittites, and from the posthumously compiled Deeds of Shuppiluliuma we learn that "troops and chariots of Egypt" attacked the country of Kadesh. This invasion came just as Hittite forces further north were encountering trouble that they could not afford to ignore: a Hurrian army had a Hittite force surrounded in Murmuriga, and although the Hittites had enjoyed some success in bringing northern Syria under their control, the major crossroads of Carchemish still held out. Having just concluded a number of successful campaigns on his northern borders, Shuppiluliuma was free to do what was necessary to effect a permanent settlement in the south. Dispatching half his army to relieve the besieged Hittites in the Hurrian lands, he himself entered northern Syria and proceeded to complete the conquest of Carchemish. The Egyptians were chastised for their attack on Kadesh by suffering a retaliatory raid by Hittite troops into Amki--the second time this had happened--but this time it was only a warning, as the raiding party returned from the field with plunder and living captives. It is at this point, Hittite sources tell us, that the Egyptians became "afraid"; and since their king--almost certainly Nebkheprure/Tutankhamon--had just died, his widowed queen sent to the Hittite camp before
Carchemish a proposal so extraordinary that an astounded Shuppiluliuma exclaimed to his council, "Such a thing has never happened to me in my entire life!":

What followed is an oft-told tale. We may pass quickly over the events themselves—how the queen begged the king of Hatti for one of his sons to be her husband, that she might be spared the humiliation of wedding one of her "subjects"; how repeated appeals from the queen and her envoys finally persuaded a suspicious Shuppiluliuma to send one of his sons to Egypt; and how the young man died along the way. What matters most is that relations between Egypt and Hatti, not surprisingly, took a sharp turn for the worse. For Shuppiluliuma let his anger run away with him, he went to war against Egypt and attacked Egypt. He smote the foot soldiers and the charioteers of the country of Egypt. The Hattian Storm-god, my lord, by his decision even then let my father [= Shuppiluliuma]

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29See Appendix 6, pp. 225-26, with references.

30The two major accounts are Fragment 28 of the Deeds (Güterbock, JCS 10 [1956]:92-98) and Murshili II's Second Plague Prayer (A. Goetze, "Die Pestgebete des Mursilis," Kleinasiatische Forschungen 1 [1930]:208-13 [= ANET², p. 395]). A minor, supplementary account is found in another prayer of Murshili: see H. G. Güterbock, "Mursili's Accounts of Suppiluliuma's Dealings with Egypt," Revue hittite et asiatique 66 (1960):60-61. For recent studies, with citations of relevant literature, see Schulman's latest article (n. 15 above) and Spalinger, in BES 1 (1979):75-80. A fragment of the original correspondence between Shuppiluliuma and the Egyptian queen, written in Akkadian, also survives: see, for now, the preliminary report by E. Edel, "Ein neugefundene Brieffragment der Witwe des Tutanchamun aus Boghazköy," Orientalistika 2 (Ljubljana, September 1978):33-35.
prevail: he vanquished and smote the foot soldiers and the charioteers of the country of Egypt.\textsuperscript{11}

The later stages of this episode, so clearly outlined in the extract from Murshili's Second Plague Prayer cited above, can be fleshed out by what we have of another document—a draft of a letter in which Shuppiluliuma, apparently, makes a formal complaint to Egypt regarding the death of his son.\textsuperscript{12} Although the very poor preservation of this tablet makes a consecutive translation impossible, the general sense of a number of passages can be inferred by careful study of the text. Since, to my knowledge, the contents of this document have not been fully utilized by any previous writer from the Egyptological side of ancient studies,\textsuperscript{13} it seems worthwhile to discuss its implications in some detail.

\footnotesize

\textsuperscript{11}ANET\textsuperscript{2}, p. 395.

\textsuperscript{12}KUB XIX 20; partly translated by E. Forrer, Forschungen II.1 (Berlin, 1926), pp. 28-30. The draft (which the present document is) was written in Hittite; the final version would have been translated into Akkadian. Although the names of both addressee and sender are lost, the identity of the sender as Shuppiluliuma I, writing under the circumstances described, is generally accepted (e.g., Güterbock, R\textsuperscript{e}v\textsuperscript{u}e hittite et asianique 66 [1960]:57 and n. 2). I am grateful to staff of the Oriental Institute Hittite Dictionary, University of Chicago, for making available a new transcription and the accompanying translation, on which these comments are based; and I am indebted to Silvin Ko\textsuperscript{s}ak and Richard Beal for their advice on its interpretation, which avoids as much as possible the extensive restorations proposed by Forrer.

\textsuperscript{13}Although Spalinger, BES 1 (1979):78-79, offers a summary of its contents, apparently based on the translation published by Forrer.
The tablet is inscribed on both sides, with individual sections set off from one another by horizontal dividing lines. The contents of these "paragraphs," in summary, appear to be as follows:

obverse 1-7 The writer recalls his victories over the Kashka people;

8-15 and his victories over the Hurrians, which includes the conquest of Carchemish.

16-13 In this badly broken passage, the writer mentions his son in the first line, then goes on to emphasize his ignorance of certain matters (obv. 16-17, 21). On the fourth line, it is possible to read, "You, the king of E[g]ypt (?) continually write." The following line (obv. 20) again mentions the writer's son in a broken passage that also contains a verb meaning "to interrogate" or "to ask a question." The whole paragraph thus seems to refer to previous messages that involved the writer's son.

24-28 The paragraph opens, "[Concerning w]hat you wrote, 'Your son died . . .,'" before damage to the lower part of the tablet reduces the rest to incoherence.
THE ROAD TO KADESH

Reverse 1-2
(The bottom of a paragraph:) "[.. ..] I held [.. ..]"

3-7
An argumentative passage: "[.. ..] if you, however, [.. ..] my son [X] sent away [.. ..] he held them in sin [.. ..] but because my son [.. ..]" (rev. 4-7).

8-20
In the first lines of this lengthy paragraph, the writer seems to be holding the addressee responsible for an injury, even despite the latter's (implied) denials: "[.. ..] since there was formerly no [bloo]dshed [.. ..] to do [X] is not right. With (or By?) blood(shed) they [.. ..] now even if mine [.. ..] you did [X] and you even killed my son . .. ." (rev. 8-11). Then the writer rebuffs what he appears to take as a veiled threat from the addressee, and he submits his case before the Hittite gods: "[.. ..] troops and] horses you continually extol. Since I will [.. ..] the troops [.. ..] and encampments. For me my lord [.. .. and the sun goddess] of Arinna, my lady, the queen of the lands. It will happen [.. .., my lord], and the sun goddess of Arinna will judge this. [.. ..] you have said much, in heaven [.. ..] as important (or big) as a pitturi
(functionary?) [. . .] because we will make it" (rev. 12-18). The paragraph ends with an obscure metaphorical allusion, the gist of which may be that the addressee is more involved in murderous activities than he cares to admit: "it does [. . .] because a falcon [kills (?) a chick (?) . . .] a falcon alone does not hunt" (rev. 19-20)."

To the addressee's charge that he would only be looking for a fight, the writer replies that his opponent should himself bring his case before the gods: "[Concerning what] you wrote, 'You would come for brawling, for against you brawl [. . .] I take (?) a brawl away [. . .],' let you take (it) away to the Storm-god, my lord [. . .] behind [X], he who is behind [. . .]" (rev. 21-24). The paragraph closes with another apparent challenge: "those who reject [him (?)] for lordship, let them do [. . .], those who went before you [. . .]" (rev. 25-27).

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3'The last two lines are translated as questions, used as proverbs, by L. M. Mascheroni, "Il modulo interrogativo in eteo-III: Usi argomentativi," in Studi orientalistici in ricordo di Franco Pintore, ed. O. Carruba, M. Liverani, and C. Zaccagnini, Studi Mediterranea 4 (Pavia, 1983), p. 134, as follows: "But what does a falcon [do (?)] with a single chick? [. . .] is not a falcon by itself [sufficient for] hunting?" (I am grateful to Richard Beal for calling this reference to my attention.)
In this badly broken paragraph, with its allusions to "brotherhood" between the two parties, the writer apparently rejects the addressee's overtures: "[.. .] in brotherhood you write [.. .] I will make against [.. .] brotherhood I continually write [.. .] our [.. . formelrly (?) were [.. .] between [.. .]."

Of this paragraph, only one word in the first line, "nothing" (or "no way") can be read; the rest is destroyed.

The account of the writer's past triumphs, no less than the situation he goes on to describe, makes it certain that this fragment has been correctly identified as a letter from Shuppiluliumi A to an unidentified ruler in Egypt. What it reveals about the latter is especially valuable in that it reflects on Egyptian policy during this crisis. In KUB XIX 20, the tablet under discussion, Shuppiluliumi is plainly responding to an earlier letter, the contents of which may be inferred as follows:

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Although Hittite, unlike Egyptian, does not distinguish between masculine and feminine in the second person singular pronoun, the references to "brotherhood" (rev. 28-34) show that Shuppiluliumi is addressing an Egyptian king—or at least someone who is in a position to claim equal status—rather than the Egyptian queen, who was formally only "the king's wife": see Appendix 6 below, at n. 78; and cf. the possible reference to the king of Egypt as the addressee in obv. 19.
a) "Your son died" (obv. 24)—a very neutral statement! It is left to Shuppiluliuma to raise the question of murder (rev. 11, "and you even killed my son").

b) "[Troops and] horses you continually extol" (rev. 12): this is probably to be seen as an ironic reference to the Egyptian king's customary statement of his own well-being, before he proceeds to wish well on his correspondent's person, family and possessions. It is not likely to have been the sort of genteel threat which occasionally closes the king of Egypt's letters to his vassals—-at least, this would be unprecedented in all the surviving "royal" letters in the Amarna archive and elsewhere.

c) The king of Egypt disputed the moral force of whatever action Shuppiluliuma might take against him (rev. 21-22, "You would come for brawling . . ."), perhaps justifying himself

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1'Cf. EA 1:6-9; 5:9-12; 31:1-6 (all from Amenhotep III to kings in Babylon and Arzawa); cf. EA 35:1-5 (the king of Alashiya to the king of Egypt). In most other examples of the "royal" letters, the greeting formula is abbreviated, omitting statements regarding the sender's well-being and going on directly to the good wishes expressed for the addressee.

2'E.g., EA 99:21-26: "And you should know that the king is as well as the sun in the sky, (and) the warriors (and) their chariots are very well"; cf. EA 162:78-81.
before a divine tribunal (rev. 16, "you have said much, in heaven . . ."). Since the first of these passages is obviously a response to a previous threat of force, it follows that KUB XIX 20 was at least the second letter sent by Shuppiluliuma to Egypt after Zannanza, his son, had died.

d) Although the pertinent passage (rev. 28-34) is poorly preserved, it appears that the Egyptian king suggested that he and Shuppiluliuma maintain diplomatic relations—thus the references to "brotherhood," which characterizes the condition of two rulers who enjoyed equal status with one another.

All of these transactions between Egypt and Hatti have been greatly abridged in the later account given by the Deeds of Shuppiluliuma, which refers to the first letter from Egypt as follows:

[When] they brought this tablet, they spoke thus: ["The people of Egypt(?)] killed [Zannanza] and brought word: 'Zannanza [died(?)]'" And when] my father he[ard] of the slaying of Zannanza, he began to lament for [Zannanza] [and] to the god[s . . .] he spoke [th]us: "O gods! I did [no evil, [yet] the people of Egypt[d]id [this to

For this, see the royal letters from El Amarna, passim. For an explicit rejection of this status by a Hittite king, writing angrily to an Assyrian, see KUB XXIII 102, in E. Forrer, Reallexikon der Assyriologie I 262-63, with partial translations by Goetze, in CAH3 II.2 258, and by K. A. Kitchen, Pharaoh Triumphant: The Life and Times of Ramesses II, King of Egypt (Warminster, 1982), pp. 63-64.
Yet the tone of the Egyptian letter, insofar as one can reconstruct it from the reply, was far from belligerent. The Pharaoh (most probably Ay) was polite and even conciliatory. Zannanza's death was laid either to natural causes or to some agency for which the Pharaoh disclaimed responsibility--this being implied, perhaps, by Shuppiluliuma's obscure allusion to the hunting of a falcon (rev. 19-20). The attack on Shuppiluliuma's frontiers which the Deeds allege in the passage quoted above probably was the Egyptian attack on Kadesh that had preceded the Hittites' raid on Amki; for there is certainly no justification in any of the sources for assuming that Zannanza's death was immediately followed by an Egyptian attack on Hittite possessions. The Pharaoh, in fact, seems to have disclaimed any threat of force in his letter, and to have appealed for the continuation of that "brotherhood"

33 Fragment 31 of the Deeds (see Güterbock, JCS 10 [1956]:107-8).

Shuppiluliuma died at the end of the six-year Hurrian war, i.e., about one and one-half to two and one-half years following the outbreak of the plague that the Egyptian prisoners of war brought to Hatti: see Philo Houwink ten Cate, "Mursilis' Northwestern Campaigns--A Commentary," Anatolica 1 (1967):58. Since Ay reigned into his fourth year (Urk. IV 2110 bottom), i.e., a minimum of three full years following the death of Tutankhamon (assuming a very short interregnum, if any at all), his death and Shuppiluliuma's should fall within a short time of one another. Since KUB XIX 20 deals with the events with some immediacy, it is hard to escape the conclusion that the addressee was the immediate successor of Tutankhamon, Ay himself, rather than Ay's successor, Horemheb.
THE ROAD TO KADESH

that, up until then, had existed between the kings of Hatti and Egypt. His overtures were rejected by Shuppiluliuma, who in the Deeds is presented as having mistrusted the Egyptians' motives from the very beginning of the affair of the Egyptian queen.\footnote{I see no justification for Spalinger's statement ("The Northern Wars of Seti I: An Integrative Study," JARCE 16 [1979]:39) that "the letter ends by indicating more peaceful relations between the two powers." The passage to which I assume he refers (rev. 28-34) is admittedly ambiguous as it stands, but the context of what precedes, no less than the historical references in the Second Plague Prayer, seems to favor the belligerent attitude I have assumed in my discussion.}

We shall probably never know the exact circumstances of Zannanza's death and the situation in Egypt that had led to it. Shuppiluliuma, we know, received formal notification of his son's death from the Egyptians, but chose to believe instead reports claiming that the Egyptians had killed him. This remained his opinion, and it was enshrined in official records. Even many years later, when Murshili II was to acknowledge (in the face of a plague in Hatti) that the Hittites had previously violated their oath with Egypt by twice invading Amki, he could still say, "when my father gave them one of his sons, they killed him even as they led him there (= to Egypt)."\footnote{ANET\textsuperscript{2}, p. 395. Although reservations are sometimes implied (see Helck, Beziehungen\textsuperscript{1}, p. 182), historians seem to have accepted unanimously the Hittite side of the case, which is that Zannanza was murdered by a faction of Egyptians who opposed his marriage to the queen of Egypt: see most recently Jan Assmann, "Krieg und Frieden im alten Ägypten: Ramses II. und die Schlacht bei Kadesch,"} Yet Ay, as we have seen, had...
denied all wrongdoing in this affair. Although scholars have generally taken this episode as Shuppiluliuma's valuation of it, the official reaction from Egypt—not at all a defiant one—raises doubts. True, Zannanza might have been murdered at the behest of one of Ay's political rivals, perhaps the ubiquitous Horemheb: Ay would then be in the unenviable position of having to exculpate himself while remaining powerless to move against an entrenched adversary. Yet the truth may have been far simpler than this scenario. When Shuppiluliuma "let his anger run away with him" and attacked Egyptian territory, he brought back prisoners who were infected with a plague that would still be rampant in Hatti some twenty years later." Shuppiluliuma and Arnuwanda, his crown prince, both died of it: why not also Zannanza?

The most important casualty of this affair, however, was the peace initiative between Egypt and Hatti. This had been a rare opportunity. The ruling faction in Egypt had been willing to come to terms with the Hittites in Syria. More than that, they had offered to seal the pact, at a most critical juncture, with the union of the Hittite and Egyptian

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Mannheimer Forum 83/84 (1983-84):185-87, 228, who argues that a "war party" in Egypt—the army—was responsible for assassinating Zannanza and for pushing Egypt into a bellicose policy from which it was only extricated by Ramesses II's peace treaty with Hatti.

"Goetze, Kleinasiatische Forschungen 1 (1930): passim; cf. ANET², p. 395.
royal houses—and although the principal of diplomatic marriage was not new, this was the first time that a foreign prince would have been brought in to wed an Egyptian royal lady.‘‘ There could have been a true and lasting peace between Egypt and Hatti, as there had been with Mitanni. Zannanza's death, and Shuppiluliuma's hysterical reaction to it, put an end to that possibility for another three generations.

The ensuing war with Egypt was only one of the many fronts that occupied Shuppiluliuma in his last years. It was surely directed against Egyptian possessions in Syria rather than against the Nile Valley, but we know very little beyond the fact that it occurred. A fragmentary passage in the Deeds mentions that Shuppiluliuma "[sent forth] my (= Murshili II's) brother [Arnuwanda, [and he (Arn.)] went ahead [to] Egypt."‘‘ The reference to "chariots" in a subsequent, regrettably broken passage, suggests that the crown prince's mission was warlike: having engaged the Hurrians at the relief of Murmuriga during the first year of the Hurrian war, he was no stranger to combat, and it seems unlikely that Shuppiluliuma would have entrusted another of

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‘‘Alan R. Schulman, "Diplomatic marriage in the Egyptian New Kingdom," JNES 38 (1979):177-93, devotes a very thorough discussion to the phenomenon as a whole, but has, quite understandably, little to say about this anomalous instance; cf. Rolf Krauss, Das Ende der Amarnazeit, Hildesheimer Ägyptologische Beiträge 7 (Hildesheim, 1978), pp. 79-83.

‘‘Güterbock, JCS 10 (1956):111 (Fragment 36).
his sons--and such an important one--to a diplomatic mission in Egypt so soon after Zannanza's death." But the war with Egypt was not Shuppiluliuma's main concern. Far more important, in the long run, was the integration into the Hittite Empire of all the territories that had formerly belonged to Mitanni. Carchemish had been subdued even as Shuppiluliuma's envoys were meeting with the Egyptian queen in her homeland. Mitanni was conquered later and given to a prince of the old royal house who acknowledged Shuppiluliuma as his suzerain. With Shuppiluliuma's sons now installed as kings in Carchemish and Aleppo, the Hittites were now in a better position than ever before to patrol the unruly marches of northern Syria. The vacuum left by the extinction of the kingdom of Mitanni had at last been filled.

Sometime during this period--certainly after Zannanza's death if not before it--Shuppiluliuma had received for a second time the submission of his fair-weather friend of old, that weathercock of the fortunes of empire, Aziru of Amurru. Consolidation of Hittite power in northern Syria,


"For this period see, in general, Goetze, CAH III.2 19-13, with references.

"Güterbock, JCS 10 (1956):95-96, 120-22; see Appendix 4 below, passim; and Appendix 6, pp. 195-96.

"On the date, see H. Klengel, "Aziru von Amurru und seine Rolle in der Geschichte der Amarnazeit," MIO 10 (1964):80, and H. Freydank, "Eine hethitische Fassung des
as well as Egypt's military ineffectiveness, forced this decision on Aziru. Having come "out of the door of Egypt" as a champion of Egyptian interests in Syria, Aziru now abandoned his military service to the Pharaoh once Egyptian credibility had been weakened in the field. The path of least resistance now led to Hatti, and with this welcome addition of another buffer zone at the southern end of his empire, Shuppiluliuma was disposed to be forgiving. Aziru thus entered into a long and honorable career as a Hittite vassal. Kadesh and Amurru now stood together in allegiance to Hatti, thus blocking any Egyptian revanche into the territories she had formerly claimed as her vassals. Self-interest had led Aziru and Aitakama both to go their separate ways as their overlords' proxies in Syria. Self-interest now led them to join forces, for the Hittites and against Egypt. The tail, in effect, had wagged the dog. This would not be the last time that Kadesh and Amurru changed sides; and their movements would continue to carry with them, as before, the delicate balance of harmony and strife between the Hittite and Egyptian empires.

Vertrages zwischen dem Hethiter-König Šuppiluliuma und Aziru von Amurru," MIO 7 (1959-60):378-79. Amurru is possibly mentioned on Fragment 31 of the Deeds of Shuppiluliuma, immediately before the death of Zannanza became known (see Güterbock, JCS 10 [1956]:107, with nn. a and 5 to the text), but this would be tenuous grounds on which to base the assumption that Aziru had already submitted to Hatti by this time.

See Klengel, Geschichte Syriens II 206 and 240 (nn. 109-10).
The death of Shuppiluliuma and the onset of the plague in Anatolia perhaps blunted hostilities with Egypt, but did not end them altogether. In the seventh year of Murshili II (a close contemporary of Pharaoh Horemheb), when Nuhashshe rebelled against the Hittites, Egyptian troops threatened Kadesh, but were apparently forced to retire. Egypt once again had failed to recover her central Syrian provinces, and her later policy in that area continued to be ineffectual. When Nuhashshe revolted again in Murshili's ninth year, this time with the support of Kadesh, Egypt seems not to have been involved. Evidence for a major Egyptian offensive against the Hittite Empire has been seen, however, in an inscription carved onto the rim of a stone libation vessel which was seen in the shop of a Cairo


52 Goetze, Annalen des Murşiliš, pp. 80-87. This event would have fallen in about the tenth year of Horemheb, if (as argued in n. 40 above) Murshili II and Ay came to the throne at roughly the same time. For the length of Murshili's reign, see Goetze, CAH3 II.2 126-27; though cf. the somewhat lower figure suggested by Houwink ten Cate, Anatolica 1 (1967):56-59.

antiquities dealer in 1973 and has been sighted in Europe since then: to wit, "regnal year 16 under the Majesty of the Lord of the Two Lands, Horunemheb [sic] the ruler; corresponding to his first campaign of victory, starting from Byblos (and) ending at the land of the vile chief of Carchemish . . . ." However, there are strong reasons for doubting the authenticity of this inscription, and the safest course appears to lie in disregarding it. In fact,


5 See J. Yoyotte, "Le général Djéhouty," BSFE 92 (1981):44; cf. J. von Beckerath, "Nochmals die Regierungsduer des Haremhab," SAK 6 (1978):47-48. Some recent articles have tended towards accepting the validity of the inscription's contents while admitting its status as a modern forgery: for instance, D. B. Redford, "A Head-smiting Scene from the 10th Pylon," . . . . Fontes atque Pontes: Eine Festgabe fur Hellmut Brunner, ed. Manfred Görg, Ägypten und Altes Testament 5 (Wiesbaden, 1983), pp. 363-64 (n. 3), 370-71 (n. 22), argues that the spurious inscription on the object at hand was copied from a genuine source; and he cites with approval the suggestion of Schulman, JARCE 15 (1978):46-47, that Horemheb might have fought this campaign as a military officer under Akhenaten or one of his immediate successors, and that the dateline is one of Horemheb's "ambitious distortions," by which events that fell before his accession to the throne were incorporated into his artificially long "reign" that covered the years of the banned Amarna Pharaohs. None of this, I am afraid, is very convincing. The genuineness of the text of the "Horemheb bowl" remains as obscure as its alleged source; and while I have no wish to enter into the complex question of the treatment of the Amarna Pharaohs by their late Eighteenth and early Nineteenth Dynasty successors here, I should point out that the locus classicus for the inflated year-numbers of Horemheb is the dateline "regnal year 59" in a text in a Ramesside tomb chapel (see G. A. Gaballa, The Memphite Tomb-Chapel of Mose [Warminster, 1977], passim), and that there is no evidence that such a practice was in vogue at any time before the Nineteenth Dynasty.
there is almost no evidence for contact of any sort between the two superpowers in Egyptian records contemporary with Horemheb and Ramesses I, and the silence of the Hittite sources after Murshili's seventh year leaves us no reason to believe that active hostilities continued beyond this point. Perhaps they did: but if so, the outcome was not to Egypt's advantage, since she conspicuously had failed to reconquer Kadesh and Amurru by the start of Sety I's reign.

The very silence that hangs over Egypt's dealings with Hatti, however, could lend itself to still another interpretation: resumption of diplomatic relations. For resumed they surely were, and ratified by treaty. This was not the first nor the last time that the two empires would come to terms in this way; but to consider the relations that prevailed between Egypt and Hatti at the start of Sety I's reign is to open the tangled question of the dating and the number of agreements that preceded the enduring treaty made under Ramesses II. This question will be discussed briefly in the following section.

**EARLY TREATIES BETWEEN EGYPT AND HATTI**

The earliest reference to any formal treaty between Egypt and Hatti is found in the posthumous account of Shuppiluliuma's Deeds, where it is described how, toward the close of his wedding negotiations with the Egyptian
queen, Shuppiluliuma

asked for the tablet of the treaty again, (in
which there was told) how formerly the Storm God
took the people of Kurushtama, sons of Hatti, and
carried them to Egypt and made them Egyptians; and
how the Storm God concluded a treaty between the
countries of Egypt and Hatti, and how they were
continuously friendly with each other. And when
they had read aloud the tablet before them, my
father then addressed them thus: "Of old,
Hattusha and Egypt were friendly with each other,
and now this, too, on our behalf, has taken place
between t[hem]! Thus Hatti and Egypt will
continuously be friendly with each other!"56

It is this same agreement which is alluded to in the second
of Murshili II's Plague Prayers, which recalls

when the Hattian Storm-god had brought people of
Kurushtama to the country of Egypt and had made an
agreement concerning them with the Hattians so
that they were under oath to the Hattian Storm-god--
although the Hattians as well as the Egyptians
were under oath to the Hattian Storm-god,
the Hattians ignored their obligations; the Hattians
promptly broke the oath of the gods. My father
[= Shuppiluliuma] sent foot soldiers and charioteers
who attacked the country of Amka, Egyptian territory.
Again he sent troops, and again they attacked it.
When the Egyptians became frightened, they asked
outright for one of his sons . . . .

Scholars are divided on the date of the original Kurushtama
Treaty: it could have been made as recently as the early
years of Shuppiluliuma himself, or as far back as the
Hittite Middle Kingdom.58 What is important here is that,

56Adapted from Güterbock, JCS 10 (1956):98.
57Adapted from ANET², p. 395.
58For an earlier dating see Helck, Beziehungen², pp.
166-67, and Goetze, CAH³ II.2 9. Houwink ten Cate, B1Or 20
(1963):274-75, cautiously suggests a date prior to the
accession of Shuppiluliuma; while a date early in
Shuppiluliuma's reign is implied by Schulman, JARCE 3
(1964):69, n. 125, and argued by Waterhouse, "Syria in the
EGYPT AND HATTI DOWN TO SETY I'S REIGN

from Shuppiluliuma's point of view,\textsuperscript{59} the treaty was still in force when he had it read to the Egyptian envoys--for why else would it be relevant at that time? According to a later interpretation,\textsuperscript{60} it had already been broken as of the first Hittite invasion of Amki, but this is clearly not the spirit in which this document was presented during the wedding negotiations. No doubt there were formal instruments that ratified the engagement of Zannanza to the queen of Egypt, but there is no reason to believe that these superseded the earlier treaty.\textsuperscript{61} This distinction is important, especially when it comes to interpreting the only other evidence we have for treaties between Egypt and Hatti prior to the time of Ramesses II--namely, a passage in the

\textsuperscript{59}Faithfully reflected in the Deeds: see Gütterbock in Rёvё hittite et asianique 66 (1960):58.

\textsuperscript{60}Evolved from the position stated in the Deeds: see ibid., pp. 61-62.

\textsuperscript{61}Spalinger, BES 1 (1979):76, has suggested that a fresh treaty may have been made at this time, a proposition which he bases on Fragments 29-30 of the Deeds (Gütterbock, JCS 10 [1956]:107). This seems doubtful, if only because these broken passages, by themselves, fall short of proving the case. The second of these fragments, moreover, is now recognized as a duplicate of KBo VII 37, which comes from a separate and apparently earlier treaty--perhaps the Kurushtama Treaty itself: see C. Kuhne, "Bemerkungen zu kürzlich edierten hethitischen Texten," Zeitschrift für Assyriologie 62 (1972):252-54 (No. 28). I am indebted for this information and the supporting reference to Professor Gütterbock.
Egyptian hieroglyphic version of the treaty between Ramesses II and Hattushili III:

As to the treaty (nt-c mty, "agreed arrangement")
which had been present (wnw dl)

6Actually, the Hittite version, originally in Akkadian, brought to Egypt and then translated into Egyptian: see Spalinger, SAK 9 (1981): 299-300, who also maintains that the Akkadian version of the treaty was translated into that language in the Egyptian capital from an Egyptian original (ibid., especially pp. 355-56).

6The sense of nt-c as being along the lines of "arrangement," "prescription," "ordinance" was recognized by Gardiner in the pioneering discussion of the Egyptian and Akkadian versions of the text: see S. Langdon and A. H. Gardiner, "The Treaty of Alliance between Hattušili, King of the Hittites, and the Pharaoh Ramesses II of Egypt," JEA 6 (1920): 186, n. 3; nt-c mty is rendered as "regular treaty," mty being translated as "regular," "normal," almost "traditional" (ibid., p. 189, n. 4). This understanding has been accepted in standard translations, e.g., John A. Wilson's in ANET², pp. 199, ("regulation" [= nt-c]), 200, ("traditional regulation" [= nt-c mty]) and in studies of the text: see J. D. Schmidt, Ramesses II: A Chronological Structure for His Reign (Baltimore, 1973), pp. 124-25 (nt-c, "terms"); Alan R. Schulman, "Aspects of Ramesside Diplomacy: The Treaty of Year 21," JSSEA 8 (1977-78): 113, 123 (n. 17)—who renders nt-c mty as "former treaty," however, thus following Breasted's older understanding (Ancient Records of Egypt III 168, n. 6) over Gardiner's; and see most recently Spalinger, SAK 9 (1981): 302, 307, 310-11, 312, "customary agreement" (= nt-c), and p. 321, "regular customary agreement" (= nt-c mty). In all of these translations, mty is regarded as having the sense of "regular" or "customary" (cf. Spalinger, ibid., p. 323, "customary šhr [= šhr mty]"), following the understanding of Wb. II 173:13 and R. O. Faulkner, A Concise Dictionary of Middle Egyptian (Oxford, 1962), p. 120, s.v. mty ("regular," "customary," "usual"). If, as Spalinger maintains, the Akkadian version of the treaty goes back to an Egyptian original (see above, n. 62), the precise meaning of the Egyptian terms is of some significance. The Akkadian text uses three equivalent terms: rikiltu, meaning "treaty" (see Wolfram von Soden, Akkadisches Handwörterbuch II [Wiesbaden, 1972], p. 984, s.v. rikis/tiu, rikiltu); šemu, which is the equivalent of the Egyptian šhr, "plan" (Spalinger, SAK 9 [1981]: 308); and parsu, meaning "ordinance" (see von Soden, Akkadisches Handwörterbuch II, pp. 385-86, s.v. parsu(m); pace
in the time of Shuppiluliuma, the Great Prince of Hatti, as well as the treaty which had existed (\textit{wnw}) in the time of Muwatalli, the Great Prince

Spalinger, \textit{SAK} 9 [1981]:312, 322, this term should not itself be translated "customary agreement," as Spalinger himself recognizes on p. 322, bottom). Since there is no exact equivalent to the Egyptian passages containing \textit{nt-\text{-\text{c}}} \textit{mty} and \textit{s\text{hr} mty} in the Akkadian text of the treaty, the meaning of \textit{mty} is not necessarily elucidated by any of the other parallel passages: thus, lines 8-9 of the Egyptian text employ \textit{nt-\text{-\text{c}}}, while the equivalent lines 11-13 of the Akkadian use \textit{\text{\text{-\text{c}}} te\text{mu}}; line 9 of the Egyptian has \textit{nt-\text{-\text{c}}}, paralleled by lines 14-16 of the Akkadian, which have \textit{rikiltu}. These differing equivalences for \textit{nt-\text{-\text{c}}} indicate that it is being interpreted, now literally as "arrangement" (= \textit{\text{\text{-\text{c}}} te\text{mu}}; or \textit{par\text{\text{-\text{c}}}unu}), now more freely as "treaty" (\textit{rikiltu}). As for \textit{mty}, it is conceivable that (despite the spellings used here) it is to be understood as \textit{\text{\text{-\text{c}}} mtr}, yielding a sense such as "the witnessed agreement" or the like. But possibilities are not proof. One cannot, in a footnote, deal with the confusion of \textit{\text{\text{-\text{c}}} mtr} and \textit{mty} (which is reflected in the entry at \textit{Wb.} II 173); suffice for the present that there is no reason to believe the spellings in the Hittite-Egyptian treaty reflect such a confusion. The root of \textit{mty} is generally regarded as being "accurate, exact, right" (see \textit{Wb.} II 173, and also Faulkner, \textit{Concise Dictionary}, p. 120); but the standard dictionaries also allow subsidiary meanings, which suggests that the basic sense still eludes us. Jürgen Osing, in \textit{Die Nominalbildung des Agyptischen} (Mainz, 1976), pp. 643-46, has pointed out a number of cases in Middle Egyptian where the sense appears to be "recognized," i.e., "understood" or "agreed upon." Eugene Cruz-Uribe has recently presented the demotic evidence, along with a discussion of the earlier pertinent material ("Saite and Persian Cattle Documents and Their Use in the Legal System of Ancient Egypt" [Ph.D. diss., University of Chicago, 1983], pp. 75-89), pointing out a passage in I. E. S. Edwards, \textit{Oracular and Amuletic Decrees of the Late New Kingdom}, Hieratic Papyri in the British Museum, Fourth Series (London, 1960), pp. 48-49, 78, that supports the general sense of volition or agreement that emerges from the demotic legal texts. In the Hittite treaty itself, \textit{mty} is not likely to be "traditional"--for even though this sense could fit the two \textit{nt-\text{-\text{c}}} \textit{mty} of the past (\textit{KRI} II 228:1-2), it does not apply to the \textit{s\text{hr} mty}, which is the present treaty (ibid., p. 228:3). Nor, I believe, do the examples cited for the cases where \textit{mty} does mean "usual, customary" carry much weight here, since these apply to things or conditions which occur with some regularity, not to a particular instance such as this \textit{s\text{hr} mty}. Provisionally, I would suggest that (\textit{nt-\text{-\text{c}}/s\text{hr}}) \textit{mty}
of Hatti, my father," I seize hold of it. Behold, Ramessu-Meryamun, the great ruler of Egypt, seizes hold [of it, the peace which he makes (?)] together with us from this day. We seize hold of it, and we act in this agreed fashion (m p3y šhr mty). 13

Notably, only two previous treaties are referred to as the forerunners of the present instrument. 14 What must be emphasized, however, is that neither of these previous treaties is said to have been enacted by the king to whose name they are attached. A literal reading of the text tells us only that they had been in force during the time of those rulers; and this, in turn, could imply that the treaties had been in force up until the time of Shuppiluliuma and

means something like "(ordinance, plan) which is understood, by common consent, and is right," or simply "agreed arrangement."

13F. J. Giles, Ikhnaten, Legend and History (London, 1970), p. 195, suggests that "Muwatalli" should be emended here to "Murshili," who was the father of Hattushili III: While the author of this second treaty may very well have been Murshili II (see below), I believe we should accept the text as it stands, either because the Egyptian scribe would have been more likely to confuse the relationship (substituting sn for it), or because it would be used here in the sense of "ancestor": see for now Wb. I 141:16, and cf. William J. Murnane, Ancient Egyptian Coregencies, SAOC 40 (1977), pp. 232-33. The whole question of the use of "father" with relation to past generations is now being studied for publication by Lanny Bell.

14KRI II 228:1-3.

15E.g., Spalinger, BES 1 (1979):87-89; cf. idem, SAK 9 (1981):321, 358, n. 93; Schulman, JSSEA 8 (1977-78):117-18. R. O. Faulkner, in "The Wars of Sethos I," JEA 33 (1947):38, and again in CAH3 II.2 221, basing himself on this passage, maintained that Muwatalli concluded this treaty with Sety I; and the text is generally regarded as saying that Muwatalli was one of the contracting parties.
Muwatalli, respectively. In other words, the first treaty mentioned here could very well be the Kurushtama Treaty: there is, at least, no good reason to assume that it was omitted from this tally of past treaties between Egypt and Hatti. This, in turn, would be consistent with the tenor of the diplomatic exchanges between Shuppiluliuma and Tutankhamon's successors. Shuppiluliuma, unlike his son Murshili, did not regard his invasions of Amki as a proper cause for the rupture of the old Kurushtama Treaty. The formal reading of its provisions before the Egyptian envoys implies, rather, that they were regarded as still being in effect: the wedding, as Shuppiluliuma explains, was something in addition to, not superseding, the previous agreement between Egypt and Hatti. Only after Zannanza's death, when Shuppiluliuma "let his anger run away with him," did he break with Egypt. Such a break can be plausibly inferred from the very tone of KUB XIX 20, not to mention at least one of its preserved passages--where Shuppiluliuma says that the matter is to be judged before the gods (rev. 13-15). There seems scarcely any reason to doubt that the death of the Hittite prince, and not the clash between Egyptian and Hittite spheres of influence, was immediately

67 As assumed, for example, by Spalinger (references in n. 66 above).

68 Both the explicit terms of this letter and the context of events presumed for it fit the conditions for a rupture of diplomatic relations as outlined by Schulman, *JSSEA* 8 (1977-78):123-24 (n. 21).
responsible for the rupture of the first treaty between their countries.

The second treaty, "which had existed in the time of Muwatalli," is a shadowy affair. In an earlier passage of Ramesses II's treaty with the Hittites (before the reference to the two previous treaties), it is said that

now from the beginning of the limits of eternity, as for the situation of the great ruler of Egypt with the Great Prince of Hatti, the god did not permit hostility to occur between them by means of an arrangement (nt-ך). But in the time of Muwatalli, the Great Prince of Hatti, my brother, he fought with [], the great ruler of Egypt. But hereafter, from this day, behold, Hattushili, the Great Prince of Hatti, [is under] an arrangement . . . in order not to permit hostility to occur between them forever."

It is a pity that the name of the Pharaoh with whom Muwatalli fought has been broken away, since it is not clear whether the Hittite king is alluding to his well-known encounter with Ramesses II or to some earlier struggle."

Whether he is telescoping the past or not, though, the clear implication is that the present treaty takes the place of that earlier "arrangement" that had been broken when Muwatalli went to war with Egypt. By default, this must be the second treaty, said to have been "in the time of Muwatalli." The sense of the text does not exclude, nor does it prove, that this treaty was made by Muwatalli, as

69KRI II 227:2-4.

70S. Langdon and Gardiner, in JEA 6 (1920):187, and Wilson, in ANET2, p. 199, restore Ramesses II's nomen in the lacuna; but could the royal name have been Sety's?
has been said above; but the fact that, in the earlier passage, an "arrangement" is said to have been broken under Muwatalli and (by implication) not mended until the reign of Hattushili III gives a greater credibility to the interpretation I have proposed, i.e., that these treaties are spoken of as having been in force last in the time of Shuppiluliuma and Muwatalli, respectively.

If Muwatalli himself made (as well as broke) the second treaty, this must have happened early in his reign, since it will be clear from what follows that it cannot have been in effect between the later reign of Sety I and the Battle of Kadesh in the fifth year of Ramesses II.\(^1\) There is, however, no serious reason why it could not have been contracted earlier, e.g., by Murshili II and Horemheb.\(^2\)

True, the lack of evidence for hostilities between the two empires for most of this period should not be misused;\(^3\) but it is not altogether true that we have no evidence that bears on the question. The Second Plague Prayer of Murshili II, composed twenty years after the outbreak of the epidemic that spread to Hatti as a result of the war between Egypt and Hatti, was first discovered during the recent excavations at Hazorsah, where it is associated with a coin of Shuppiluliuma II.\(^4\)

\(^1\)See chap. 3.

\(^2\)This is suggested by Wilson in ANET, p. 199, n. 6, but disputed by Spalinger, BES 1 (1979):89, n. 99; cf. my discussion below.

\(^3\)Spalinger, BES 1 (1979):83-86.
and Hatti, contains an acknowledgement of the Hittites' guilt towards Egypt. These prayers, to be sure, are penitential, not diplomatic or historical, instruments. There is no guarantee that the attitudes they express had an important effect on Hatti's foreign relations. Nevertheless, these very attitudes surely did not exist in a vacuum. Murshili's determination of his father's guilt came only at the end of a long process, as is observed in the other prayers. The gods to whom the sin was acknowledged were the same gods who acted as guarantors to Hittite treaties. Such treaties, moreover, were regarded as being oaths to the gods as well as between the contracting parties; and divine "judgements" on such matters were believed to take place within the course of human history. Thus, Murshili's determination of Hittite war guilt would have removed, at least, an emotional barrier to peace, even if it did not lead automatically to a new treaty with Egypt.

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7See the discussions of Philo Houwink ten Cate, "Hittite Royal Prayers," Numen 16 (1969):81-98; and E. Laroche, "La prière hittite," Ecole pratique des hautes études, Annuaire 72 (1964):3-65. Cf. John Van Seters, In Search of History (New Haven and London, 1983), p. 123 with n. 96. On the judgement of the gods, see above, KUB XIX, 20 (rev. 12-18); and on the practical results of such judgements, an example cited is the dethronement and death of Tushratta of Mitanni, which was viewed as the settlement of his "case" with the rival king of Hurri-land (see Goetze, in CAHII.2 14, for discussion and references).
All this falls short of proving that peace with Egypt was part of Murshili's prescribed "penance" for his father's sin. The change of mind that came with the admission of sin, however, and Murshili's tacit rejection of the bellicose attitudes present in earlier compositions such as the Deeds of Shuppiluliuma could only have made easier any rapprochement between the superpowers. The fact remains that the second treaty, which Hattushili III says had existed in the time of Muwatalli, can be ascribed only to Muwatalli himself or to his immediate predecessor, Murshili II. These very limits suggest that we are dealing with an event that followed the crisis over the plague in Hatti, which took place in the middle third of Murshili II's reign. At the very least, there is no good reason why Murshili could not have come to terms with Horemheb at some point near the end of their concurrent reigns. Even if the peace was made by Muwatalli, with Ramesses I or even with a very young Sety I, it is very likely that it was already in force in the early years of the Nineteenth Dynasty. This is a probability that we must keep in mind when we examine the foreign policy of Sety I in Asia.
CHAPTER II
SETY I'S EARLY WARS IN WESTERN ASIA

With the accession of Sety I, the darkness that surrounds Egypt's foreign relations during the reign of Horemheb suddenly lifts. An imposing series of reliefs, carved on the exterior walls at the northern end of the Great Hypostyle Hall at Karnak, provides a framework for the other monuments that commemorate the king's foreign victories. It has long been recognized that the Karnak reliefs are our most important source for the wars of Sety I.¹ Disagreements still persist, however, on the sequence of individual campaigns and on the scope of Egyptian strategy. The


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reexamination of the evidence that accompanied the
Epigraphic Survey's recopying of these well-known scenes
is thus timely: the discovery of new data and rethinking
of old led us in many cases to a new assessment of the
historical problems that bear on Egyptian policy in
western Asia at the start of the Nineteenth Dynasty.

Much of what follows may be viewed as a commentary to the
new publication of the battle reliefs. For the reader's
orientation, the war scenes fall into two groups, lying east
and west of the central doorway into the Great Hypostyle
Hall. In the eastern group we find the campaign against the
Shasu, dated to Sety's first regnal year (bottom register,
pls. 2-8); the Yenoam campaign (second register, pls.
9-14); and a further campaign in the third register that,
for all practical purposes, is destroyed (see pl. 14, top,
for the few fragments that remain). This eastern group will
be discussed in this chapter, leaving the scenes to the west
of the doorway for chapter 3: these are the campaigns
against Kadesh and Amurru (third register, pls. 22-26) and
the Hittite campaign (bottom register, pls. 33-36). The
register of Libyan war reliefs that intervenes between the

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²Plate references throughout are to Chicago, Reliefs IV.
³Both the datelines (referring to Sety's first regnal
year) and the general usage in narrative sequences carved on
the walls of of Egyptian monuments suggest that this is the
first register of battle reliefs to be read: see G. A.
Gaballa, Narrative in Egyptian Art (Mainz, 1976), pp. 103-4.
two groups of Asiatic war scenes on the western side (middle register, pls. 27-32) will be discussed separately in Appendix 3.

**THE SHASU WAR**

Sometime in Sety's first regnal year, a messenger "came to tell His Majesty: 'The Shasu enemies are plotting rebellion! Their tribal leaders are gathered in one place, standing on the foothills of Khor, and they are engaged in turmoil and uproar. Each one of them is killing his fellow. They do not consider the laws of the palace'" (pl. 6:3-9). Both the circumstances and the placement of these troubles are worth noting. "Khor," to be sure, is an unsatisfyingly general term for Palestine and Syria: beginning at the Egyptian border, Khor can extend as far north as the country of Upe, near Damascus. But the pictorial record of the reliefs is more specific. One battle, at least, took place along the military road from Egypt to Palestine, between the border fortress of Tcharu (pl. 6) and a city that has been plausibly identified as Raphia (pl. 4:21). The war is further defined, moreover, as "the devas[tation] which the energetic forearm of Pharaoh . . . made against the Shasu enemies, from the fortress of Tcharu to the Canaan" (pl. 3:1-5). That Canaan was in fact the northern limit of these

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operations is proved, finally, in a second battle scene, said to be located at "a town (or the town?) of Canaan" (pl. 3:14)—perhaps Gaza. These specifications all point to a little war, fought along the "Ways of Horus" and into southern Palestine.

The political environment of the war is also intriguing, for the violence of the wretched Shasu was directed, not against the Egyptians, but one another (pl. 6:7-8): despite the presence of tribal leaders "gathered in one place," the prevalence of "turmoil and uproar" suggests a state of internecine feuding which the Shasu chiefs were powerless to control. These troubles seem also to have affected communications between Egypt and Palestine, since it is noted that "(as for) the hills of the rebels, they could not be passed on account of the Shasu enemies who were attacking [him]," i.e., the king (pl. 5:11-14).

'Thus ibid., p. 100. The idea that the city represents Gaza was suggested by Faulkner, *JEA* 33 (1947):35-36; followed by Helck, *Beziehungen*, p. 196 (although wrongly translating our pl. 3:4-5 as "von der Festung Sile bis zur Stadt [sic] P3-Knψn"); also by Giveon, *Bédouins Shosou*, p. 57 (2), although he argues (ibid., pp. 58-59) that the topography of the city as shown in the Egyptian relief is at variance with the true environs of Gaza. Cf. Spalinger, *JARCE* 16 (1979):44, n. 9.


'The foothills which the Shasu had rendered impassable (see pl. 5:11-14 and below) would be those bordering the road between Egypt and Palestine, lying south of this road.
SETY I'S EARLY WARS

difficulties with Shasu marauders in southern Palestine are implied by Pap. Anastasi I. To the Egyptians, they probably seemed irritating rather than formidable; but the disruption of the overland route, with its attendant threat to commercial and military operations, would itself invite Egypt to restore order.

A situation of this sort might also explain the curious interpolation of settled Asiatic chieftains--not Shasu--who pay homage to a triumphant Sety I as he stands on his chariot (pl. 4). These chieftains would seem to be defeated enemies, for in the text above the scene, the king is said to have caused "the chieftains of Khor to cease all the boasting of their mouths" (pl. 4:8-9). A tribute of ornamental vases, moreover, appears in this scene, surely the same booty that is to be presented to Amon at the end of

as far as Raphia and following the coastal plain northeast into Palestine. See, for the time being, Itzaq Beit-Arieh, "Fifteen Years in Sinai," Biblical Archaeology Review 10, no. 4 (July-August 1984):52.

9For the relevant passages, see the convenient collection in Giveon, Bé douins Shosou, pp. 125-30. Later conflicts under Ramesses II are also attested (ibid., pp. 65-70 and 98-115). Such information as we have regarding the Shasu's living arrangements suggests that they were a nomadic, pastoral people (ibid. pp. 224-25, 236-37, 240-41), living in uneasy balance with the settled Asiatics of the coastal plains--not an unusual situation in the Near East: cf., for example, G. Buccellati, The Amorites of the Ur III Period (Naples, 1966), especially pp. 336-39, 355-60; and also the Habiru, or SA.GAZ, people, who infested Syria in the New Kingdom (Moshe Greenberg, The Ḥab/piru [New Haven, 1955], passim).

10See the comments of Spalinger, JARCE 16 (1979):30-31.
the campaign (pl. 8). The rhetorical text of that scene (pl. 8) speaks of the king as returning from "the foreign land of Retchenu the vile, the chiefs of foreign countries being living captives, their tribute on their backs, consisting of every precious vase of their countries, (and of) silver, gold and genu[ine] lapis lazuli" (pl. 8:2-6). Had the princes of the towns in Palestine encouraged the Shasu in their marauding? This seems doubtful, if only because of the normal record of bad relations that existed between settled communities and their seminomadic neighbors in this part of the Middle East. The wording of the tribute list, rather, reflects standard phraseology, and not current events. Moreover, while the original version of the prisoners (pl. 8) showed both settled Asiatics and Shasu, the former were all recarved into Shasu for the final version of the scene. In other words, the truth which this sequence of reliefs was finally made to convey is that the Shasu, and the Shasu alone, were Egypt's enemies on this occasion—the prisoners being described only as "[the booty which His Majesty brought away, consisting of Shasu whom His

References to precious vases (hnww) abound in tribute lists of the Eighteenth Dynasty (e.g., Urk. IV 665:14, 666:4, 667:7, 668:14, 707:2, 722:4, 733:6); and at least two passages in rhetorical texts that are similar to this one provide tolerably close antecedents to its phrasing (ibid., pp. 759:17, 1685:8-10). The list of precious minerals in our text is also common in these inscriptions, as is the reference to "Rretchenu the vile."

See Chicago, Reliefs IV, p. 25, regarding this revision of the scene.
Majesty] himself [destroyed] in regnal year one of the Repeater of Births," i.e., Sety I himself (pl. 8:21). The alleged boastfulness of the chieftains of Khor (pl. 4), being couched in the customary language of Egyptian triumphalism, need not reflect any real hostility between them and Egypt. Given the nature of the trouble that the Shasu caused on this occasion, might not the tribute of the Asiatic chiefs be regarded as some kind of payment—a baksheesh—presented to the king once he had restored peace to the area?\(^1\)

**WAR(S) IN PALESTINE AND SYRIA**

The Palestinian campaign in the second register was no doubt described in rhetorical terms that are similar to those used for the war against the Shasu. The loss of the upper part of the second register has deprived us of this information, but a victory stela from the town of Beth Shan survives to illuminate one phase of the campaign:\(^1\)^\(^5\)

Regnal year one, third month of the third season (= \(III \text{ Šmw}\)), day 10. . . . On this day, one came to tell His Majesty, "The vile foe that is in the town of Hammath has gathered unto himself many people and has seized the town of Beth Shan and, having joined (?)\(^1\)^\(^6\) those of Pella (Phr), does not

\(^1\)^\(^{Ibid.}, p. 26, n. e.\)

\(^1\)^\(^{Cf. the comments of Spalinger, JARCE 16 (1979):36, who agrees that the products ostensibly brought back from the Shasu war would be incongruous as the tribute of these people.\)

\(^1\)^\(^{KRI I 11-15, 12:7-14.\)

\(^1\)^\(^{Assuming that a suffix was dropped following sm3. On \(hr sdm.f\) see J. Černý and S. I. Groll, A Late Egyptian
THE ROAD TO KADESH

allow the prince of Rehob to go out." Then His Majesty sent the first army of Amon, (called) "Powerful of Bows," against the town of Hammath; the first army of Pre, (called) "Abounding in Valor," against the town of Beth Shan; and the first army of Seth, (called) "Mighty of Bows," against the town of Yenoam. After the duration of a day had passed, they were felled through the power of His Majesty.

Two episodes in this war are treated in the Karnak reliefs: the attack on Yenoam (pl. 11), described on the stela, and the submission of the chiefs of the Lebanon, who obediently hew wood in the presence of the king (pl. 10). The relationship of these tableaux is implied in the portrayal of "the town of Qader in the land of Henem" (pl. 10:30, lower right corner), which is set at the far end of the scene, away from the tree-felling that dominates the relief, but adjoining the attack on Yenoam. The doorposts of this town have been knocked askew, while those of the unnamed Lebanese town on the upper left (pl. 10:31) have not. Qader is thus ranged more closely with the fighting in Palestine than with the seemingly peaceful activities in the Lebanon.17 The submission of the Lebanese chiefs, moreover,

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17 Helck, Beziehungen, pp. 192-93, locates Qader south of the Yarmuk River, east of Yenoam; cf. J. Simons, The Geographical and Topographical Texts of the Old Testament (Leiden, 1959), p. 558 (references s.v. Gedor). The Lebanese context of pl. 10 need not rule out this placement: if the contrasts noted in the discussion of this scene are significant, Qader might well be ranged with those Palestinian towns that Sety had chastised before his progress into the Lebanon. Also favoring Helck's proposal is that Tell es-Shihab, where another of Sety's victory
appears to be the rhetorical culmination of the war; and, if only by their silence, the reliefs imply that Sety went no further at this time.\textsuperscript{18}

The later course of Sety's military strategy following the Yenoam campaign was no doubt described in the third register. Unfortunately, this section is almost completely gone (see pl. 14, top), and none of the war scenes survive. As early as his eighth regnal year, Sety fought a Nubian war that is memorialized on stelae from Sai and Amarah West: it is possible but not very likely that this war was the one shown in the third register at Karnak.\textsuperscript{19} It seems more probable that the war described here supplied a logical bridge between the two wars shown in the registers below and those on the west wing.\textsuperscript{20} A reference to this conflict is perhaps found in the "second" Beth Shan stela, which tells of a disturbance by the "Apiru of Yarmuth," quelled when Sety detailed a number of men to turn back into the hill country of Djahy; and in the space of two days they returned

\textsuperscript{18}A possible memorial of this campaign is Sety's stela from Tyre (see KRI I 117). Unfortunately, neither the date nor anything beyond the opening rhetorical flourishes is preserved.

\textsuperscript{19}See Appendix 3 below.

with their prisoners. Although this skirmish may have occurred on the fringes of a larger war, neither the date nor the circumstances can be defined with certainty.

If the scenes themselves fail to shed light on the further scope of these wars, valuable evidence can still be derived from the lists of name-rings in the great triumphal scenes to the east and west of the central doorway through the northern wall (pls. 15, 17). Not all of these toponyms reflect the course of Sety's campaigning: all the African names, for instance, were copied from earlier lists of Thutmose III. By contrast, the two lists of Asiatic toponyms are stereotyped neither in content nor in sequence. Leaving aside for the moment the "first northern list," with its predominantly central Syrian environment, we find significant points of contact between the eastern battle reliefs and the "final northern list" (pls. 15:54*-70* = 17:49*-65*). Some of the names on this list are already attested in connection with the Yenoam campaign, while

21KRI I 15-16; this idea was also mooted by Spalinger, JARCE 16 (1979):32.

22Previous studies of this list are: Simons, Handbook, pp. 140, 143 (= Lists XIII and XIV); M. Noth, "Die Wege der Pharaonenheere in Palästina und Syrien," ZDPV 60 (1937):210-29; Helck, Beziehungen, pp. 192-93; Aharoni, Land of the Bible, pp. 166-68; and Spalinger, JARCE 16 (1979):37-39 (cf. KRI I 29, 32). All these treatments are handicapped, to some extent, by identifications based on apparent mistakes in earlier readings and by the erroneous conviction that these Asiatic names were originally part of the great triumph scenes and were suppressed by the palimpsest African names. For the African toponyms as a whole, see Chicago, Reliefs IV, p. 55, n. a.
others (e.g., Kumedi, Uzu and Beth Anath) occur for the first time in lists of this sort. Since all of these names were deliberately added to the triumph scenes, it is all the more likely that we are dealing, not with a stereotyped mélange of toponyms drawn from earlier sources, but with a conscious effort to depict a historical reality within the framework of a conventionalized genre.

The historicity of the final northern list permits us to reconstruct the extent of Sety's early wars in Asia, if not their chronology or precise line of march. The southern limit of the fighting is defined by Raphia, at the eastern end of the military road from Egypt (pls. 15:70* = 17:65*). First named on the list, however, are toponyms already found in the battle reliefs and the first Beth Shan stela: Pella, Hammath, Beth Shan, Yenoam (pls. 15:54*-57* = 17:49*-52*) and Qader (pl. 15:67* = 17:62*).

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23 See the discussion on the recutting of these name-rings on pls. 15 and 17 in Chicago, Reliefs IV, pp. 49-50 and 59.

24 The precise relationship of the names in the lists is in dispute. Noth, ZDPV 60 (1937):228-29, maintains that the sequence in which the toponyms occur reflects their position in the day-books of the campaign, and thus Sety's line of march. As modified by Helck, Beziehungen, p. 193 (who sees a grouping of more-or-less contiguous places, not an exact itinerary), this would be a reasonable explanation; but it is by no means certain that all these locations figured in a single campaign (see Spalinger, JARCE 16 [1979]:38).

25 For Qader, see n. 17 above. Its context in the lists is not clear, for the surrounding toponyms cannot be identified with any certainty. Earlier attempts to identify these places--Tu[---]mu, Kermem, and Kertas (pls. 15:65*, 66*, 68* = 17:60*, 61*, 63*) are invalidated by defective readings.
extends north, to the southern edges of the Lebanon: Acco, Uzu and Tyre on the coast (pls. 15:59*, 62*, 63* = 17:54*, 57*, 58*), and Hazor and Beth Anath inland (pls. 15:64*, 69* = 17:59*, 64*). Interpolated between Acco and Tyre are two localities that lie still further north: Kumedi,\(^2\) east of the Litani River and northwest of Damascus; and Ullaza, on the coast at Nahr el-Barid, south of Sumur (pls. 15:60*, 61* = 17:55*, 56*). Since these places lie beyond the furthest known extent of the Yenoam campaign, their presence in this list suggests that they were encountered during the war that would have been represented in the third register of the east wing at Karnak (see n. 20 above). Certainly their position (threatening Kadesh and Amurru, respectively), along with the later course of events in central Syria, is consistent with the assumption that Sety had already mounted operations in these areas before he went on to attack Kadesh and Amurru themselves.\(^3\)

\(^2\)Despite the skepticism of Helck, Beziehungen\(^2\), p. 192, bottom, I see no objection to identifying Kmd with Kumedi (thus also Simons, Handbook, p. 215, and Gauthier, Dict. géog. V 155-56). The variant spelling Kmt, which Helck prefers (Beziehungen\(^2\), pp. 130, 550, 560), is attested only in the early lists of Thutmose III, while several later lists have Kmd (Simons, Handbook, pp. 215, 217).

\(^3\)Assuming that Sety actually campaigned in these areas, and did not merely encounter forces from these localities in the field: Spalinger, *BES* 1 (1979):72, top, and n. 54, makes a similar point regarding the list of countries met by Ramesses II at Kadesh.
THE EarLIEST WARS IN THE NINETEENTH DYNASTY

We may now turn to the vexed question of how the campaigns illustrated in these two registers relate to one another. They could be viewed as separate, unrelated wars, but the scholars who have maintained this point of view so far have been defending a minority position; most commentators tend to see the campaign described in the first Beth Shan stela as part of a larger Palestinian war that directly followed Sety's mopping up of the Shasu.²⁸ Some support for this interpretation can be derived from the datelines that accompany the main accounts of these actions: the Shasu campaign, as we have seen, is dated to "regnal year one," as is the quelling of Yenoam, Hammath and Beth Shan—but the specific dateline that appears on the Beth Shan stela helps to date this action towards the end of the regnal year.²⁹ If the Shasu campaign were part of the same war, it is (hypothetically) to be dated sometime in II Ṣmw, preceding Sety's operations in Palestine during the next month. Following this interpretation, Sety would have

²⁸Maintained, at least implicitly, by Meyer, and later by Faulkner, Helck, Aharoni (see n. 1 for these references), Spalinger (most recently in JARCE 16 [1979]:31, 33, 37 and 43); and by Kitchen, Pharaoh Triumphant, pp. 20, 22. The reverse position is defended by Breasted, Ancient Records of Egypt III, sections 123-31, 133, and p. 40, n. c; and Gaballa, Narrative in Egyptian Art, pp. 103-4.

 returned to Egypt near the end of his first regnal year or quite early in his second.

Also germane to this discussion are two stelae from the Temple of Karnak. One of them, the Alabaster Stela, dated to II 3ht 1 in Sety's first regnal year, contains some bellicose rhetoric in praise of the king but is mostly concerned with the dedication of this monument inside the Temple of Amon. The other stela, from the Temple of Ptah that lies north of the Great Hypostyle Hall, is less specifically dated—merely to "regnal year one"—but contains allusions to the king's return "from his first campaign of victory" and to his presence at Thebes, perhaps accompanied by captive foreign chiefs. The relevance of the Alabaster Stela is, admittedly, ambiguous: while it could fit well into the ritual program enacted by Sety on his first visit to Thebes as king, it is equally possible that the monument was dedicated in his absence. The stela from the Ptah Temple, however, does contain unequivocal references to the end of the first campaign and to the king's subsequent visit to Thebes—and it is virtually certain that the dateline applies not only to the first action, but to the second as well. This determination

\[1^0\text{KRI I 39.}\]

\[1^1\text{Ibid., pp. 40-41.}\]

\[1^2\text{For translations of the pertinent passages from both stelae and also a discussion of the problems of dating them and similar memorials, see Appendix 1.}\]
imposes certain temporal limits on Sety I's movements during his accession year. If the campaigns against the Shasu and against Yenoam follow closely on one another, the king would be obliged to march into Lebanon after III Šmw 10 (the starting date of his activities in Palestine according to the first Beth Shan Stela). After asserting his control over all these localities, he would then have to return to Egypt, sail posthaste up to Thebes and then return quickly to Memphis, arriving back at his capital no later than IV Šmw 23 (a date on which he is known to have been there, very early in his second regnal year). Three months later, he would return to Thebes once more, to celebrate the Opet Feast. Is this a realistic timetable? As a test, we offer this hypothetical reconstruction of his itinerary, in which a reasonable minimum for the duration of each episode is adhered to as rigorously as possible.

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13 KRI I 244:11-13. This itinerary for Sety seems to be advocated, at least implicitly, by Spalinger, JSSEA 9 (1979):238-40; and idem., JARCE 16 (1979):33 and 44, n. 34.

14 Cf. n. 29 above. Sety left Memphis on his way to Thebes on II 3ḥt 1 of his second regnal year (KRI I 247:10), giving himself enough time to arrive in time for the opening ceremonies of the Opet Feast in the middle of the month: see S. Schott, Altägyptische Festdaten, Akademie der Wissenschaften und der Literatur in Mainz, Abhandlungen der geistes- und sozialwissenschaftlichen Klasse, Jahrgang 1950, no. 10 (Wiesbaden), pp. 84-87.

15 For the rate of the army's daily march and also for the timings of travel between Memphis and Thebes used in the reconstruction, see Appendix 2. The distances cited are based on the maps in Gardiner, AEO, and in Helck, Beziehungen and also on John Bartholomew, ed., The Times Atlas of the World II, South-West Asia and Russia (London,
III Šmw 10 (in year one) News of the disturbance by Hammath, Yenoam and Pella is brought to Sety, who, for the sake of argument, we locate at Megiddo, about two days' march from the cities named in the stela.

III Šmw 11 Divisions of the Egyptian army are sent against Hammath, Beth Shan and Yenoam. Let us assume that Sety leaves for Tyre by way of the coastal road on the same day.

III Šmw 13 Sety arrives at Tyre (ca. 45 miles from Megiddo = three days' march).

III Šmw 15 Sety leaves Tyre on his way back to Egypt, having received the submission of the Lebanese princes on the previous day.

III Š mw 24 Sety arrives at Gaza (ca. 135 miles from Tyre = ten days' march).

IV Šmw 5 Sety arrives at the Egyptian border town of Tcharu (ca. 141 miles = eleven days' march).

1959), and Survey of Israel (Department of Labour), Atlas of Israel (Jerusalem and Amsterdam, 1970).

'This figure is a minimum: note that Thutmose III, on his outward march during his first campaign, covered this distance in about 15 days (Urk. IV 648-57).

'This was apparently the pace of Thutmose III on his first campaign (Urk. IV 647-48); but the distance can be covered more quickly. In A.D. 70, for instance, the Roman general Titus reached Gaza on his fifth day's march from Pelusium on the Egyptian border (Josephus, Jewish War 4.661-63). Both Alexander the Great (Arrian, Anabasis
IV Šm 8
Sety arrives in Memphis (ca. 90 miles = three days' journey). 13

IV Šm 9
Sety departs for Thebes in the morning.

IV Šm 21
Sety arrives in Thebes after a journey of thirteen days. 19

IV Šm 23
(in regnal year two) Having presented his booty to Amon on the day before, Sety sets out once more for Memphis; note that the change from the first to the second regnal year takes place, at the latest, on this day.

I Šm 4
Sety is in Memphis (the journey north from Thebes being optimistically estimated to be of twelve days' duration). 40

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3.1,1) and Ptolemy IV in 217 B.C. (Polybius 5.80,1-3) took a day longer to cover the same terrain. These faster timings presume that the armies moved by forced marches--as, indeed, the circumstances in each case might warrant. Sety would be under no pressure to move so quickly on his return journey. Alternatively, Sety could have returned to Egypt by sea, thus shaving some time from this proposed itinerary. This assumption contradicts, however, the circumstantial--hence believable--account of his triumphal return to Tcharu as seen in the Karnak reliefs (pl. 6).

13In A.D. 70 Titus covered an equivalent distance with his army (from Nicopolis in the Mendesian Nome to Pelusium) in three days of marching (Josephus, Jewish War 4.658-61). It is conceivable that Sety could match this speed by leaving the army at the Egyptian border and proceeding to the capital with a smaller party.

19See Appendix 2.

40For the minimum possible duration of this trip and also a survey of the timings achieved by nineteenth century travelers before the introduction of motorized shipping on the Nile, see Appendix 2.
It is obvious that this timetable does not square with historical fact: on IV ሽ ሪ 23, the hypothetical day of his departure from Thebes, we know that Sety was already in Memphis. In assuming a minimum duration for each episode, moreover, the timetable imposes on events a chronological straitjacket that often seems to defy common sense. It posits, for instance, a bare minimum for the northern extension of the campaign. Is this credible? And why should the Egyptians return to Egypt in such haste, with the army tired from campaigning and laden down with prisoners and spoil? Why, for that matter, would the king feel obliged to make such a lightning visit to Thebes when he was presumably scheduled to go (and in fact did go) some two months later, in time for the Opet Feast? One seeks in vain any plausible reason for the frenetic activity this reconstruction forces on the participants. On the other hand, if the campaign(s) into Lebanon and Palestine did not form part of Sety's "first campaign of victory," and if this honor goes to a separate Shasu campaign that preceded the war at the end of the first regnal year--then the difficulties disappear.

In theory, the war against the Shasu could have taken place at the very beginning or in the middle of Sety's first year. Is it possible, however, that it occurred even earlier? Already during the lifetime of his father, Ramesses I, Sety appears to have done some campaigning in
western Asia. The description of the fighting is quite vague. In the text of the stela he set up in his father's memorial chapel at Abydos, Sety recalls,

I [smote] for [him] the lands of the Fenkhu, and I repelled for him the dissidents who were on the uplands. I protected Egypt for him according to his desire. . . . I gathered his army and caused it to be of a single heart. I sought out the condition of the Two Lands for him, and I performed my deeds of valor in protecting his limbs upon the foreign countries whose names are not known. I acted as a bold and energetic warrior in his presence, so that he would open his eyes to my goodness.41

It is probably this campaign that is mentioned on two stelae from the Temple of Isis at Buhen. The texts of these memorials, set up by Ramesses I and Sety I, respectively, are virtually identical, Sety's decree being in effect a confirmation of the previous endowment. Ramesses I's stela is dated to II Prt 20 in his second regnal year and opens with the customary acknowledgements of the gods' favor--"inasmuch as they have given him valor and victory, all lands being gathered with a single heart, praising your Ka; all lands, all foreign countries and the Nine Bows being slain. . . ." Details of the new endowments follow, including a reference to "filling his (= the god's) workhouse with male and female slaves of His Majesty's

41 KRI I 111:7-15; for the terms employed, see Spalinger, JSSEA 9 (1979):229-30; cf. pl. 15:1-3; but see also C. Vandersleyen, Les guerres d'Amosis, Monographies Reine Elisabeth 1 (Brussels, 1971), pp. 102-21.
capturing." Sety's stela is dated to IV Šmw, last day, just over six months after his father's decree and near the beginning of his own first regnal year. The warlike rhetoric is virtually the same as on the earlier monument, and the fighting it alludes to is probably also the same. Could this have been the Shasu campaign? It could be significant that the Buhen stela and perhaps also the stela from the Ptah Temple (dedicated after Sety's "first campaign of victory") speak of living captives, which seem to have bulked large in the spoil of the Shasu war. If all these documents refer to the same war, it would have been fought at least six months prior to Sety's formal accession to the throne: the datelines in the battle reliefs (all "regnal year one") would thus be artificial, bringing a previous event into the compass of a new reign. At Karnak, Sety

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'KRI I 2; restorations in the damaged text are made following the similar passages on Sety I's stela.

'Ibid., p. 38. The last five lines of Ramesses I's stela were erased by Sety and recarved with three lines of his own (see Spalinger, JSSEA 9 [1979]:232), perhaps at a date even later than that on his own stela from Buhen: note that the new lines refer to the "making for him (= Min-Amon of Buhen) a temple like the horizon of heaven" (KRI I 3:2), while Sety I's own stela speaks only of establishing divine offerings and providing the stela itself (KRI I 38:7, 10).

'See Chicago, Reliefs IV, pls. 6 and 8, and pp. 24-25. The identity of the Shasu campaign with the war fought under Ramesses I was first suggested by R. O. Faulkner: see CAH II.2 217.

'The vexed question of "regent" versus "coregent," and of whether both partners enjoyed independent dating systems during the period of their association, cannot be dealt with here: see William J. Murnane, Ancient Egyptian Coregencies,
could then have commemorated his victory on his first visit as king, presumably in II 3ḥt, when the Alabaster Stela (and thus also the monument at the Ptah Temple) was set up."

It is probably safer, however, to differentiate the Shasu war from that fought under Ramesses I. A campaign against the Shasu in the Gaza Strip (at the south end of the "lands of the Fenkhu") might have taken less than a month to complete, as the timetable outlined above can show. It could have been conducted shortly after Sety's accession and have been over prior to IV .getSimpleName measurements 30, when the endowment of the Buhen temple was renewed with a donation of fresh spoils. Alternatively, the Shasu war might have taken place after Sety's return from Thebes, in the latter part of the Inundation (3ḥt) season. It would thus have nothing to do with the Fenkhu war mentioned on the Buhen stelae, and conceivably nothing with the "first campaign of victory" referred to in the stela from the Ptah Temple (assuming that this monument was set up at the same time as the Alabaster Stela and refers to the Fenkhu war). On the other hand, if


"The opening date on the Alabaster Stela, II 3ḥt 1, falls shortly before the Opet Feast, and we know that Sety left Memphis on his way to Thebes on precisely this date during his second regnal year (KRI I 247:10). Ramesses II also attended the Opet Feast during his first regnal year (ibid. II 325:5-6; Murnane, Ancient Egyptian Coregencies, p. 64).

"Thus also Spalinger, JSSEA 9 (1979):228, and n. 2, citing earlier studies."
Sety's "first campaign of victory" was in fact the Shasu war, and if this campaign took place in the middle of his first regnal year, the Ptah Temple Stela could have been dedicated as late as the beginning of the Harvest (Smw) season—perhaps in I Smw, when the king might have been in Thebes to celebrate the Festival of Amon or, perhaps, the Min Feast. 4 None of these alternatives can be proved: there is no certainty as to when the Shasu campaign was fought, nor is it clear that Sety's "first campaign of victory" refers to his first military venture as king rather than the earlier war he fought as his father's deputy. 49 All that can be said is that the Karnak reliefs recognize the Shasu campaign as the first of Sety's wars, distinguished not only by the datelines in "regnal year one," but also by the ostentatious emphasis on his Two Ladies name, "Repeater of Births," to dignify the start of a new reign. 50

4 Schott, Altägyptische Festdaten, pp. 103-5.

49 The stela from Ramesses I's chapel does offer a few hints to the effect that Sety was not yet king when he fought in the Fenkhu lands: e.g., "Let me proclaim what I did in his presence until I began to rule" (nfr yt r bk3.i); and his valorous actions "so that he (= Ramesses I) would open his eyes to my goodness" (KRI I 111.8). The statement that Sety "tied on his kingship for him thereby like Horus on the throne of Wenennefer" (ibid., p. 111:11) immediately follows the account of the Asiatic war and could suggest that Sety was promoted to the status of joint ruler as a result of his effective leadership. It appears likely that Sety enjoyed at least a brief coregency with his father: see Murnane, Ancient Egyptian Coregencies, pp. 183-84.

50 Perhaps an allusion to Amenemhet I, the most distinguished king of record to have claimed the epithet prior to this: see Gauthier, LdR I 254-62, especially p.
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Viewed as a whole, the earlier wars of Sety I fall into two groups: a consolidation of Egypt's position within her traditional sphere of influence, followed by an extension of Egyptian arms north, to the very borders of the Hittite Empire. The war in "the lands of the Fenkhu" under Ramesses I and both the Shasu and Yenoam campaigns occupied the first period, and the ventures into central Syria the second. That this pattern makes good strategic sense is patent: it might even reflect Sety's grand design. Regrettably, though, we have no firm evidence on how long these events took to accomplish. We know that in his first year on the throne, Sety was occupied with two campaigns--the war with the Shasu (presumably fought near the start of the regnal year) and the Yenoam campaign, from Palestine into Lebanon (at its end). Since it appears that Sety spent the first half of his second regnal year at home, it is logical that he was in no position to launch a(nother) large-scale campaign to the north. However, it is clear that he prepared for such a time when he would have the opportunity (Spalinger, JARCE 16 [1979]:49, n. 106, lists the references).
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campaigns can only have taken place subsequently: a more precise date cannot be given at this time.

The loss of the third register on the eastern wing of the Karnak wall is especially unfortunate, since it might have shed light on the operations involving Kumedi and Ullaza and also supplied a logical antecedent for the better known wars in central Syria that appear on the western wing. As it is, these early activities on the borders of the Hittite Empire can be inferred only from the toponyms in the final northern list. The precise nature of these contacts are matters for speculation. Kumedi, lying in the district of Upe, was located in what should have been Egyptian territory even after the defection of Kadesh; but Ullaza is distinctly within the kingdom of Amurru as it finally was in the reign of Aziru.² Had Kumedi attempted to defect to the Hittite sphere, which lay nearby, or did Sety merely "show the flag" there? Did troops from Ullaza meet Sety's army on the borders of Amurru? Or was there, already, some discreet diplomatic rapprochement between Egypt and her former vassal? All we can say for certain is that the achievements of this campaign laid the foundation for the challenge to the Hittites' control of Syria that was soon to follow.

CHAPTER III

THE LATER WARS OF SETY I

Sety I's confrontation with the Hittite Empire is recorded on two out of the three registers of battle scenes carved on the western wing of his war monument at Karnak. At the top is the war against Kadesh and Amurru (pls. 22-26), while in the lowest register (pls. 33-36) we find an encounter with the Hittites themselves. The war in Libya that is shown in the middle register, between these two Asiatic campaigns, was a diversion, unrelated to the main thrust of Sety I's foreign policy; thus it is dealt with elsewhere, along with the Nubian war of year eight, in Appendix 3.

While there is no question that each of the western registers represents a separate campaign, there is considerable uncertainty regarding the order in which they are to be read. The normal sequence--indeed, that which is observed on the eastern wing--is from the bottom up, which would suggest that the Hittite campaign preceded the attack on Kadesh and Amurru.¹ The reverse order has been maintained by a majority of scholars, however, who argue that a

¹G. A. Gaballa, Narrative in Egyptian Art, (Mainz, 1976), pp. 103-4.
struggle with the Hittites themselves would be the logical outcome of Egypt's alienation of Hatti's two southernmost border provinces.\(^2\) Recent scholarship has adjudged the matter to be an open question, but the second alternative is still preferred on the external grounds of historical probability.\(^3\)

Unfortunately, no definite resolution to this problem can be derived from the other narrative compositions inscribed on the walls of Egyptian monuments. Most such sequences are spread over a single register, and the exceptional cases which occupy several, being scattered over the length of Egyptian civilization, do not offer a coherent guide to the common usage of any one period. In a tomb from the Old Kingdom, for instance, one sequence (if it has been properly interpreted) does seem to move in the order proposed for the Sety I battle scenes, i.e., up one side and down the other,\(^4\) but this is a very isolated example. Closer to home are the ritual scenes on the northern wing of the eastern interior wall


\(^4\)E.g., the funeral procession of Idu at Giza, where the sequence seems to move up the right jamb, across the lintel and then down the left jamb—although, since there is some disorder in the sequence of episodes, a case can be made for reading each jamb separately, from the bottom up, with the lintel read last: see W. K. Simpson, The Mastabas of Qar and Idu, Giza Mastabas 2 (Boston, 1977), pp. 21-23 and fig. 35.
SETY I'S LATER WARS

of the Great Hypostyle Hall at Karnak (carved by Sety I); but although at least one group of episodes appears to move from the top down, against the usual direction taken by such sequences, the arrangement of episodes is so difficult to follow on this wall that one hesitates to draw any but the most obvious conclusion, namely, that some variability in the vertical arrangement is possible. The same lack of uniformity is also seen in some of the sequences which observe the usual order of episodes from the bottom up, but in which the horizontal arrangement of the scenes varies. In sum, the question is still open; it cannot be answered by appealing only to the internal consistency of comparable source materials. I do not believe we can impose on Sety's battle reliefs a uniform vertical arrangement on the basis


6This variability is first seen in the Old Kingdom, e.g., in the tomb of Qar at Giza, where the funeral procession starts in the upper left-hand corner and finishes at the lower left: see Simpson, Mastabas of Qar and Idu, pp. 5-6 and fig. 24. New Kingdom examples are few but seem definite enough—e.g., the birth scenes at Luxor Temple (Gaballa, Narrative in Egyptian Art, p. 54); Jubilee scenes from the Temple of Amenhotep IV at Thebes (see D. B. Redford, "Preliminary Report on the First Season of Excavations in East Karnak, 1975-76," JARCE 14 [1977]:23 and 31, n. 66; D. B. Redford and W. R. Smith, The Akhenaten Temple Project I [Warminster, 1976], p. 127, n. 66, and pls. 41-42, with end papers). Another example may be found on the west face of the western side wall to Court I at Karnak, north of the Seventh Pylon (Bibl. 2 II 132-33 [490]-[495]), where the battle scenes proceed boustrophedon from the bottom right if the sequence of localities in Merneptah's "Israel Stela" is adhered to: see for now F. J. Yurco, "Merneptah's Palestinian Campaign," JSSEA 8 (1978):70.
of available parallels. At the proper place in the following discussion, I will present reasons for believing that the registers on the west wing are most probably to be read from top to bottom, and that the Amurru-Kadesh campaign preceded Sety's war with the Hittites.

THE AMURRU-KADESH CAMPAIGN

"The ascent which Pharaoh ... made in order to destroy the land of Kadesh and the land of Amurru" (pl. 23:1) tersely describes Egypt's opening salvo against the Hittite Empire. This label is inscribed on a fortress, the focus of a battle scene which, beyond a graphic rendering of the city's hinterland, tells us nothing further about this campaign.'

The identification of the Kadesh represented in these reliefs with Kadesh on the Orontes, while accepted by most scholars, is disputed by Yohanan Aharoni, *The Land of the Bible*, trans. A. F. Rainey (London, 1966), p. 68, who argues that the hilly country around the city and also the adjoining forest are inappropriate for this northern locality. This position has been rebutted by Gardiner, *AEO I 140*-41*; and its cogency is diminished by the association of our Kadesh with Amurru on the label of the scene (pl. 23:1). Wooded areas around Kadesh on the Orontes, moreover, had been noted in Egyptian records as early as the reign of Amenhotep II, and they would later play a part in the career of Ramesses II (see Gardiner, *The Kadesh Inscriptions of Ramesses II* [Oxford, 1960], p. 37, R-11); it is probably this "Wood of Robawi" that is shown here. And could the hills in the relief, if they are to be taken seriously, represent the tell on which the city was built? Note the designation "Kadesh the Old" in the "Bulletin" (B-26 = *KRI II 108*, and B-64 = ibid., p. 115; and cf. Gardiner, *Kadesh Inscriptions*, p. 32, B-26, who notes that "the reason for the epithet remains obscure"). It has been suggested that "Kadesh the Old" is the nearby tell at Sefinet Nūh, northeast of Tell Nebi Mend (Arnulf Küschke, in *LA V 32*, s.v. "Qadesch-Schlacht"), but this would seem likely only if
Another battle scene was carved around the corner from this one (pl. 22). Only part of the king's figure can be made out here; but since the melee on the northern face of the wall takes place at Kadesh (pl. 23:3), the engagement shown on the western side most probably belongs in the land of Amurru—a likelihood strengthened by analogy to the episodes preserved on the eastern side wall (pls. 10, 23), which show the outer geographical limits of these campaigns.

Sety's conquest of Kadesh was commemorated in a victory stela set up in that city. Only a fragment from the top of this monument is preserved, but it is enough to show that, though badly weathered, the stela was never defaced, even after Kadesh passed finally into the Hittites' control during the reign of Sety's son. The condition of Sety I's stela implies that, even as they took it down, the rulers of Kadesh did not regard their submission to Hatti as being necessarily final—an interesting comment, given Kadesh's past history of duplicity and revolt.

Other references to this campaign in Egyptian sources are meager and ambiguous. It is likely, for instance, that most of the central Syrian toponyms listed at Karnak, and on the bases of two sphinxes from Sety I's mortuary temple in West something different were meant by the Egyptian t3 isy, for the site was settled roughly a thousand years after Tell Nebi Mend was first occupied (cf. ibid., col. 37, n. 19); Tell Nebi Mend itself goes back to Neolithic levels (see Kuschke, LÄ V 27, s.v. "Qadesch," with references).

'See Bibl. VII 392 for references.
Thebes, designate places that fell to Egypt during this time. The more northerly toponyms in these lists do not fit well into this implied theater of operations, however; and since it is probable that Sety campaigned in the north once more following the Amurru-Kadesh campaign, these northern places could have been engaged at that later time.\(^1\)

More substantial accounts are preserved in Hittite sources, particularly in the historical preambles to the treaties which contemporary Hittite kings made with successive generations of kings in Amurru: the treaty of Hattushili III with Benteshina\(^1\) and that of Tudhaliya IV with Shaushgamuwa.\(^1\) Both documents agree that there was trouble between Hatti and Amurru when they were ruled by Muwatalli and Benteshina respectively, but each one treats it in rather gingerly terms. Hattushili III says only that Muwatalli deprived Benteshina of his throne and carried him off to captivity in Hatti (treaty between Hattushili and Benteshina, obv. 11-13): Egypt is not mentioned. It is

\(^1\)KRI I 33-35. For the central Syrian localities in Sety I's topographical lists and their connection to his later activities there, see A. J. Spalinger, "The Northern Wars of Sety I: An Integrative Study," JARCE 16 (1979):38, and nn. 70-71.

\(^1\)See below, pp. 90-99.

\(^1\)See E. F. Weidner, Politische Dokumente aus Kleinasien, Boghazköy Studien 8 (Leipzig, 1923), pp. 127-29.

\(^1\)The English translation that follows is based on C. Kühne and H. Otten, Der Šaušgamuwa-Vertrag, Studien zu den Boghazköy-Texten 16 (Wiesbaden, 1971), especially pp. 7-9.
from the later treaty (between Tudhaliya and Shaushgamuwa, obv. I 13-39) that we learn the details of his ouster:

[In the past] the land of Amurru had not been subdued by means of the arms of the land of Hatti. When Aziru [came] to Shuppiluliuma, the grandfather of my "Sun," in the land of Hatti, the lands of Amurru were still [enem]y (country); they [were] vassals of the Hurrian king. Even thus was Aziru loyal to him. But he (= Shuppiluliuma) did [not subdue] him unto himself through armed might. Aziru, your grandfather, then protected [Shuppi]luliuma in (his) lordship, and he also protected the [land of Ha]tti. Thereafter he also protected Murshili in (his) lordship, and he also protected the land of Hatti; and against the land of Hatti he committed not the slightest breach of faith. But when Muwatalli, the brother of the father of my "Sun," became king, the people of Amurru broke faith with him, and this is what they had to say to him: "From free entities, we became vassals. Now, however, we are your vassals no longer!" And they entered into the following of the king of Egypt. At this, the brother of the father of my "Sun," Muwatalli, and the king of Egypt, together with the people of Amurru, fought. And Muwatalli triumphed over him and forced the land of Amurru to the ground with weapons and made it subject. Thus in the land of Amurru he installed Shapili as king.

Amurru's defection is clearly linked here to an Egyptian revanche in central Syria. Just as clear, moreover, is the link between Amurru's reconquest and the defeat of the Egyptian king by Muwatalli. After Amurru had been subdued and given a new king, the text continues the story into the time of the present generation's predecessors (obv. I 40-48):

But when Muwatalli, the brother of the father of my "Sun," had become a god, then Hattushili, the father of my "Sun," became king, and he put Shapili aside (and) made Benteshina, your father, king in the land of Amurru. And he protected the father of my "Sun" and protected the land of
Hatti; and against the land of Hatti he committed not the slightest breach of faith. Since the settlement of the affairs of Amurru is immediately followed by Muwatalli's death (in the text of the treaty), the defeat of the Egyptian king can only refer to the Battle of Kadesh in the fifth year of Ramesses II. But when had Amurru "entered into the following of the king of Egypt"? Kitchen has suggested that the revolt in the time of Benteshina, mentioned in this treaty, took place in the year before the Battle of Kadesh. Amurru would thus have rebelled twice, once under Sety and then again, after its first return to the Hittite fold, under Ramesses II. This seems unlikely. None of the war memorials which Ramesses II set up in western Asia prior to the Battle of Kadesh implies that Amurru was subdued once more at that time: the Nahr el-Kelb stela and the tablet from Byblos both lie outside the territory of Amurru, and no clear reference to any specific actions emerges from them. During the Kadesh campaign itself, Amurru was ranged with Egypt. There is no

14 KRI II 1.
15 Ibid., p. 224.
16 Amurru is not in the list of Egypt's enemies on this occasion: see, for convenience, Gardiner, Kadesh Inscriptions, pp. 7, 8, 29. It can no longer be assumed, however, that part of the Egyptian army arrived at the battle from the coast of Amurru: see Alan R. Schulman, "The N'CRN at Kadesh Once Again," JSSEA 11 (1981):7-19, especially
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good reason to think it had not been thus allied since it had first been (re)captured by Sety I; and this is actually implied by the Shaushgamuwa Treaty, where the revolt that Muwatalli put down after the Battle of Kadesh is treated as Amurru's first breach of faith since it had become part of the Hittite Empire. Although one might question the reliability of this text, since it fails to mention the reign of Murshili III (Urhi-Teshup), which intervened between the death of Muwatalli and the accession of Hattushili III, we shall see that there are tendentious reasons for this on the part of the treaty's two contracting parties. No grounds exist for supposing that an earlier revolt was simply ignored here; indeed, given the frankness that prevails in other vassals' treaties with Hatti, this would be uncharacteristic in the extreme. Benteshina clearly was held responsible for Amurru's revolt and was deprived by Muwatalli of his throne; his restoration by Urhi-Teshup is elsewhere described as an action of which his


17 Cf., for example, J. Friedrich, Staatsverträge des Hatti-Reiches in hethitischer Sprache I, Mitteilungen der Vorderasiatisch-aegyptischen Gesellschaft 31.1 (Leipzig, 1926), pp. 7-9; cf. Weidner, Politische Dokumente, pp. 15, 77 (references to "disloyalty" of Kadesh and Amurru at a time when neither was bound by treaty to the Hittite Empire).
father would have disapproved. Muwatalli's strong resentment against Benteshina makes far better sense as the outcome of a rebellion lasting a decade or more rather than a year's fall from grace that—as Kitchen's own account makes clear—would have been forced on Benteshina by circumstances beyond his control.

Even so, it is undeniable that Benteshina's guilt is dealt with rather circumspectly by both of the previously mentioned treaties: Benteshina's own pact with Hattushili III gives no reason for his deposition by Muwatalli, while the Shaushgamuwa Treaty ascribes the revolt to "the people of Amurru," not to Benteshina himself. Spalinger has interpreted these "oblique and oddly vague terms" as reflecting a certain tenuousness which the Hittites recognized in their claim to Amurru against Egypt. Such ancient bonds of loyalty, however, must have been superseded, in the Hittites' view, by Amurru's treaties with Hatti over the last three generations. To think otherwise

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2'Spalinger, BES 1 (1979):81-83.

On the question of Amurru's earlier status before her submission to Hatti, and the treatment of this question in Hittite sources, see Appendix 6 below, pp. 234-39.
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would be to acknowledge the Egyptians' claim in full, and there is no doubt that the Hittites would have given as short a shrift to this argument on legal grounds as they did in the field—since, demonstrably, Amurru was not allowed to remain outside the Hittite fold for long. Still, the gingerly treatment of Benteshina requires explanation. I believe it is to be sought in the political climate in which each treaty was drawn up.²¹

Most of the provisions of the Benteshina and Shaushgamuwa treaties are paralleled in other agreements between Hatti and her neighbors. The kings of Amurru agree to abide by Hittite policy in their dealings with other foreign powers.²² They swear fealty to the Hittite ruling house and receive appropriate guarantees for their own posterity;²³


²²Weidner, Politische Dokumente, pp. 133-35 (=Benteshina Treaty); Kühne and Otten, Šaušgamuwa-Vertrag, pp. 15-17. This, of course, is universal in the treaties between Hatti and her vassals.

²³Kühne and Otten, Šaušgamuwa-Vertrag, pp. 7-9 (= Shaushgamuwa Treaty); Weidner, Politische Dokumente, pp. 129-31 (= Benteshina Treaty); cf. ibid., pp. 19 (treaty of Shuppiluliuma I with Mattiwsa of Mitanni), 87 (Mursili II with Talmi-Sharuma of Aleppo), 95 (Muwatalli with Shunashshura of Kizzuwatna); Friedrich, Staatsverträge I 13 (Muwatalli with Duppi-Teshup of Amurru); II (Mitteilungen der Vorderasiatisch-aegyptischen Gesellschaft 34.1 (Leipzig, 1930), pp. 55-59 (Mursili II with Alakshandu of Wilusha).
and they are allied to the Hittite royal house by marriage. The unwonted delicacy that surrounds the treatment of past history is indeed unusual; but a closer look at both treaties suggests a reason for it, some of it based on the personalities involved. When Benteshina had been carried off to exile in Hatti, he had been turned over for safekeeping to the king's brother, Hattushili, who took him off to his own provincial capital (Benteshina Treaty, obv. I 13-21). On the accession of Urhi-Teshup as king of Hatti, Hattushili embarked on the course that would compel him, first to preserve himself, and then to rebel against his nephew. Benteshina's restoration in Amurru must have had, if not his outright support, then at least his consent: why else would Hattushili later claim to have restored Benteshina himself? The personal bond thus established would later be cemented by a new treaty and by marriage ties over the next two generations.

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24 Kühne and Otten, Šaušamuwa-Vertrag, pp. 7, 9 and cf. p. 11 (Muwatallii made Mashtiuri of Sheha his brother-in-law); Weidner, Politische Dokumente, p. 129 (Benteshina Treaty), cf. pp. 19 and 53 (treaties between Shuppiluliuma I and Mittuwa of Mitanni); Friedrich, Staatsverträge I 107 (treaty of Murshili II with Kupanta-KAL of Mira and Kuwaliya), and pp. 107, 125 (treaty of Shuppiluliuma I and Huqqana of Azzi).

Amurru's position on the southwestern flank of the Hittite Empire, however, gave her a strategic importance that could not be taken for granted. Moreover, yet another source of anxiety was that Hattushili III was a usurper: neither he nor his descendants enjoyed an inborn right to rule—and Urhi-Teshup, the rightful king of Hatti, eventually took refuge in Egypt.\textsuperscript{2} A direct threat would be neutralized by the terms of Hattushili's treaty with Ramesses II, in which each king agreed to respect the legitimacy of the other's line.\textsuperscript{2}\textsuperscript{7} Yet, the Egyptians had played this card before,\textsuperscript{2}\textsuperscript{8} and they might do so again. These considerations might explain

\textsuperscript{2}A Hittite demand for Urhi-Teshup's extradition from Egypt, made sometime before the conclusion of the treaty in Ramesses II's twenty-first year, was refused: see E. Edel, "Die Abfassungszeit des Briefes KBo I.10 und seine Bedeutung für die Chronologie Ramses' II," JCS 12 (1958):130-32; and later, Urhi-Teshup was still in Egypt during the marriage negotiations between Ramesses II's twenty-first and thirty-fourth years (W. Heick, "Urhi-Teşup in Ägypten," JCS 17 [1963]:87-97); for this period, see Ünal, Hattušili III, pp. 159-63. For the date of his deposition by Hattushili III, see n. 7 in Appendix 4 below.

\textsuperscript{2}For clauses referring to the royal succession in the treaty between Ramesses II and Hattushili III, see ANET\textsuperscript{2} p. 203 (obv. 40 ff. of the Hittite version; this perhaps corresponding to a broken passage of the Egyptian text, KRI II 228:12-229 = ANET\textsuperscript{2} p. 200, with n. 13). I am grateful to Professor Hayim Tadmor for discussing some of this material and its implications with me. For a discussion of these and other considerations regarding the treaty, see Alan R. Schulman, "Aspects of Ramesside Diplomacy: The Treaty of Year 21," JSSEA 8 (1978):117-20, 126-30.

\textsuperscript{2}Note that Ramesses II, after he had made his treaty with Hattushili III, found it necessary to inform his Asiatic vassals that the Egyptian "line" on Urhi-Teshup had changed: see B. Meissner, "Die Beziehungen Ägyptens zum Hattireiche nach Hattischen Quellen," ZDMG 72 (1918):43-44; and cf. references in n. 26 above.
the care, verging on fussiness, with which Hatti sought to guarantee Amurru's loyalty to the dynasty of Hattushili III. It is hard to believe that Tudhaliya IV would not have had Urhi-Teshup and his heirs in mind when he warned the king of Amurru (Shaushgamuwa Treaty, obv. I 12, II 1-48, III 1-28) against supporting a usurper to the Hittite throne, even though (as he specifically notes) Tudhaliya's own father had profited from his vassals' laxity in this very regard.²⁹ Political expediency, one suspects, was not the least important reason for the favor shown by the house of Hattushili III to Benteshina's dynasty: one does not remind a valued ally of his past sins.

Sety I's seizure of Kadesh and Amurru must have resulted in the immediate abrogation of the treaty which, I have suggested, was in force between Egypt and Hatti earlier in Muwatalli's reign. Amurru probably clung to its new alliance with Egypt for as long the Egyptian military presence made it possible to do so. Kadesh, however, must have been reconquered--or returned voluntarily to the Hittite fold?--sometime in Ramesses II's first years on the throne, for it is listed among the enemies of Egypt in the war of year five (as Amurru is not), and "the vile chief of Kadesh" played a prominent role in the Hittites'

²⁹ For the influence of Urhi-Teshup and his sons during the time of Tudhaliya IV, see Ünal, Hattušili III, pp. 172-74.
preparations for battle.\footnote{KRI II 3-4, at 4:6-9, 16-18 (= Gardiner, Kadesh Inscriptions, pp. 7-8).} The presence of Sety I's victory stela in Kadesh suggests, at the very least, that the city did not change hands again quickly. Its return to the Hittite alliance could have taken place as late as the latter half of Ramesses II's third year, providing the occasion for the military demonstrations of year four and a casus belli for the war that followed.\footnote{Ramesses II's military operations in year four (if such they were) are dated to nearly opposite ends of his regnal year: the Nahr el-Kelb stela to IV \textit{ḥt} 1 (KRI II 1:9), and the Byblos stela to IV \textit{šmw} (ibid., p. 224:6). For Ramesses II's accession date (probably in the first half of the season of \textit{ḥt}), see n. 13 in Appendix 1 below.}

\section*{THE HITTITE WAR}

The Hittites, however, may not have delayed until the time of Ramesses II their reaction to the loss of Kadesh and Amurru. A direct clash between Hatti and Egypt under Sety I is attested in the lowest register of battle reliefs on the west wing of his war monument at Karnak (pls. 33-36). The scene of battle is described as "the vile land of the Hittites, among whom His Majesty . . . made a great heap of corpses" (pl. 34:1). The king is described as a mighty bull "who smashes the Asiatics and tramples the Hittites; who slays their chiefs as they lie prostrate in their blood; who enters into them like a blast of fire" (pl. 34:14-19). In the next scene, depicting the march back to Egypt with
prisoners from the campaign, the king is said to have
"returned after he had triumphed, after he had destroyed the foreign countries and trampled the land of Hatti" (pl. 35:27-28; cf. pl. 36:1-4). The prisoners he brings back are called "the great chiefs of Retchenu the vile, whom His Majesty brought away by his [victo]ries over the foreign countries of Hatti" (pl. 36:26-27). Even though this wording accords well with the previous mention of "Asiatics" in the battle scene (pl. 34:14), only Hittite captives are shown here. The language in which these inscriptions are cast is so ridden with traditional formulas that it seems difficult to separate the truth from the bombast, or to go far beyond the irreducible claim that Sety had campaigned somewhere in Hittite territory.

Further light, albeit of a dim and uncertain sort, is cast on Sety's northernmost campaign by lists of name-rings found on the bases of two sphinxes at Sety I's mortuary temple, the so-called Qurna Temple in West Thebes. These nearly identical lists each fall into three parts, the first of which—consisting of the traditional "Nine Bows"—is of no interest. The second part (North, nos. 11-24 = South, nos. 10-22) corresponds in its composition to the final northern list at Karnak (pls. 15:54*-68* = 17:49*-65*), having most of the same Palestinian and Lebanese toponyms

11KRI I 33-35; references in the text are to name-ring numbers in this publication.
found there: an interesting entry, not present in the preserved versions of this list at Karnak, is Ṣumur (Ḍmr: North and South no. 14), which like Kumedi and Ullaza probably played a part in the Syrian campaign that preceded Sety's push against Kadesh and Amurru. The final part of the list (preserved only on the northern sphinx, nos. 25-43) is central and north Syrian in its environment. Again, many of the same names in the first northern list at Karnak (pls. 15:25*-37* = 17:24*-36*) are found here also, and a number of these lie north of Kadesh and Amurru: for instance, Ardukka (Qurna no. 39; cf. pls. 15:37* = 17:36*?), Ukupta lands (Qurna no. 28 ['Ipt]; cf. pls. 15:34* = 17:33* ['Ikpt]), Tunip (pls. 15:28* = 17:27*; Qurna nos. 32 + 38 [sic]), Pabahhi (pls. 15:30* = 17:29*; Qurna no. 34) and Barga (pls. 15:35* = 17:34*; Qurna no. 42). Kadesh also appears (pls. 15:29* = 17:28*; Qurna no. 31), as do Upper and Lower Retchenu, Naharin, Tahsy and Assyria (Qurna nos. 25, 26, 30, 33 + 35 [sic], 37). The last of these places, obviously,

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'Ḍmr is probably a mistake for Ḍmr, "Ṣumur" (cf. Spalinger, JARCE 16 [1979]:45, n. 71). Qurna (North) name-ring no. 23 is more probably to be read 'Ikpt rather than "Upe" as suggested by Spalinger, ibid., p. 38). For the locations of the northern toponyms in this list see E. Edel, "Neue Identifikationen in den konventionellen Namenzusammenstellungen des Neuen Reiches," SAK 3 (1975):51-54 (Pabahhi), 58-59 (Ardukka), 60-61 (the Ukupta lands). Since, with the exception of Ṣumur all the above-named localities lie in the north--some of them east of the Euphrates (see Edel's map, ibid., p. 73)--I see no reason why 'Irtg should be interpreted as the Syrian Arazig rather than the more northerly Ardukka, especially if Sety met contingents from these areas in battle (see n. 39 below).
would only be opposing Egypt at this time as an affiliate of Hatti; and the other names cited, along with the Nine Bows and traditional names that stand at the head of the list, are standard entries in lists claiming to show the extent of Egypt's empire and have no historical value whatsoever. Most of the names in the last section of the list from the Qurna Temple and in the first northern lists from Karnak, however are not at all "standard." Very few of the names either in the first or final lists from Karnak appear in topographical lists before the reign of Amenhotep III. The Hittites themselves turn up for the first time in lists of his reign, while still other names enter the lists under Horemheb. The rest make their first appearance only in the reign of Sety I. this distribution suggests that at least some names found in topographical lists of Sety I's time had

34Kadesh (pls. 15:29* = 17:28*) under Thutmose III (Simons, Handbook, List I); Qatna (pls. 15:31* = 17:30*) under Amenhotep II (ibid., List VI); Shasu (pls. 15:37* = 17:42*) under Thutmose IV (ibid., List VIII).

35Pls. 15:23* = 17:22* (ibid., List X); and also a few others: see E. Edel, Die Ortsnamen aus dem Totentempel Amenophis' III., Bonner biblische Beiträge 25 (Bonn, 1966), pp. 4-5 (Brg), 6 ('Irtyg, Ht3), 7 ('Irtyw, Mn[ws]?)(= pls. 15:33*, 35*, 36*, 38*; 17:32*, 34*, 36*, 43*).

36E.g., Pabahhi (pls. 15:30* = 17:29*; Simons, Handbook, List XI).

37Tunip (with the spelling Wnwm, pls. 15:28* = 17:27*; it is already attested under Thutmose III with the spelling "Tupip"; Simons, Handbook, p. 219); Ishuwa ("Isy = pls. 15:32* = 17:31"); 'Ikpt (pls. 15:34* = 17:33*).
SETY I'S LATER WARS

a real contemporary significance; and while Kadesh, Sumur and Ullaza lie in areas that Sety could have subdued in those campaigns that took him as far north as Kadesh and Amurru, the more northerly localities do not. Their presence can best be explained as reflecting Sety I's invading of these areas, or as his meeting of contingents from these countries in battle. The likeliest context for such an engagement, in turn, is a campaign against "the vile land of the Hittites," north of the areas that Egypt had traditionally claimed as her own.

In sum, it seems likelier than not that the Hittite war reliefs are to be taken seriously by historians, and that Sety I did campaign on Hittite territory. But did this

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18 The Asiatic names are markedly less stereotyped than the Nubian names found at Karnak—which as noted in Chicago, Reliefs IV, pp. 54 (n. a), 56 (n. a) and 64 (n. a), were borrowed from much earlier lists of Thutmose III. The selectivity shown in the composition of the first northern list suggests that they were carved after Sety had finished the campaigning described in the adjoining battle scenes. This conclusion is not compromised by the fact that the final northern lists were carved in palimpsest over earlier African names (see ibid., pp. 49-50 and 59), for we cannot rule out miscalculation by the scribes entrusted with laying out the triumph scenes, or a preliminary decision to stress Sety's later wars at the expense of any earlier campaigning (particularly since "Shasu" was already present in the original version of the scenes [pls. 15:37*=17:42*]). The secondary carving of the Palestinian names of the final Asiatic list may simply reflect a wish to give greater emphasis to these triumphs, rather than an earlier date (and a less historical cast) for both triumph scenes.

19 See Spalinger, BES 1 (1979):70-72, 84, especially p. 72, n. 54.

20 Thus they are not mere "space-fillers," as are, e.g., the Asiatic war scenes of Ramesses III (Med. HABU II 87-99). Although Sir Alan Gardiner, Egypt of the Pharaohs (Oxford, 1961), p. 298, and R. O. Faulkner, CAH' II.2 243-44, dismiss
happen before the conquest of Kadesh and Amurru, or afterwards? While the second alternative has always been regarded as the more probable, we should recall that, in his eighth and tenth years, Ramesses II would bypass both Kadesh and Amurru when he pushed deep into Hittite-held territory to conquer the cities of Dapur and Tunip.\textsuperscript{1} Though his efforts to establish Egyptian bases there failed, the strategy is worth noting: driving a wedge between Kadesh and Amurru was seen as having at least a chance of success; and it is possible that Ramesses II could have been influenced by an earlier use of this device, perhaps even by Sety I. Sety's success might then have sufficiently destabilized the Hittites' hold on central Syria to persuade the rulers of Kadesh and Amurru to side, once again, with Egypt. Carrying this hypothesis even further, it is conceivable that the people of Amurru, in their panic at the imminent Egyptian danger, might then have stampeded their

\textsuperscript{1}Kitchen, \textit{Pharaoh Triumphant}, pp. 68-70.
ruler, Benteshina, into abandoning the Hittite alliance and reentering "the following of the king of Egypt"—thus earning the unfavorable notice that the Shaushgamuwa Treaty would later give to them.

This is a possible scenario; but it is not, in my opinion, a convincing one. An Egyptian base in central Syria would be extremely difficult to maintain without the support of Kadesh and Amurru: with its long supply lines, subject to attack on three sides, it would be certain to fall, not only to a direct assault from the north, but to the forces which the Hittites would surely have poured into their border provinces to the east and west. Ramesses II's use of this strategy can be seen as a desperate gamble, a last resort following the loss of Kadesh and Amurru to Hatti. Notably, it was not a success. Sety, unlike his son, was not compelled to operate in the sure knowledge that these two provinces would stand in arms against him: the situation in his day was more flexible, and indeed, Amurru seems eventually to have changed sides of its own accord.

Success in central Syria depended, for Ramesses II, on the long chance he took with Tunip and Dapur. For Sety, it did not. Nor does it seem likely that the Hittite war would have been provoked by Hatti before the Egyptian takeover in Kadesh and Amurru. There is no good reason to suppose that the Hittites had expanded their border south of there under Horemheb and Ramesses I. And, once their boundaries were
established, the Hittites reacted to, rather than initiated, military actions in Syria: it is not likely that Muwatalli, being occupied with the same northern frontier wars that had plagued his predecessors, would gratuitously invade Egyptian territory. All of Sety's earlier operations, moreover, had taken place in areas that, in theory, already belonged to Egypt. Even if Sety I had probed the edges of Amurru in his third campaign, what we know of past Hittite policy does not suggest that Muwatalli would take an actively hostile view to Egypt's reestablishing control within her own sphere of influence.

On the other hand, it does not seem at all likely that the Hittites would acquiesce to the loss of their two most important Syrian provinces, the main buffer zones which protected their most reliable southern vassal, the kingdom of Carchemish. Their reaction would not be long in coming--certainly not as late as the early years of Sety's successor. The Hittite war shown at Karnak, then, is a logical candidate for the struggle over central Syria that must have come in the wake of Sety's reconquest of that region. What we can infer from the Karnak reliefs, as well as from the other indirect sources for this campaign, is

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'\(^2\) Albrecht Goetze, CAH' II.2 127-28; and Spalinger, BES 1 (1979):72-73.

'\(^3\) See Faulkner, CAH' II.2 221; Goetze, ibid., p. 252; Spalinger, BES 1 (1979):88-89; idem, JARCE 16 (1979):34 and 45, n. 48.
that Sety met a Hittite army, in part composed of diverse north Syrian levies--the "Asiatics" mentioned in the Karnak scenes--led, perhaps, by the Hittite king's deputy in the south, the king of Carchemish. There is scarcely any doubt that the Egyptians were victorious: one does not often commemorate one's own defeat! Both southern provinces remained in Egyptian hands for the time being, even though Kadesh would later defer to renewed Hittite strength by abandoning her Egyptian alliance before Amurru did. No cuneiform sources mention this campaign, but documents that might record a Hittite setback--royal year annals or penitential literature that would regard the Egyptian victory as a theodicy--do not survive from the reign of Muwatalli. In view of his later success, it is perhaps not surprising that an earlier defeat was not allowed to mar the triumphant picture that is reflected in later treaties and similarly tendentious records that are extant. Egypt's success in taking and then holding onto both Kadesh and Amurru carries with it a strong presumption of Hittite overconfidence and miscalculation: the king of Hatti does not seem to have met the challenge in person, nor does he

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"Except, perhaps, in the very specialized manner in which Ramesses II chose to memorialize the Battle of Kadesh: see Jan Assmann, "Krieg und Frieden in alten Ägypten: Ramses II. und die Schlacht bei Kadesch," Mannheimer Forum 83/84 (1983-84): 207-28."
appear to have met it in sufficient strength, even after Sety had overrun his two southern border provinces. This was a mistake which Muwatalli would not repeat when he finally confronted Ramesses II at Kadesh.
SUMMATION

The overthrow of the kingdom of Mitanni and its replacement by the Hittite Empire disrupted the peace of Western Asia for the better part of a century. During the period of Mitanni's struggle with Hatti, the normally volatile balance between the states of Syria became even less stable than before. The Hittites were slow at first to assert their dominance in the lands that had "belonged" to the Hurrian kings; and while Egypt showed herself capable of overcoming the most overt challenges to her authority, she did not take the initiative, either in pushing her own frontiers northward or in preventing developments that would eventually undermine her position at the edges of her own sphere. These conditions created a temporary and partial vacuum in Syria: excellent conditions for enterprising local rulers who sought to aggrandize themselves at the expense of their neighbors, and who cultivated good relations, now with one of the superpowers, now with the other, while playing on their mutual suspicions.

The vacuum, in the end, would be filled by Hatti, which was better situated than Egypt to dominate Syria. In the meantime, the expansionist policy of Shuppiluliuma I
was pitted against the availability of Egypt to champion all those who resisted the Hittite advance. This polarity—partly natural, but sedulously fostered by the vassal princes—would have made it difficult, at best, for Egypt and Hatti to come quickly to the same terms of agreement that had existed between Egypt and Mitanni. Yet, despite these odds, they almost did: at the death of Tutankhamon, Egypt showed herself willing to ratify the Hittites' possession of Syria, including Kadesh and Amurru, and to accept a new dynasty from the union of an Egyptian queen with a Hittite prince. The failure of this diplomatic marriage—an unfortunate accident—brought about the resumption of hostilities, to be ended only by the "halt in place" worked out by the next generation of Hittite and Egyptian rulers. Kadesh and Amurru remained Hittite; nothing, apparently, had changed.

The shock waves from this conflict of empires, however, had penetrated deep into each one. The Hittite border provinces of Kadesh and Nuhashshe repeatedly rebelled against their new masters. As recent additions to the Empire, their disaffection could be expected; and the near presence of a rival power was an added inducement to turn their coats. But the same instability now seems to have affected Egypt's closer Asiatic possessions. Not since the time of Thutmos IV had the Pharaohs of the later Eighteenth
Dynasty campaigned personally in Canaan and southern Syria.\(^1\) To the best of our knowledge, the armies of Tutankhamon and Horemheb encountered only the Hittites and their vassals in the field. With the start of the Nineteenth Dynasty, however, we begin to hear of troubles closer to home. Already, as Ramesses I's crown prince, Sety I had been warring against the Fenkhu lands.\(^2\) Soon following his accession as king in his own right, Sety was on his way to suppress the Shasu Bedouin; and not long afterwards, he had to quell yet other disturbances in Canaan and Lebanon. What we know of these actions shows them to be barely different from the local ructions that are so vividly described in the Amarna Letters. Yet nothing on this scale, and requiring the personal intervention of the Pharaoh, had occurred in these provinces since the days of the mid-Eighteenth Dynasty. What was it that impelled Sety I to lead the armies of Egypt into battle within her own bailiwick?

Sety has been credited with restoring the influence Egypt had lost in Asia during the Amarna Period.\(^3\) This view requires qualification: if the Egyptian presence in western Asia was not so strong as to preserve itself intact, it had


\(^2\)For the locality, see n. 41 to chap. 2 above.

never been so weak as to lose all cohesiveness. During the Amarna Period, and into the reign of Horemheb, Egypt had grappled with Hatti for mastery in central Syria. That she lost seems due primarily to her unfavorable strategic position and to the inadequacy of the resources she had committed to the struggle, not to any loss of nerve. In a contest for the possession of Syria, victory ultimately went to the preponderant power with the surest supply lines. Egypt was at a disadvantage: central Syria was lost to the Hittites, and without the cooperation of those vassals Egypt would never be able to restore her position there for long. The breaking of Egypt's entente cordiale with the northern superpower, moreover, and the highly visible diminution of her influence that followed would not improve her position with those Lebanese and Palestinian princes whose prudent loyalty to the Pharaoh had been so strenuously won during the Eighteenth Dynasty. It had been Egypt's understanding with Mitanni that had enabled her to treat her squabbling vassals with a measure of benign neglect. It is not at all surprising, now that a new and potentially hostile superpower faced Egypt in the north, that these fickle

' See n. 7 to chap. 1 above.

Cf. the course of the war between Hatti and Egypt under Ramesses II; and also the contest for Coele-Syria fought by the Ptolemies and the Seleucid monarchs: see W. W. Tarn, in CAH VII 699-731; Edouard Will, Histoire politique du monde hellénistique (323-30 av. J.-C.) I (Nancy, 1966), pp. 208-33.
princes would have to be taught again that the Pharaoh and his armies were, indeed, very well. What Sety had to do, in fact, was to reestablish the credibility of imperial Egypt. Sustaining this image involved him in an aggressive, conspicuously military policy that could only escalate, if carried to its logical conclusion, into a major war with Hatti.

Sety's Kadesh-Amurru campaign and his Hittite war were the opening salvos in a struggle that would drag on over the next two decades. In the beginning, both sides seesawed violently between victory and defeat, before settling down to an inconclusive tussle in which nobody won very much for long. Hatti, losing central Syria to Sety, got it back after the Battle of Kadesh. Ramesses II lost Upe in the wake of his Kadesh campaign, but regained it subsequently. Later efforts to improve on these positions were unsuccessful, and in the end both sides lapsed into about a decade of cold war. Only when the mutual interests of both parties brought them together for the comprehensive treaty of Ramesses II's twenty-first year was the optimal balance between them finally achieved. With Hatti and Egypt now truly in agreement, the states of western Asia that lay between them could also know peace--if only for the short time that remained before the coming of the Sea Peoples

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would alter in a more decisive manner the complexion of the Mediterranean world.
APPENDIX 1

TWO STELAE AND THE DATING OF SETY'S FIRST CAMPAIGN

Sety I alludes to the earliest military activities of his reign on two stelae he set up in the precinct of Amon-Re at Karnak. One of them, found at the Temple of Ptah, is dated to "regnal year one" and then proceeds as follows:¹

Now, as for the Good God, (he is) great of strength like the Son [of Nut, Montu] being on his right side (and) Re on his left side.² ... It is in order to widen his borders that he goes, his face being great (?) through his two strong arms. No foreign land can stand up before him, being fearful on account of his awesomeness. His renown has encompassed the foreign lands, (who say): "Your divine power is in the hearts of the Nine Bows!"

His Majesty returned, his heart being joyful, from his first campaign of victory, his assault against every foreign land having succeeded. He despoiled the rebellious foreign lands by means of the strength of his father Amon, who ordained for him valor and victory, and who has placed him in front of him. His heart is joyful while performing [wonders (?)] on behalf of his son and bequeathing to him Upper and Lower Egypt, west and east united. The one who violates his frontier is placed in his grasp. No one can oppose him. Their chiefs are brought as living captives, their tribute on their backs, presenting them to his august father Amon together with his Ennead, in order to fill their storehouses with male and female slaves, being the spoil of every foreign land.

¹KRI 1 40-41.

²Cf. pl. 23:4 of Chicago, Reliefs IV.
Now His Majesty (was) at the town of "The Southern City" (= Thebes), performing what his father, Amon-Re, Lord of the Thrones of the Two Lands praises. Gathered together (are) the chiefs...
THE DATING OF SETY'S FIRST CAMPAIGN

in time; for the "making" of the stela, on a particular day of a specific month in year one, must refer either to the decree ordaining its manufacture, the date of its completion, or the day on which it was set up at Karnak. Fortunately, neither of these documents is unique. They can be compared with many similar monuments; and the comparison may suggest a solution that grows out of the way datelines are used on the monuments themselves.¹

A number of ancient Egyptian documents record the performance of a certain action on a specific date: in most of these cases, the date and titulary of the king are followed by the expression hrw pn, "(on) this day," or by another expression which demonstrates the connection.⁶

¹The documents selected range in date from the Second Intermediate Period to the end of the New Kingdom. They are cited for convenience in the handiest publications HHBT, Urk. IV and KRI), with other literature being referred to whenever necessary. Dockets and other short entries in which the relationship between date and action is clearly spelled out have been omitted from this sampling.

⁶For example: HHBT, pp. 46-47 (inscription of Sobekhotep VIII, recording his visit to the flooded Karnak Temple on the fifth Epagomenal Day of IV Šmw in his fourth regnal year); ibid., pp. 100-103 (transfer of property on behalf of Queen Ahmose-Nofretari on IV 3ḥt 7 in an unknown year of Ahmose); Urk. IV 1885-86 (record of a royal audience on an unknown day in II 3ḥt under Amenhotep III); ibid., pp. 1965-80 (Earlier Proclamation in year <5>, IV Prt <13> of Akhenaten); ibid., pp. 1981-86 (Later Proclamation on IV Prt 13 of Akhenaten's sixth year); ibid., p. 2031 (activity in the palace at Memphis on IV 3ḥt 19 under Tutankhamon, possibly in his first regnal year; perhaps the date of issuing the decrees of restoration alluded to in the text above [ibid., pp. 2025-31]); ibid., p. 2078 (royal decree on III Šmw 16 of an unknown year of Tutankhamon); ibid., p. 2109 (royal decree on III Šmw I of Tutankhamon's third year); KRI I 3-4 (private donation on I Šmw 10 in Ramesses I's
Subsequent episodes that are recorded in such documents are of secondary interest, for the main emphasis is placed on the first (dated) decree. 

A far greater number of documents lack the specifying formula "(on) this day," but their contents record events that can be reasonably connected to the initial date. Many of these documents are decrees (defined by the formula \( \text{w} \text{d}-\text{nswt}, \) or a variant thereof). 

\begin{itemize}
  \item P. 11-12 (announcement of a rebellion on III \( \text{Smw} \) 10 in year 1 of Sety I);
  \item P. 16 (announcement of a rebellion on an unknown date in the reign of Sety I);
  \item Pp. 37-38 (royal decree issued at Memphis on the last day of III \( \text{Smw} \) in Sety I's first regnal year);
  \item Pp. 65-67 (visit by Sety I to the area around Wadi Mia on III \( \text{Smw} \) 20 in his ninth regnal year);
  \item P. 79 (quarrying record from an unknown year of Sety I);
  \item II 226 ff. (Hittite Treaty of Ramesses II: date of the arrival of the Hittite envoy bearing the silver tablet of the treaty);
  \item P. 369-71 (burial dates of the sacred bulls in the sixteenth, twenty-sixth and thirtieth years of Ramesses II);
  \item Pp. 803-06 (judicial proceedings on II 3h\( \text{t} \) 14 in Ramesses II's forty-sixth year);
  \item Pp. 361 ff. (Manshiyet es-Sadr stela; date of Ramesses II's promenade prior to achievement of works mentioned later in the text);
  \item III 464-65 (oracle delivered on III 3h\( \text{t} \) 25 in Ramesses II's fourteenth regnal year);
  \item V 228 (royal commission issued on III Prt 8 of Ramesses III's sixth year);
  \item P. 230 (activity in Memphis on I \( \text{Smw} \) 24 of year 1[4] + X under Ramesses III);
  \item VI 283 (oracle delivered on III 3h\( \text{t} \) 8 in the seventh year of Ramesses VI).
\end{itemize}


\'For example, HHBT, pp. 11-12, 18-19, 73-74, 122-26, 130, 133 (top, no. 140), 142; Urk. IV 45-49, 193-96, 832, 1737, 2170-71; KRI I 45, 46-58 (at p. 50:12-13), 73 (bottom, no. 36), 74, 85-96 (Nile stelae of Sety I, Ramesses II, Merneptah and Ramesses III at West Silsila); ibid. II 362-63; ibid. IV 73-74; ibid. V 231, 234-37; ibid. VI 10, 12.
documents, issued under the royal aegis; and still others are couched in a manner that strongly suggests a connection between the date and the action (or actions) involved. One notable subgenre in this category is what is known as the Königsnovelle, whereby the king holds an audience on a certain day, summons his courtiers and announces his plans, often in highly rhetorical language. It can be safely assumed in these cases that the royal audience and the resulting decree are to be dated identically, unless the text provides reason to believe otherwise. By extension, the consecutive operations recorded in occasional memorials such as quarrying inscriptions or grants of royal favor are so closely connected that it seems certain that they occurred in close proximity to one another during the regnal year to which they are assigned.

Many other inscriptions, however, record a a number of episodes, which are all under the heading of a single date. Sometimes, as in Sety I's stela from the Ptah Temple at Karnak, this date is simply a regnal year date which, prima facie, embraces all the activities described in the text. Such documents, giving only the regnal year without the month or the day, are relatively few. Some examples follow.

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9 I.e., HHBT, pp. 65-69 (the "stèle juridique" from Karnak).

10 For example, HHBT, pp. 21-29; Urk. IV 349-54, 1252-73, 1738, 1739, 1867, 1869; KRI I 2-3, 60-61; ibid. II 353-60.

11 Urk. IV 24-25, 393-94, 1681, 2177.
THE ROAD TO KADESH

1. Victory stelae of Kamose (HHBT, pp. 82-97)

   Following the date, "regnal year 3," and the listing of royal titulary, the narrative can be broken down into the following sections:
   a. The royal audience: Kamose announces his intentions;
   b. The campaign up to Nefrusi;
   c. Kamose's boastful speech to the Hyksos king;
   d. The campaign up to Avaris;
   e. The intercepted message of the Hyksos king to the son of the Kushite ruler, and Kamose's final harrying of the northern country;
   f. Kamose and his army arrive in Thebes during the Inundation season;
   g. Kamose commands the seal bearer Nesha to have his deeds recorded on a public monument.

2. Records of the first Hittite marriage of Ramesses II (KRI II 233-56)

   Following the date, "regnal year 34," and the statement of the king's titulary, there is a long rhetorical introduction dwelling on the prowess of the king and alluding to his past triumphs. The narrative begins:
   a. The Hittite ruler appeals to the king of Egypt for peace "year by year," but to no avail;
b. Seeing the devastation of his country, the Hittite ruler summons his army and announces his decision to send his daughter to Egypt;
c. News of these events reaches Egypt, and Ramesses makes arrangements to receive the wedding party;
d. Ramesses prays to Seth to ensure good weather for the arriving delegation, and Seth responds favorably;
e. Arrival of the wedding party at Piramesse in "regnal year 34, III Prt": presentation of the Hittite princess at court;
f. Final state of accord between Egypt and Hatti.

3. Inscription of the first Libyan war of Ramesses III (Med. Habu I 27-28)

The date, "regnal year 5," is followed by the king's full titulary and a long section in praise of his might. Then:

a. The plans of the Libyan coalition;
b. Previous arrangements in Libya, frustrated by the present rebellion;
c. Ramesses III defeats the rebellious Libyans;
d. The expedition's triumphant return to Egypt;
e. Misery of the vanquished Libyans;
f. Defeat of the "northern countries" (actually, in Ramesses III's eighth regnal year);
g. Final glorification of the king.
4. Inscription of Ramesses III's war against the Sea Peoples (Med. Habu I 45b, 46)

Following the date, "year 8," there is the usual sequence of titles, names and rhetoric in praise of the king, followed by:

a. The advance of the Sea Peoples' confederation;
b. Ramesses' preparations by land and sea;
c. Defeat of the invaders;
d. Praises of the champion king.

Were it not for the undated, and otherwise unmarked interpolation of events from Ramesses III's eighth year into the inscription of year 5, all of these narratives could fall plausibly within the regnal year that is mentioned. The military accounts of Kamose and Ramesses III might be compared with the year annals of Thutmose III, in which the events of the year's campaigning are described under the heading of a single regnal year.\footnote{Ibid., pp. 685-721 (Fifth through Fourteenth Campaigns).} The events on the "Marriage Stela," also, could all have taken place within the same regnal year; for since the \textit{terminus ante quem} is the arrival in Piramesse of the Hittite marriage party in III Přt of year 34, its dispatch from Hatti should also fall within that year even if the month's duration of the journey between Hatti and Egypt\footnote{On the duration of this journey, see E. Edel, "Weitere...} were doubled. The observable
regularity in the use of regnal year dates in such long narrative inscriptions, however, is seemingly disrupted by the injection of events from Ramesses III's eighth year into his inscription of year 5. This insertion does not compromise the value of the main text; in fact, it is useful in showing that both historical inscriptions were composed and executed following the occurrence of events described in the later narrative. Yet the mere presence of this material in the inscription of year 5, undistinguishable by any internal criteria from the rest of its contents, raises the possibility that events described in other narratives (dated...
to a specific regnal year) might also fall outside the regnal year cited. Kamose's commissioning of his victory stelae, for instance, could have fallen sometime after the campaign's end, even in a subsequent regnal year: in our ignorance of Kamose's accession date and of the immediate sequence of events following his return home, we cannot prove that it did not.

Facing the uncertainties, however, does not require that we fall into critical paralysis because of them. The intrusion of later events into the narrative dated to Ramesses III's fifth year, at any rate, is something that is easily identifiable from other reliefs and inscriptions at Medinet Habu.\textsuperscript{14} Nothing of the sort is found in the inscription of year 8, nor can it be demonstrated from anything in the Kamose stelae. Lacking any evidence to the contrary, it is perhaps wisest to opt for the most

\textsuperscript{14}Quarrying for the Medinet Habu temple of Ramesses III began in the very year of his first war against the Libyans: see Champ., \textit{Not. descr.} I 255–57; K. R. Lepsius, \textit{Denkmaeler aus Aegypten und Aethiopien} (Expedition 1842–45) VI (Berlin, 1849), p. 23:6–8; and Breasted, \textit{Ancient Records of Egypt} IV 11–12 (sections 19–20). Thus, the carving of the inscription must have followed by some time the events it describes; and the intrusion of the events of year 8 into it reflects only its later composition, after the Sea Peoples war had been won. It would seem that most of the work on the Great Temple at Medinet Habu was done in the second half of Ramesses III's first decade, an impression reinforced by the carving of the year 11 victory festival over the Meshwesh over an earlier part of the calendar (see \textit{KRI} V 172–73). On all this, cf., K. C. Seele, "Some Remarks on the Family of Ramesses III," in \textit{Ägyptologische Studien} (ed. by Otto Firchow), Institut für Orientforschung, Veröffentlichungen 29 (Berlin, 1955), p. 308.
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straightforward explanation that is open to us, and to assume that the events described in these narratives all belong to the regnal year to which they are assigned, unless there is good reason to believe otherwise—for instance, regarding the previous conditions alluded to by Ramesses II (above, 2a) and by Ramesses III (3b), which must precede the year of the main narrative. To go beyond this, by assuming long intervals between the events on these documents without any internal or external basis for doing so, involves questionable methodology that can only lead to historical fantasy.

Another, more plentiful class of documents are those which are dated to a single day within the regnal year. This date can refer to only one of the several events described, and in the absence of the specifying "(on) this day . . .," it is not always clear how the choice can be made.

5. Inscription of Thutmose I from Seheli (Urk. IV 89-90)

"Regnal year 3, I Šmw 22 under the Majesty of the King of Upper and Lower Egypt, Okheperkare, given life. His Majesty commanded the excavation of this canal, after he had found it [bloc]ked with stones, (and) no [boat could] sail [on it]. He we[nt north] on it . . . ."
Two other inscriptions from the same region provide the solution to the choice between the commanding and the finishing of this task. Both are dated to I šmw 22 in year 3, one stating that "his Majesty returned from Kush, (and) from having overthrown [his] opponent[s]" (ibid., p. 88 [bottom]); the other, "His Majesty's navigation of this canal, in victory and in might, in his returning from overthrowing vile Kush" (ibid., p. 89 [top]). This war had itself been commemorated over seven months previously, in a rhetorical inscription at Tombos dated to Thutmose I's second year, II 3ḥt 15 (ibid., pp. 82-89). One suspects that the king issued the necessary orders on his way south, allowing the canal to be cleared while he was in Nubia. In any event, the date on the Seheli inscription clearly refers to the second of the two events mentioned, the king's passage through the cleared canal, not to the decree that had commanded the work.

6. Inscription of Thutmose II on the road between Aswan and Philae (Urk. IV 137-41)
   a. Date, "regnal year 1, II 3ḥt 8," and royal titulary;
   b. The king is in his palace, receiving tribute from the Asiatics (ibid., pp. 137:16-138:10);
   c. Announcement of the rebellion in Nubia (ibid., pp. 138:12-139:7);
d. The king's anger (ibid., p. 139:9-16);
e. "Then His Majesty dispatched many troops to Nubia on his first occasion of victory . . ." (ibid., p. 140:3-5);
f. "Then this army of His Majesty reached vile Kush . . ." (ibid., p. 140:6-8);
g. "And this army of His Majesty overthrew these foreigners . . ." (ibid., p. 140:9-14);
h. "Now His Majesty is arisen on the dais while the living captives which this army brought to His Majesty were dragged in . . ." (ibid., pp. 140:15-141:4);
i. Triumph of Thutmose I ascribed to the favor of Amon.

7. Sehēl inscription of Thutmose III (Urk. IV 814-15)
   Dated "year 50, I Šmw 22," this text very closely parallels the earlier memorial of Thutmose I (no. 5 above): "His Majesty commanded the excavation of this canal . . . . He sailed north on it . . . ." By analogy with the earlier inscription, the date here should refer to the king's navigation of the canal rather than his command that it be cleared.

THE ROAD TO KADESH

a. Date, "year 3, III Šmwy 15" (A), with titulary and praises of the king (A and E: ibid., pp. 1289-1294:12);  
b. "Now His Majesty is embellishing (snfr) this temple which his father, the King of Upper and Lower Egypt, Menkheperre, made for his fathers, all the gods . . ." (ibid., pp. 1294:13-1295:8);  
c. Description of Amenhotep II's works in the temple (ibid., pp. 1295:9-1296:6);  
d. "Now His Majesty caused this stela to be made, it being set up in this temple at the Station of the Lord, L.P.H., carved with the great name of the Lord of the Two Lands, the Son of Re, Amenhotep II, in the house of his fathers, the gods (A; "in the house of his father Khnum, Lord of Kebhu," E), after the return of His Majesty from Upper Retchenu, after he had overthrown his enemies while broadening the boundaries of Egypt on his first campaign of victory. His Majesty returned, . . ., when he had killed the seven chiefs . . . who had been in the district of Takhsy, (they) being placed upside down on the prow of the falcon ship of His Majesty. . . . And the six men of these opponents were hung in front of the rampart of Thebes, the hands as well; the other enemy was brought south to Nubia, being hung from the rampart of Napata. . . ." (ibid., pp. 1296:7-1298);
e. Colophon to the Elephantine stela, dated "year 4," recording a decree for additional improvements in the Temple of Khnum (ibid., p. 1299).

The identity of the datelines in both stelae is supported both by the traces of the date on the Elephantine stela (Urk. IV 1289:2) and by the date of its colophon (ibid., p. 1299), which one would expect to be subsequent to the provisions outlined in the main text. I have already discussed in detail my reasons for believing that the initial date on both stelae refers to the ordering of the stated improvements in both temples (sections b and c above) rather than the actual emplacement of the stelae.\textsuperscript{15} Since Amenhotep II's "first campaign of victory" took place in his seventh regnal year (see ibid., p. 1301:2, 15), the passage that describes how the stela was set up after the first campaign is a digression. It is distinguished from what precedes not only by the length, specificity and subject of the narrative, but also by its elaborate account of the circumstances surrounding the erection of the stela: similar passages in other inscriptions are short and go no further than to record the king's command for the making of a stela.\textsuperscript{16} Thus, although it is an outside source (once

\textsuperscript{15} W. J. Murnane, \textit{Ancient Egyptian Coregencies}, SAOC 40 (1977), pp. 44-48.

\textsuperscript{16} I.e., \textit{HHBT}, p. 97 (Kamose Stela): \textit{Urk.} IV 675:5 + 1232:11-12 (references to stelae on the Euphrates), 1283:12-14, 1662:12 (visits to sites of stelae commissioned
again) that supplies the hard evidence for the separation of the principal episodes in the text, this separation is also indicated internally—-not by means of a dateline, but by a detailed account of the circumstances that would have been readily understood by near contemporaries.

9. Sphinx Stela of Thutmose IV (Urk. IV 1540-44)
   a. Date, "regnal year 1, III 3ḥt 19," and titles of the king;
   b. Praises of the king;
   c. The king's youth, and his habit of taking exercise in the pyramid fields near Memphis;
   d. Prince Thutmose's dream;
   e. Awakening and pious response of prince;
   f. Finale (badly broken).

Since there appears not to have been coregency of Thutmose IV with his father, Amenhotep II,¹⁷ the date must refer to the realization of the pious intentions outlined in the penultimate section of the text (e), which were only carried out once the Sphinx's prophecy had come to pass, i.e., when Thutmose IV had become king (referred to, very probably, in the final, broken lines of the inscription).

¹⁷Murnane, Ancient Egyptian Coregencies, pp. 117-23.
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10. Konosso stela of Thutmose IV (Urk. IV 1545-48)
   a. Date, "regnal year 8, III Prt 2," and titles of the king;
   b. "Now His Majesty was in the Southern City, at the town of Karnak," sacrificing to the gods;
   c. Announcement of the rebellion in Nubia;
   d. Oblation to Amon on the next morning (ibid., pp. 1545:14-1546:3);
   e. Sending of the army to crush the rebellion;
   f. The king sets off for Nubia "after this";
   g. Stop at Edfu for the festival of "washing the image";
   h. The king joins the army and locates the Nubian enemy;
   i. Finale (text breaks off).

11. Aswan stela of Amenhotep III (Urk. IV 1665-66)
   a. Date, "year 5, III 3ḥt 2," and titles of king;
   b. Announcement of the rebellion in Nubia;
   c. Suppression of the revolt;
   d. Praises of the victorious king.

Prima facie, it would appear that the dateline here is to be connected with the formula that immediately follows it, ḫṯt ḫr ḫm n Hr . . . , "appearance by"¹ the Majesty of Horus (King Amenhotep III)." But when did this appearance

¹"Gardiner, Gr.", section 39 (bottom) with references.
take place? The earlier inscription in which this formula was used (see no. 6 above) describes a Nubian campaign under Thutmose II, culminating in the royal victory celebration at the end of the war (Urk. IV 137:10, 140:15-141:4). It seems likely, though it is nowhere stated, that the dateline refers to this climactic event. The same might well be true in this case, as in so many others where the commemorative monument was clearly made after the end of the war. There is, unfortunately, no way of establishing when Amenhotep III's campaign in Nubia ended, though it seems probable that the dateline of this stela refers to that end. Another stela, on an island in the First Cataract, at Konosso, describes "His Majesty's return, having triumphed in his campaign of victory, from the land of vile Kush . . . (and) he establishes the stela of victories at the limit of (r-mn) the Fountain of Horus" (ibid., p. 1662:8-12). Given the proximity of these two monuments, both from Amenhotep III's fifth year and both in the area of the First Cataract, it seems likely that they were set up on the same occasion, i.e., the return of the expedition from Nubia, and that both datelines refer to this event.

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2 See Gauthier, *Dict. géog.* V 171 for references and past interpretations. On the basis of this text, the term should refer to the area of Nubia, perhaps even to the First Cataract specifically.
12. Sinai stela of Amenmose (Urk. IV 1891-93)
   a. Dated "regnal year 36, II Prt 9" of Amenhotep III;
   b. "Now His Majesty (was) in the Southern City, [on the west]rn [si]de of Thebes. Now it was commissioned unto NN to pro[vide turquo]ise, as His Majesty was anticipating\textsuperscript{21} a Jubilee";
   c. "And [there took place the da]wn of the last day of [ . . .]\textsuperscript{22} now [NN set out (?)]"
   d. Account of favorable reception of the mining expedition by Hathor, goddess of Sinai;
   e. Praises of Amenmose;
   f. Previous experience and rewarding of Amenmose by the king;
   g. Departure of Amenmose by sea for Egypt;
   h. Safe arrival of the expedition at Thebes.

The proper interpretation of this record is made difficult by the very poor preservation of some of its most important lines. It has been demonstrated, however, that

\textsuperscript{21}Van Siclen, \textit{JNES} 32 (1973):296, n. 32.

\textsuperscript{22}W. Helck restores \[\text{h}b$-$sd\] on external and, I believe, insufficient ground in "Die Sinai Inschrift des Amenmose," \textit{MIO} 2 (1954):190, at "Zeile 6"; the previous restoration of \[\text{h}d$$-$t3\] is more plausible, given the surviving trace of the wedge with stroke as determinatives; but the extreme damage to this section of the text recommends the sort of caution shown in the interpretation of this passage by Černý in A. H. Gardiner, T. E. Peet, and J. Černý, \textit{The Inscriptions of Sinai II}, \textit{MEES} 45 (1955), p. 166 (at no. 211).
the last day of Amenhotep III's Jubilee fell on III šmwy 2,
and that it had begun on IV ṗrt 26, just over two months
earlier. Thus the commissioning of the expedition did not
take place during this festival, either on the second or the
third occasion of its celebration by Amenhotep III (see nn.
21-22 above). The dateline could still refer to the date of
that commission at Thebes: a few other inscriptions at
Sinai lend themselves to just that interpretation. Lacking
the specifying formula "(on) this day . . .," however, these
passages could as easily be taken as describing the earlier
events that led up to a (dated) event in Sinai itself. As
in most other dated inscriptions at Sinai, it is likely that
all these datelines refer, not to the royal commission, but
to the day on which the memorial was left on the site. A
good parallel can be found in the Wādi Hammāmāt inscriptions
from the second year of Nebtowyre Montuhotep IV, whose
"official" tablets (nos. 113 and 192), in fact, begin with a
dateline, II 3ḥt 15, followed immediately by a statement of
the royal commission. The internal evidence of these
narratives shows, however, that all the datelines of these
texts refer to events in the Wādi Hammāmāt itself: on II

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2I.e., Gardiner, Peet, and Černý, Sinai II, pp. 187-88
(no. 275), 193 (no. 296), 194 (no. 302).

3For translations and references to the publications,
see W. Schenkel, Memphis - Heracleopolis - Theben, AA 12
3ḥt 3 occurred the miracle of the pregnant gazelle, on the yet unquarried site of Nebtowyre's sarcophagus lid (no. 110); the dedication of the stelae on II 3ḥt 15 corresponds to the "bringing" of the sarcophagus (see no. 113:13), followed by the extraction of its lid on II 3ḥt 27 (colophon to no. 192). By analogy, the dateline on Amenmose's stela could refer to the date on which he left his memorial at Sinai, rather than to the previous royal commands or to the clearly prospective account of his return to Egypt (sections g and h above).

13. Nubian war stelae of Akhenaten (at Buhen and Amada)26

a. Dates: "[regnal year 1]2, III 3ḥt 20" (Buhen); "[regnal year --], I 3ḥt 13" (Amada);27

b. The king is in [his palace];

c. Announcement of the rebellion;


27Thus Smith, Fortress, p. 126, n. 1; cf. A. R. Schulman, "The Nubian War of Akhenaton," in L'Égyptologie en 1979: Axes prioritaires de recherches II, Colloques internationaux du Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique 595 (Paris, 1982), p. 301, n. 16--both on the date of the Buhen Stela. My examination of the published facsimile suggests that "year 13, IV 3ḥt" is also a possible restoration of the date, and may even be preferred if the spacing of the numerals is assumed to have been consistent. Could the date on the Amada Stela have been the same, i.e., [II]I 3ḥt 20 (damaged, hence misread "13")?
d. Commissioning of the viceroy Thutmose to suppress the revolt;

e. Victory over the enemy;

f. Booty from the war;

g. Speech of the viceroy and paean to the king.

Both these stelae were found, not at the Egyptian border, but in Nubia. This would imply that they were so situated to commemorate an Egyptian victory not far away; and this would suggest that the datelines (if these are in fact different datelines for what appears to be the same text) refer to some event which took place following the end of the hostilities.

14. Records of Sety I's Nubian war from Sai and Amara West (KRI I 102-4)

a. Date, "regnal year 8, [--] Prt 20" (see Appendix 3 for a discussion of the year numeral), and royal titulary;

b. The king is in Thebes;

c. Announcement of the rebellion;

d. Sending of the expedition to Nubia;

e. "The army of His Majesty reached the fortress (named) <Pacifier of the Two Lands> on <III> Prt 13; one joined with them, the might of the Pharaoh (being) before them like a blast of fire, trampling the hills. (When) the dawn of
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seven days had come to pass, the might of Menma'atre was carrying them off, not one of them being missing...(but) he had captured the six wells," etc.;

f. Booty from the campaign

A literal reading of the passage dealing with the victory (e) suggests that the hostilities were finished in less than seven days after the expeditionary force had arrived at the fortress. It would be tempting to read the opening dateline as [III] Prt 20, making it the climactic final day of the war; but this is quite uncertain.

15. Libyan victory stela of Merneptah ("Israel Stela": KRI IV 13-19)

a. Date, "year 5, III šmw 3," and titulary of the king;

b. Glorification of Merneptah;

c. Paean on the defeat of the Libyans;

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2"To the publication of the text of the Sai stela in KRI I now add the facsimilie by Jean Vercoutter, "Le pays d'Irem et la première pénétration égyptienne en Afrique," in Livre du Centenaire IFAO, 1880-1980, MIFAO 104 (1980), p. 159, fig. 1. The traces of the name of the fortress as given here suggest, even more than they do in KRI I 103:10, the restoration sg[r]<h t3wy> (for the expression, with references, see Wb. IV 324:7; but cf. Vercoutter, "Le pays d'Irem," p. 166, n. 1). In the dateline that follows, two out of the three ticks are visible, and the spacing strongly suggests "III"; the month-name and day-numeral are both clear. (On p. 158 of "Le pays d'Irem," Vercoutter unaccountably reads ssw 21; on the drawing, however, it is clearly ssw 13.) For ḫs r, see Wb. V 398:9.
d. Rejoicing in Egypt;
e. Triumph of Egypt over all foreign lands.

16. Granite columns celebrating Libyan victory of Merneptah (KRI IV 23, 38)
   a. Date, "year 5, II šmw," and titles of king;
   b. Announcement of the rebellion;
   c. Sending of the army;
   d. Final tally of Libyan casualties.

17. Another Libyan war stela of Merneptah (KRI IV 19-22)
   a. Date, "year 5, III šmw 3," and titles of king;
   b. Praises of the victorious Merneptah;
   c. Tally of the spoils.

Documents 15-17 supplement the main account of Merneptah's Libyan wars from Karnak, which dates the crucial battle of the campaign to III šmw 3; but the expedition must already have been underway during the previous month, as is evident from the account of its activities prior to the beginning of III šmw, including the notice regarding its preparations "to join battle in fourteen days" (see KRI IV 5:8-6:2, etc.). The date in II šmw on the victory columns (no. 16) must then refer to the start of the war—the announcement of the invasion and the measures taken to cope
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with the danger—as a number of other writers have already suspected.29

18. Stelae of the Nubian war of Merneptah (KRI IV 33-37)
   a. Date, "year 6, I 3ḥt 1," and titulary of king;
   b. Announcement of the rebellion;
   c. "Regnal year 5, III Šmw 1, corresponding to the return of the valiant army of His Majesty which had smitten the vile chieftain of Libya";
      wretched fate of the Libyans, "the remainder being placed on the stick at the south of Memphis";
   d. "The fierce lion sent the fiery blast of his mouth against the land of Wawat . . . .";
   e. Exemplary punishment of the rebels;
   f. Final praises of the king.

Some confusion arises here from the dating of the return of the victorious army from Libya—which, as we have seen, could not have been on III Šmw 1, as described here (see nos. 15, 17). Assuming that the victory celebrations at Memphis took place in the Harvest season, however, the

29 E. Edel, "Ein Kairener Fragment mit einem Bericht Über dem Libyerkrieg Merneptahs," ZÄS 86 (1961):101-2 with references; A. P. Zivie, "Quelques remarques sur un monument nouveau de Mérenptah," GM 18 (1975):45-50. It is unlikely that II Šmw is a mistake for III, given that the lower numeral is found on two separate copies of the same text.
The dateline in year 6 must still fall over a year later, near the very end of the regnal year. While the sequence of the text could imply that the army went straight to Nubia after it had finished with the Libyans, the allusion might simply be a reminder of its recent, conspicuous triumph. There is thus no clear indication as to whether the dateline refers to the beginning of the Nubian war or its end.

19. Victory stela of Sethnakht from Elephantine
   a. Titulary of the king;
   b. Rhetorical account of Egypt's sorry condition;
   c. "[Regnal year] 2, II Šmw 10: there are no opponents of His Majesty, L.P.H., in all the lands";
   d. Rhetorical finale.

20. Inscription of Ramesses III's second Libyan war
   (Med. Habu II 80-83)
   a. Date, "year 11, IV Šmw 10 + x," and titulary of king;
   b. "Beginning of the victory of Egypt," followed by praises of the king;
   c. Antecedents of the war;

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30 For the accession day of Merneptah in the early part of the season of 3ḥt, see Wente and Van Siclen, in Studies in Honor of George R. Hughes, p. 235, and n. 106.

The expedition sets out;
Capture of the Libyan chieftain and victory of the Egyptians;
Flight and wretched condition of the Meshwesh Libyans;
Triumph of Ramesses III and his speech to his court.

21. Another inscription of the second Libyan war (Med. Habu II 83-86)
Date, "year 11, II Prt 8," and titulary of the king;
Praises of the king and reflections on the abjectness of the foreign countries;
More rhetoric, including an allusion to the first Libyan war;
The second invasion from Libya;
The father of the captured Libyan chief is tricked, and the Libyans are routed;
Rejoicing in Egypt and praises of the king.

In addition to these two dates referring to the war in Ramesses III's eleventh year, there is yet another: namely, "regnal year 11, first month of 3ḥt day 28: the destroy[ing] of the land of the Meshwesh which King Ramesses III did," a festival day in the calendar of feasts at Medinet Habu (KRI V 173). Since Ramesses III's accession date (and thus the
change in regnal year) fell on I Šmw 26 (see KRI V 140, bottom), these three dates can be placed in their proper sequence:

IV Šmw 10 x (no. 20)
I 3ḥt 28 (Feast of Victory)
II Prt 8 (no. 21).

Since the first of these datelines (no. 20) is immediately followed by the phrase, "beginning of the victory of Egypt", it does not seem to be merely impressionistic to place the outbreak of the war at this time. The "Feast of Victory" falls one and a half months later, time enough for us to take it at its face value as the actual date of the Libyans' defeat. Four and a half months later--nearly seven months after the start of the war--Ramesses III had finally settled the affairs of Libya and was able to celebrate the public triumph that is alluded to, albeit rhetorically, in the first inscription of the series (no. 20g) and implied in the second (no. 21f).

This selection of documents, while it does not by any means encompass all of the dated inscriptions by New Kingdom Pharaohs, conveniently illustrates the manner in which only one date can precede a narrative which contains more than one episode. There are also many cases where a specific dateline is assigned, not merely to one sequence of events, but to an
entirely rhetorical composition. Two of these are interesting enough to merit discussion:

22. Armant stela of Thutmose III (Urk. IV 1244-47)
   a. Titulary and date, "regnal year 22, II Prt 10: collection of the occasions of valor and victory which this Good God made, consisting of every effective occasion of energetic action (sp nb mnḥ n pr-c)";
   b. Generalized deeds of valor; the king splits a copper target;
   c. Triumphs at hunting: (i) general; (ii) the elephant hunt at Niya, on the king's return from Naharin; (iii) the rhinoceros hunts in the deserts of Nubia;
   d. Expeditions to Djahy: (i) [date?], the Megiddo campaign; (ii) date, "regnal year 29, IV Prt 10 + x"; the rest is broken away.

The individual events referred to in this document are apparently compiled under several topical headings. The initial dateline relates, specifically, to none of them, although it has been ingeniously suggested as the date on which Thutmose III assumed sole rule in Egypt, after the

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1 I.e., Urk. IV 82-85, 806-10, 1228-43; HHBT p. 143; KRI I 97-98, 100, 117; ibid. II 150, 224, 262, 337; ibid. IV 73; ibid. V 231, 239; ibid. VI 17, 227.
death of his senior coregent and aunt, Hatshepsut. Each of the sections that follow has its own internal consistency: a chronological sequence is not observed among them, nor is it certain that the same rules govern the arrangement of each section. Thus, while the expeditions to Djahy (d) seem to be in proper order, the preceding section on hunting (c) places the elephant hunt from year 33 (cf. Urk. IV 696-97) before the rhinoceros hunt during Thutmose III's "first campaign of victory" in Nubia (ibid., pp. 1247 [bottom], 1248), which could have been earlier. Thus it is

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33 Margaret Drower, in The Temples of Armant, Text Volume, Sir Robert Mond and Oliver H. Myers, MEES 43 (1940), p. 183, n. b.

34 I.e., the Megiddo campaign of year 22 (the starting date for which could be broken away on the stela; cf. Urk. IV 1246:13; and Drower in The Temples of Armant, p. 183); and the fifth campaign (Urk. IV 685-88).

35 The dating of Thutmose III's "first campaign" in Nubia is difficult: D. B. Redford, History and Chronology of the Eighteenth Dynasty of Egypt (Toronto, 1967), pp. 61-62, has argued that the Nubian campaign fought already under Hatshepsut is meant, and in this he is followed by David O'Connor, in The Cambridge History of Africa I, ed. J. Desmond Stuart (New York, 1975), p. 904. This case, however, overlooks the topical arrangement of episodes on the Armant stela and rests on the fact that the Nubian campaign is described before the Megiddo campaign of year 22 in this document; whereas, the Nubian war is itself preceded by the account of Thutmose III's eighth campaign, in year 33. There is no reason why Thutmose III's "first" Nubian campaign could not be subsequent to this date: T. Säve-Söderbergh, The Navy of the Eighteenth Egyptian Dynasty, Uppsala Universitets Årsskrift 6 (Uppsala, 1946), p. 6, n. 1, suggests that it took place as late as the forty-seventh year, identifying the stela mentioned in the Armant text (Urk. IV 1246:5) as the Gebel Barkal Stela, which is dated to that year (ibid., pp. 1228 ff.). While I do not believe that this is necessarily so in every detail, Säve-Söderbergh is correct, in my opinion, to recognize the
possible, though not at all certain, that this section is organized on geographical, instead of chronological lines.

23. Aswan stela of Ramesses II (KRI II 344-45)

a. Date, "year 2, III Šmw 26," and titles of the king;\(^1\)
b. Rhetorical text, speaking of his victories over "Asiatics . . ., foreigners of the North . . ., Libyans . . ." and also "warriors of the Sea (in or threatening?) Lower Egypt";
c. Giving praise by an official.

While the dateline probably refers to the ex-voto left in the quarries near Aswan, the fulsome phrases that intervene are of unusual interest in mentioning the first dated eruption of the Sea Peoples into the Mediterranean world. The Egyptians' first brush with them must have

\(^*\)

relevance of the data from Armant for this question; for on the Armant stela, it is said that "he (= Thutmose III) set up his stela there (= in the Nubian country of Miw) as he had done behind [the Euphrates]." If this conceit was genuinely Thutmose III's, rather than merely that of the writer of this inscription, it would place the campaign sometime after year 33, and the chronological consistency of each section of the Armant stela would be maintained. Note that the tribute of Kush and Wawat only makes its appearance in Thutmose III's annals as of year 31 (see ibid., pp. 695 ff.), with a son of the ruler of Irem being brought as a hostage to Egypt in year 34 (ibid., p. 708:12).

preceded this date, falling earlier in the reign of Ramesses II or at the very end of that of Sety I. Out of the eighteen dated inscriptions considered here, seven (nos. 5, 7, 9, 15, 17, 19, and 21) bear datelines that clearly refer to the latest episode that is mentioned in the text; and the datelines of another five (nos. 11, 12, 13, 14, 23) more probably refer to a later than earlier event in each of the narratives. Three cases (nos. 6, 10, 18) are inconclusive; and the four examples in which the dateline refers to an early episode (nos. 8, 16, 20, 22) are exceptional in a number of ways. Amenhotep II's texts (no. 8) are mainly concerned with his works in the Amada and Elephantine temples, while the narrative of the "first campaign" is a digression, set off as such in the texts, which helps to define the circumstances of the carving of the stelae at a later date. The date on Merneptah's victory columns (no. 16) clearly precedes the date of the battle as given in the

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1. See R. O. Faulkner, in CAH^2 II.2 226 (who dates the incursion to the second year of Ramesses II); and Kitchen, Pharaoh Triumphant, pp. 40-41 (placing it during the later years of Sety I, at the start of Ramesses II's royal career).

2. No. 19 is exceptional in that the dateline follows a number of allusions to historical events; it thus refers specifically to the statement immediately following; i.e., Sethnakht is now unopposed, and the civil war is over.

3. Nos. 12 and, especially, 23 are parts of ex-votos left by private officials in their own name at the site of their operations. In the first case, the date may well have fallen in the time of the expedition, which is included among the events described; in the second, however, the date is a terminus post quem for the victories it recounts.
account of that war at Karnak; and the inscription itself (following the announcement of the invasion and the despatching of the army) gives only a cursory account of the war itself, as a prologue to the listing of prisoners and spoil. The first inscription dealing with Ramesses III's second Libyan war (no. 20) emphasizes the early stages of the campaign, both rhetorically and in its narrative. The meaning of the dateline is further defined by the external, but closely related, evidence given by the later dates in the calendar of feasts and in the second inscription (no. 21). Finally, Thutmose III's stela from Armant (no. 22) is, in its layout, the most curious of all these dated inscriptions: for the initial dateline falls before the events mentioned in the text (see n. 33 above); and the following "summation" of the king's career is organized along topical rather than strictly chronological lines.

Thus, while these records are not all consistent, it would appear that the most frequent practice is to have the dateline refer to the culmination of the events described, that is, the final episode(s) of the narrative. Joined with the evidence of the first four examples, we may now apply these conclusions to the stela from the Temple of Ptah at Karnak. Although certainty eludes us, given the erratic treatment of dates by the ancient Egyptians themselves, we believe that the most natural interpretation of the text is one that would conform to the usage of most similar cases.
By this standard, Sety's first campaign and his subsequent visit to Thebes would both fall during his first regnal year, as implied by a literal reading of the text with its dateline.

The Alabaster Stela from Karnak presents a different problem, in that its date (II 3ht 1 in regnal year 1) refers to an event that is not precisely spelled out in the text: as noted above (p. 107) the "making" of the stela can be interpreted in a number of ways, e.g., as the commissioning of the stela, its completion or its emplacement at Karnak. Regrettably, the many parallels which employ the formula ir.n.f m mnw.f . . . are equally ambiguous. Whether they are dated only by the regnal year or by a full dateline, they do not specify which stage of the operation is meant. The vast majority of examples, of course, are not dated at all and convey little more than the dedication of a building by the king's gift. The interpretation of the date on the

40 I.e., HHBT, pp. 18-19; KRI I 41-43; ibid. II 363, 886-87.

41 I.e., HHBT, p. 103; Urk. IV 1228-43 (= the Gebel Barkal Stela), 1677-78, 1920-21; KRI I 75-76.

42 Usually, these inscriptions mention only the monuments on which they are carved; but an exceptional case is found in Khonsu II 43C:2, where there is a reference to the hewing of Amon's sacred barge. Kitchen, The Third Intermediate Period (Warminster, 1973), p. 252, n. 45, followed by E. F. Wente, in Khonsu I, p. xiv, suggests that this text was carved in anticipation of the success of the voyage of Wenamun to Byblos in the year 5 of the "Renaissance"; for this narrative, see W. K. Simpson, ed., The Literature of Ancient Egypt, new edition (New Haven, 1973), pp. 142-55.
The dating of Sety's first campaign

Alabaster Stela thus remains open. Moreover, although the stock phrases of the text define the stela as a royal donation, they tell us nothing about the king's movements—whether he was at Thebes or Memphis, whether he was present when the stela was set up, or indeed anything else that has a bearing on the circumstances defined by the dateline. The material from which the stela is made was not native to Thebes; but the stone could have arrived in its raw state and been shaped in the ateliers of Karnak Temple. In this, as in everything else about the Alabaster Stela, however, there is no certainty: it could have been manufactured in the north, but neither its material nor its contents demonstrate that this was so.

For all these uncertainties, however, the dateline on the Alabaster Stela cannot be too far from what we may reasonably suppose was Sety's first visit to Thebes as sole ruler. His accession date, and hence the death of his father, Ramesses I, fell between III Smw 18 and IV Smw 23.

—Alfred Lucas and J. R. Harris, Ancient Egyptian Materials and Industries, 4th ed. (London, 1962), pp. 59-60: sources for alabaster are found in the vicinity of Cairo in the north, and then down to Middle Egypt (Hatnûb); the alabaster found in the western hills at Thebes does not appear to have been worked in antiquity.


—W. J. Murnane, "The Accession Date of Sethos I," Serapis 3 (1975-76):23-33. Contrary to my previous opinion (idem, Ancient Egyptian Coregencies, pp. 80-87), I now
We do not know whether Ramesses I died in Upper or Lower Egypt: if the latter, thirteen days must be added to the seventy required for the mummification process, allowing the funeral cortege to arrive at Thebes no less than eighty-three days after the old king's death, at the very earliest. "This itinerary, at both ends of the range for Sety's accession, can be reconstructed as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Days</th>
<th>Days</th>
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<th>Days</th>
<th>Days</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>III Šmw 18</td>
<td>IV Šmw 23</td>
<td>IV Šmw 30</td>
<td>IV Šmw 30</td>
<td>5 Epagomenal Days</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(13 days)</td>
<td>(48 days)</td>
<td>(43 Days)</td>
<td>(73 Days)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I 3ht 1</td>
<td>II 3ht 1</td>
<td>II 3ht 1</td>
<td>III 3ht 1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(78 Days)</td>
<td>(83 Days)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

believe that the junior partners in Nineteenth Dynasty coregencies began to date by their own regnal years only after their accession to sole rule. Sety I's accession date, as calculated above, would be the day after the death of Ramesses I, not the date of his assumption of the regency with his father. In the case of Ramesses II, III Šmw 27 would be the day of his nomination as coregent, and the date in 3ht would be that of his accession to sole rule: these points are to be developed in a separate study.

"For timings of travel between Upper and Lower Egypt, see Appendix 2. We know that on III Šmw 30 of his first regnal year, Sety was in Memphis (KRI I 38:1-5); but since the date lies within the range of uncertainty during which the year change could have taken place, we cannot be sure whether it fell at the beginning or the end of the regnal year."
Thus, the day Ramesses I was buried at Thebes could be II 3ḥt 6 (at the earliest) or III 3ḥt 11 (at the latest), assuming that he had died in the north. If he died at Thebes, his burial could have taken place thirteen days earlier: on I 3ḥt 22 (at the earliest) or on II 3ḥt 28 (at the latest).

The point of this demonstration is that, if the dateline II 3ḥt 1 on the Alabaster Stela has to do with Sety's presence at Thebes, he could not have accompanied his father's funeral procession from Memphis. Of course, he could have preceded the cortege to Thebes; and if Ramesses I died there, II 3ḥt 1 would fall within the period of Sety's stay, whether this date fell after the funeral (under the earlier options for Sety's accession) or before it (under the later options). There are too many imponderables here to allow a firm connection between Ramesses I's funeral and a date for Sety's arrival in Thebes at this time. It seems likely, however, that Sety would have made an effort to be present for the feast of Opet, which fell in the latter half of II 3ḥt: the theme of this celebration, the annual (re)birth of the divine ruler and the reconfirmation of his right to govern, is singularly appropriate to a king who was about to bury his father and assume his place as sole lord on the Horus Throne of the Living. '7' In his second regnal

7 See for now W. J. Murnane, "Opetfest," in Lexikon der Ägyptologie IV, ed. W. Helck, E. Otto and W. Westendorff (Wiesbaden, 1982), pp. 574-79; and idem, "The Opet Festival
year, we know that Sety I went to Thebes from Memphis at
this very time, departing his capital on II 3ḥt 1 and
allowing himself a fortnight to reach the Southern City."
The likelihood of his presence at Thebes on II 3ḥt 1 of his
accession year seems high, given the elaborate ceremonies
held at the start of a new reign. Prior to that date, he
would have had time for a short campaign against the Shasu
in southern Palestine: the triumphal rhetoric on the
Alabaster Stela could refer to this, although the very
generalized phraseology lends little support to this
proposition."
The evidence of both this monument and stela
from the Ptah Temple, however, suggests that Sety had
already returned from his first campaign when he visited
Thebes in his accession year, there to attend to the burial
of his predecessor and to initiate the benefactions in the
Amon Temple which are dated to this first regnal year.

and the Rebirth of the Divine King," JNES, forthcoming; and
Lanny Bell, "Luxor Temple and the Cult of the Royal Ka,"
JNES, forthcoming (summarized in The Oriental Institute

"KRI I 247:10.

"Contrast this passage with the references to specific
ethnic groups in no. 23."
APPENDIX 2

MOVEMENTS OF ARMIES AND TIMINGS OF TRAVEL IN EGYPT AND THE LEVANT

Such importance is attached to Sety I's movements during his first regnal year that it is appropriate to ask, quite simply, what was possible. How fast, for instance, could an army move? Would it move at its best pace over an extended period of time? In the Nile Valley, what was the fastest rate at which a traveler could cover the distance from Memphis to Thebes, and back again? And what was the customary pace of these journeys, based on the means which the ancient Egyptians had at their disposal, i.e., sailing boats on the river? While the note that follows does not pretend to be exhaustive, it may serve to put the question of Sety's movements on a minimally realistic footing.

The actual pace of an army on the move would depend, of course, on the conditions of the campaign. Training and necessity, however, would impose a regular rate of march, and for data on this matter our best sources are for the armies of classical Greece and Rome, which operated under the same conditions as the Pharaonic armies. At the outset, it is important to distinguish between what the army was normally trained to do, and what it actually could do when
faced with extraordinary conditions. Roman recruits were trained to cover as many as 24 Roman miles a day (= 18.4 standard miles) for five hours, roughly equivalent to the current British rate of about three miles per hour.\(^1\) Forced marches of up to 40 standard miles a day are sometimes attested,\(^2\) but obviously such a pace could not be sustained by an army over a long period of time. Thus, while the entire army of Alexander the Great moved at a maximum known speed of 19.5 miles a day, it generally covered only 13 miles a day—and this pace is calculated over long distances, with allowances for day-long rest halts every five to seven days. Over shorter distances, it moved at 14 miles a day; and with a rest halt one day in seven, this works out to an average of 15 miles per day.\(^3\) A rate of 15 miles per day, in fact, appears to be the optimal figure known for the armies of ancient Assyria\(^4\) and China,\(^5\)

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\(^3\)Donald W. Engels, *Alexander the Great and the Logistics of the Macedonian Army* (Berkeley and Los Angeles, 1978), pp. 153-56. I am grateful to JoAnn Scurlock for discussing Engel's data with me in the light of more recent comparanda, for which see below.

\(^4\)Sources collected by JoAnn Scurlock for her dissertation on the Assyrian army; I am indebted to her also for the references to later sources in the notes that follow.

Given these figures for comparison, we will probably not be far off the mark in assuming that Sety I's army also moved at about 15 miles per day. Of course, it could have moved at a faster pace occasionally, when required to do so; but as we lack any evidence for the conditions under which these campaigns were undertaken, it seems best to use the most probable average rate in our calculations.

Although Herodotus (Histories ii.9) stated that the distance between Heliopolis and Thebes could be covered in nine days, this figure is universally regarded as incorrect: the journey south from the Memphite region to Thebes (modern Luxor) would occupy a minimum of 13 days. Such a figure, in fact, is consistent with the known intervals allowed for this journey in ancient Egyptian sources: Sety I allowed himself two full weeks to reach Thebes from Memphis, departing on II 3ḥt 1 and arriving at Thebes, one presumes, in time to celebrate the opening ceremonies of the Opet Feast, which took place in the middle of that month.

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9 For Sety's departure from Memphis, see KRI I 247:10; on the dates of the Opet Festival, see Siegfried Schott, Altägyptische Festdaten, Akademie der Wissenschaften und der
Similarly, news of Siptah's accession, on IV 3ht 28, took about three weeks to reach Thebes (on I Prt 19), presumably from Piramesse in the Eastern Delta. These timings could be improved, of course, if the flotilla going south traveled both day and night. Barring any convincing reason for its having done so, however, we may safely assume that Sety's first journey to Thebes took him the usual minimum of 13 days.

A bare minimum for the return journey, from Thebes to Memphis, is suggested by the claim of a contemporary of Wenis in the Fifth Dynasty that he reached Memphis from Elephantine in seven days: it is assumed that he would have been traveling at the rate of 3-4 miles per hour, 24 hours a day. Given ideal conditions, this is not as improbable as it sounds: at the height of the Inundation, in September, water that left Aswan arrived in Cairo within five days, as opposed to the 13 days required during the season of low water, in March and April. Ideal conditions, however, are quite rare on the Nile, where progress to the north can be

Literatur in Mainz, Abhandlungen der geistes- und sozialwissenschaftlichen Klasse, Jahrgang 1950, no. 10 (Wiesbaden), pp. 84-87.


hampered, and made dangerous, by high winds. These conditions are especially prevalent in the spring, when the sand-filled *khamsin* blows from the west, but they are apt to occur in the autumn as well. Thus, Caillaud's effort to reach Cairo from Luxor at the greatest possible speed was complicated by high winds and rough waters, with a final duration of 15 days. If Sety's return journey took place in IV *šaw*, it would have fallen in the latter part of October and might have been exposed to similar conditions. The accounts of nineteenth century travelers, moving down the Nile on *dahabiyahs* powered only by sail, allude more often than not to high winds and slow progress. True, many of them paused on the way to see the sights, or were delayed by meddlesome local officials; but if the timings they give are adjusted to eliminate all but climatic delays, the average duration of a journey between Luxor and Cairo is rather high. Lady Duff Gordon was once to spend 38 days on such a trip. Both C. Rochford Scott and John Gadsby

\[1^{13}\] F. Caillaud, *Voyage à Meroe, au fleuve blanc, etc. I* (Paris, 1826), pp. 282-84.


spent about one month enroute, with M. de Verninac de Saint-Maur not far behind: bearing the second obelisk from the Luxor Temple, he took 29 days of travel to reach Cairo. Belzoni's journeys of 1816 and 1819, requiring 24 and 23 days, respectively, although fairly long, represent a not unrealistic medium. At the lower end of the scale, E. de Montule took 17 days for this journey; and the best attested time was made in the 1870s by Villiers Stuart, who finished the journey in 12 days. We may take this figure as a fair minimum in determining the most favorable possible duration for Sety's return journey to Memphis from Thebes during his first or second regnal year.

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APPENDIX 3

THE LIBYAN AND NUBIAN CAMPAIGNS

The Libyan war occupies an anomalous position on Sety I's war monument at Karnak. Although it has a section all to itself (west wall, middle register: see pls. 27-32), it has nothing at all to do with the other campaigns, which, taken all together, revolve around the main theme of Sety I's foreign wars, namely, his wars in Western Asia. Consequently, it seems best to deal separately with these reliefs, together with the Nubian war (which seems not to be represented on the war memorial at Karnak).

Very little, in fact, can be said about the Libyan war.¹ The records at Karnak are stereotyped both in form and content, and do not convey the sort of specific information found in the accounts of the Shasu, "Yenoam" and Amurrite campaigns. A purely conventional nature for these texts may be suggested by what seems to be a careless mistake in their description of the king's return from the campaign, "when he had destroyed Retchenu and kill[ed] the[ir] chiefs" (pl. 32:24-25). It is conceivable, however, that the apparently gratuitous substitution of "Retchenu" for "Libya" in this

passage might allude to the campaigns in western Asia that preceded it. Indeed, Spalinger has suggested that the Libyan war followed the campaign against Kadesh and Amurru in the register above.\(^2\) His interpretation might well be borne out by another passage in the register below this one, containing the Hittite campaign, where it is said that "Retchenu comes to him in submission, and the Tchehe<nu> land is on its knees; he puts down seed according to his desire in this vile land of the Hittites" (pl. 35:18-21). The sequence "Syria" (= Rtnw)/"Libya" (= Thnw)/"Hatti" is, in fact, a plausible order in which to read the three registers on the western side, and the phrasing of this passage gives added encouragement to do so.

None of Sety I's successors alludes to his Libyan war. As with so many other past skirmishes with Egypt's western neighbors, from earliest times down to the reign of Merneptah, it was a necessary nuisance—a trophy for the warrior king, but otherwise of no serious consequence. The archaeological record in Libya itself is similarly meager and uninformative: a few scarabs of Sety I are owned by the Tunis Museum, perhaps coming from ancient cemeteries nearby that have yielded similar materials, ranging in date from the Fourth to the Twenty-sixth Dynasties.\(^3\) Obviously, these

\(^2\)Ibid., p. 34.

\(^3\)See Bibl. VII 367.
scraps have no necessary connection with that war which was
so imposingly memorialized at Karnak Temple.

The Nubian war, known only on the basis of the stelae
at Sai and Amara West, has already been described briefly
in Appendix 1 (see pp. 128-29 [no. 14]). Sety was in Thebes
when the revolt was first announced, perhaps in the first
half of the season of Prt during his eighth regnal year: 1

One came to tell His Majesty: "The enemies of the
foreign country of Irem are plotting rebellion!"
(But) then His Majesty put the matter against them
aside, in order to hear their plans completely.
And His Majesty said to the officials, the
Companions and the attendants: "What is (this)
vile Irem, that they should transgress in the time
of My Majesty? It is my father Amon-Re who will
cause them to fall to the knife of My Majesty.
(And) I will cause to retreat any (other) foreign

See, for convenience, KRI I 104-6; but for the Sai stela
one should refer also to J. Vercoutter, "Le pays d'Irem et
la première pénétration égyptienne en Afrique," in Livre du
1), where there is a facsimile that improves the previously
published text at a number of points.

For the season of the war, see Appendix 1, and
especially n. 28. On strictly epigraphic grounds,
Vercoutter ("Le pays d'Irem," n. 2) says that the opening
year date on the Amara West stela could be 4, 12 or 20, with
8 (suggested by KRI I 104:6) being less probable. I was not
able to concur with these suggestions (made on the basis
of a photograph) when I examined the stela itself (Brooklyn
Museum No. 39424) in the spring of 1982. The numeral
occupies one group, of which the bottom half is preserved;
and in this space, four complete strokes can be read. The
restored complete numeral, then, could hardly be any of
those proposed by Vercoutter, but 8 would be entirely
reasonable (with 14, 15 and 16 as less probable
alternatives). I am grateful to the authorities at the
Brooklyn Museum, and particularly to the curator of the
Egyptian collection, Richard Fazzini, for arranging for me
to see the stela and for a second opinion on the reading.
country which does the like before My Majesty!"

Then His Majesty made a plan against them; he ordained devastation against them, and he set obstacles against all their places. And His Majesty sent troops, and also many cavalry. The army of His Majesty reached the fortress (named) **<Pacifier of the Two> Lands (?) on <III> Prt 13.**

One joined (battle) with them (i.e., the enemy), the might of Pharaoh (being) before them like a blast of fire, trampling the hills. (When) the dawn of seven days had come to pass, the might of Menma'atre was carrying them off, not one of them being missing, either male or female; (and) he had captured the six wells . . . .

As these last lines suggest, the Egyptians were bent on deportation, not extermination of the vanquished on this occasion. The final tally is damaged on both stelae, and there are discrepancies between the two versions; but the Nubians who were carried off into captivity included over fifty young men of military age ([g3]mw), about sixty maidens (sqmw(t) nfrwt Nhswt) and nearly fifty children (msw), adding up to over 420 souls.¹

¹Reading **di.i ht irf kt h3st lrt m-mitt**, following Vercoutter, "Le pays d'Irem," p. 159 (fig. 1); Kitchen's copy (KRI I 103:5-6) omits the t of kt on the Sai stela and reads the initial k of this word as nb. In fairness, nb and k are often confused in carved hieroglyphic inscriptions, and the parallel version from Amara west seems to have **di.i ht nbt [sic] h3st lrt mltt**. I did not check this passage in Brooklyn, but on the photograph which Mr. Fazzini so kindly made available, the basket-sign shows no distinct loop at the right corner; the loop, if any, would have been minuscule and would be lost in the slight degree of wear found at the edges of the sign, so I believe nb is the proper reading here.


³Following Vercoutter, "Le pays d'Irem," p. 178, n. 2, who sees this figure as being the total number of human captives, rather than K. A. Kitchen, "Historical
In view of the continuing and unresolved dispute over the location of the country of Irem, a detailed military analysis of this war seems pointless. Its circumstances, however, bring to mind many other cases (both past and to come) in which the settlements, tracks and gold-mining establishments of New Kingdom Nubia had to be defended from the untamed peoples of the surrounding deserts. Yet gold was only the most valuable, and skins and ostrich plumes the most picturesque, of the products Egypt derived from her exploitation of Nubia. Manpower played an important part in supporting Egypt's imperial machine, and nowhere was it more cheaply available than in Nubia. Troublesome eruptions south of the border could be turned to advantage when Nubian

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Observations on Ramesside Nubia," in Ägypten und Kusch, ed. E. Endesfelder, K.-H. Priese, W. Reinecke and S. Wenig, Schriften zur Geschichte und Kultur des Alten Orients 13 (Berlin, 1977), p. 217, who suggests "[cattle/goats (?)]." Given the environment, with its specification of such diverse categories of humans in the preserved portions of the list, Vercoutter's interpretation seems more probable; and since young people already account for 170 persons, the number of adults and elderly people needed to make up the comprehensive total of 420 persons does not seem excessive.

9The placement of Irem in the region southwest of the Third Cataract, south of Dongola but north of the great bend in the Nile, has been most recently defended by Kitchen, in Ägypten und Kusch, pp. 218-20, and by Vercoutter, "Le pays d'Irem," pp. 163-74. The alternative view, which locates Irem south of the Fifth Cataract, in the Berber-Shendi stretch of the Nile and the adjoining Bayuda Desert, is argued by David O'Connor, in The Cambridge History of Africa I, ed. J. Desmond Stuart (New York, 1975), pp. 934-40.

captives swelled the ranks of armies, labor forces and other service cadres.\textsuperscript{11} Sety I's Nubian war was scarcely different, in its general causes, from most other local "rebellions" during the New Kingdom.\textsuperscript{12} It can hardly have been less important than the Libyan campaign, however; and thus its absence from the battle reliefs at Karnak\textsuperscript{13} could suggest that the wars shown there took place earlier in Sety's reign.

\footnotesize
\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{11}As Kitchen has pointed out, Nubians were recruited as slave labor for the building of the later Nubian temples in the year 44 of Ramesses II; and for other services in the wake of Ramesses III's war in the neighborhood of Irem (see \textit{Ägypten und Kusch}, pp. 221, 224-25).
\item \textsuperscript{12}The great rebellion under Merneptah, with its possible collusion between Libyans and Nubians, is different, and was punished with greater severity than usual: see Kitchen, ibid., pp. 221-24.
\item \textsuperscript{13}Thus also Spalinger, \textit{JARCE} 16 (1979):42, 43; cf. above, chap. 2, p. 60.
\end{itemize}
APPENDIX 4

THE KING OF CARCHEMISH IN SETY I'S BATTLE RELIEFS?

In the great battle scene that illustrates Sety I's Hittite war at Karnak (pl. 34), Sety is confronted by a figure, larger in size than those in the rout of fleeing Hittites, who stands with one leg outside his chariot and raises his arms in a gesture of submission. Although he is plainly the Hittite commander, it seems unlikely that this would be the king of Hatti himself; rather, this must be one of his subordinates who, in this record, remains unidentified. Spalinger has already suggested that this figure very probably represents the king of Carchemish, who, as the Hittite king's deputy in northern Syria, might well have been the first to grapple with an Egyptian onslaught there. I would not seriously disagree with this proposal, although it must be emphasized once more that the figure is, after all, not identified in the Egyptian relief. Spalinger goes further, however, in suggesting that, since the figure

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1It should be emphasized, however, that Spalinger's identification of this figure as someone other than the Hittite king rests on a misreading, perpetuated by KRI I 17:10, of p3 '3 ḫs n ḫt3, "the vile great one of Hatti," whereas in reality the text refers to p3 t3 ḫs, "the vile land of the Hittites" (see pl. 34:1, with n. a to the translation in Chicago, Reliefs IV, p. 106).
in this scene is shown transfixed with arrows, he was very likely killed in this battle; and he tentatively identifies him as one [...]-Sharuma, who (he says) was king of Carchemish at an early stage in the reign of Muwatalli, but was replaced later on by Shahurunewa, "who is known to have lived under the reign of Muwatallis sometime after the Kadesh war of year five of Ramesses II."²

Not all of this necessarily follows from the data. As Spalinger correctly notes, [...]-Sharuma was appointed to office in the ninth year of Murshili II on the unexpected death of his father, the king of Carchemish Shari-Kushuh.³ This passage, however, is our sole evidence for the historicity of [...]-Sharuma. During the reign of Muwatalli we hear instead of a king of Carchemish named Shahurunewa, who appears among the witnesses who guaranteed the authenticity of a newly issued copy of a treaty between Hatti and Aleppo, a document originally made in the time of Murshili II.⁴ This is our only contemporary reference to

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⁴E. F. Weidner, Politische Dokumente aus Kleinasiien, Bogazköy Studien 8 (Leipzig, 1923), pp. 87-89; cf. G. Del Monte, "I testimoni del trattato con Aleppo (KBo I 6)," RSO 49 (1975):1-10; I am indebted to Professor Güterbock for this last reference.
Shahurunewa, although we know, on the basis of seal inscriptions belonging to his son and successor, that he too was the son of the king of Carchemish, Shari-Kushuh, who had died in the ninth year of Murshili II! There is no evidence bearing on the presumed succession of [...]-Sharuma by Shahurunewa, nor is it clear why the latter should be so specifically dated to the later reign of Muwatalli, following the Battle of Kadesh. Indeed, there are grounds for believing that his appearance, and also the reissue of the treaty with Aleppo, came earlier than this. Another of the witnesses was the Great Scribe Mitannamuwa, who, having been appointed to this post by Murshili II, relinquished it to his son in the time of Muwatalli, when he was himself promoted to be the governor of the Hittite capital, Hattusha. By the reign of Urhi-Teshup, this same man is described as being old and sick. In the treaty with Aleppo, however, Mitannamuwa appears under his earlier title and would have been in the prime of life. This document can thus not fall very late in the reign of Muwatalli, who is believed to have reigned no more than six years after the

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6 Thus KBo IV 12, obv. 13-22 = Goetze, Hattusiliš, Mitteilungen der Vorderasiatisch-ägyptischen Gesellschaft 29 (Leipzig, 1925), p. 43; cf. Del Monte, RSO 49 (1975):6 and Ahmet Ünal, Hattušili III I.1, Texte der Hethiter 4.1 (Heidelberg, 1974), pp. 113-14. It must be emphasized that we are completely in the dark as to the precise date of Mitannamuwa's promotion.
Battle of Kadesh, having already ruled at least as long beforehand.  

The joint appearance of Shahurunewa and Mitannamuwa in the reissued treaty with Aleppo, then, seems to fall most easily in the first part of Muwatalli's reign, before the Battle of Kadesh. He would thus have replaced [...]-Sharuma at about this time, or even earlier, perhaps in the later reign of Murshili II. But did he? Although these two names are sometimes thought to refer to two brothers, both sons of Shari-Kushuh, it is quite possible that they are the Hittite and Hurrian names that belong, in reality, to only one person: note that the father, in addition to being called by his Hurrian name Shari-Kushuh, was also known in Hittite as Piyashshili. It is not at all certain, then,

'Required by chronological considerations, above all the necessity of fitting the seven years of Urhi-Teshup's reign, plus his post-royal career (including his arrival in Egypt), between the fifth and twenty-first years of Ramesses II. Unal, Hattušili III 1.1, p. 91, places Muwatalli's death as little as one year after the Battle of Kadesh, which would be convenient, but is probably too low an estimate. Perhaps more realistic is the calculation that places Hattushili III's accession in about the sixteenth year of Ramesses II, with Muwatalli dying in his ninth; see M. B. Rowton, "Comparative Chronology at the Time of Dynasty XIX," JNES 19 (1960):16-18, and also idem, "Material from Western Asia and the Chronology of the Nineteenth Dynasty," JNES 25 (1966):244-245; cf. K. A. Kitchen, Pharaoh Triumphant: The Life and Times of Ramesses II, King of Egypt (Warminster, 1982), p. 250.


'H. G. Güterbock, "The Deeds of Suppiluliuma as Told by His Son, Mursili II," JCS 10 (1956):120-22; Hawkins, Reallexikon der Assyriologie V 429-30; Horst Klengel,
that Shahurunewa "replaced" [...]-Sharuma at all; and given the conventions of Egyptian war scenes, it is far from proven that the Hittite commander who opposed Sety was really killed in battle anyway.
APPENDIX 5

THE MYSTERIOUS MEHY

Although foreign affairs are the major concern of the Karnak reliefs, a few of these scenes cast a dim but tantalizing light on the internal politics of the royal house. In no fewer than six cases (pls. 6, 10, 12, 23, and 29) there appears a distinctively equipped figure who is identified in at least two instances (pls. 23:17, 29:9; and perhaps 10:21) as the "group-marshaller and fan-bearer, Meḥy." In the three examples on the west wing (pls. 23 and 29) Meḥy's figure was inserted into the previously carved relief, where no figure was originally planned. On the east wing, however, Meḥy occupied the space that had been filled initially by another, perhaps anonymous official. His ascendancy, however, was brief. In all places, Meḥy's figure was removed--either it was erased (pl. 23) or it was usurped, by Sety's crown prince, the future Ramesses II (pls. 6, 29), or by another official (pl. 10).

1 See Chicago, Reliefs IV, pp. 19-20 (pl. 6) and 29-32 (pl. 10); for the figure in pl. 12, see next note.

2 In the final version on pl. 12, the figure wore sandals, as does the prince in pl. 29. The earlier version of the figure was barefoot, as is Meḥy on pl. 29. For the status of the figure, see ibid., p. 37. Since hardly more than the feet of the figure on pl. 12 are preserved, it is hard to say precisely how they were adapted, or from what source.
The question of Meḥy's status is one of the great unresolved puzzles in the war reliefs. His relatively minor title stands in odd juxtaposition to the extraordinary effort made to secure his immortality. Of his antecedents, and of the presumably military services he rendered before assuming such a signal honor, we know nothing. Even his full name cannot be established: "Meḥy," as we know, is a commonly used abbreviation for names ending in "emheb," but the divine name that would have formed the first part of his name is unknown.

Meḥy's displacement at the hands of the crown prince Ramesses could suggest that he had been regarded as heir presumptive earlier in Sety's reign: had he in fact succeeded, he would have ranked among the "soldier kings" of the late Eighteenth and earlier Nineteenth Dynasties—high-ranking officers, who had been adopted by their predecessors on the strength of their merits rather than by any claims of heredity. The absence of the distinguishing title یرسپت from any of Meḥy's known monuments, while not supportive of this case, is also not fatal, given the paucity and poor condition of the surviving

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'Chicago, *Reliefs*, p. 92, n. 8.

material. More disturbing, however, is Meḥy's low military rank: however lowly his origins, it seems odd that Meḥy would remain so subordinate, or that he would choose to emphasize his humble origins, if he were in line for the highest dignity in the Two Lands.

Whoever Meḥy was, his persecution by Prince Ramesses is easily understood. As the first-born son of Sety I, Ramesses could expect to be in line for the throne by hereditary right, especially after he had become heir apparent and his father's chief helper during the latter part of Sety I's reign. He would quite easily resent the obscure interloper who was memorialized, at his expense, in his father's war reliefs; and it is not surprising that he should have redressed this offensive emphasis at the first opportunity.

How and when all this came to pass, however, is another matter. If Meḥy's career is truly reflected in his appearances in the war scenes, he would have been active during Sety's first two campaigns (pls. 6, 10, 12), in the war against Kadesh and Amurru (pl. 23) and in the Libyan campaign (pl. 29)--thus, from the very beginning of Sety's reign to an unspecified point within it. This timetable accords well with the apparent lateness of Prince Ramesses' emergence on the scene. His first dated appearance is in Sety's ninth year when--as an unnamed "eldest son" of the

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6 Chicago, Reliefs, p. 92, n. 7.
In a eulogistic text composed some five years later, when he was already king, Ramesses asserts that he had held administrative functions and was chief of the army since the age of ten. Even if we take this claim at its face value, however, we cannot prove it on the basis of material from the reign of Sety I. It is possible, though, to derive some minimum controls to any calculations. Ramesses II's war reliefs at Beit el-Wali, which were carved no later than the first half of his second regnal year, show him already as the father of two sons. Even though these children were undoubtedly born to different mothers and may have been mere babes at this time, their father must have been a young teenager, at least, when they were conceived. Let us assume that these sons had been born in the first half of their father's second regnal year, at the latest. Their father must have been about twelve, at least, when they were conceived in the previous year: for the sake of argument,

7In the "larger" Aswan stela (KRI I 74, especially line 14): see Murnane, "The Earlier Reign of Ramesses II and His Coregency with Sety I," JNES 34 (1975):189-90.


9Beit el-Wali, p. 8. On the transition between the earlier and later forms of Ramesses II's praenomen, see Murnane, JNES 34 (1975):158-61.


11Male puberty in ancient Egypt was socially acknowledged
let us place this in year eleven of Sety I, corresponding to Ramesses II's first regnal year.\textsuperscript{12} If so, it follows that Ramesses must have been at least one year old at his father's accession—and it is thus not likely that anyone else would be regarded as heir presumptive during the earlier years of Sety I, particularly since the hereditary principle had already been reestablished, in Sety's own favor, by Ramesses I. Thus, Ramesses' age at his father's ninth year would have been at least the ten years that he would later claim for his earliest tenure in high office.

by the rite of circumcision, which took place sometime during the boy's second decade: the age of fourteen has recently been suggested as the most probable, based on the available evidence (thus E. F. Wente, in \textit{An X-Ray Atlas of the Royal Mummies}, E. F. Wente and J. E. Harris, [Chicago, 1980], pp. 236-38). Without disagreeing with this estimate, but (because of the lack of hard evidence) in order not to prejudice my argument unnecessarily, I am assuming a somewhat earlier age for sexual maturity and for marriage in the exceptional case of the royal child.

\textsuperscript{12}This assumes a very short overlap, or none at all, between Sety I and Ramesses II (see Wente, in \textit{Wente and Harris, Atlas}, p. 259). If they were coregents, and if Ramesses II began counting his regnal years during his father's lifetime (as I argued in \textit{Ancient Egyptian Coregencies}, pp. 80-87), the real date of the Beit el-Wali relief would be pushed even further back into Sety I's reign, which I still regard as having been approximately eleven years in length (ibid., pp. 86-87; cf. Helck, \textit{MDAIK} 37 [1981]:213, n. 9). Assuming the equation of Sety I/year 8 = Ramesses II/year 1 (as mooted below in n. 16), the Battle of Kadesh in Ramesses' fifth year would fall in the year following Sety's death, with Ramesses' "first" campaign (in regnal year 4 memorialized on the Nahr el-Kelb stela; see p. 90) having taken place during Sety's uncompleted eleventh year. As of this writing, there is no way of proving (or of disproving) this proposition; and I am no longer convinced that coregents in the Nineteenth Dynasty employed their own dating systems during the lifetimes of their senior partners (see above, n. 45 to Appendix 1).
Of course, he could have been older. Be that as it may, however, one's impression is that the official careers of Meḥy and Prince Ramesses did not overlap for any great length of time: Meḥy seems to have flourished in the earlier part of Sety's reign, while Ramesses first becomes active towards its end.

A more significant intermingling of Meḥy's and Ramesses' careers is implied by a suggestion of Spalinger, who has pointed out that the campaigns into which Ramesses inserted himself at Karnak (Shasu, Yenoam, Libyan) are thematically similar to those shown on the north wall of the entrance hall in Ramesses II's temple at Beit el-Wali.

Could they be identical, and is Ramesses' participation in his father's early wars a fact? We are not persuaded that this was so. Any conclusions regarding the extent of Meḥy's (and Ramesses') participation in the Karnak reliefs are bound to be incomplete, owing to the loss of the two upper registers on the east side and the virtual inaccessibility of the western side wall. Inferences from Ramesses' failure to do more than erase Meḥy's figure from the Kadesh battle scene (pl. 23) should not be drawn hastily: after all, we do not know how any corresponding figures in the reliefs would have appeared.

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14 *Beit el-Wali*, pls. 11-15.

15 This factor is already noted by Spalinger, *JNES* 38 (1979):275, n. 14.
third register, east side were treated, or why. Beyond these obvious uncertainties, moreover, one may question the historical genuineness of both Meḥy's and Ramesses' claims. Since both were inserted into the reliefs secondarily, they stand at one remove from the events described there—and the connection is all the weaker in Ramesses' case, since his usurpation was aimed at replacing the earlier figures with his own. Seen in this light, his claims have no more validity than those of Thutmose I or II when their names are surcharged over those of Hatshepsut.

Even more troublesome to this hypothesis is the mere overlapping of these careers: if Ramesses had been old enough to take a significant part in campaigning from the very beginning of his father's reign, why would he—a viable crown prince—be denied a place of honor that was then conferred on a virtual nobody instead? The identity of the wars shown at Beit el-Wali and at Karnak can also be doubted. Bedouin, Asiatics and Libyans were the common enemies of Egypt at this time: they are shown, moreover, grouped together on one wall; whereas the fuller, more circumstantially "realistic" portrayal of the Nubian war occupies the full length of the facing wall. It is also curious that Ramesses should claim to have participated (along with the suppressed Meḥy) in his father's earliest wars, but not in the later campaigns when, by his own account, we would expect him to be most heavily involved in
civil and military administration. If any of the war
reliefs at Beit el-Wali are to be assigned to the reign of
Sety I, the most likely candidate should be the Nubian
campaign itself, rather than the cursorily treated scenes
involving Libyans and Asiatics. This cannot be proved,
however; and as for the other war scenes, is it not safer,
in the present state of our knowledge, to reverse the
equation and to hazard that Ramesses II chose to represent
these episodes at Beit el-Wali because they were the very
campaigns he had usurped from Meḥy at Karnak?

In the end, Meḥy remains a shadowy figure. Only the
discovery of fresh evidence can bring him fully into the
light of history. His impact on the contemporary record,
outside the battle reliefs, is nil: no one who is otherwise
known from Sety's reign, or even that of Ramesses II, can be
convincingly identified with him. The reasons for his

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16I am grateful to Frank J. Yurco for this suggestion,
which has also been mooted by Jean Vercoutter, "Le pays
d'Irem et la première pénétration égyptienne en Afrique," in
Livre du Centenaire, IFAO, 1880-1980, MIFAO 104 (1980):177,
n. 2; but see Appendix 3. For lack of evidence, it is best
to regard the war of Sety's eighth year as separate from
that shown by Ramesses II at Beit el-Wali.

17Possible candidates from the time of Sety I are
Khnumemheb, a scribe and "overseer of attendants" (KRI I
308) and Horemheb, an official "of the Lord of the Two
Lands" (ibid., p. 320, bottom). From the reign of Ramesses
II, there is the fan-bearer Horemheb (ibid., III 119), the
chief steward of the Ramesseum Horemheb (ibid., pp.
187-91), the charioteer Sutiemheb (ibid., p. 246), the
chariorty scribe Amonemheb (ibid., p. 249), and the chief
of works Minemheb (ibid., p. 282). Most of these people
have titles quite different from those attested for
Meḥy—although, in the case of the Horemheb from East
prominence are equally obscure. If, like the relatives of Queen Tiyi under Amenhotep III, he owed his rise to his family connections with the royal house, we do not know of them. Any thought that he might have been considered, however briefly, as heir apparent by adoption—to have succeeded to the throne, just as Ramesses I had followed Horemheb—is dispelled by his very subordinate rank in the army and the presence, however insignificant, of Prince Ramesses. What we know of Meḫy's status, though, suggests an alternative role for him. Wherever he appears, Meḫy is seen preeminently as a valiant fighter, supporting the warrior king. This in itself was hardly new. Since the beginning of the Eighteenth Dynasty, men had found in the army an avenue to wealth and power. If Meḫy fits comfortably into this milieu, however, his appearance in Sety's war scenes is distinctly anomalous: a commoner, in the privacy of his own tomb, might extol his prowess in battle beside the king; but none had ever figured on a royal monument in quite this way.

This extraordinary honor, in my opinion, justifies our viewing Meḫy as one of the last in a series of powerful commoners—men like Yuya (Amenhotep III's father-in-law), Amenhotep son of Hapu, and the "God's Father" Ay—whose

Silsila (ibid. I 320), only the final and nondiagnostic part of his title remains: if he was in charge of quarrying at Silsila—not an inappropriate role for a military man like Meḥy—the identification is possible; but this is quite speculative.
relatively low titles belied their real influence in the land." The extent of Meḥy's contribution to the new aggressive foreign policy under Sety remains incalculable; but it must have been considerable, if only on the strength of its extravagant acknowledgement. To a new dynasty, seeking to assert its legitimacy through conspicuous works of war and peace, however, men such as Meḥy were dangerous. In the recent past, military magnates had successfully grasped even the kingship itself.20 A danger perceived in this way, rather than the mere envy of the crown prince, is altogether the most probable reason for Meḥy's fate in the battle reliefs. His erasure and overall replacement by Prince Ramesses, in turn, cannot be separated from the nearly concurrent featuring of Ramesses II's own children in his earliest war reliefs--particularly since these boys were almost certainly too young to have taken an active part in the fighting.21

Because this theme is also as new as it is persistent, it is very tempting to suspect Ramesses of making thereby a

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1W. Helck, Der Einfluss der Militärführer in der 18. Ägyptischen Dynastie, UGÄA 14 (1939), passim.
2Ibid., pp. 73-86; cf. idem in MDAIK 37 (1981):214.
4Wente, in Wente and Harris, Atlas, p. 259.
THE MYSTERIOUS MEHY

deliberate point at the expense of Meḥy and anyone else with similar aspirations. In the same vein runs his insistence on his own youth when he had assumed leadership of the army (see n. 7 above); and it is even possible that some of these concerns are echoed in the unflattering portrait of the Egyptian army in the "literary" account of the Battle of Kadesh. This last, of course, is unprovable, and not very important anyway, since it is clear at all events that Ramesses is carrying to a new level the rhetoric already implicit in Sety's war scenes: almost single-handedly, with the aid of Amon (and of his sons, in the pictorial record), Ramesses embodies the superhuman hero, the "fighter for millions who protects his army, a rampart for hundreds of thousands" (cf. pl. 23:5-6). Perhaps this strongly emphasized theme is mere vainglory. What we know of Meḥy's career in the context of events during the later Eighteenth Dynasty, however, suggests that it be taken more seriously.

Yet another echo of Meḥy's career has been seen in poetry of the Ramesside age, in which a dashing figure by the same name is spoken of with admiration and desire. Could this Meḥy of the love songs be the champion whose

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22 See, for example, Sir Alan Gardiner, The Kadesh Inscriptions of Ramesses II (Oxford, 1960), pp. 9-12 (P 80-95, 110-20, 170-205, 250-75); and note the contrast between the king's fearlessness and the pusillanimity of his shield-bearer (ibid., pp. 11-12 = P 205-15).

figure was erased from Sety I's battle scenes? This attractive idea, while unprovable, is also not easy to dismiss. The Meḥy of the love poems occurs frequently enough to appear as an archetypal figure, one who might well have lived in another age. The trappings of his rank, as described, could be military as well as princely. If this Meḥy is indeed the hero who lived under Sety I, his survival in this medium raises interesting questions. Not suffering a total damnatio memoriae at his expulsion from the battle reliefs, he would still shine, in his proper sphere, as the Egyptian embodiment of the hero. Whether this role coexisted easily with the heroic pretensions of the king in the Ramesside age, or in subtle antagonism to them, are.

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2 A. Gardiner, *The Library of A. Chester Beatty: Chester Beatty Papyri, No. 1* (Oxford, 1931), pp. 31-32, and pl. xxiii (C2, 4 sqq.). Two fragmentary poems in which Meḥy appears are found on ostraca published by G. Posener, *Catalogue des ostraca littéraires de Deir el Médineh, DF-IFAO 1.3* (1938), pl. 44 (nos. 1078, vso. 4; 1079, 7).

2\textsuperscript{2} Gardiner hazarded that Meḥy is "perhaps" a prince because of his chariot and his retinue (*Chester Beatty Papyri*, p. 32, n. 1); cf. P. Smither, "Prince Meḥy of the Love Songs," *JEA* 34 (1948):116. In ostracon no. 1079, 7 (Posener, *Catalogue*, p. 44), there is a reference to Meḥy (with his name in a cartouche, as in no. 1078, vso. 4, but followed here with 'nh wḏ3 snb), lw.f.m t3y.f ṭr[...] "while he is in his for[tress] (?)" (see Wb. V 356:1) or perhaps "in his ca[bin]" (ibid., p. 356:5; the cabin of a boat is meant). The cartouches written in the Deir el-Medina copies need not be taken seriously: cf. the "King" Sapair in the Abbott Papyrus (Pap. B.M. 10221, 3.13 = T. E. Peet, *The Great Tomb-Robberies of the Twentieth Egyptian Dynasty* [Oxford, 1930], pp. 38 and 43, n. 9), who was thus "promoted" in later memory from his original status of prince (see H. E. Winlock, "The Tombs of the Kings of the Seventeenth Dynasty at Thebes," *JEA* 10 [1924]:222, n. 3).
problems too speculative to be discussed in these pages. Meḥy's intrusion into the war scenes at Karnak and his subsequent treatment allow us to infer something of his role in contemporary politics; but he remains a phantom beyond the limits of the battle reliefs of King Sety I.
APPENDIX 6

SYRIA IN THE AMARNA AGE: PROBLEMS AND PERSPECTIVES

The evolution of the quarrel between Egypt and Hatti, as presented in the first chapter of this book, derives from an interpretation of a wide range of documents from western Asia. Nearly all of this material is tendentious in one way or another, and the sense of the entire corpus is sufficiently unclear to allow more than one possible understanding of its meaning. Much of what follows is not new, and the discussion cannot be exhaustive; but my aims are rather modest. Previous studies have devoted a great deal of effort and ingenuity to examining the material, particularly the Amarna Letters, in an attempt to resolve one big question, i.e., the existence of the alleged coregency of Amenhotep III with Akhenaten. The results, it seems fair to say, have been inconclusive; and owing to the focus of the questions asked so far, rather less attention has been paid by Egyptologists to the placement of individual letters, and groups of letters, relative to one another within fairly short periods of time. Consideration of these smaller localized problems, I believe, may bring the broader questions into sharper focus, to yield--if not
final certainty--at least the grounding for a responsible opinion. To this end, at any rate, I dedicate the following pages.

OUTLINE OF EVENTS

The replacement of Mitanni by Hatti as the dominant superpower in Syria was enacted on a number of overlapping stages. The Hittites had to contend with Mitanni and her vassals, and with Egypt and the principalities within the Egyptian sphere of influence; and the defending powers had to deal, not only with the Hittite menace, but (in various combinations) with one another. To serve the purposes of clarity, it might be well to present the argument and introduce the characters in the drama before going on to the details on which the overall interpretation depends.

The Hittites in Syria through Shuppiluliuma's Great Syrian Campaign

The earliest phases of the struggle between King Shuppiluliuma I of Hatti and King Tushratta of Mitanni are ill-defined and need not concern us here. Hatti's decisive

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1K. A. Kitchen, *Suppiluliuma and the Amarna Pharaohs* (Liverpool, 1962), passim, argues that the Great Syrian (here called the "First Syrian") war was preceded by two Syrian forays (the first a Hittite defeat, the second a victory), followed by a counterattack from Mitanni. Samuel D. Waterhouse, "Syria in the Amarna Age: A Borderland between Conflicting Empires" (Ph.D. diss., University of Michigan, 1965), pp. 1-63, has only one (unsuccessful) Syrian "foray" before the Mitannian counterattack, which was followed by the Great Syrian war (here called the "First
victory came during what I will call the Great Syrian war,² which began with Shuppiluliuma's reconquest of Ishuwa and the surprise attack on the Mitannian capital at Washshukanni that followed (see map 1). Tushratta fled without giving battle, and, with his enemy's rout assured, Shuppiluliuma wasted no more time in the Mitannian homeland, but immediately recrossed the Euphrates to secure the allegiance of Mitanni's most powerful vassals. Aleppo fell to him in short order, then Mukish, and while the Hittite king was encamped at Alalakh, the capital of Mukish, the king of Niya came to sue for peace. In his absence, however, a faction hostile to Hatti seized power in Niya and, in league with local members of the Hurrian aristocracy,³ joined with the

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²The main source is the historical preamble to the treaty between Shuppiluliuma and Mattiwaza, the ruler of the rump state of Mitanni, dating towards the end of Shuppiluliuma's reign: see E. F. Weidner, Politische Dokumente aus Kleinasien, Boghazköy Studien 8 (Leipzig, 1923), pp. 6-9 (the relevant passage is also translated by Goetze, in ANET¹, p. 318).

³The terms "Hurrian" and "Mitannian" can lead to some confusion. "Hurrian" is preeminently a gentilic term, and the territories controlled by members of the Hurrian
lands of Nuhashshe in blocking a Hittite advance further south. But when forces of Niya and Nuhashshe began to put pressure on Ugarit to join their united front, Ugarit's King Nqmad II appealed to Shuppiluliuma for help. The invaders were repulsed with the aid of Hittite troops, and, when the coast was clear, Nqmad made his way to Alalakh to tender his own personal fealty to the Hittite king. Niya and her allies were defeated in their turn, and it seems that the Hittite army next followed the course of the Orontes River still further south, to subdue the hostile city of Qatna. Having thus neutralized all the surrounding territories, the Hittites could now proceed to the invasion of Nuhashshe. A violent end had come to the king of

confederacy stretched west of the Euphrates, beyond the limits of the kingdom of Mitanni. Following the death of Tushratta, "Hurrian lands" in this study will refer to the countries ruled by Hurrian princes to the east of the Euphrates, including but not confined to the territory of the erstwhile kingdom of Mitanni. See Waterhouse, "Syria in the Amarna Age," pp. 21-22, and Goetze, CAH' II.2 1-5.

For the treaty between Shuppiluliuma and Nqmad II, see Jean Nougayrol, Le palais royal d'Ugarit IV, Mission de Ras Shamra 9 (Paris, 1956), pp. 48-52; and cf. Waterhouse, "Syria in the Amarna Age," pp. 46-52 and 91 (n. 34). A valuable discussion of this treaty is found in Mario Liverani, Storia di Ugarit nell'età degli archivi politici, Studi Semitici 6 (Rome, 1962), pp. 43-50, although I cannot agree with Liverani in all details—i.e., his placement of the Hittite expansion into Syria entirely within the reign of Tutankhamon (ibid., pp. 36-43).

Shuppiluliuma's probable itinerary, along waterways and on roads still used in classical antiquity, can be inferred: I have used the map "Lands of the Bible Today" from The National Geographic Magazine 90, no. 6 (December 1956), and also Heinrich Kiepert, Atlas Antiquus, 2d ed. rev. (Berlin, n.d.), Tab. 4, following the indications in the text of the
Nuhashshe who had submitted to Shuppiluliuma at an earlier date, so some time was spent in setting up a friendly government and in rounding up unreliable elements among the populace for deportation to Hatti. With Nuhashshe finally settled, the Hittites turned back towards the south, on their way to overawe rulers in the land of Abina (= Upe) who might still be inclined to side with their old Mitannian overlord. Shuppiluliuma had planned to bypass the territory of Kadesh without a fight, but to his surprise King Shutatarra took the field against him. It was a gallant but hopeless gesture: defeated in battle and then besieged, Shutatarra too was finally carried off into captivity along with many of the leading men of Kadesh—-one of whom, Shutatarra's son Aitakama, would soon be playing a prominent

Mattiwaza Treaty. I do not accept the hypothesis mooted by D. B. Redford, History and Chronology of the Eighteenth Dynasty of Egypt (Toronto, 1967), p. 221, n. 14; and cf. idem, Akhenaten: The Heretic Pharaoh (Princeton, 1984), pp. 196-99, which assigns the campaigns against Qatna and Nuhashshe to a later war, the account of which was interpolated into the Mattiwaza Treaty: not only does this emendation contradict Shuppiluliuma's explicit claim to have fought all of these campaigns in a single year (Weidner, Politische Dokumente, pp. 14-15), but there seems to be no textual or even strategic necessity for making it.

6On this identification, see Weidner, Politische Dokumente, p. 14, n. 1, and (more recently) Helck, Beziehungen3, pp. 176-77, and Waterhouse, "Syria in the Amarna Age," p. 43 (cf. pp. 234 and 242 [n. 35]). In J. A. Knudtzon, Die El-Amarna-Tafeln II (Leipzig, 1915), pp. 1112-13, Otto Weber also argued for the identity of "Ube" and "Abi." pointing out that letters from Biria aza in Upe itself use the latter spelling, "Abi," while the former is preferred by his neighbors to the north and east (e.g., Akizzi and Aitakama).
part in the affairs of the region. In Upe at last, Shuppiluliuma vanquished a hostile coalition led by King Ariwanna. With his foes now all defeated, in retreat or in captivity, Shuppiluliuma and his armies could now go home.

Shuppiluliuma would later boast that he had defeated all his enemies in a single year, setting the boundaries of his empire at the Euphrates River and the Lebanon range. This was premature. A number of powerful city-states in northern Syria, notably Carchemish, were still independent and unwilling to accept Hittite suzerainty. The Mitannians, routed and divided though they now appeared, remained in a position to threaten the Hittites' hold on Syria. Hatti's new position as a controlling power in Syria, moreover, conferred on her the doubtful loyalties of several princes who were not yet willing to commit themselves wholeheartedly to this new overlord. The interaction of these people with

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7A "rebellion" of Carchemish against Hatti, along with Aleppo and Nuhashshe, which is referred to in Murshili II's treaty with Talmi-Sharuma of Aleppo (Weidner, *Politische Dokumente*, p. 85 [obv. 33-36]), is probably to be dated to Shuppiluliuma's accession year or shortly thereafter, when he first set his boundary at the mountains of Lebanon (cf. Mattiwaζa Treaty, obv. 1-4 = Weidner, *Politische Dokumente*, p. 3). Carchemish is not mentioned in the latter treaty's account of the Great Syrian war, though it may have figured in the version of events given by the Deeds of Shuppiluliuma: see H. G. Güterbock, "The Deeds of Shuppiluliuma as Told by His Son, Mursili II," *JCS* 10 (1956):84, at Fragment 26; cf. Horst Klengel, *Geschichte Syriens im 2. Jahrtausend v.u.Z* I (Berlin, 1965), p. 41.

8See Goetze, *CAH* II.2 13-20, and Waterhouse, "Syria in the Amarna Age," pp. 59-63, 82-84, for the situation of Mitanni after Tushratta's defeat and during the later reign of Shuppiluliuma.
their neighbors and the great powers beyond would involve the Hittites more deeply in Syria and bring them into ultimate conflict with Egypt.

The Rise of the State of Amurru

Further light on conditions in Syria before, during and after the Great Syrian war is cast by the Amarna Letters, which tell us most of what we know about the rise of that strong and persistent influence on regional affairs, the kingdom of Amurru. All of these events extend across a substantial, if still indeterminate period of time.¹⁰

¹⁰Up-to-date translations of the Amarna Letters are still hard to come by as of this writing. For EA 69-96 I have used Ronald Fred Youngblood, "The Correspondence of Rib-Haddi, Prince of Byblos" (Ph.D. diss., Dropsie College, 1961), and Anson F. Rainey, El Amarna Tablets 359-379, 2d ed. revised, Alter Orient und Altes Testament 8 (Neukirchen-Veluyn, 1978), as well as the few letters translated in such collections as ANET² and A. Leo Oppenheim, Letters from Mesopotamia (Chicago, 1967). Otherwise, I have had to depend on the often outdated translations of Knudtzon, supplemented by more recent treatments, whole or fragmentary, which are scattered throughout the literature: see Edward Fay Campbell, Chronology of the Amarna Letters (Baltimore, 1964), pp. 142-63; Cord Kühne, Die Chronologie der internationalen Korrespondenz von El-Amarna, Alter Orient und Altes Testament 17 (Neukirchen-Veluyn, 1973), pp. 159-64; and most recently, Jean-Georges Heintz, Index documentaire d'El-Amarna I (Wiesbaden, 1982)—I am indebted to Klaus Baer for this last reference. I have also profited from advice on a number of passages from William L. Moran (Harvard University), whose translation of the Amarna Letters is to appear in the "Littératures anciennes du proche-orient" series.

¹⁰Both the sequence of events and the length of the period spanned by the archive are disputed: contrast the tentative chronology of Campbell, Chronology of the Amarna Letters, which allows more than three decades, with the much
Amurru's rise took place in two phases (with a temporary setback in between), during which local strongmen—first Abdi-Ashirta, and then his son Aziru—gained control over the territory of Amurru by exploiting social unrest in adjacent city-states, occasionally attacking their neighbors, and attempting, above all, to gain possession of the city of Šumur, the headquarters of the Egyptian Commissioner (rabīṣu) in Amurru. The activities of these rapacious princes of Amurru bulk large in the Amarna Letters, above all in the correspondence of Rib-Addi, prince of Byblos, whose letters form the largest single dossier in the Amarna archive, and whose fortunes are the reverse image of the waxing or waning success of his enemies in Amurru.

During the first phase, when Abdi-Ashirta ruled in Amurru, the Egyptian Commissioner was one Pahamnate (= P3-ẖm-nṯr). By this time the Egyptians were already having shorter periods envisaged by F. J. Giles, *Ikhnaton, Legend and History* (London, 1970), pp. 68-69, and by Waterhouse, "Syria in the Amarna Age," pp. 200-205, with notes.

11Frequent charges against the rulers of Amurru include murder and subversion against other city rulers (EA 73:23-33; 74:23-32; 75:25-34; 81:6-19; 84:34-39) and having become allied to the Š ApiRū, or SA.GAZ, people (EA 70:10-12; 91:3-13 [see Youngblood, "Rib-Haddi," p. 355], and otherwise passim throughout the pertinent correspondence).

12See EA 60 and 68; for the Egyptian equivalents of this and other names in the Amarna Letters, see W. F. Albright, "Cuneiform Material for Egyptian Prosopography, 1500-1200 B.C.," *JNES* 5 (1946):7-23. I am not fully convinced by the arguments of Campbell, *Chronology of the Amarna Letters*, p. 83, for placing EA 68 after Abdi-Ashirta's death,
trouble keeping possession of Şumur, and Abdi-Ashirta would write to the Commissioner (perhaps disingenuously) that the city had been virtually undefended when he had rescued it from marauding warriors (EA 62:9-34). With Şumur thus under his control, Abdi-Ashirta could beleaguer neighboring city-states at his leisure (EA 76:9-20; 87:15-24), and at one point Rib-Addi's territory was reduced to the very environs of Byblos (EA 91:3-26). Shuppiluliuma scored his early victories over Mitanni during this period, and Rib-Addi reported to Egypt that "the king, my lord, should be informed that the king of Hatti has seized all the countries that were vassals of the king of Mitanni."\(^3\)

Mitanni's efforts to recover her position in Syria were also mentioned in due course: the Pharaoh was notified that the Mitannian king had "gone out" with his chariots and his army (EA 58:4-6), and that he had succeeded in reaching Şumur before a lack of water forestalled a planned march on Byblos, forcing him to return home (EA 85:51-55). Abdi-Ashirta appears to have made a quick submission to the

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\(^3\) EA 75:35-39. The translation quoted is that of Moran (personal communication) rather than Youngblood's ("Rib-Haddi," p. 159) or Goetze's (CAH\(^3\) II.2 8). The submission of Nuhashshe to Hatti at this time is probably alluded to in Shuppiluliuma's treaty with Tette of Nuhashshe, in Weidner, Politische Dokumente, p. 59 (obv., I 1-11); see Horst Klengel, Geschichte Syriens im 2. Jahrtausend v.u.Z. II (Berlin, 1969), pp. 25-26, but also Waterhouse, "Syria in the Amarna Age," pp. 17, 22-28.
invader: a great deal of spoil is reported to have been
taken from Amurru to Mitanni (EA 86:8-12), and in another
letter (EA 90:19-22) Abdi-Ashirta is described as being "in
Mitanni" but still continuing his pressure on Byblos." But
reverses continued to plague the Amurrite ruler. Some time
after the invasion of Amurru by the Mitannians he fell sick,
EA 95:41-42; cf. lines 23-24 in Youngblood's translation),
and Rib-Addi redoubled his efforts to get the Egyptians
to intervene (EA 70:10-32; 73:6-25; 82:47-52; 86:6-8;
95:25-40). Eventually an army did come out from Egypt,
Abdi-Ashirta was killed, and an Egyptian commissioner once
again took up his post in Șumur.

In the second phase of Amurru's rise to prominence,
the stage was dominated by Aziru and the other "sons of
Abdi-Ashirta." Events followed the same pattern as before.
Aziru subdued his neighbors with the same ruthless tactics
his father had employed, and, once more, his most vocal
opponent was Rib-Addi, who would eventually see himself

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14 Youngblood, "Rib-Haddi," p. 341. For this Mitannian
counterattack, see the references cited above in n. 1,
especially Goetze, in CAH III.2 10, 13, and Waterhouse,
"Syria in the Amarna Age," pp. 21-28 with notes.

15 On EA 95 especially, see Youngblood, "Rib-Haddi," p.
391 (showing that the threat to Amurru in this letter comes
from Egypt, and not Mitanni as the Knudtzon translation
implies).

16 W. L. Moran, "The Death of 'Abdi-Asirta," Eretz Israel
9 (1969):94-99 (on EA 101), against, inter alia, Helck,
Beziehungen, p. 172, n. 33 (cf. EA 132:10-18); and cf.
chap. 1 above, pp. 7-9.
again reduced to possession of only his home city. The beleaguering of Šumur was lengthier and more eventful, however, than it had been during Abdi-Ashirta's reign. Early in this phase the office of Commissioner changed hands, probably when the aged Pahamnate died and was succeeded, not as expected by his son Haib (= Ḥṣpy?), but by a military officer named Pawara (= P3-wr).\textsuperscript{7} When, later on, this man was captured and killed under obscure circumstances,\textsuperscript{8} his place was finally taken by Haib, who ended by surrendering Šumur into the hands of Aziru (EA 132:36-43; 149:37-40). Rib-Addi's position in Byblos was now untenable. A naval blockade that Aziru was able to

\textsuperscript{7}EA 106:20-28. In EA 107:17-24 (following Moran's translation in "Amarna Glosses," Rêveu d'assyriologie 69 [1975]:155-56), Rib-Addi recommends that Haib be recalled to Egypt for questioning while an unnamed "archer-commander" stays in Šumur. Since this is roughly contemporary with the notice about the commissioner's having died—the text (EA 106:22) does not say he was killed—it may (following Helck, Beziehungen\textsuperscript{2}, p. 174) refer to Pahamnate's succession by Pawara. At about this time also, Rib-Addi was urging the Pharaoh to send forces in order to capture Aziru (called "a son of Abdi-Ashirta") and his brothers, who were then in Damascus (EA 107:26-34). While the wording of the passage suggests that this letter falls early in Aziru's career, as I have already said in a review of Krauss, Das Ende der Amarnazeit (Or. 52 [1983]:278), I no longer believe that it implies a close dating with Aziru's war against Biriawaza, which belongs to a much later stage in Aziru's career, as will be made clear below. Haib did become Commissioner eventually, but he too held his post during the last stage of Aziru's drive against Šumur.

\textsuperscript{8}I am unable to agree with Helck, Beziehungen\textsuperscript{2}, p. 177, n. 64, that Pawara was not the rabīṣu in Šumur, since he is described as such in EA 362:69; see also EA 129:11-14 and EA 132:43-46, where the murder of a rabīṣu (doubtless Pawara: see EA 129:95-97) is mentioned.
impose on Byblos with the aid of her commercial rivals took
a fatal toll of her people's patience, but Rib-Addi refused
to come to terms with Aziru, even rebuffing appeals from
within his own family. Eventually he concluded a treaty of
alliance with Beirut, but on returning home found himself
locked out of Byblos in a bloodless coup headed by a younger
brother, named Ilirabih (EA 136, 137). Rib-Addi now took
refuge with Ammunira, his new ally in Beirut, where he stayed
for some time (EA 138). Egypt promised military aid (EA
141, 142), but when it proved slow in coming, Rib-Addi took
the desperate step of appealing for restoration to none
other than his old enemy, Aziru. His earlier mistrust
proved sadly justified, however, and the king of Egypt
would later tax Aziru for his role in Rib-Addi's ultimate
disappearance (EA 162:7-21).

Aziru and the Other Princes of Syria between Egypt and Hatti

Rib-Addi was only the most vocal of those who suffered
at Aziru's hands. In addition to the small city-states
swallowed up in his drive against Šumur and Byblos, Aziru
ran afoul of his neighbors further east, notably Akizzi of
Qatna (EA 55:16-27) and Biriawaza, a prominent local ruler
in Upe.¹ These encounters must have taken place during and

¹Although representing Egyptian interests in Upe,
Biriawaza was not a rabišu: see Weber, in Knudtzon,
El-Amarna-Tafeln II 1113-14; Helck, Beziehungen², pp.
179-80; Redford, History and Chronology, pp. 219-20; and
SYRIA IN THE AMARNA AGE

after the Great Syrian war: Akizzi himself may well have come onto the scene as a result of Shuppiluliuma's campaign; and all his extant letters belong, in various stages, to the period after it. In his contest with Biriawaza, moreover, Aziru is said to be in league with "Aitakama, the lord of Kadesh" (EA 151:59-63). These details confirm the placement of EA 151, and what it reports, in the period after the Great Syrian campaign, during which Aitakama had been deported with his father to Hatti. Now back on the scene as a Hittite vassal, Aitakama appears as a wholehearted partisan of his new masters. Having urged Akizzi of Qatna to turn his coat, and been rebuffed, Aitakama had still managed to bring several neighboring


Waterhouse, "Syria in the Amarna Age," pp. 42-43, 53-55. Although I am not as certain as Waterhouse that Biriawaza himself comes onto the scene in the aftermath of the Great Syrian war, I do not share Hachmann's conviction (Kâmid el-Lôz--Kumidi, p. 67) that EA 194 is a letter written by Biriawaza at the accession of Amenhotep IV/Akhenaten. This document is brief, one-sided and unspecific. Why, if it is written to greet a new Pharaoh, could it not be addressed to Smenkhkare, or Tutankhamon?

For this passage (EA 151:55-63) I follow Moran's translation (apud personal communication): "Fire destroyed the palace of Ugarit; (rather,) it destroyed half of it, and so half of it is gone. There are no Hittite troops about. Etakama [sic], the lord of Kadesh, and Aziru are at war; the war is with Biriawaza." Cf. The Chicago Assyrian Dictionary, vol. I/J (Chicago, 1960), p. 230b, s.v. išatu; and Waterhouse, "Syria in the Amarna Age," pp. 147 (n. 25) and 117-18.
towns into the Hittite orbit, and with them he had set about plundering the lands of Biriawaza (EA 53:24-39, 56-70; 54:22-37; 56:14-28). In support of Egypt, Akizzi reported that four local rulers besides himself—including the kings of Nuhashshe and Niya—stood at the Pharaoh's disposal (EA 53:40-44); and that in the Mitannian lands across the Euphrates, the Egyptian king's messenger had found three or four "kings" who were united in their hostility to the king of Hatti (EA 54:38-43; 56:36-41). Shuppiluliuma's victory, it seems, had not been as absolute as he would later maintain, and Hittite agents in Syria still had their work cut out for them.

In his own defense, Aitakama told the Pharaoh that Biriawaza had slandered him, taken his kingdom, burnt his city and delivered the lands of Upe and Tahsy to the 'Apiru (EA 189 obv.:6-2, rev.:9-12). Still Aitakama had compromised himself too hopelessly before the Egyptians to successfully maintain even a veneer of loyalty. In the same letter in which the Pharaoh challenged Aziru's handling of the deposed

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12 This interpretation seems more consistent with the rest of the data than Helck's suggestion (Beziehungen², p. 179) that this rapprochement with Egypt came about later, as a result of Biriawaza's pressure on Kadesh; see next note. It is possible, as Moran suggests, that EA 189 dates even earlier, to the period before the Great Syrian war, when Aitakama would have been ruling in Kadesh as his father's coregent (for which see Klengel, Geschichte Syriens II 162-63). While this possible placement for EA 189 cannot be excluded, I believe the evidence for this coregency is weak (see chap. 1, pp. 14-16), and that EA 189 belongs with the other documents attesting to Aitakama's war with Biriawaza (thus also Krauss, Das Ende der Amarnazeit, p. 63, n. 2).
Rib-Addi, the Amurrite was also taxed for his friendliness with Aitakama, a man from whom the king of Egypt had turned away (EA 162:22-29; cf. EA 140:20-30). Aziru had evidently been under suspicion for some time, since this same letter reveals that a year before he had been ordered to present himself in Egypt for questioning, but that he had asked for and received a year's grace. Now he was to come immediately, or send his son as a hostage (EA 162:42-54).

Aziru eventually did as he was told (EA 140:22-24; cf. EA 169), and in his absence two other sons of Abdi-Ashirta, Ba' aluya and Beti-ilu, ruled Amurru in his place. During this period, Aziru and his kingdom were beset on all sides. Enemies such as Ilirabih of Byblos, Rib-Addi's undutiful brother (now estranged from Aziru, his former patron), wrote denunciations to the Pharaoh (EA 139, 140);\(^2^3\) and when

\(^{2^3}\) Helck, Beziehungen\(^2\), pp. 178-79, dates these denunciations, along with most of Aziru's activities with Aitakama and his temporizing over the rebuilding of Sumur, to the period following Aziru's return from Egypt. This, I agree, could be a plausible dating for some of the letters, particularly EA 159-61--letters that deal with the rebuilding of Sumur, an issue not mentioned in the Pharaoh's letter (EA 162) or in Aziru's repeated appeals for a delaying of the required appearance before Pharaoh which that letter mentions (EA 164-67). The case is less convincing when it touches Aziru's involvement with Aitakama, particularly since this one thing Aziru was called upon to explain to the king of Egypt (EA 162:22-29). Unless we are to assume that the Amarna archive contains two distinct demands that Aziru present himself in Egypt, it seems best to date Aziru's and Aitakama's war with Biriawaza before the writing of EA 162, which itself would precede Aziru's journey into Egypt. Aziru was master of Sumur when he received EA 162; but it is unclear whether this letter precedes or follows the group EA 159-61, in which Aziru is urged to rebuild that city.
Aziru was detained at the Egyptian court instead of being released immediately, Nuhashshe attacked Amurru on the pretext that Aziru's brothers had sold him into captivity, and that he would never return (EA 169:16-34). A more ominous development is reported in EA 170, a letter perhaps even addressed to Aziru himself in Egypt. Written jointly by Aziru's two brothers, it recounts how Hittite troops under the leadership of a commander named Lupakku entered the country of Amki and took its cities, while another Hittite force led by a second commander, Zitana, had allegedly come on the scene: the writers promise to verify the truth of this report and assure the addressee that Beti-ilu will be sent against the invader, whether he enters Nuhashshe or not. A further clutch of letters (EA 174-76, 363) reveals that with the Hittite raiders in Amki was "the man of Kadesh," Aitakama. The outcome of this episode is not found in the Amarna archive; but Aziru we know, was released by the Egyptians, and he returned to his kingdom, ultimately to become a loyal vassal to the Hittite Empire.24

The Consolidation of the Hittite Empire in Northern Syria

The later Syrian campaigns of Shuppiluliuma fall into the period of the six-year Hurrian war at the end of his reign, and they were described in the Deeds of Shuppiluliuma

For Aziru's stay in Egypt, see in general Klengel, Geschichte Syriens II 279-85; and cf. n. 56 below.
that were composed in the reign of his son, Murshili II. The fragmentary nature of the surviving portions makes it difficult to derive from them a clear sequence of events or a continuous narrative; but the beginning of the period, fortunately, falls on a single fragment, the best preserved section of the entire text, so that the ordering of the various episodes in this part, at least, is not in doubt. The renewed activity in Syria came at the end of at least two years during which Shuppiluliuma was engaged in securing his borders in Anatolia. At the start of the third year, while Shuppiluliuma was still at home, his son Telepinu—called "the Priest" in this narrative—succeeded in routing a horde of tribal troops, presumably somewhere in the area of the upper Euphrates. As a result, "all the countries of Arziya and Carchemish made peace with him, and the town of Murmuriga made peace with him (too)." Only the city of Carchemish now held out against the Hittites, so Telepinu left a garrison in Murmuriga and returned to Hatti to report to his father. In his absence, however, a Hurrian force came and surrounded the Hittite garrison in Murmuriga. Concurrently, it is also mentioned that "to the country of Kinza (= Kadesh), which my father had conquered, troops and chariots of Egypt came and attacked the country of Kinza." When word was brought to Shuppiluliuma of the trapped army's plight, he mobilized his home forces and marched

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2 Güterbock, JCS 10 (1956):90-98 (=Fragment 28).
THE ROAD TO KADESH

south. In Tegarama, the army split into two parts. One wing, led by the crown prince, Arnuwanda, and a commander named Zita (the same man as the Zitana mentioned in EA 170?), moved into Hurrian territory, where it eventually met and defeated the enemy. After waiting in Tegarama to cut off any stragglers, Shuppiluliuma proceeded with the rest of the army to reduce Carchemish for once and for all.

It was while Shuppiluliuma was in the country of Carchemish that he sent Lupakku and another officer, Tarhunta-Zalma, to raid the country of Amki, Egyptian territory, in retaliation for the earlier attack on Kadesh. The news of its success intimidated the Egyptians; and since, as the Deeds recalls, "their lord Nipkhururiya had died, therefore, the queen of Egypt, who was Dahamunzu (= t3 hmt-nswt, "the wife of the king" in Egyptian), sent a messenger to my father, and wrote to him," proposing that Shuppiluliuma send one of his many sons to be her husband. This astounding offer demanded consideration, so to gain time and more information Shuppiluliuma sent his chamberlain to Egypt to discuss the queen's proposal, but with secret orders to discover whether Nipkhururiya had indeed died childless, as was being maintained.

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2 W. Federn, "Daḥamunzu (KBo V 6 iii 8)," JCS 14 (1960):33.
During his chamberlain's mission to Egypt, Carchemish fell to the Hittites after a siege lasting one week, and Shuppiluliuma now proceeded to a drastic reorganization of the Hittite Empire's machinery in Syria. Previously, the vassals' fealty had rested, for the most part, on their personal treaties with the Hittite king, along with the occasional garrison (e.g., in Ugarit). Otherwise, however, the closest Hittite army had been in southern Anatolia, where Telepinu had been installed as the ruler ("Priest") in the holy city of Kummani. Shuppiluliuma now placed important centers in Syria under the direct rule of his sons. Telepinu was designated king of Aleppo, while another brother, Piyashshili (also known by his Hurrian name of Sharri-Kushuh), was made king of Carchemish. These arrangements concluded, Shuppiluliuma returned to Hatti for the winter. In the spring, the Hittite envoy returned from Egypt, bringing with him an Egyptian negotiator, Hani (the same man who is mentioned in the Amarna Letters?), and another letter from the queen. The outcome of these fresh discussions was the sending of a Hittite prince, Zannanza, to Egypt, followed by his death and the outbreak of

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27 See Goetze, in CAH III 1.2 9, with references.

28 KBo VI 28, obv. 6-25 (=Kitchen, Suppiluliuma, p. 51).

29 EA 161:11-34 and 162:55-77, referred to there as the "king's messenger" (wpwty-nswt) dealing with Aziru towards the end of Akhenaten's reign or slightly later; on the name, see Albright, JNES 5 (1946):11 (9*).
hostilities between the superpowers. Shuppiluliuma defeated the Egyptians in battle, but the prisoners of war brought with them into Hatti a plague that killed, first Shuppiluliuma, then Arnuwanda, whose death cleared the way for the succession of a younger son, Murshili II, to the throne of Hatti. Before his death, however, Shuppiluliuma had managed to bring Mitanni, as well as Syria, fully into the Hittite system. The empire he left would retain its integrity for over a century, with the exception of an interlude in the reign of Muwatalli, the Hittite contemporary of Sety I and the younger Ramesses II in Egypt.

THE CHRONOLOGICAL FRAMEWORK

Interrelating all the western Asian sources with the reigns of the Amarna Pharaohs is still impossible: too many imponderables remain, especially in the earlier period, to allow even a relative chronology to be proposed with any great exactitude. What can be done, however, is to define realistic limits for certain periods. If the model presented in the following pages does not solve all of these problems, it may still bring us closer to seeing the direction in which solutions may lie.

\footnote{See A. Goetze, "Die Pestgebete des Mursilis," in \textit{Kleinasiatische Forschungen} 1 (1930):161-235; cf. \textit{ANET}², p. 395. For this plague and its scope, see especially Helck, \textit{Beziehungen}², p. 183, and Campbell, \textit{Chronology of the Amarna Letters}, p. 89 and n. 56.}
The date of Shuppiluliuma's Great Syrian campaign within the reign of Akhenaten can be approximately fixed by means of the Amarna Letters written by Tushratta of Mitanni. EA 27, in particular, bears a hieratic docket, the date of which is most probably to be read "[regnal year] 12, I Prt 5 (or 6)." It has been shown, moreover, that another letter in this dossier, EA 29, was written several years after EA 27 was sent—for Tushratta says (EA 29:112) that the king of Egypt has had his messengers before him for the past four years; and the internal evidence of this letter together with the rest of the later Mitannian correspondence from Amarna (EA 27, 28) indicates that these four years were calculated from the sending of the messengers who are mentioned in EA 27. It follows that EA 29 was written, at

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1Kühne, Chronologie, pp. 43-44, n. 205, and 44, n. 207; cf. W. J. Murnane, "On the Accession Day of Akhenaten," in Studies in Honor of George R. Hughes, SAOC 39 (1976), p. 165, n. 18; and idem, Ancient Egyptian Coregencies, SAOC 40 (1977), pp. 124-25, especially n. 166. While acknowledging the dissent of D. B. Redford in a review of the last-named work (JEA 69 [1983]:182-83), I still believe it most probable that the disputed traces should be read "10 + 2" and not [rnpt] + sp + 2: this will be discussed at length in a forthcoming article. I also remain unconvinced that the reading "12" has any bearing on whether there was a long coregency between Amenhotep III and Akhenaten. The chronological implications sought in Tushratta's references to events that occurred in the time of Amenhotep III are, I believe, impressionistic: one might with equal justice argue that the contents of EA 29 (which gives a far more circumstantial account of Tushratta's claim than do the other letters in this series) show it to be the first document in the sequence, whereas the internal evidence leads to its placement some years after EA 27 was composed (see next note).

2Kühne, Chronologie, pp. 47-48, 125.
the latest, in the fifth year following the despatch of EA 27—that is, in Akhenaten's sixteenth year. On the other hand, if Tushratta's reckoning was rough and was meant to include both the present year and that of the original despatch, the interval could be much shorter. The date on EA 27 and also the change between one regnal year and the next in the time of Akhenaten fell in the early part of December. Since it is likely that Tushratta would have been reckoning in terms of a calendar on the Babylonian model, in which the year began in the spring, the period of four years could have started in the fall of the year in which EA 27 was sent and included, as its terminus, the third spring thereafter. Thus, if EA 27 was received in the Egyptian court at the very beginning of Akhenaten's twelfth regnal year, the four years mentioned in EA 29 could have been reckoned from the despatch of the letter in year 11, ending in the spring of year 14. If, however, the date on EA 27 falls at the end of Akhenaten's twelfth year, it would have been sent earlier in that same year, and the terminal

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Calculated with the aid of Erik Lundsgaard, Egyptian Calendar for the Years B.C. 3000-200 (Copenhagen, 1942); cf. R. J. Demarée and J. J. Janssen, Gleanings from Deir el-Medina (Leiden, 1982), p. xiii. For Akhenaten's accession date, see Murnane, in Studies in Honor of George R. Hughes, pp. 163-67.

point for the four years would be the spring of Akhenaten's fifteenth regnal year. This uncertainty cannot be resolved with the data at our disposal; but one thing is clear. The letters in this sequence were written at a time when Tushratta could afford to dicker with Egypt in terms that would have been fatuous after his defeat in the Great Syrian war. It follows that all these letters were sent before Shuppiluliuma's raid on Washshukanni, and that this last event cannot be dated any earlier than the spring of Akhenaten's fourteenth year as Pharaoh.

The Amarna Letters of Akizzi of Qatna suggest, in turn, that the Great Syrian war fell at a time that cannot be too much later than the earliest date proposed. EA 53, along with its associated letters (EA 54 and 56), reports on the subversive activities of the Hittites' most enthusiastic agent in Syria, Aitakama of Kadesh, against Biriawaza, Egypt's most prominent supporter in Upe. These events clearly fall some time after the Great Syrian war, for Aitakama—who had been deported to Hatti at that time, along with his father—is now back as the ruler of Kadesh. EA 53,

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3"This line of reasoning is not affected by the controversy over the date of Tushratta's death, which Kitchen, Suppiluliuma, p. 48, and H. Klengel, "Aziru von Amurru und seine Rolle in der Geschichte der Amārnazeit," MIO 10 (1964):79, n. 25, believe occurred many years after his defeat by Shuppiluliuma, in about the second year of the Hurrian war, but which most other scholars place (more convincingly, in my opinion) shortly after his defeat in the Great Syrian war: see Waterhouse, "Syria in the Amarna Age," pp. 59-63; Goetze, CAH' II.2 14-15; Helck, Beziehungen², p. 180.
moreover, is addressed to the Pharaoh "Namhuria" (i.e., Neferkheprure/Akhenaten). Since Akhenaten's last year was his seventeenth, these letters could have been written no later than that--and this point is separated by a mere three years from the terminus post quem we have established for the Great Syrian war, in Akhenaten's fourteenth year.

Another letter from Akizzi to Akhenaten, EA 55, is earlier than the rest of his dossier, and it must have been written at a time very close to the Great Syrian campaign. It begins by recalling that the land and the city of Qatna had belonged to Egypt since the time of Akizzi's fathers, and that supplies for Pharaoh's infantry and chariots had always been forthcoming from his loyal vassals. All countries would still bow to the armed might of Egypt, but help must be sent within the current year--then the entire land of Nuhashshe will belong to the Pharaoh, and (in Moran's suggested rendering of this passage) he will be able to take Aziru as his prisoner. The Pharaoh should be aware, however, that the king of Hatti has been scorching the country, and that he has taken the gods of Qatna; and now Aziru has taken subjects of Qatna as hostages, for ransom. Thus Akizzi petitions the Pharaoh to make good on his

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17 See Campbell, Chronology of the Amarna Letters, p. 68, on this identification.

standing promise of financial aid: in bygone times, the sun
god of Qatna had made a glorious name for Akhenaten's
predecessors. This divinity was taken away by the king of
Hatti, but the Pharaoh knows the ways of gods, and the sun
god has now returned to Akizzi. So let the king now be
generous with his gold, and his relationship with the god of
Qatna will be as lustrous as it was in earlier times (EA
55:7-66). The allusions in this letter to the Great Syrian
campaign seem hard to deny. The devastation wreaked by the
Hittites and, in particular, the removal of Qatna's gods all
point to the sacking of the city by Shuppiluliuma, as
recounted in his treaty with Mattiwaza. The gods' return
implies, at least, that this phase of the campaign had been
concluded, and that Akizzi had come to some kind of terms
with the invader; but a more precise definition of the
letter's context is made possible by what it says about the
position of Nuhashshe. That country is represented as being
ripe for the Egyptians to take, if they act speedily and
send armed help. The Hittites are not mentioned
specifically in this connection, but they are in the
background, and another common enemy is seen in Aziru, who
has already invaded the country. The Mattiwaza Treaty

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1 Weidner, Politische Dokumente, p. 13 (obv. 37); see
Waterhouse, "Syria in the Amarna Age," pp. 42-43, 43-55, for
the situation of Qatna during and after the Great Syrian
war, an analysis which I find more convincing than Redford's
suggestion (History and Chronology, pp. 220-23) that Qatna,
Ugarit and Nuhashshe fell to Hatti during a war that
followed his Great Syrian campaign.
describes the subjugation of Nuhashshe, one of the later episodes of the Great Syrian campaign, in terms that imply the necessity of subduing Nuhashshe's neighbors and surrounding it with foes. It was probably during the early part of the campaign that Addu-Nirari of Nuhashshe had written to the Pharaoh, begging for Egyptian help. The contents of EA 55 can be interpreted as reflecting a later stage of the war, when the Hittites had not yet conquered Nuhashshe and while hopes of Egyptian intervention were still alive. It thus seems likely that EA 55 was written in the very midst of—or, less probably, shortly after—the Great Syrian campaign.

Now that a rough chronological framework for these events has been established, it may be useful to examine more closely the Amarna dossiers of two figures, Rib-Addi of Byblos and his great enemy, Aziru of Amurru. In no fewer than four of his extant letters, Aziru assures the Pharaoh (EA 165) and other prominent figures at the Egyptian court (EA 164, 166-67) of his intention of visiting Egypt: having

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received reassurances from the Pharaoh (EA 164:4-17, 35-42), he and the Egyptian envoy Hatib (= Hotpe) are ready to set out--but the king of Hatti has come into Nushashshe, and Aziru tells Tutu that they will wait until he retires before coming on to Egypt (EA 164:18-26). The other letters in this series were evidently despatched somewhat later: the Hittite king is now entrenched in Nushashshe, a mere two days' march from Tunip (EA 165:18-21, 38-39; 166:21-29; 167:20-27), and Aziru fears for his safety. The identity of this campaign with the Great Syrian war seems beyond question, especially given the notice of the Hittite king's personal presence in Nushashshe, where he is not known to have campaigned at any other time. The invasion of Nushashshe belongs to one of the war's later phases, as we have seen; and these letters of Aziru should have been written after EA 55, which shows Aziru acting, in all probability, as a Hittite proxy before Shuppiluliuma had subdued Nushashshe and before Aziru himself had been checked by the onerous presence of an Egyptian watchdog. The

4 Thus, Klengel, Geschichte Syriens II 272-73; Goetze, CAH I 2 12; and Kitchen, Suppiluliuma, p. 44. A somewhat later date for these references is suggested by A. R. Schulman in "Ankhesenamun, Nofretity and the Amka Affair," JARCE 15 (1978):44-45, but his reconstruction depends on discounting Aziru's report of the Hittite king's personal presence in Nushashshe and on placing Aziru's letters to this effect with EA 170, written by Aziru's brothers. While it is possible to interpret this last letter as being in support of Aziru's excuses to the Pharaoh for not appearing in Egypt, 170 is more generally regarded as having been written during Aziru's stay in Egypt (see n. 56 below).
precise date of these events, unfortunately, cannot be fixed: even if we assume that the attack on Washshukanni came immediately after the despatch of EA 29 to Egypt (which falls, at the earliest, in the spring of Akhenaten's fourteenth year), and that the Hittite army covered the distances in the campaign at the standard rate of march (fifteen miles per day), the intervals between each step in the campaign cannot be measured with any certainty. Given the Hittites' itinerary, however—which includes diversions into Ugarit and then south to Qatna before the final attack on Nuhashshe, not to mention stays of some length at Alalakh and in Nuhashshe, followed by the forays into the territories of Kadesh and Upe, and the final march home—it does not seem likely that the Hittites withdrew much before the summer, at the earliest. It seems more probable that they stayed up until the close of the campaigning season, in late fall.

Two further points are worth noting. First, Aziru seems to have been at some pains to assure the Pharaoh that he was not using the invasion of Nuhashshe as an excuse to dally with the Hittite king even while professing loyalty to Egypt (EA 165:28-32). This protest seems disingenuous, since it appears that Aziru already—no doubt out of prudent self-interest—had been at least in correspondence with Shuppiluliuma before being recalled sharply to heel by

'1See Appendix 2, pp. 145-47.
Second, Aziru's expressed concern is not only for Amurru, but for Tunip (EA 165:38-41), a city which he took over at some point in his career (EA 161:11-16). But when? Aziru's insistence on the strategic importance of Tunip in his letters to Egypt implies but does not prove that he regarded it as a threatened possession: it could as easily be a vulnerable border town at this time. We can at least be certain that it was not in his hands early in the Great Syrian war, since in a letter to the Pharaoh the citizens of Tunip attack Aziru, speaking of him in terms that suggest he was in regular contact with the Hittite court (EA 59:21-24). This is a situation that can be imagined only in the wake of Shuppiluliuma's invasion--hardly before it. Thus it would seem that Tunip fell to Aziru no earlier than the second part of the Great Syrian campaign, and perhaps some time later.

When the Tunip letter was written, moreover, Aziru was not yet master of Sumur (EA 59:34-38); and the placement of this conquest after the Great Syrian campaign is also

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"'See chap. 1, pp. 16-18.

'For the translation of this passage, see Waterhouse, "Syria in the Amarna Age," pp. 136 and 156 (n. 94); cf. The Chicago Assyrian Dictionary, vol. N, part 1 (Chicago, 1980), p. 247a, s.v. namšarratu. Waterhouse's interpretation of this letter, in which he regards it as having been written by the citizens of Tunip while Aziru was on his way to Hatti following his release by the Egyptians ("Syria in the Amarna Age," pp. 135-37 with notes) is more debatable."
suggested by Rib-Addi's correspondence with Egypt."

Particularly important is EA 126, which was written in the
teeth of what Rib-Addi regards as total indifference from
Egypt to Levantine affairs. Rib-Addi recalls that he has
written repeatedly that the Hittites are scorching the
land, but to no result: now the Pharaoh should take care,
lest the Hittites come and take Byblos as well (EA
126:51-61)--and let him not heed the words of his army
officers (mISHI people = Egyptian mŠC)," since all the gold
and silver they give to the sons of Abdi-Ashirta has been
turned over to the "strong king" (i.e., the king of Hatti),
and for that reason the sons of Abdi-Ashirta are strong (EA
126:62-66). The alleged immediacy of the threat to Byblos
implies that this letter was written some time after the
start of Shuppiluliuma's invasion--not before, since the
Hittites do not seem to have maintained much of a profile in
Syria between the Mitannian resurgence near the end of
Abdi-Ashirta's life and the Great Syrian campaign itself.
Sumur is not mentioned in this letter, but other matters
affecting Rib-Addi here can be related to other, more
voluble letters he sent to the court of Egypt. In a message
sent to Byblos before this letter was written, for instance,
the Pharaoh had asked for a type of wood that, Rib-Addi

"Thus also, Helck, Beziehungen", p. 176, n. 61.

"See T. O Lambdin, "The MISHI-people of the Byblian
reminds him (EA 126:4-13), is available only through Ugarit—and Ugarit is now blocked, cut off by Aziru and the allies who cooperate with him. This naval blockade is mentioned elsewhere, in letters of a slightly earlier date (EA 98:3-20; 105:6-40; 114:6-41), which make it clear that, though difficult of access, Šumur is still in Egyptian hands. In EA 126:30-48, moreover, Rib-Addi complains that the Pharaoh has ignored his persistent requests for military and economic aid even though he has been informed that all Rib-Addi’s cities but one have fallen to the sons of Abdi-Ashirta. In letters that convey the same complaint (EA 124 and 125) Šumur is said to be in Egyptian hands, with the added implication that the Egyptian Commissioner Pawara was still governing it (EA 124:44-47). Although these letters, even if they overlap to some degree, reflect the situation over a period of time, the confluence of these factors does imply that this was how Aziru stood vis-à-vis Šumur and Byblos in the year of the Great Syrian war. Since, as we have seen, Aziru was under Egyptian scrutiny when Shuppiluliuma entered Nuhashshe, it seems unlikely that he would have resumed his drive against Šumur at this time. One doubts, in fact, that he would have been in any position to do so before the withdrawal of Hittite troops and the

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"Campbell, Chronology of the Amarna Letters, pp. 84-85."
onset of winter—in any case, hardly very much before the start of Akhenaten's fifteenth regnal year."

To the next stage belongs the murder of the Egyptian Commissioner, Pawara, and his replacement by Haib, who ultimately surrendered Sumur into Aziru's hands. This process must have taken several months, at the minimum, especially since such major policy decisions affecting Sumur would surely have been referred to Egypt. Rib-Addi's own fall from power came quickly thereafter. He was already under attack from within Byblos itself, for in the aftermath

"Supporting evidence comes from another letter, belonging either to the year of the Great Syrian war or shortly thereafter, in which Aziru asks for an assurance of Egyptian aid should the Hittite king send an army against him (EA 157:28-33). Aziru also emphasizes that, despite his past and present loyalty, the "great ones" of Sumur have not allowed him to protect the king's servants (for this see EA 157:9-16)—which sounds, to me, like a complaint, with no necessary implication that Aziru had already mastered Sumur when this letter was written. At least, there is no firm basis for Campbell's belief (ibid., p. 88) that all the letters in Aziru's dossier at Amarna were written following the fall of Rib-Addi.

These include, inter alia, the news of Pawara's murder, negotiations regarding his successor, and the subsequent surrender of Sumur to Aziru. The transmitting of these reports to Egypt and their disposition would take some time; and, for the process of consultation, cf. EA 133:4-10, in which Rib-Addi tells the Pharaoh to confirm what he says with Haib, the former Commissioner who is now in Egypt.

The interval cannot have been too long: note that the writer of EA 67 asks the Egyptian court for instructions regarding what he is to do with Egyptian refugees from Sumur who have come to live in his country—adding, moreover, that a number of local rulers, including the prince of Byblos, have come to terms with the conquerer of Sumur. Since this would hardly have been true of Rib-Addi, whether with Abdi-Ashirta or Aziru, the reference must be to Ilirabib (as noted by Campbell, Chronology of the Amarna Letters, p. 131).
of Sumur's fall he was obliged to put down a rebellion by a faction that maintained Rib-Addi should bow to the inevitable and make peace with Aziru. This sentiment remained strong, however, and when Egypt again failed to respond with military help, it returned in force: even members of Rib-Addi's immediate family now urged him to come to terms with Amurru, but to no avail (EA 138:28-50; cf. EA 136:8-15). Instead, Rib-Addi sought to bolster his position by seeking an alliance with Ammunira, prince of Beirut. His success was futile: on his return to Byblos, Rib-Addi found himself locked out of his city by a younger brother, who had led a coup in favor of accommodation with Amurru (EA 138:50-80). Rib-Addi's last letter to Egypt allows us to date these events, for he says (EA 138:75-80) that immediately on his return to Beirut following the coup, he had sent his son to Egypt; but now, four months later, the young man has still not gained an audience with the Pharaoh.

Even more valuable is an unfortunately damaged passage, earlier on, in which Rib-Addi seems to be asking rhetorically if he has not been living in Beirut already for twelve months (EA 138:20-21).\(^5\)\(^2\) Since, as Moran has certified, the reading of these lines is probably correct as stated, this figure can be reconciled with the four months since Rib-Addi's reentry into Beirut only by assuming (as

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Moran suggests) that it refers to the entire period of Rib-Addi's residence in Beirut since he first approached Ammunira for an alliance. The notion that Rib-Addi had been living in Beirut for eight months before he was locked out of his city may seem improbable; but the only alternative is that he misstates the terms of his expulsion from Byblos in two out of the three letters he sent to the Pharaoh after the event (EA 136:24-35; 138:51-59). Perhaps, with the renewed unrest that followed Egypt's refusal to send help after Šumur's fall, Rib-Addi had felt it prudent to leave town until he could produce another source of support—it is certain that he was absent at least briefly during his negotiations with Ammunira—but perhaps, too, his rhetorical question is not to be taken literally. However this may be, even if Rib-Addi is rounding off the number of months since he began treating with Ammunira (as Moran suggests), it still represents close to a year; and since at least two months had passed between the fall of Šumur and the start of these negotiations (time enough for the rebellion, Aziru's letter begging help from Egypt, and the failure of a response), we should not be far wrong if we date EA 138 to the spring of Akhenaten's sixteenth year, about one year following the fall of Šumur to Amurru.

Even so, this was not the end of the story. Two letters from Ammunira, Rib-Addi's host in Beirut, speak of local preparations being made to receive an Egyptian army.
that is expected to arrive.\textsuperscript{53} Rib-Addi was still in Beirut at this time (he is explicitly mentioned in EA 142:15-24), and such a promise of aid may even be alluded to in Rib-Addi's last letter--being implicit, perhaps, in the jeering remarks of his former subjects about help from Egypt that does not come (EA 138:122-26). When this force was supposed to arrive and whether it came at all are things which we do not know: the rhetorical thrust of EA 138 is that Rib-Addi has heard nothing at all from the Egyptian court, so the armed initiative may be later. What is certain is that Rib-Addi obtained no satisfaction from this quarter: whether the force was never sent, in the end, or whether the direction it took was not in Rib-Addi's favor remains uncertain. We do know, however, that Rib-Addi eventually took the seemingly desperate step of appealing for reinstallation in Byblos to his archenemy, Aziru. This was his last mistake: his death is alluded to by the Pharaoh in terms that strongly imply Aziru's complicity (EA 162:1-21), and Ilirabih, Rib-Addi's treacherous brother,

\textsuperscript{53}EA 141, 142. Other references to this episode in the Amarna Letters have been collected by A. R. Schulman in "Some Remarks on the Military Background of the Amarna Period," JARCE 3 (1964):63-64, n. 99; and they are also regarded as referring to one event in Nadav Naʿaman's unpublished dissertation, which I have not seen (reference courtesy of Professor Moran). The logistical aspects of such expeditionary forces from Egypt have been discussed at length by F. Pintore, "Transiti di truppe e schemi epistolari nella Siria egiziana dell'età di El-Amarna," Or. Ant. 11 (1972):101-31; and idem, "La prassi della marcia armata nella Siria egizia dell'età di El-Amarna," Or. Ant. 12 (1973):299-318.
obliquely makes a similar charge (EA 141:33-40) at a time when he had fallen out with Aziru. Since Aziru was Ilirabih's patron at the time Rib-Addi was writing his last letters from Beirut (see above, EA 138:71-73), it is scarcely credible that the deposed prince would be looking to Aziru then. The rift between the courts of Byblos and Amurru, and Rib-Addi's disastrous approach to Aziru, must fall later than this—and if EA 138 was sent by Rib-Addi, at the earliest, in the spring of Akhenaten's sixteenth year, the dénouement must fall, at the earliest, in the second half of the same year.

The death of Rib-Addi is one of the topics discussed in a sharp letter (EA 162) sent to Aziru by the king of Egypt. After discussing the facts of the case, with a strong suggestion that Aziru had not been completely honest with either Rib-Addi or the Pharaoh, his lord (lines 1-21), the king goes on to other matters. He complains that Aziru is still at peace with "the man of Kadesh" (i.e., Aitakama) even though this is a man with whom the Pharaoh has fought, and he points out that this is not what he expects of a loyal vassal (lines 23-29). The king reminds Aziru that his enemies are seeking to do him harm, and he warns him that the penalty for disloyalty is death for him and his whole family (EA 162:30-41). Earlier, Aziru had asked for and received a year of grace, during which he was required neither to come to Egypt at the king's command nor to send
his son as a hostage: now, he should not repeat this request, but either present himself before the Pharaoh within this year or send his son (EA 162:42-54). There follows a list of political prisoners that Aziru, under the terms of a previous letter, had agreed to send to Egypt and the letter closes with the assurance--formulaic, but ominous in context--that the king and his armies are very well (EA 162:55-81).

Most of the allusions in this letter are familiar ones: the death of Rib-Addi, which falls at the earliest sometime in Akhenaten's sixteenth year, and Aitakama's war with Biriawaza in Upe, which came, at the latest, in the seventeenth and final year of the heretic's reign. The letter could have been written by Akhenaten, particularly if the period of grace allowed to Aziru in the previous year was granted by the same king who wrote EA 162; but this cannot be proved. The whole background of Aziru's journey to Egypt, in fact--how often he was asked, how long he delayed, and when he actually went--is all fog and speculation. Aziru's reply to EA 162 could perhaps be seen in EA 156, for in it he protests his own and his sons' loyalty to Egypt and presents two youths, sons of his, whom he sends to do the king's bidding so long as he, Aziru, is allowed to stay in Amurru. One misses, however, the

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5'This does not refer back to the similar business in EA 161, where Hani's mission is spoken of in somewhat different terms.
fulsomeness and detail that one would expect in any reply to the charges enumerated in the Pharaoh's letter—not to mention the obviously required response in the matter of the prisoners—so it seems more likely, as Knudtzon believed, that his letter belongs earlier in Aziru's dossier.

Other groups of letters illuminate Aziru's circumstances without casting any light on his fateful journey into Egypt. EA 159-61, for instance, have as their common theme Aziru's insistence that he will rebuild Šumur as soon as circumstances permit. The hostility of Nuhashshe is cited as a reason for the delay: at Hotpe's instigation, its rulers have been harassing Aziru's cities, and Hotpe himself stands accused of pocketing much of the treasure which the Pharaoh had meant for Aziru's own use (EA 161:35-46). In another, perhaps earlier letter in this series, Aziru also blames Nuhashshe for his forced inaction but promises to rebuild Šumur within a year (EA 160:20-33). The placement of these letters is elusive. Although they obviously belong in the period following Aziru's takeover of Šumur, they cannot be tied to any of his other datable activities—although (in EA 161:47-53) Aziru defends himself, not very convincingly, against the Pharaoh's charge that Aziru had provided for the envoys of the king of Hatti, but not for Pharaoh's messenger. The dating of this group of letters to the period following Aziru's return from
Egypt, while tempting, cannot be proved; and the letters themselves say nothing regarding that visit, either as being imminent or as being in the past. Aziru's final departure for Egypt from Amurru might be seen (with Knudtzon) in the badly broken and much restored EA 168. The very small extent of what is actually preserved there is disturbing, however, and I am inclined to think that Knudtzon permitted himself a degree of wishful thinking, both in his reconstruction of the text and in its placement within Aziru's dossier. The fact remains that we do not know what Aziru's response to EA 162 was, or how much time elapsed before he finally bowed to his overlord's pressure and presented himself in Egypt.

When EA 169, the next extant letter in the dossier, was written, Aziru had already been held in Egypt for some time--time enough to cause trouble at home, for the writer (one of Aziru's sons) warns Tutu that the Nuhashshe kings have been taunting him for having sold his father into captivity, and that there is a consensus in neighboring countries that Aziru will not return: in consequence, Amurru's neighbors have turned to aggression, and only Aziru's speedy return will restore order (EA 169:16-37). Even worse, however, was the situation at the time that EA 170 was sent. Written by Aziru's brothers, in all

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5 Helck, Beziehungen², p. 179 (see n. 23 above):
probability to Aziru himself, it reports the presence of one Hittite force in Amki--supported, as it turns out, by Aziru's old ally, Aitakama of Kadesh (cf. EA 174-76, 363)--while another army seems poised to enter Nuhashshe (EA 170:17-35). The exact placement of this letter is as problematic as that of its predecessors. If, for the sake of argument, we assume that Aziru journeyed to Egypt in the spring of Akhenaten's seventeenth year, one might assign EA 169 to a minimum of three months thereafter--enough time for those left behind in Syria to realize that the Egyptians planned to hold Aziru for longer than it took him merely to pay his respects. The events mentioned in EA 170 could have occurred as early as a month later, so that the Hittite eruption into Amki would be taking place--again, at the very earliest--in the late summer or early fall of Akhenaten's last year.

56Thus Otto Weber, in Knudtzon, Die El-Amarna-Tafeln II 1273; cf. Klengel, Geschichte Syriens II 279-83, and Campbell, Chronology of the Amarna Letters, p. 61. I still find this position convincing: the independence of action shown by the writers of EA 170 is more consistent with their presumed status as regents in Aziru's absence than as subordinate field commanders, operating under Aziru himself: see Waterhouse, "Syria in the Amarna Age," p. 153 (n. 73) and also n. 42 above. The political environment of the letter also seems closer to that of EA 169 (surely written when Aziru was in Egypt) than to the rest of Aziru's dossier; and for the rest, the form and contents of the letter are better suited to Aziru as its recipient than to the king of Egypt, as Weber pointed out long ago. The text of this letter has been reedited by M. Dietrich and O. Loretz, "Der Amarna-Brief VAB 2, 170," in Beiträge zur Alten Geschichte und deren Nachleben I, ed. R. Stiehl and H. E. Stiehl (Berlin, 1969) pp. 14-23; I am indebted to Professor Moran for this reference.
Although the outcome of these events is not preserved in the Amarna archive, they and their immediate sequel might possibly be reflected in the Hittite sources that recount Shuppiluliuma's conquest of Carchemish. The coincidences are indeed striking. According to the Deeds of Shuppiluliuma, the Hittite invasion of northern Syria and the retaliatory raid into Amki that followed both took place in the year that an Egyptian king called "Nipkhururia" died. If this name is assumed to be a cuneiform transcription of "Neferkheprure"/Akhenaten, the temptation to equate this incident with the invasion described in EA 170 is very strong.\(^5\)\(^7\) Both accounts share, moreover, not only the name of one of the Hittite commanders--Lupakku--but also the involvement of Kadesh, which (according to the Deeds) had recently survived an attack by Egyptian chariots and foot soldiers: it would be no surprise if, following on this, Aitakama would be in the van of a retaliatory raid on Egyptian territory, as the other Amarna Letters in this sequence show him to be. Since, moreover, the attack could have taken place in the very year Akhenaten died, the resulting time frame looks very convincing indeed. The exact date of Akhenaten's death is unknown, of course, but hieratic docketts on wine jars from Amarna show that he lived at least through the wine-making season of his seventeenth

year, or (roughly) into the summer months. Thus, the Egyptian queen's messengers could have arrived at the Hittite camp before Carchemish in the early autumn, allowing Shuppiluliuma's envoys to go to Egypt shortly thereafter, and leaving enough time for the Hittites to complete the conquest of Carchemish and then go home for the winter. All in all, a very seductive case can be made for this view of events. If adopted, it would have Shuppiluliuma consolidating his southern border three years (rather than thirteen) after the Great Syrian campaign—we know already from what is left of the Deeds that he could have done so no earlier—and it would identify the Egyptian queen as Akhenaten's female successor.

On closer inspection, however, this case seems less convincing. The first and most obvious problem is chronological—for the validity of this reconstruction depends on the placement of the Amki invasion in the year of Akhenaten's death, and this possibility in turn, rests on assuming the shortest reasonable interval between the events

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5 For a discussion of the evidence, see Krauss, Das Ende der Amarnazeit, pp. 176-78.

5 Either Nefertiti, as originally proposed by J. R. Harris ("Nefernefruaten," GM 4 [1973]:15-17, and subsequent articles) and most recently argued by Julia Sampson, Amarna, City of Akhenaten and Nefertiti. Nefertiti as Pharaoh (Warminster, 1978), pp. 107-139; or Meritaton, as proposed by Krauss, Das Ende der Amarnazeit, pp. 33-47, 118-21. The situation is still unclear, but some added light may be expected from a study that is presently being readied for publication by J. P. Allen (personal communication to the author).
that led up to that affair. A cumulative error of even a few months--say, the delivery of EA 162 to Aziru in the spring of Akhenaten's seventeenth year--might be enough to invalidate the entire equation. The very sequence of events, moreover, is in doubt once we are past Rib-Addi's death and the more-or-less concurrent war between Aitakama and Biriawaza in Upe. We do not know, for instance, that Aziru went to Egypt immediately following the receipt of EA 162: he might well have temporized, particularly since the Pharaoh himself offered him a safe way out (i.e., sending his son instead). A tight chronology for all these events--the war in Upe, Aziru's journey to and his detention in Egypt, and the Hittite raid on Amki--remains a theoretical possibility; but there is no compelling reason why these events must be grouped together so closely.

Another series of difficulties arises when we compare the two accounts of this allegedly single campaign. The Deeds tell how Shuppiluliuma, when he was down in the country of Carchemish, "sent Lupakki and Tarhunta(?)-Zalma forth into the country of Amki. So they went to attack Amki, and brought back deportees, cattle and sheep. . . ."\(^6\) This description suggests nothing more than a raid, rapidly executed and designed to inflict punishment rather than a more serious loss. In EA 170, however, the implications are more alarming. Hittite troops under Luppaku have taken

\(^6\)Adapted from Güterbock, JCS 10 (1956):94.
cities in Amki, as well as those belonging to another local ruler. Moreover, the writers have heard that Zitana has come with a force of 90,000 foot soldiers, but this they have not been able to verify: as soon as they know where Zitana is—whether in Amki or in Nuhashshe—Beti-ilu will be sent against him (EA 170:14-32). The different names given to the second Hittite commander in the Hittite record and in EA 170 have been explained in various ways, but in the Deeds there is still another factor to consider—namely, a high-ranking officer named Zita, who is seen to be operating in the Hurrian lands alongside the crown prince Arnuwanda and not with the main army from which the raiders against Amki were detailed. The identity of this man with the Hittite commander Zitana in EA 170 is at least possible. His appearance as a major participant in the war fought during the year of Nipkhururiya's death, but in another theatre, is thus a factor which cannot be discounted. One might even argue that Tarhunta(?)—Zalma was named as the second commander in the raid on Amki to distinguish this episode from the earlier raid in which Zita(na) had taken

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61 Schulman, JARCE 15 (1978):45, gives the figure as "9,000"; but the text actually says "9 (x) 10,000", i.e., "90,000" (thus Moran; see also the newer edition of EA 170 by Dietrich and Loretz referred to in n. 56 above).


63 Güterbock, JCS 10 (1956):93-94.
part. Or alternatively, it might be assumed that Zita, having completed his work in the Hurrian lands, was sent with a supporting force into Amki some time after the main body of raiders had gone there. This would be consistent with the report of his arrival there in EA 170--but nothing of the sort is implied in the Deeds, in which the raid on Amki is treated as a minor military venture. All in all, we cannot prove that Zita took part in the raid on Amki during the year Nipkhururiya died. It follows that there is at least a reasonable case to be made for the conclusion that the two accounts, EA 170 and the Deeds of Shuppiluliuma, each refer to a separate campaign.

Beside these internal difficulties, another reason for not identifying these two raids on Amki as one and the same is that, in later Hittite records, Shuppiluliuma was held responsible for no fewer than two such attacks. In his Second Plague Prayer, Murshili II would recall that

My father sent foot soldiers and charioteers who attacked the country of Amki, Egyptian territory. Again he sent troops, and again they attacked it. When the Egyptians became frightened, they asked outright for one of his sons..."

It seems unlikely that separate operations conducted as part of the same campaign--e.g., the two columns commanded by Lupakku and Zitana in EA 170--would be described in this fashion, since the violation of Egyptian territory would be

"ANET², p. 395."
one and the same. Consequently, it is hard to identify the first attack on Amki as anything but the invasion mentioned in EA 170. Certainly there was nothing like this in Shuppiluliuma's earlier career: though his route during the Great Syrian war took him past Kadesh and into Upe, there is no indication that he attacked the cities or the country of Amki at that time; and since we know that he had expected to avoid conflict with one known Egyptian vassal (Kadesh), it is hard to imagine why he would attack gratuitously another possession of Egypt when his preeminent quarrel was with the king of Mitanni. The text of the Second Plague Prayer states, moreover, that the two violations of Amki both took place before the affair of Zannanza and the Egyptian queen. If the first attack must be that of EA 170 (which fell in the year of Akhenaten's death or some time later), the second can only have occurred later still. The two raids cannot be the same unless the evidence of the Plague Prayer is discarded or explained away—and there is as yet no convincing way of doing either.

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65 As proposed by Krauss and Redford (see n. 62 above); but cf. the observations of Houwink ten Cate in BiOr 20 (1963):275; also K. A. Kitchen, "Further Notes on New Kingdom History and Chronology," Chronique d'Egypte 43 (1968):318-19; and my own in Or. 52 (1983):278-79, along with my comments on the two accounts of the Hittites' invasion(s) of Amki in the text above.

66 Gratuitous assumptions about Shuppiluliuma's having attacked Amki during the Great Syrian war are what vitiate, in my opinion, Waterhouse's otherwise useful discussion of the evidence from western Asia in "Syria in the Amarna Age," especially pp. 44-46.
SYRIA IN THE AMARNA AGE

It has been said in favor of conflating the two campaigns that to do so permits a shorter and simpler sequence of events than that which the other option requires. Is this more elegant model actually demanded by the evidence? Other Hittite sources are of limited value, it is true, for their narrative style is topical rather than chronological; still, they are not inconsistent with the longer option. Thus KUB XIX 9 (written under Hattushili III) begins by mentioning a twenty-year period during which Shuppiluliuma brought the lost Anatolian territories back under Hittite rule. There follows a very summary account of the conquest of Syria and Mitanni, encompassing the gains made at various times and culminating in the final settlement, when Shuppiluliuma made his sons kings of Carchemish and Aleppo; and it adds that, because the Hurrian lands were "strong," Shuppiluliuma tarried there and took six years to restore them to order.6 Although this passage lends itself to the interpretation that twenty years' campaigning in Anatolia was followed by six years in the Hurrian lands (embracing the Great Syrian war, the conquest of Carchemish, and the entire aftermath)7 it could as easily follow that the two periods were separated by a

6"The translation on which this discussion is based is Kitchen's Suppiluliuma, p. 3 with notes.

7Thus, most recently, Krauss, Das Ende der Amarnazeit, pp. 54-58.
number of years, or even that the twenty years spent in reconquering the Anatolian lands includes Shuppiluliuma's final war with Tushratta, the Great Syrian war. This last interpretation is made all the more plausible by the account of events in the Deeds, where it is recounted that Shuppiluliuma was occupied in Anatolia for at least two years before events in northern Syria and Mitanni made his personal intervention imperative. Neither this source nor any other allows us to compute with absolute certainty how much time elapsed between the Great Syrian war and Shuppiluliuma's reentry into the field (in what is called the Hurrian war) at the end of his reign. In the Amarna Letters, and in particular the letters from Akizzi of Qatna (written one or two years after the Great Syrian war), conditions seem to be volatile enough, with several "kings" in Mitanni said to be willing to join with factions in Niya and Nuhashshe, both Hittite vassals, in a war with Egypt against Hatti and her Syrian allies. What we do not know, however, is whether these resolves were ever tested or whether they were just talk: significantly, they are presented by Akizzi as being dependent on Egyptian action which is slow in coming. What must still be demonstrated, in the last analysis, is that the Hittites' position in northern Syria was so precarious in the years just following the Great Syrian war that it needed such speedy consolidation. With garrisons posted in strategic places
(e.g., Ugarit) and with the help of partisans such as Aitakama, it seems credible enough that the Hittites would have been able to contain local challenges to their suzerainty while slowly laying the basis for more solid control of the yet unintegrated areas. According to the Deeds, in fact, Shuppiluliuma's son Telepinu was on the verge of achieving just this sort of victory when the Hurrian army intervened in Murmuriga to upset the Hittites' plans. Under these circumstances, it is understandable that Shuppiluliuma should have decided to settle the affairs of Mitanni and northern Syria all at once; but we have no good reason for thinking that he was forced to this conclusion very soon after the Great Syrian campaign.

Finally, there is the Egyptian queen herself and her situation as it is reported in the Deeds. If she was Akhenaten's widow, her initial claim—"My husband has died, a son I have not"—is not surprising, since none of Akhenaten's known consorts is ever described as the mother of a male heir. But this denial is elaborated in later stages of the narrative: Shuppiluliuma, fearing that the Egyptians "do have a son of their lord," sends his chamberlain to Egypt to find out; and on this mission's return to Hatti, it not only brings another disclaimer from the queen, but an expanded denial from the Egyptian envoy: "Nipkhururiya, who was our lord, died; a son he has not.

— Güterbock, JCS 10 (1956):93-94.
Our lord's wife is solitary." What is important to Shuppiluliuma, and what the Egyptians had finally brought themselves to admit, is that Nipkhururiya had no male heirs from any source whatever. Moreover, as the queen repeatedly says, the Hittite marriage is seen as an alternative to wedding one of her subjects and (by implication) making him king, something she was unwilling to do. This implies that the royal family was depleted, leaving her no choice except to marry outside—and it is just this scenario that rings false for the period following Akhenaten's death. Waiting in the wings at that time, as we know, were two "king's bodily sons," Smenkhkare and Tutankhamon, both of whom did eventually ascend the throne. Their parentage is unknown,
but the consensus is that they must have been born to either Akhenaten \(^1\) or Amenhotep III. \(^2\) Another possibility, that they were more distant relatives of the royal family who gained the rank of "king's sons" by appointment, has only very seldom been seriously entertained. \(^3\) But, whoever their father was, the existence of these boys would hardly be a state secret. By virtue of their royal birth they would enjoy, at the very least, a strong competitive claim against any other aspirants to the crown, whether from the ranks of the Egyptian commons or from abroad. This makes it difficult to believe that the queen could have passed them off credibly to a suspicious Shuppiluliuma as her

Valley of the Kings," *JE A 67* (1981):48-56. The age of the mummy found in that burial may be raised in the light of ongoing study (personal communication from James E. Harris), even if the serious doubts raised by Reeves, *JE A 67* (1981):54-55, are not sustained.


\(^2\) See for convenience, the citations collected by Wente in Harris and Wente, *X-Ray Atlas*, p. 136. A recent reevaluation upwards of Tutankhamon's age at death (personal communication from James E. Harris) now permits this paternity without recourse to a long coregency between Amenhotep III and Akhenaten, which has hitherto seemed necessary to this presumed relationship.

\(^3\) But see Redford, *Akhenaten*, pp.192-93. Later, Ramesses II mentions the occasion on which "I was inducted (\(\text{iw.\(i\) bs.\(k\(w\)l}\) [as] eldest king's son" (*KRI II* 327:13-14); note also the grandsons of Ramesses II who were given the right to hold the title of "king's son": see Gauthier, *LdR* III 90 (K') a); and W. Spiegelberg, "Ostraca hiératiques du Louvre," *Recueil de travaux* 16 (1894):65 (cf. J. D. Schmidt, *Ramesses II: A Chronological Structure for His Reign* [Baltimore, 1973], p. 91 and n. 346).
"subjects," lower in rank and thus not worth considering as rivals for the kingship.

If, on the other hand, the queen was Ankhesenamon, widow of Tutankhamon ("Nebkheprure"), her situation as described in the Deeds is far more consistent with the rest of what is known. The royal couple, to begin with, had no living offspring, and at Tutankhamon's death no heirs from any branch of the royal family presented themselves: the Eighteenth Dynasty was defunct. In the wings, moreover, were two "servants" of the old dynasty, Ay and Horemheb, who both eventually assumed the crown, effectively demonstrating that there was no one else. Since Tutankhamon was buried in the spring, his death can be placed in January or (at the very latest) early February.\(^7\) Some time previous to this, the Egyptians had attacked Kadesh, perhaps in concert with Assyria.\(^7\) The result was an Egyptian defeat, soon followed by the punitive raid into Amki once the Hittites had moved in force into northern Syria, at about the same time as the young king's death. The first of the queen's letters could thus have reached Shuppiluliuma by the late summer or in early fall, in time to allow a return mission to Egypt before the onset of the winter rains, and permitting Shuppiluliuma to complete his conquest of Carchemish and to

\(^7\)Krauss, *Das Ende der Amarnazeit*, pp. 13-14 with references.

settle the affairs of northern Syria before returning home for the winter.

Plausible though this model is, it does not address a crucial question—regarding not only who ruled in Egypt during this period, but who reigned. The royal myth of Pharaonic Egypt maintained that, on the death of the old king, his successor "arose" the next morning on the Horus Throne of the Living. The absence of an heir at Tutankhamon's death would be embarrassing and would be unprecedented for at least the previous two centuries. Since Tutankhamon had died without issue, the obvious and indeed the time-honored solution would be for a respected commoner to assume the throne and found a new royal house. Perhaps this is what had already been done. In the paintings on the walls of Tutankhamon's tomb, his funeral is presided over by King Ay, whose praenomen "God's Father" is the historic title of those nonroyal fathers of the founders of new dynasties. If Tutankhamon's burial followed the statutory seventy-day period of mummification directly after

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his death, the evidence found on the walls of his burial chamber should mean that Ay had become king already, and that he was actually reigning when the Hittites invaded Amki and when Ankhesenamon sent her letters to Shuppiluliuma.

The account in the Deeds, while it says not a word in support of this assumption, is not inconsistent with it. While implying that the queen was the only responsible negotiator, it also speaks of her as "our lord's wife, who is now solitary" and, earlier, in terms of her queenly title, t3 hmt-nswt, "the king's wife": her own rank, in other words, was not sovereign, but her husband would be in a position to become sovereign lord of Egypt. Ay's kingship could thus be seen as a practical expedient, to stave off other ambitious "servants" perhaps, and to fill the necessary role of Horus, successor to the dead Osiris, until Ankhesenamon could wed her Hittite prince: such a caretaker status is in fact suggested by Ay's own praenomen (see n. 77 above). The Deeds would thus confine its retelling of events to the bare essentials of the story--the queen's offer and its tragic outcome--while omitting details that might complicate the telling and confute Shuppiluliuma's posthumous reputation.

"Thus, the way in which she is described in the Deeds contradicts the royal status that is claimed for her by, inter alia, Krauss, Das Ende der Amarnazeit, pp. 41-43: see my comments in Or. 52 (1983):277.

"Problems connected with Zannanza's proposed accession to the Egyptian throne are treated in detail only by Krauss, Das Ende der Amarnazeit, pp. 79-83.
for sagacity. The only alternative to this scenario is an interregnum: one could suppose that Tutankhamon actually died in the summer of the year Carchemish fell to the Hittites (in the Pharaoh's tenth regnal year) but that his burial was delayed, and that he was only laid to rest next spring, following the collapse of the Hittite marriage project, when Ay was forced to take the throne. Apart from the uncertainty of this premise, however, the resulting time frame seems uncomfortably tight: Tutankhamon should have been buried by the end of April, at the latest, but the queen's second letter arrived in Hatti "when it had become spring," i.e., around the beginning of March at the

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80The purpose of the exceptional scene in Tutankhamon's tomb, wherein King Ay is shown officiating before the mummy of his dead predecessor, is doubtless to secure for Ay the rights of the "heir of burial" and thus to secure his succession to the throne: for this principle, see for convenience the references in K. A. Kitchen, The Third Intermediate Period (Warminster, 1973), pp. 332-33, with n. 498. It would be unwise to draw far-reaching conclusions from the fact that the paintings in Tutankhamon's burial chamber were executed after the shrines had been erected around the sarcophagus, i.e., after the burial (see Howard Carter, The Tomb of Tut-Ankh-Amen II [London and New York, 1927], pp. 25-26): this was surely done to prevent damage to the paintings from the necessity of leaning the heavy pieces of the shrines against the walls, and it does not have to imply that the walls were left blank in order to provide a suitable space for decoration by Tutankhamon's approved successor (e.g., Zannanza) following his burial. This latter explanation, while not strictly impossible, implies that the tomb would have been kept open (if under guard) for the protracted period of negotiations with Hatti, and this seems improbable. (I am indebted to Rolf Krauss for advice and discussion on this question.)

81Güterbock, JCS 10 (1956):96; cf. n. 75 above for the season of the year during which Tutankhamon was buried.
earliest. Zannanza's death, if it occurred on his way to Egypt (as the Hittite sources say),\(^8\) could have become known in the Nile Valley by the early part of April, allowing enough time—but just enough—for the funeral near the end of the month. The previous option, which assumes the immediate succession of Ay with no interregnum in Egypt, seems preferable.

The conclusions we can draw from the foregoing are far from unequivocal. Both the earlier and later dates proposed for "Nipkhururiya" (identifying him as Akhenaten or Tutankhamon, respectively) require some special pleading. The later date, in my opinion, requires less. For all the attractiveness of the earlier alternative, it acceptance demands a rigidity in the interpretation of the data that the later option avoids. The blocks of evidence which, when set in order, yield both possible chronologies have been spaced as closely together here as it is reasonably possible to place them. Certain points are fixed: the Great Syrian campaign occurred no earlier than the spring of Akhenaten's fourteenth year; and the war between Aitakama and Biriawaza fell thereafter, but still during Akhenaten's lifetime—no later, surely, than his seventeenth year and probably no earlier than his sixteenth. It is this last indeterminacy, coupled to the uncertain timing of events leading up to Aziru's journey to Egypt and the uncertain length of his

\(^8\)ANET\(^2\), p. 395.
stay there, which makes the earlier date for Nipkhururiya possible; but these same factors also make it a very risky proposition. For this alternative to work, the shortest reasonable interval must be allowed in each case, from the start of the Great Syrian war down to the time of Nipkhururiya's death. It is this rigidity, demanded of such uncertain evidence, that strains credibility, as much as the interpretive difficulties noted in the preceding paragraphs. In the current state of our knowledge, then, it seems safest to follow the conventional interpretation of events, in which the Great Syrian war took place in the reign of Akhenaten, but the Hurrian war began in the year of Tutankhamon's death. This conclusion is subject to change, but only on the emergence of the sort of clear and definite proof that has heretofore been lacking in discussions of Syria in the later Amarna age.

The STATUS OF KADESH AND AMURRU

While the relations of Kadesh and Amurru with the two superpowers, Egypt and Mitanni, have occasionally been discussed in the preceding sections, their precise affiliation has remained unclear. Amurru, before she submitted to the Hittites, is generally regarded as having belonged to Egypt's sphere of influence, but opinion is divided as to the original status of Kadesh: some regard it as having been Egyptian territory prior to its conquest by
Hatti, while others believe it to have been wrested from Egyptian control by Mitanni before this time. Since these two states' earlier affiliations do have a bearing on their later oscillation between Egypt and Hatti, this question must be discussed here if their situation during Sety I's reign is to be understood.

Hittite records are oddly inconsistent in describing the status of these two southern vassals before they fell under Hittite control. Kadesh, we know, had been taken over by Hatti during Shuppiluliuma's year-long campaign against Tushratta and his vassals, the Great Syrian war. During his negotiations with the Egyptian queen's envoys, moreover, Shuppiluliuma was to upbraid the Egyptians for having "attacked the man of Kinza (= Kadesh), whom I had [taken away(?)] from the king of Hurri-land." This, at least, was Shuppiluliuma's attitude as it is reported during the reign of Murshili II, under whom this account was written down. The case is quite different, however, in a later document, composed in the reign of Hattushili III, where it is said that Shuppiluliuma "fixed the boundary on yon side (at) the

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2Houwink ten Cate, BiOr 20 (1963):274.


4Güterbock, JCS 10 (1956):97.
land of Kadesh (and) the land of Amurru, and vanquished the
king of Egypt."" Kadesh and Amurru are also said to have
belonged to the Egyptian sphere of influence in the
historical preamble to Murshili II's treaty with Talmi-
Sharuma of Aleppo. Since a contradiction is obvious
once these passages are laid side-by-side, their differences
should be explained.

In the case of Amurru, the problem is still more
involved. The preamble to Tudhaliya IV's treaty with
Shaushgamuwa of Amurru, some four generations after these
events, does state in definite terms that "the lands of
Amurru were still [enem]y (country); they were vassals of
the Hurrian king" before Aziru submitted to Shuppiluliuma.
But Amurru's relations with her Hittite overlord had been
variable, as the text of this treaty makes plain, and two
earlier documents appear to contradict this version of
events. The treaty of Hattushili III with Benteshina of
Amurru recalls how the latter's great-grandfather, "Azira,
the king of the land of Amurru], changed [(the?). . .of
the land of Egypt, and [fell down] at the feet of

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"KUB XIX 9 (Kitchen, Suppiluliuma, p. 2).

** In the reedition by A. Goetze, "Die historische
Einleitung des Aleppo-Vertrages KBo I, 6), Mitteilungen der
33-36; superseding the version of the text published by
Weidner, Politische Dokumente, pp. 84-85 ad loc.

" C. Kühne and H. Otten, Der Šaušgamuwa-Vertrag, Studien
15-20).
Shuppiluliuma, m[y gran]dfather." In two passages from the Hittite version of his treaty with Shuppiluliuma, moreover, Aziru is said to have come out of "the [borde]r of the land of Egypt" (var., "the door of Egypt") and to have submitted to the Hittite king in person; and Amurru's earlier affiliation with Egypt is also stated in Murshili II's treaty with Aleppo (see above at n. 88). Again, these earlier accounts show a contradiction with the version of events given in the Shaushgamuwa Treaty. The Amarna Letters, too, convey a strong impression that both Aziru and his father were Egyptian vassals: indeed, Rib-Addi complains that the Amurrites, aided by elements of the Egyptian army in Syria, "have killed Abdi-Ashirta, whom the king (of Egypt) had set over them, not they themselves" (EA 101:3-6, 29-31). On what basis, then, would Hittite records be able to claim that Amurru had belonged to Mitanni before it transferred its allegiance to Hatti?

Part of the answer has been sought in the measures that Egypt and Mitanni had contracted for the defense of Syria prior to the Great Syrian war. The "Mitannian letter" (EA 24) sent by Tushratta to Amenhotep III might be an enlightening source of information in this regard, if only our knowledge of the Hurrian language in which it is written

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90Weidner, Politische Dokumente, p. 125, (obv. 4-5).  
91Freydank, MIO 7 (1959-60):367–68 (I 18'-19', 22'-25').
As it is, what has been seen as its references to a clearly defined border between Egyptian and Mitannian spheres of influence and to the payment of subsidies to Mitanni by Egypt in return for Tushratta's assumption of military responsibility for northern Syria must be treated with some caution. It is still possible, of course, that such an arrangement did exist. One wonders, however, whether it would have encompassed Amurru, where, in settled times, an Egyptian commissioner represented the Pharaoh's interests. This measure of control, which Abdi-Ashirta temporarily usurped before the Mitannian invasion of Amurru, was reestablished by Egypt during Tushratta's lifetime—so it would seem that Egypt did not countenance (even if she did not strongly oppose) her ally's incursion into her possessions. It thus appears unlikely that the Hurrian "claim" would have stemmed from any joint administration exercised by Egypt and Mitanni in these disputed territories.

A basis for this claim does exist, however, in the submission of Amurru to Tushratta during the "Mitannian counterattack" in the time of Abdi-Ashirta—when, as

9. See Kühne, Chronologie, pp. 32-33, especially n. 149 (bottom). I am also grateful for the advice of Professor Gene Gragg on this question.


THE ROAD TO KADESH

described above (p. 186), Tushratta's forces had reached Šumur, Amurru was heavily taxed, and Abdi-Ashirta himself was said to have continued harassing his neighbors under Mitannian auspices. This episode had come to an end with the murder of Abdi-Ashirta by Egyptian military personnel, thereby interdicting further payments to Mitanni's and restoring the direct rule of Egypt's commissioner in Šumur. Abdi-Ashirta's successors, and in particular his son Aziru, had no choice but to accept, for the present, this state of affairs. Like his father, Aziru aimed at acquiring control over the cities of Amurru; but he also wished to do so with at least the tacit consent of the Egyptian authorities. Caught between his Egyptian masters and the nascent power of Hatti, Aziru tried to steer a course that would win him the greatest independence with the least possible entanglement. Thus, in dealing with the Hittites during and after the Great Syrian war, he is unlikely to have presented himself as a Hurrian vassal: such a rash gesture might well have brought down the very Hittite intervention he was at such pains to avoid. It was far safer, for now, to appear as a somewhat larcenous vassal of the king of Egypt, to be treated circumspectly for as long as Shuppiluliuma cared to avoid antagonizing the Pharaoh. Only when Aziru had made

99I prefer this interpretation of EA 101:4-10 to that of Waterhouse, who ("Syria in the Amarna Age," p. 175, top) sees Abdi-Ashirta's killers as collecting a payment for Mitanni.
his final decision for Hatti, once he had left "the door of Egypt," would it have made sense for him to even hint at a previous Hurrian affiliation. Then, in the wake of Hatti's victory, Aziru could present himself as a former vassal of Mittani who, bowing to the judgement of the gods, was now transferring his allegiance to this empire's successor. Such a rationalization is at least implied by the Shaushgamuwa Treaty, though the distance of this document from the actual events weakens its reliability as a source on this point. There is, to be sure, no mention of anything like this in either the Akkadian or the Hittite version of Aziru's treaty with Shuppiluliuma, which dwells exclusively on the immediate circumstances of Aziru's change of allegiance. What is demonstrated, though, is that there were grounds, however tenuous, for Hatti to claim that, in accepting the fealty of Amurru, she had only taken over an old affiliate of her defeated enemy, the kingdom of Mitanni.

The case of Kadesh is much different. Like Amurru, she is known to have been an Egyptian vassal before she fell to Hatti, and, indeed, her subject status can be traced back much longer.96 At the same time, there is no evidence (as there is for Amurru) that she had passed into Mitannian hands prior to the Great Syrian war: such a transfer of allegiance must be assumed if we are to accept as truthful

Shuppiluliuma's claim to the Egyptian envoys before Carchemish. How else could he have argued at that time that he had taken Kadesh away from the "king of Hurri-land"? The answer, I believe, rests not on any legalistic niceties regarding the past status of Kadesh, but rather on the Hittites' need to justify their possession of a valued but embarrassing acquisition. When Shuppiluliuma had set out for Upe after settling the affairs of Nuhashshe, he had not expected to fight with Kadesh: this suggests that he did not anticipate opposition from that quarter because he believed that Kadesh, as an Egyptian vassal, would not champion the Hurrian cause. But King Shutatarra had taken it upon himself to come out against the Hittites. Why he did this—whether on his own initiative or on instructions from his Egyptian overlord—we shall never know. In any case, having ranged himself with Shuppiluliuma's enemies, the pro-Mitannian factions in Syria, Shutatarra was treated accordingly. By putting himself in the way of the Hittite juggernaut he had, in effect, acted as a partisan of the Mitannian king. His behavior gave the Hittites a reason to justify their continued sway over Kadesh in later years, when Aitakama was their willing proxy in Syria: thus, at Carchemish, Shuppiluliuma breezily informed the Egyptian envoys that he had taken Kadesh away from the Hurrian king—for, having behaved as if she were a Mitannian vassal at that time, this was de facto what Kadesh had been, and
her entry into the Hittite orbit was none of Egypt's business. This was a fiction that the Hittites would feel obliged to maintain for as long as they felt the need to make a case against Egypt's prior claim on Kadesh. Later on, with the city in Hittite hands and Egypt estranged from Hatti, it could be safely admitted that, in taking Kadesh, Shuppiluliuma had inflicted a defeat on the king of Egypt.

It is hard to avoid concluding that, by acting in this way, the Hittites stumbled onto a path that would lead them into conflict with Egypt. Akhenaten, we know now, was no pacifist. Egypt had not tolerated the alienation of one of her vassals, Amurru, even when her Mitannian ally had been fighting for its life: there was no reason for her to accept the loss of Kadesh now, in the wake of Mitanni's disintegration. It is quite probable that she fought back. References in Tutankhamon's restoration decree to Egyptian failures in Asia during the Amarna period, even if they are tendentious, do imply that some effort was made.7 Remains from contemporary decorated buildings in Egypt, moreover, appear to document an Egyptian claim to have fought with the Hittites during Akhenaten's reign.8 These reliefs, if they depict an Egyptian response to the Great Syrian campaign, most probably refer to Biriawaza's struggle with Aitakama, "To be discussed in a forthcoming study by Professor Schulman; for now, see the references he has assembled in JARCE 3 (1964):53-54, and JARCE 15 (1978):45-46.

7Urk. IV 2027:13-14. (I am indebted to Frank Yurco for emphasizing the importance of this passage.)
as reported in the letters written by Akizzi of Qatna to Akhenaten and in Aitakama's own letter to the Pharaoh (EA 189). Only the loss of an important vassal could underlie the king of Egypt's personal exasperation with Aitakama (in EA 162) and Egypt's persistent attempts to reconquer Kadesh. With the eventual defection of Amurru, of course, the situation became far graver, for Egyptian possessions in Upe and Lebanon were now at risk. Together, they formed an impregnable barrier across the Hittite Empire's southern flank; and it was together that Kadesh and Amurru would defect during the time of Sety I, setting in train the events that led to the Battle of Kadesh. Only with the concluding of the definitive peace treaty in Ramesses II's twenty-first year did Egypt give up her claim to these two territories." Coincidentally, it is in the next generation that we first hear of the Hurrian "claim" on Amurru in Hittite sources. A case of forgetfulness, or a scribal error? Perhaps. But it is just as easy to suppose that this formulation was deliberate, and that a legalistic quibble, long forgotten, had been raised to the dignity of official history because of its usefulness in sugaring over the unpalatable truth (for Hatti's ally, the Pharaoh) that Egypt's northern border provinces had been swallowed up for good by the Hittite Empire.

'Although specific borders are not dealt with in either the cuneiform or Egyptian versions of the treaty (ANET², pp. 199-203), the details might well have been treated in a separate instrument, pendant to the treaty, but now lost.
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[. . .]-Sharuma, see Shahurunewa
MAP 2

PALESTINE
AND THE
GAZA STRIP

MEDITERRANEAN SEA

CANAAN

DEAD SEA

LAKE MENZALA

PELUSIUM

TCHARU

GAZA

RAPHIA

BETH SHAN

REHOB

HAMMATH

PELLA

YENOAM

MEDITERRANEAN SEA

CAN PAR

QADER?
MAP 3

EGYPT AND NUBIA IN THE XVIII\textsuperscript{TH} AND XIX\textsuperscript{TH} DYNASTIES

IREM? (O'CONNOR)

IREM? (VERCOUTTER ET AL.)