THE ROAD TO KADESH

A HISTORICAL INTERPRETATION OF THE
BATTLE RELIEFS OF KING SETY I AT KARNAK

SECOND EDITION REVISED

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THE ORIENTAL INSTITUTE OF THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO

STUDIES IN ANCIENT ORIENTAL CIVILIZATION • NO. 42

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PREFACE TO THE SECOND EDITION

Since an author seldom enjoys the luxury of second thoughts so soon after the initial appearance of his work, some explanation of this revised Road to Kadesh seems appropriate. First, no one (and least of all I) could have anticipated that the first edition would be sold out barely five years after it appeared. Second, a great deal of work on the “international relations” of the Amarna Age and its aftermath has appeared during this time. Thus, when the Oriental Institute’s publications director, Thomas Holland, broached the subject of a reissue in the summer of 1989, I was delighted to find him so amenable to publishing a substantially changed version of this study. Not only were many substantive alterations made as a result, but the entire text was reformatted on a Macintosh SE computer. I am happy to acknowledge my indebtedness to Dr. Holland and his staff, especially Thomas Urban, for the help and facilities that made this task easier than it might otherwise have been.

I would like to thank those scholars who reviewed or commented on the first edition of this book in professional journals. My indebtedness to their remarks will be apparent in the following pages, not only in matters of detail, but in approach as well. This book is not a comprehensive treatment of Western Asia and its interactions with Egypt from the later Eighteenth to the early Nineteenth Dynasties. It is still, as it began, a historical essay on the background of Sety I’s battle reliefs at Karnak. If I sometimes appear to dwell on matters well known to specialists in cuneiform studies, it is with no pretense of “discovering” much that is new to them. Rather, my aim has been to cover significant developments in Western Asia in a way that will help Egyptologists and other scholars understand both the importance of the cuneiform evidence and why it is so frequently used to support contradictory conclusions. If this essay can encourage similar enterprises to “widen the borders of Egypt,” the extensive road work that went into this new edition will not have been done in vain.

William J. Murnane
Memphis State University
Summer, 1990
A draft of this study was first written as a chapter of historical commentary, to accompany the Epigraphic Survey’s publication of the battle reliefs of King Sety I at Karnak. As I worked on this project, however, I came to realize that the material demanded a more detailed treatment than that which I had originally planned. The wars of Sety I, after all, are but one episode in the long process of adjustment between the Egyptian and Hittite empires which would culminate, first in the Battle of Kadesh, then with the treaty enacted during Ramesses II’s twenty-first regnal year. Proper understanding of this one stage of the conflict involves a host of other issues, many of them remote from the war monument at Karnak and even from Sety’s own reign. The chapter was rewritten several times, with progressively more cumbersome footnotes, until finally, in the summer of 1983, it was completely reconceived and rewritten as a monograph. Many of the conclusions reached here are based on the documentation published in Reliefs IV; and this book is still, to a great extent, a companion volume to that publication. But my primary aim has been to explore the significance of Sety I’s wars, not only in his own time, but as part of the pattern of Egyptian-Hittite relations that had been evolving since the twilight years of the Eighteenth Dynasty. Many other scholars have worked on these problems before me. They will find their work reflected in my own, not always with full agreement, but with constant and sincere gratitude.

I am happy to thank my colleagues, Egyptologists at the Oriental Institute (Chicago) and at Chicago House (Luxor)—in alphabetical order, Klaus Baer, Lanny Bell, Janet H. Johnson, Charles C. Van Siclen III, Edward F. Wente, and Frank J. Yurco—for reading the manuscript, entire or in part, and for offering their criticism. I am also grateful to Professor Alan R. Schulman (Queens College, Flushing, New York) and Dr. Rolf Krauss (Ägyptisches Museum, Berlin), both of whom read parts of the text with useful results. A special debt of thanks goes to all those scholars at The Oriental Institute in Chicago who graciously gave of their time and expertise with the Akkadian, Hittite, and Hurrian sources: once again in alphabetical order, I am indebted to Richard Beal, Gary Beckman, Robert Biggs, Gene Gragg, Hans G. Güterbock, Silvin Košak, JoAnn Scurlock, and Wilfrid Von Soldt for their advice. I am especially grateful to Professor William L. Moran (Harvard University), who took time away from his own translation of the Amarna letters to read my sixth appendix.

In order to keep the cost (and thus the price) of the book to a minimum, the published text was produced using the TREATISE/SCRIPT text formatter on the IBM 3081D computer and XEROX 9700 printer at The University of Chicago computation center. The maps were drawn by W. Raymond Johnson; Katherine Rosich and Theresa Bicanic were immensely helpful at a crucial stage of the preparation of the manuscript; and it was edited by Pamela Bruton, Elisabeth Garner, and Paul Hoffman—all working with their customary patience and skill. I could not have asked for better colleagues.

William J. Murnane
Chicago House
Luxor, Egypt
LIST OF BIBLIOGRAPHIC ABBREVIATIONS

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<tr>
<td>AAWLM</td>
<td>Abhandlungen der Akademie der Wissenschaften und der Literatur in Mainz. Wiesbaden</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ÄA</td>
<td>Ägyptologische Abhandlungen. Wiesbaden</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AIP</td>
<td>Annuaire de l'institut de philologie et d'histoire orientales et slaves. Brussels</td>
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<td>AOAT</td>
<td>Alter Orient und Altes Testament. Kevelaer and Neukirchen-Vluyn</td>
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<td>ASAE</td>
<td>Annales du Service des Antiquités de l'Egypte. Cairo</td>
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<tr>
<td>ATP II</td>
<td>Akhenaten Temple Project II. Aegypti Texta Propositaque 1. Toronto, 1988</td>
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<tr>
<td>BASOR</td>
<td>Bulletin of the American Society of Oriental Research</td>
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<tr>
<td>BIFAO</td>
<td>Bulletin de l'institut français d'archéologie orientale. Cairo</td>
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<tr>
<td>BiOr</td>
<td>Bibliotheca Orientalis. Leiden</td>
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<tr>
<td>BSFE</td>
<td>Bulletin de la Société française d'égypologie. Paris</td>
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<tr>
<td>BZAW</td>
<td>Beiheft zur Zeitschrift für die alttestamentliche Wissenschaft. Berlin</td>
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CAH²

CAH³

CdE
Chronique d'Égypte. Brussels

Champollion, Notice
Notice descriptive des monuments égyptiens du Musée Charles X. Jean F. Champollion. Paris, 1827

CoA
The City of Akhenaten, 3 vols. Egypt Exploration Fund 38, 40, and 44. London, 1923–51

Couyat-Montet, Inscr. du Ouadi-Hammâmât

CRRA
Compte rendu, Rencontre Assyriological Internationale

DFIFAO
Documents de fouilles de l’Institut français d’archéologie orientale du Caire. Cairo

EA

EM-EES

Faulkner, CD

Fs. Bresciani

Fs. Brunner

Fs. Edel

Fs. Grapow

Fs. Hintze

Fs. Hughes

Gardiner, AEO

Gardiner, EG
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<td>GM</td>
<td><em>Göttinger Missellen</em>. Göttingen</td>
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<td>HAB</td>
<td>Hildesheimer ägyptologische Beiträge. Hildesheim</td>
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<td>IEJ</td>
<td><em>Israel Exploration Journal</em>. Jerusalem</td>
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<tr>
<td>JAOS</td>
<td><em>Journal of the American Oriental Society</em>. New Haven</td>
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<td>JARCE</td>
<td><em>Journal of the American Research Center in Egypt</em>. Boston</td>
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<td>JCS</td>
<td><em>Journal of Cuneiform Studies</em>. Cambridge and New Haven</td>
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<tr>
<td>JEA</td>
<td><em>Journal of Egyptian Archaeology</em>. London</td>
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<tr>
<td>JNES</td>
<td><em>Journal of Near Eastern Studies</em>. Chicago</td>
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<td>JSSEA</td>
<td><em>Journal of the Society for the Study of Egyptian Antiquity</em>. Toronto</td>
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<td>KUB</td>
<td><em>Keilschrifturkunden aus Boghazköy</em> I–XXXIV. Berlin, 1921–44</td>
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<td>LAPO</td>
<td>Littératures anciennes du Proches-Orient. Textes égyptiens. Paris</td>
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<td>LÄ</td>
<td><em>Lexikon der Ägyptologie</em> I–. Wiesbaden, 1972–</td>
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MÄS
Münchner ägyptologische Studien. Berlin and Munich

MANE
Monographs on the Ancient Near East. Malibu

MAOG
Mitteilungen der Altorientalischen Gesellschaft. Leipzig

MDAIK
Mitteilungen des Deutschen archäologischen Instituts, Abteilung Kairo. Cairo

Medinet Habu
Medinet Habu I–VIII. Oriental Institute Publications 8, 9, 23, 51, 83, 84, 93, 94. Epigraphic Survey. Chicago, 1930–69

MIFAO
Mémoires publiés par les membres de l’Institut français d’archéologie orientale au Caire. Cairo

MIO
Mitteilungen des Instituts für Orientforschung. Berlin

MVAG
Mitteilungen der Vorderasiatischen Gesellschaft. Leipzig and Berlin

NAWG
Nachrichten von der Akademie der Wissenschaften zu Göttingen. Göttingen

OA
Oriens Antiquus. Rome

OIP
Oriental Institute Publications. Chicago

OLP
Orientalia Louvaniensia Periodica. Leuven

OLZ
Orientalistische Literaturzeitung. Leipzig

Or.
Orientalia, new series. Rome

Palais Royal d’Ugarit IV

PM

PM²

RdE
Rivista degli studi orientali. Rome

Reliefs IV

RHA
Revue hittite et asiatique. Paris

RSO
Rivista degli studi orientali. Rome

RT
Recueil de travaux relatifs à la philologie et à l’archéologie égyptiennes et assyriennes

SAK
Studien zur altägyptischer Kultur. Hamburg, 1974
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<td>SAOC</td>
<td>Studies in Ancient Oriental Civilization. Chicago</td>
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<td>SMEA</td>
<td><em>Studi Micenei ed Egeo-Anatolici.</em> Rome</td>
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<td>UA VA</td>
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<td>Untersuchungen zur Geschichte und Altertumskunde Ägyptens. Leipzig and Berlin</td>
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<td>VT</td>
<td><em>Vetus Testamentum.</em> Leiden</td>
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<td>WZKM</td>
<td><em>Wiener Zeitschrift für die Kunde des Morgenlandes.</em> Vienna</td>
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<td>ZA n.F.</td>
<td><em>Zeitschrift für Assyrinologie, neue Folge.</em> Berlin</td>
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<td>ZA</td>
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<td>ZÄS</td>
<td><em>Zeitschrift für ägyptische Sprache und Altertumskunde.</em> Leipzig and Berlin</td>
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<td>ZDMG</td>
<td><em>Zeitschrift der Deutschen Morgenländischen Gesellschaft.</em> Leipzig and Wiesbaden</td>
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<tr>
<td>ZDPV</td>
<td><em>Zeitschrift des Deutschen Palästina-Vereins.</em> Leipzig and Wiesbaden</td>
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Map 1. Hatti, Mitanni, and the Syrian Vassals
CHAPTER 1

EGYPT'S RELATIONS WITH HATTI FROM THE AMARNA PERIOD DOWN TO THE OPENING OF SETY I'S REIGN

Sometime during the later Eighteenth Dynasty, a Hittite prince—"Zi[t]a, the king’s son, your son"—sent a letter to the pharaoh. The young man, after recalling a polite greeting he had sent with an earlier messenger, went on to describe the gift with which he had charged the present delegation and then closed, disarmingly, with an appeal not unfamiliar to surrogate relatives in other times and circumstances: "I want gold. My father, send me gold. All that you, my father, wish, write me so that I may send it to you."\(^1\)

The Hittites were at peace with the Egyptian empire when this effusion was written. Within the next generation, however, they would enter into a bitter rivalry. Subduing the enemies that had threatened their Anatolian homeland, the Hittites would emerge from nearly a century of obscurity and topple the empire of Mitanni. Hatti would thus take Mitanni’s place as the ruling "superpower" in central Syria—but the result would be more than three generations of conflict between the Hittites and their erstwhile ally, Egypt.\(^2\) Yet, on the face of it, this was entirely an evitable conflict. No intrinsic threat to the legitimate security interests of either side should have prevented them from resuming the comfortable arrangement that had existed previously between Egypt and Mitanni. After a time, in fact, this was precisely what they did. Before this could come to pass, however, the better part of a century would be spent in intermittent warfare and unremitting suspicion. A review of Egyptian-Hittite relations in the early part of this period will show not only how particular accidents of policy shaped this state of affairs, but also the extent to which both superpowers were manipulated by forces they believed themselves able to control.

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THE ROAD TO KADESC

THE CLASH OF EMPIRES AND THE SELF-SERVING VASSAL STATES OF SYRIA

Hatti's confrontation with Egypt was precipitated by her ultimately successful struggle against the Hurrian empire of Mitanni. Although the contest assumed the character of a personal combat between Shuppiluliuma, the Hittite king, and his opponent, Tushratta of Mitanni, its roots were far less frivolous. The health of the Hittite kingdom depended in great measure on its control over the rich provinces of eastern Anatolia and the no less strategic territories of north-central Syria. Such mastery, exercised briefly before the collapse of Hittite power in the seventeenth century B.C., was now to be pursued with no less zeal by Shuppiluliuma. The earlier phases of the war, which were centered for the most part in the north, were prolonged over an undetermined number of years and they will not detain us here. What matters is the effect this contest had on the vassal states in Syria. For them, it is true, the crisis only intensified the hostilities that were a normal part of life in the Near East. Vassal kings, insofar as they did not act disloyally, were allowed a degree of autonomy that encompassed diplomatic relations, and even warfare, with other states. Egypt, in particular, permitted a great deal of fighting among her Asiatic affiliates. Never an enthusiastic imperialist, Egypt held to a policy of limited


4. K. A. Kitchen, Suppiluliuma and the Amarna Pharaohs (Liverpool, 1962), passim, argues that the Great Syrian (here called the “First Syrian”) war was preceded by two Syrian forays (the first a Hittite defeat, the second a victory), followed by a counterattack from Mitanni. Samuel D. Waterhouse, “Syria in the Amarna Age: A Borderland between Conflicting Empires” (Ph.D. diss., University of Michigan, 1965), pp. 1-63, has only one (unsuccessful) Syrian “foray” before the Mitannian counterattack, which was followed by the Great Syrian war (here called the “First Amkī Attack”). A. Goetze, CAH 3 II.2 6-16, proposes that an early unsuccessful Hittite foray was followed by a victorious “First Syrian” war, during the course of which Mitanni mounted an ineffective counterattack; the “Second (= Great) Syrian” war took place some years later. Philo Houwink ten Cate makes a case for an early war with Mitanni over the possession of Ishuwa, followed by a Syrian foray (threatening Ugarit) and then the Great Syrian war (here also called the “First”) coming thereafter (Review of Suppiluliuma and the Amarna Pharaohs, by K. A. Kitchen, BiOr 20 [1963]:271-72, 273). For a summary of this controversy, see Rolf Krauss, Das Ende der Amarnazeit, HÄB 7 (Hildesheim, 1978), pp. 54-55.

5. Idrimi of Alalakh, for example, made an extradition treaty with a neighboring ruler in which his overlord, Paratarna of Mitanni, acted as guarantor (ANET 3, pp. 532-33); and in Idrimi's official "biography" it is stated that diplomatic contact with other rulers was the norm following his submission to Mitanni (ibid., p. 557). See H. Klengel, Geschichte Syriens im 2. Jahrtausend v.u.Z. I (Berlin, 1965), pp. 227-32; idem, “Historischer Kommentar zur Inschrift des Idrimi von Alalah,” UF 13 (1981):269-72, 276-78; and G. Wilhelm, The Hurrians, transl. J. Barnes (Warminster, 1989), pp. 25-26.

EGYPT'S RELATIONS WITH HATTI

Involvement in Asiatic affairs. Vassals' appeals for Egyptian "peacekeeping" troops were generally met with very modest commitments of manpower; but such requests were just as likely to be ignored. The pharaohs were prepared to tolerate local warfare inside their sphere of influence so long as the victor observed his obligations as an Egyptian vassal. This state of "permanent abnormality" was not supposed to work against the interests of the overlord or his allies, although in practice it occasionally did. Usually, however, the "great kings" of the Near East could assume that the peace between them would at least assure their messengers safe passage through the lands of one another's vassals.

The reemergence of Hatti as a power in the Near East threatened, however, to disrupt, not only this relative tranquility, but more fundamentally the system of obligations that had lasted, largely unchanged, for the past two generations. Disaffection among the Mitannian vassals was a weapon that Shuppiluliuma did not hesitate to unsheathe, and the results were predictable: as the superpowers sparred, kings and factions in the principalities of Syria watched, schemed, and occasionally took action to ensure that their side, with the aid of one or another of the great powers, emerged with the winners.

But if the contest between Hatti and Mitanni was an ongoing source of anxiety, it was equally worrying to ponder how the Hittites would accommodate themselves in victory to the other superpower, Egypt. Governed by local city rulers under the supervision of the pharaoh's administrators, the northernmost territories of the Egyptian empire were contiguous with those owing fealty to the Mitannians. As a commercial power, Egypt would not welcome the disruption of ports and trading routes affected by Hittite pressure within Syria, particularly on such long-standing Egyptian affiliates as Ugarit. As the Mitannians became less able to sustain their position in Syria, moreover, Egypt was increasingly on call by those vassal states that wished either to avoid Hittite domination or, if possible, to maneuver themselves into a viable position between the great powers. Barring the resurgence of Mitanni, a reckoning between Egypt and Hatti might not be put off indefinitely. In the meantime, prevailing conditions gave


9. For example, EA 7:73–82 (= Moran, Amarna, p. 76), EA 8:8–42 (= ibid., pp. 78–79), and EA 16:37–42 (= ibid., p. 108).
10. See, e.g., EA 30 (= Moran, Amarna, pp. 191–92), a “passport” in which a king (presumably of Mitanni) demands from “the kings of Canaan, servants of my brother” safe passage for his envoy through their territories.
THE ROAD TO KADESH

the Syrian princes room to pursue their own interests. Mitannian weakness, and Egyptian reluctance to fill Mitanni's shoes completely, allowed enterprising rulers a freedom they would not have enjoyed otherwise: what could be seized during this disturbed period might accrue to one's advantage by the time the Egyptians felt compelled to treat with this new colossus from the north.

An outstanding example of such opportunism is provided by the kings of Amurru, whose very political existence was due to the conditions just described. The land itself commanded a strategic location along the seaboard in central Syria, between the kingdom of Ugarit and Egyptian possessions in the south. Even so, during the first half of the fourteenth century B.C., Amurru was one of the wilder, least populated regions in the Near East. While a number of towns are mentioned in contemporary documents, modern archaeological surveys of the region suggest that Amurru's population mostly consisted of pastoralists. Equally indeterminate was Amurru's political identity. Although not a united principality, most of the country seems to have belonged to the Mitannian sphere of influence. A significant exception was Amurru's principal port at Šumur, which was administered by an Egyptian commissioner. Tunip, an independent city state inland, was affiliated with Mitanni, however, before it would return to its earlier status as an Egyptian vassal. An aspiring ruler, before he could plausibly claim the lordship of the entire country, would not only need to subdue the various entities within Amurru and cow anxious neighbors such as Byblos to the south, but would also have to find a way of reconciling his mastery with the superpowers' competing claims within his kingdom.

This might have seemed a daunting task with few prospects of reward or victory. Yet, by the end of the fourteenth century, Abdi-Ashirta and his son Aziru would succeed in forging a major kingdom between the Orontes river and the Mediterranean Sea. Their progress can be traced principally in a number of biased but valuable sources. Hittite documents, and particularly the treaties with which successive generations of Amurrite kings bound themselves to the rulers of Hatti, contain much useful information, although it is generally skewed to reflect the Hittites' political agendas. The Amarna letters, dossiers of correspondence between pharaohs of the late Eighteenth Dynasty (Amenhotep III to Tutankhamun) and their contemporaries in Western

15. This can be inferred from the data assembled by G. Kestemont ("La société internationale mitannienne et le royaume d’Amurru à l’époque amarnienne," *OLP* 9 [1978]:27–32), although he exaggerates their relevance to the policy of the kingdom that Abdi-Ashirta and his sons created. See Appendix 8 below.
EGYPT'S RELATIONS WITH HATTI

Asia, are illuminating and tendentious in equal measure. Mitannian policy towards Amurru can be inferred from some of these letters, but most of them quite understandably deal with the sins Abdi-Ashirta and his sons are said to have committed against Egypt and her vassals. Self-serving as many of these complaints undoubtedly were, they constantly return to a theme that, in retrospect, seems hard to deny: namely, that the Egyptians' military presence in Syria was not equal to preserving the status quo. This does not mean it was totally ineffectual. On the contrary, we shall see that Egypt, when she chose, could indeed enforce her writ on the countries under her control. But Egyptian power, though it would still overawe an Aziru at the height of his career, did not prevent him from consolidating the kingdom of Amurru. This is the central crux around which the rise of Amurru as a power in the Near East revolves, especially since the work of Abdi-Ashirta and his sons would have consequences that went far beyond the eclipse of a few local princes.

The house of Abdi-Ashirta owed much of its success to its skill in manipulating a class of people described in the texts as 'Apiru, or SA.GAZ. The meaning of these terms has been much debated, but during the Amarna period they apparently denoted neither the ethnic forebears of the Hebrew people nor merely the generic "enemies" of the townsfolk who made derogatory use of these names. ‘Apiru, rather, were "refugees"—dispossessed peasants and other rootless individuals who had lost or withdrawn from their affiliations with settled communities. By themselves, these marginal and occasionally lawless elements of society were a potentially


disruptive force in Amurru; but with the direction they now received from the house of Abdi-Ashirta, they proved irresistible.\textsuperscript{24}

Amurru’s rise took place in two phases, during which local strongmen—first Abdi-Ashirta and then (after a temporary setback) his son Aziru—gained control over the territory of Amurru. The activities of these two men bulk large in the Amarna letters, above all in the correspondence of Rib-Addi, prince of Byblos, who sent letters from the largest single dossier in the Amarna archive, and whose circumstances are the reverse image of the waxing or waning fortunes of his enemies. Frequent charges against the rulers of Amurru include their reliance on the ‘Apiru, as well as murder and subversion against other city rulers.\textsuperscript{25} But the ambition of the new dynasty ran wider still. A strong and independent kingdom of Amurru was incompatible with its current status in the Egyptian empire—especially with its resident commissioner at Ṣumur, on the coast, within easy reach of Egypt by sea. The house of Abdi-Ashirta was thus committed to a dangerous double game: to dislodge the commissioner, but also to keep him out by constituting the kings of Amurru as defenders of imperial interests in the locality.

During the first phase, when Abdi-Ashirta came to power in Amurru, the Egyptian commissioner was one Paḥamnate (= P3-ḫm-ntr).\textsuperscript{26} By this time, however, the Egyptians were already having trouble keeping possession of Ṣumur—the result, perhaps, of the unsettled conditions that Abdi-Ashirta’s campaign of subversion had unleashed within Amurru? In any case, the commissioner had retired to Egypt, and Abdi-Ashirta could write to him (perhaps disingenuously) that the city had been virtually undefended when he had rescued it from marauding warrior bands.\textsuperscript{27} With Ṣumur thus under his control, Abdi-Ashirta could beleaguer neighboring city-states at his leisure,\textsuperscript{28} and at one point Rib-Addi even claimed that his territory was reduced to the very environs of Byblos.\textsuperscript{29}

It was also during this period that Shuppiluliuma scored his early victories over Mitanni. Rib-Addi reported to Egypt that “the king, my lord, should be informed that the king of Hatti has


\textsuperscript{27} EA 62:9–34.

\textsuperscript{28} EA 76:9–20 and EA 87:15–24.

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seized all the countries that were vassals of the king of Mitanni. Broad as this statement is, it can be plausibly applied to Shuppiluliuma’s first important success in Syria, when Sharrupshi, king of Nuḫaššē, threw up his affiliation with Mitanni and became a Hittite vassal. Somewhat later, the same writer also reports on Tushratta’s efforts to recoup his losses: the pharaoh is told that the Mitannian king had “gone out” with his chariots and his army and had succeeded in reaching Sumur before a lack of water forestalled what Rib-Addi claimed was a planned march on Byblos, forcing him to return home. Tushratta’s appearance on the soil of Amurru was not without effect, however, for Abdi-Ashirta seems to have made a quick submission to the invader: a great deal of spoil is reported to have been taken from Amurru to Mitanni, and in another letter Abdi-Ashirta is described as being “in Mitanni” (i.e., in the latter’s orbit) but still continuing his pressure on Egypt’s vassal, Byblos.

The operations of a foreign army so close to Egypt’s sphere of influence, especially as reported in alarmist terms by her vassals, may well have occasioned a certain anxiousness at the pharaoh’s court. That it resulted in a coolness that tilted Egypt, for all practical purposes, against Mitanni in her death-struggle with Hatti is widely assumed but difficult to prove. Tushratta’s last letters to Egypt (EA 26–29) do betray a mounting irritation with his correspondent, “Napkhururiya” (= Amenhotep IV/Akhenaten), but the matters in dispute are so picayune that it would be hazardous to read a serious rift into them. Two Egyptian possessions are indeed said to be at risk from Mitanni, but with what credibility? The threat to Byblos was never realized and may have sprung from Rib-Addi’s fertile imagination. Further north, moreover, Rib-Addi’s report tells us only that “the king of Mitanni has advanced as far as Sumur.” It is not clear that Tushratta occupied the place or that he planned to contest the pharaoh’s sovereignty over it. Whatever tension this episode created between the two superpowers seems, rather, to have been caused by Amurru’s past history of disorganization and mixed affiliations. As a “geographical expression” Amurru had been fragmented into sections that belonged either to Egypt or Mitanni. Abdi-Ashirta’s kingdom, however, was a new entity that could belong to only one sphere of influence. As we have seen, Abdi-Ashirta had sought earlier to justify his possession of Sumur by claiming a role as Egypt’s watchdog in Amurru. Rib-Addi himself—perhaps optimistically—

31. This episode, mentioned retrospectively in the context of the Great Syrian war (in Shuppiluliuma’s treaty with Shattiwaza: ANET, p. 318), is probably referred to as well in his treaty with Tette of Nuhaššē (E. F. Weidner, Politische Dokumente aus Kleinasiern, Boghazköy Studien 8 (Leipzig, 1923), p. 59 (obv. I 1–11); see Klengel, Geschichte Syriens II (Berlin, 1969), pp. 25–26, but also Waterhouse, “Syria in the Amarna Age,” pp. 17, 22–28. See Appendix 7 for the relative chronology of these events.
33. EA 86:8–12.
35. E.g., Wilhelm, The Hurrians, pp. 34–35; Redford, Akhenaten, the Heretic King (Princeton, 1984), pp. 195–97. Goetze, CAH II, 7–8 attributes the growing coolness to Mitanni, in reaction to what is seen as Egypt’s studied inactivity in Syria.
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bears witness to the presence of pro-Egyptian elements in Amurru. But while the situation could have disrupted relations between Egypt and Mitanni, there is no proof that it actually did so. In any case, the vacuum that had occurred when the pharaoh's commissioner had retired from Šumur was not tolerated for long. Egyptian forces, perhaps assisted by dissident forces within Amurru, were sent against Abdi-Ashirta. His death, whether at the hands of Egyptians or his own disaffected subjects, removed the troublesome question that the kingdom of Amurru had created for the superpowers. An Egyptian commissioner once again took up his post in Šumur. Conditions in Western Asia returned (for the time being) to the status quo ante. The fate of Abdi-Ashirta's kingdom, however, was not to be decided by the intervention of the great powers. Its fortunes would be restored by Aziru, the most dynamic of the "sons of Abdi-Ashirta" who shared power after their father's death. He was lucky, for the shifting balance among the superpowers would soon favor the prospects of another strongman in Amurru.

For over two generations Babylon, Egypt, and Mitanni had dominated the Near East. Mitannian weakness now put at risk this rudimentary "international system" which they led. Tushratta, king of Mitanni, had indeed shown the Mitannian colors in Syria, but the most he could claim was his short-lived triumph over Amurru. Worse, he had failed to achieve the far more important object of restoring Mitanni's control over Nuḫassē. Matters were equally bleak in the east, where the empire not only faced challenges from Assyria, another restive vassal, but also from the third of the great powers in the Near East, Kassite Babylonia. Mitanni's very unity was further strained, moreover, by old quarrels within the royal family. The tangled events surrounding Tushratta's accession to the throne now returned to haunt him as a rival claimant, Artatama II, was encouraged by Mitanni's enemies. Hemmed on too many sides, Tushratta proved unable to withstand the Hittites' next major incursion into Syria. This attack, which we will call the "Great Syrian" campaign, followed immediately upon Shuppiluliuma's final absorption of eastern Anatolia into the Hittite kingdom. Nothing shows the sapping of Hurrian power more convincingly than its utter confusion when Shuppiluliuma suddenly appeared before the Mitannian capital at Waššukanni. Tushratta fled without giving battle—indeed, his discomfiture was so complete that Shuppiluliuma wasted no more time in the Mitannian


37. For different points of view see W. L. Moran, "The Death of Abdi-Ašīrta," Eretz Israel 9 (1969):94–99 (= Abdi-Ašīrta killed by his subjects); and A. Altman, "The Fate of Abdi-Ašīrta," UF 9 [1977]:1–11 (= Egyptian forces, aggravating Abdi-Ašīrta's unpopularity in Amurru and taking advantage of his weakness during an illness, removed him to Egypt, where he presumably died). On the disputed passages see now Moran, Amarna, pp. 287–88 with n. 4 (on EA 95:41–42: political distress, and not a physical malady, is referred to here); and ibid., pp. 294–95 (on EA 101).

38. Wilhelm, The Hurrians, pp. 30–31, 35–37. For a somewhat different view of the rival factions within the Hurrian homeland see, however, Goetze, CAH3 II.2 1–5.

39. Compare the terminologies cited above in n. 4. The main source for what follows is the historical preamble to the treaty between Shuppiluliuma and Shattiwaza, the ruler of Ḥanigalbat (as the rump state of Mitanni was called after Tushratta's death), which was made near the end of Shuppiluliuma's reign: see Weidner, Politische Dokumente aus Kleinasien, pp. 6–9 (the relevant passage is also translated by Goetze, in ANET3, p. 318). For the reading of the Hurrian name, which is widely rendered as "Mattiwaza" in the literature, see C. Zaccagnini, "Šattiwaz(z)a," OA 13 (1974):25–34. On the much debated location of Waššukanni see W. Mayer, "Taide oder Waššukanni? Name und Lage der Hauptstadt Mitannis," UF 18 (1986):231–36, with references.
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homeland. Instead, he immediately recrossed the Euphrates to secure the allegiance of Mitanni's remaining vassals in northwestern Syria. The Hittite juggernaut seemed unstoppable. Aleppo fell in short order, then Mukish, and while Shuppiluliuma's army was encamped at Alalakh the king of Niya came to sue for peace.

The reality of a Hittite victory, however, seems at last to have provoked the reaction for which Tushratta had worked in vain. While the king of Niya was on his way to treat with Shuppiluliuma, a faction hostile to Hatti seized power back home. In Nuḫašše, too, the pro-Hittite ruler, Sharrupshi, was put out of the way. In concert with the other allies that joined their cause, Niya and Nuḫašše could have mounted a stiff resistance to the Hittites as they tried to advance further south (see Map 1). Only Ugarit might allow the Hittites easy passage along the allies' western flank—and since Niqmad II was an Egyptian vassal, his cooperation with the invader was not guaranteed. The Hittites, however, were a new and unpredictable factor in great power politics. Their commitment to the status quo was uncertain, at best, and the allies had to reckon with the possibility that Shuppiluliuma might force Ugarit's cooperation. It was in trying to forestall this development, probably, that the allies overreached themselves. Ugarit was urged, in increasingly forceful terms, to join the united front against Hatti. When she temporized, or refused, the opposition governments in Niya and Nuḫašše resorted to armed pressure on Ugaritic territory. Niqmad II might have appealed to the pharaoh. But Egypt was far away, and the danger was pressing. Submitting to the Hittites would violate Ugarit's pact with Egypt, but Hatti was also far away and relatively unproved as an imperial power. Opportune cooperation with Shuppiluliuma might prove less dangerous, in the end, than capitulating to one's neighbors. Niqmad rid his territory of the invaders with the help of Hittite troops. Eventually, the king of Ugarit would make his own way to Alalakh and tender his personal fealty to the Hittite king. Now solidly in possession of northern Syria, Shuppiluliuma could pick off his remaining opponents at leisure. Following the rapid defeat of Niya and her smaller allies, it seems that the Hittite army next followed the course of the Orontes river still further south,


41. For the treaty between Shuppiluliuma and Niqmad II, see Jean Nougayrol, Le palais royal d’Ugarit IV.1, Mission de Ras Shamra 9 (Paris, 1956), pp. 48-52; and compare Waterhouse, “Syria in the Amarna Age,” pp. 46-52 and 91 (n. 34); Klengel, Geschichte Syriens II 340-58. A valuable discussion of this treaty is found in Liverani, Storia di Ugarit, pp. 43-50, although I cannot agree that the Hittite expansion into Syria occurred entirely within the reign of Tutankhamun (ibid., pp. 36-43). See Appendix 7 below.

42. Shuppiluliuma's probable itinerary, along waterways and on roads still used in classical antiquity, can be inferred: I have used the map “Lands of the Bible Today” from The National Geographic Magazine 90, no. 6 (December 1956), and also Heinrich Kiepert, Atlas Antiquus, 2d ed. rev. (Berlin, n.d.), Tab. 4, following the indications in the text of the Shattiwaza treaty. I have chosen not to accept the hypothesis of Cavaignac (followed by D. B. Redford, History and Chronology of the Eighteenth Dynasty of Egypt [Toronto, 1967], p. 221 and n. 14), whereby the campaigns against
to subdue the hostile city of Qatna. Having neutralized all the surrounding territories, the Hittites now proceeded to reduce Nuḫaššē itself.

Thus far Shuppiluliuma could justify all his field operations, at least, as legitimate actions against the allies of his principal enemy, Mitanni. Following the reconquest of Nuḫaššē, however, the purposes of this “Great Syrian” campaign are more difficult to follow. After spending some time in Nuḫaššē—setting up a friendly government and deporting unreliable elements among the populace to Hatti—the Hittites continued their march south. Their destination, however, brought them still closer to a direct confrontation with Egypt. Of their opponents we know next to nothing: the Shattiwaza treaty, our only source, treats the campaign against Ariwanna and his allies merely as the final step in eliminating Mitannian partisans in Syria. Ariwanna, however, is called the king of Abina (= Upe); and most of Upe (see Map 1) was manifestly under Egyptian suzerainty. Most probably, however, Ariwanna was a Mitannian vassal whose lands lay in northeast Upe, on the western side of the Euphrates. Shuppiluliuma had nothing to gain by gratuitously offending Egypt, and it would be difficult, otherwise, to explain the restraint with which he approached another Egyptian vassal on his way south. The city of Kadesh, on the eastern bank of the Orontes river, lay directly on the path of the Hittites’ march to Upe. Since its status within the Egyptian empire was beyond dispute, Shuppiluliuma’s intention (declared in the Shattiwaza treaty) of passing it without a fight comes

Qatna and Nuḫaššē are assumed to refer to a later war which was interpolated into the account given by the Shattiwaza treaty: not only does this emendation contradict Shuppiluliuma’s explicit claim to have fought all of these campaigns in a single year (Weidner, Politische Dokumente, pp. 14–15), but there also seems to be no valid reason, textually or strategically, for making it.

43. On this identification, see Weidner, Politische Dokumente, p. 14, n. 1 and (more recently) Helck, Beziehungen², pp. 176–77, and Waterhouse, “Syria in the Amarna Age,” p. 43 (and compare pp. 234 and 242 [n. 35]). In Knudtzon, Die El-Amarna Tafeln II 1112–1113, Otto Weber also argued for the identity of “Ube” and “Abi,” pointing out that letters from Biriawaza in Upe itself use the latter spelling, “Abi,” while the former is preferred by his neighbors to the north and east (e.g., Akizzi and Aitakama). For more recent discussions see now Pitard, Ancient Damascus, p. 67, n. 65 with references.


46. Although it is widely assumed that Ariwanna’s kingdom did lie in the Egyptian sphere of influence: e.g., Pitard, Ancient Damascus, p. 67; Goetze in CAH³ II.2 14; and—implicitly—Wilhelm, The Hurrians, p. 36. Klengel (e.g., in Geschichte Syriens III [Berlin, 1970], p. 97) doubts that Shuppiluliuma would have antagonized Egypt so blatantly at this time, but he also disputes the generally accepted identification of Abi(na) with Upe: see n. 43 above.


as no surprise. Unexpectedly, however, Shutatarra, king of Kadesh, chose to block the Hittite advance. Shuppiluliuma’s intentions, perhaps, were not as clear as he would later maintain. The Egyptians, certainly, had good reason to doubt him, given Ugarit’s recent defection and the Hittites’ dangerous proximity to their strongholds in Upe. As Shutatarra’s overlord the pharaoh might well have ordered him to resist—but if so, this was a desperately foolhardy gesture. Backed up by no Egyptian troops, insofar as we know, Shutatarra and his allies were defeated in battle, besieged, and finally captured. Among the leading men of Kadesh carried off into captivity in Hatti were Shutatarra and his son Aitakama—the latter destined to play no unimportant part in the consolidation of Hittite power in Syria.

Shuppiluliuma would later boast that he had defeated all his enemies in a single year, setting his boundaries at the Euphrates river and the Lebanon range. This was premature. The collapse of the Mitannian empire had indeed been swift—so thorough and unanticipated that it had left Tushratta no time to call in his Egyptian ally, nor time for Egypt to send the help to which it was committed by treaty. But the Hittites were still far from secure in northern Syria. A number of powerful cities, notably Carchemish, were still independent and unwilling to accept the new superpower. The Hurrians, routed and divided though they now appeared, were still in a position to threaten the Hittites’ hold on Syria. Writing to Akhenaten in the aftermath of the “Great Syrian war,” the king of Qatna could report that, in addition to himself, four local rulers (including the kings of Nuhašše and Niya) stood at the pharaoh’s disposal; and that in the Mitannian lands across the Euphrates, the pharaoh’s messenger had found three or four “kings” who were united in their hostility to the Hittite king. Hatti’s armed might commanded respect—but even among her sworn vassals commitment to the new order was not unanimous. These people in particular, interacting among themselves and with the great powers, would force the Hittites into a deepening involvement in Syria that would bring them, ultimately, into conflict with Egypt.

Egypt’s immediate reaction to the “Great Syrian” campaign, however, was surprisingly bland. Appeals for her intervention at the height of the war had fallen on deaf ears. Now, with

49. The existence of a mutual assistance pact between Egypt and Mitanni is indicated by section 26 of the “Mitannian letter,” EA 24:III 108–18 (= Moran, Amarna, p. 147; compare Wilhelm, The Hurrians, p. 33).

50. The “rebellion” against Hatti by Carchemish, along with Aleppo and Nuhašše, which is referred to in Murshili II’s treaty with Talmi-Sharuma of Aleppo (Weidner, Politische Dokumente, p. 85 [obv. 33–36])—if it does not refer to their resistance in the “Great Syrian” campaign—may be dated to Shuppiluliuma’s accession year or shortly thereafter, when he first claims to have set his boundary at the mountains of Lebanon (compare Shattiwaza treaty, obv. 1–4 = Weidner, Politische Dokumente, p. 3). Carchemish is not mentioned, however, in that treaty’s account of the Great Syrian war, although it may have figured in the version of events given by the “Deeds of Shuppiluliuma”; see H. G. Güterbock, “The Deeds of Shuppiluliuma as Told by His Son, Mursili II,” JCS 10 (1956):84, at Fragment 26; and compare Klengel, Geschichte Syriens 1 41.

51. Continued Hurrian resistance is definite, with or without the involvement of Tushratta. For different scenarios on the situation of Mitanni after Tushratta’s defeat and during the later reign of Shuppiluliuma, see Goetze, CAH 3 II.2 13–20; Waterhouse, “Syria in the Amarna Age,” pp. 59–63, 82–84; and Wilhelm, The Hurrians, pp. 36–37.

52. EA 53:40–44 and EA 56:36–41. See Appendix 7 for the chronological placement of these letters.

53. E.g., EA 55:16–23 (from Akizzi of Qatna, urging Akhenaten to hasten and take possession of Nuhašše); compare EA 51 (from Addu-nirari of Nuhašše, reminding the pharaoh of his ancestor’s
two of her provinces overrun by the Hittites, this was surely the time for a demonstration of the pharaoh's might. Yet, for all the urging of her present and would-be allies, Egypt waited. Nothing in the Amarna letters or any other source indicates that the Egyptians followed up the "Great Syrian" campaign with an expedition of their own. The reasons for their caution had little to do, however, with Akhenaten's alleged distraction from foreign affairs or with any spinelessness in facing up to the Hittite challenge in Syria. The Hittites, in fact, had left something of a vacuum there. No heavy commitment of Hittite troops was left to back up the vassals' new political alignments, and when, at a later time, trouble again broke out in Syria the nearest Hittite army was stationed in southern Anatolia. Very probably, Akhenaten and his advisers opted to let the dust settle. Shuppiluliuma, to be sure, had already taken over one Egyptian vassal and trounced another—but the Hittites' plans for Kadesh were not yet clear, and the military debacle could be attributed to Shutatarra's over-reaction to the Hittites' pursuit of Mitannian, not Egyptian, affiliates. As for Ugarit, since there is no evidence that it was ever seriously in dispute between the two powers, it seems likely that Egypt was prepared to countenance its removal into the Hittite sphere if only the status quo were ratified further south. In short, with so much left uncertain in the wake of Mitanni's defeat, it made sense to wait and see if the new superpower could be dealt with in some way short of all-out war.

The acid test of this cautious optimism would be the behavior of Kadesh itself. When Aitakama, son of the deported king of Kadesh, returned from captivity in Hatti to take his father's place, he continued to present himself as the pharaoh's vassal. Assumptions that Kadesh had returned docilely to the Egyptian alliance were shaken, however, as Egypt's subjection to Egypt and asking for support against the Hittites). For Addu-nirari as Sharrupshi's successor see Klengel, *Geschichte Syriens* II 27, 41–44; Liverani, *Storia di Ugarit*, p. 39.

54. Goetze, *CAH* III.2.9; and compare Drower, ibid., p. 138 (Ugarit).

55. While Egypt's reaction cannot be followed in any detail, no serious effort to recover Ugarit can be inferred from the little pertinent evidence there is: see Liverani, *Storia di Ugarit*, p. 51–52; compare Astour in Young, ed., *Ugarit in Retrospect*, pp. 20–26. Of possible relevance is the "Letter of the General" from Ugarit, in which an officer tells the king that he is guarding the southern frontier against the possible arrival of an Egyptian army—but such watchfulness does not necessarily presuppose hostility; and the letter itself has affinities with the earlier Amarna letters, particularly those of Abdi-Ashirta: see, for convenience, Schulman, "Hittites, Helmets and Amarna: Akhenaten's First Hittite War," in Redford et al., *Akhenaten Temple Project II*, Aegypti Texta Propositaque 1 (Toronto, 1988), pp. 61 and 77 with references, especially n. 114 (henceforth abbreviated "ATP II"). The issue of Ugarit is conspicuously absent, moreover, in accounts of later negotiations between Egypt and Hatti. The Hittites' absorption of other northern allies such as Arzawa may well have prompted the Egyptians to cut their losses and concentrate on central Syria: see Moran, *Amarna*, pp. 192–94 (= EA 31); S. Heinhold-Krahmer, *Arzawa: Untersuchungen zu seiner Geschichte nach den hethitischen Quellen*, Texte der Hehiter 8 (Heidelberg, 1977), pp. 50–55, 62–83.

56. While it is possible that EA 189 dates to the period before the Great Syrian war, when Aitakama would have been ruling in Kadesh as his father's coregent (for which see Klengel, *Geschichte Syriens* II 162–63), the evidence for this coregency—merely Aitakama's fighting against the Hittites alongside his father—is weak. Given its contents, it seems more likely that EA 189 belongs with the war that we know Aitakama and Aziru fought with Biriawaza after the "Great Syrian" campaign (see below, n. 76; and thus also Krauss, *Das Ende der Amarnazeit*, p. 63, n. 2). The notion that Aitakama was defending himself in this connection seems more consistent with the rest of the data than Helck's suggestion (*Beziehungen* 2, p. 179) that his rapprochement with Egypt came later, as a result of Biriawaza's continued pressure on Kadesh.
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supporters in Syria vied with one another to report Aitakama's activities as a Hittite recruiter. Akizzi of Qatna, for example, after accusing Aitakama of inviting him to defect, told the pharaoh that the prince of Kadesh had subverted some neighboring towns, and with them he had set about plundering his neighbors in Upe. The brunt of his attack was borne by one Biriawaza, then the most prominent local ruler in Upe. In his own defense, Aitakama told the pharaoh that Biriawaza had slandered him, taken his ancestral domains, burnt his city, and delivered the lands of Upe and Taḥṣy to the "Apiru. These are familiar charges, and they may indicate that Aitakama sought to present his war with Biriawaza as one of those "normal" contests between vassals that the suzerain usually ignored. Perhaps this was all it was. Kadesh would have been vulnerable during Aitakama's enforced absence, and his complaints against Biriawaza may have been justified. Efforts by the new king of Kadesh to redress the situation on his return could have been misrepresented to the pharaoh, particularly since his expeditious return from Hatti would already have placed him under suspicion. Open collaboration with the Hittites may have been forced on the king of Kadesh by his enemies' successful propaganda. In any event, Aitakama's protestations of loyalty were received skeptically. His estrangement from Egypt set in motion developments that would end in Kadesh declaring herself unequivocally as an affiliate of Hatti.

To contain the brush-war in Syria, Egypt required the cooperation of Amurru, Aitakama's neighbor to the west. She could expect that assistance, for Aziru had been rebuilding his father's kingdom with a good deal of forbearance and, indeed, help from the pharaoh's government. For example, Egypt had continued to allow Aziru a free hand in bullying his neighbors. The most assiduous chronicler of Amurru's rise was, once again, its worst enemy, Rib-Addi of Byblos. Tendentious as this man's many letters to the pharaoh surely are, there is no denying the tale they tell: for Byblos would eventually knuckle under to the new regime in Amurru, and Rib-Addi would end his life as a fugitive. Aziru took care, moreover, to cultivate high officials in

60. Notably, both of Aitakama's confederates, the cities of Lapana and Rūḫiẓī, were located on the border of Kadesh with Upe, and thus within range of the aggression that Aitakama accuses Biriawaza of committing in EA 189: see Helck, Beziehungen2, pp. 130 (= 1), 132 (= 79); compare S. Ahituv, Canaanite Toponyms in Ancient Egyptian Documents (Jerusalem-Leiden, 1984), p. 131; Rainey, "Toponymic Problems: Rāḥiṣum = Rōgišu?," Tel Aviv 6 (1979):158–60.
61. Briefly, when Aziru was able to impose a naval blockade on Byblos, with the aid of her commercial rivals, Rib-Addi still refused to come to terms with Aziru, ignoring popular demands that he do so and even rebuffing appeals from within his own family. Eventually he concluded a treaty of alliance with
Egypt who might be expected, occasionally, to speak up for their client when policy matters were discussed at court. Even later, when relations with Egypt had deteriorated, Aziru was still charged with a number of responsibilities in his own region. In addition to providing the usual tribute and supplies, for example, the pharaoh expected Aziru to keep the peace in Amurru and to "place the enemies of the king in his power." In return, Aziru received direct subsidies from Egypt. Aziru himself urged on the pharaoh his own fitness to represent Egyptian interests in all Amurru; and in another letter he would accuse Hotpe, an Egyptian agent in Amurru, of misappropriating gold and silver that the king of Egypt had intended for Aziru's use. Rib-Addi had inveighed against the policy, which (he alleged) was inspired by Egyptian military advisers. But although he warned that these funds would only be repaid as tribute to the "strong king" of the Hittites, they continued to be paid.

Even more remarkably, Aziru was again able to achieve his father's aim of replacing the Egyptian forces in Šumur with one of his own. Quite early in his reign, it appears, the office of Commissioner changed hands—probably when Pahammate died and was succeeded by his own son Ḥaib (= H̲₂py?). Later, perhaps when Ḥaib was recalled to Egypt, his place was taken by a military officer named Pawara (= P3-wr), who was eventually killed under obscure circumstances. Ḥaib then returned to Šumur, only to end his tenure, as Rib-Addi angrily noted,
by surrendering the city into Aziru’s hands. Yet, even now, Egypt’s demands on Aziru were modest—for he was only ordered to refortify the place, in earnest of his professed loyalty to Egypt. Misguided as this mildness may have been in the end, there is a reasonable explanation for it. Syria, it has been well pointed out, “was a tall order for the Egyptians.” Having committed themselves only under pressure to an empire in Western Asia, they were currently operating it with only a small investment of resources and personnel. Their present policy towards Aziru is consistent, I suggest, with this minimalist approach to imperial government. City rulers and, occasionally, local strongmen—for example, Biriawaza in Upe—handled the routine operations of the empire. Aziru, it appears, was to fill the same role for the Egyptians in Amurru.

Aziru, however, had overstepped himself. His neighbors regarded the growing power of Amurru with alarm, and beside Rib-Addi there were others—most notably, the princes of Qatna, Tyre, and (presently) Nuḫaššē. Moreover, Aziru was most inconveniently on what the pharaoh regarded as the wrong side, for he was reported as being in league with Kadesh against Biriawaza. Even worse, reports that the prince of Amurru had at least flirted with a Hittite alliance could not be argued away. The contemporary record is unclear, but the episode is mentioned in the preamble to the treaty that Aziru’s grandson, Duppi-Teshup, made with Murshili II:

Aziru was your grandfather, Duppi-Teshup. He rebelled against my father, but submitted again to my father. When the kings of the Nuḫaššē lands and kings of Kinza (= Kadesh) rebelled against my father, Aziru did not rebel. As he was bound by treaty, he remained bound by treaty. As my father fought against his enemies, in the same manner fought Aziru ... When my father became a god and I seated myself on the throne of my father, Aziru behaved towards me just as he had behaved towards my father. It happened that the Nuḫaššē kings and the king of Kinza rebelled a second time against me. But Aziru, your grandfather, and DU-Teshup, your father, did not take their side. They remained loyal to me as their lord.

70. EA 132:36-43 and 149:37-40. What actually lay behind this highly colored description of events is unrecoverable.
73. See above, nn. 6, 7, 8.
76. EA 151:55–63. For this passage I follow Moran, Amarna, p. 389: “Fire destroyed the palace of Ugarit; (rather,) it destroyed half of it, and so hal[f] of it is gone. There are no Hittite troops about. Etakama (sic), the lord of Kadesh, and Aziru are at war; the war is with Biriawaza.” Compare The Chicago Assyrian Dictionary, vol. I/1 (Chicago, 1960), p. 230b, s.v. šatu; and Waterhouse, “Syria in the Amarna Age,” pp. 147 (n. 25) and 117–18. These details confirm the placement of EA 151, and what it reports, in the period after the Great Syrian campaign.
77. Adapted from Goetze’s translation in ANET, p. 203.
The wording of the opening lines—Aziru “rebelled” but “submitted again” to Shuppiluliuma—implies that Aziru had violated a previous arrangement which he then made good by his final submission, i.e., when he concluded his well-known treaty with Hatti. His steadfast behavior during the rebellions of Kadesh and Nuḫašše is generally assigned to this later period, when Aziru was formally a Hittite vassal; and the first of these rebellions is customarily dated to the years of the “Hurrian war,” near the end of Shuppiluliuma’s reign. But are these equations correct? What the treaty describes as Nuḫašše’s second rebellion, in the time of Murshili II, was actually her third or perhaps even her fourth known revolt against Hittite suzerainty. To be sure, it was only Nuḫašše’s “second” revolt against the person of Murshili II—but this description would not apply to Kadesh, which had not joined Nuḫašše on the first occasion she had defied Murshili. As a reflection of Hatti’s past relations with both Kadesh and Nuḫašše, the account given in Duppi-Teshup’s treaty seems, at least, to be confused.

These problems, I believe, are illusory. What the text reports is not demonstrably the full tally of past revolts by Kadesh and Nuḫašše, but may only be those occasions when both parties had been caught out together. Thus the “second” revolt, under Murshili II, would be that of the king’s ninth year, when “the Nuḫašše kings and the king of Kinza rebelled a second time, against me” (my italics); and the first rebellion, against Shuppiluliuma, would have been the Great Syrian war, when the kinglets of Nuḫašše, together with Shutatarra and Aitakama, the once and future kings of Kadesh, had all resisted the Hittite advance. The most plausible date, in terms of the later treaty text, at which Aziru could thus have reached his original understanding with Shuppiluliuma thus lies sometime after the Great Syrian war.

Aziru had certainly been in contact with the Hittites at about this time. In a letter to the king of Egypt, he is forced to defend himself, rather lamely, for having entertained Hittite envoys. Even earlier, however, the citizens of Tunip had been writing about Aziru to the pharaoh, intimating that he would at least rejoice if the Egyptians were discomfited by Hatti. Even so, we are left wondering how this original “submission” of Aziru could have taken place, and how formal it really was. It is unlikely that he visited Shuppiluliuma in Alalakh, about the same time that Ugarit and Niya had submitted. It may have been as little as an exchange of messages, or a prudent coordination of Amurru’s military maneuvers around the Hittites’ planned assault on Qatna and Nuḫašše. At a later stage of the Great Syrian campaign, when Shuppiluliuma was occupying Nuḫašše, Aziru would be lumbered with the presence of Hotpe, an Egyptian imperial

78. E.g., Goetze, in CAH3 II.2 17; Klengel, Geschichte Syriens II 44–45.
79. See below, nn. 146–47 in this chapter; and compare G. F. del Monte, “Niqmadu di Ugarit e la rivolta di Tette di Nuḫašše (RS 17.334),” OA 22 (1983):221–31 (= a document referring to a revolt that falls somewhere between Shuppiluliuma’s capture of Carchemish and the revolt in Murshili II’s year 7—though not necessarily to be identified with the joint revolt with Kadesh referred to in the Duppi-Teshup treaty: see following note).
80. Favoring this interpretation is its avoidance of the special pleading that the conventional dating requires (e.g., in Waterhouse, “Syria in the Amarna Age,” pp. 138–42) if it is to square a rebellion of Kadesh in the last years of Shuppiluliuma with Aitakama’s survival into the reign of Murshili II.
81. EA 161:46–53. For the chronology see Appendix 7.
82. EA 59:21–24, 29–38 (= Moran, Amarna, p. 232). The crucial passage that mentions Hatti is obscure (ibid., p. 233, n. 6), but the hostile intent is clear from the context. A similar interpretation of EA 59 is advanced by Waterhouse, “Syria in the Amarna Age,” pp. 135–37, although he dates the letter—incorrectly, in my opinion—to Aziru’s final shift of allegiance towards Hatti.
officer, and he would have to reassure the Egyptian court repeatedly of his loyalty and good faith. Amurru, in truth, was not yet ready to stake its future on the Hittites, who retired by the end of the year, leaving behind them a vacuum for Egypt to fill. Faced with a resurgence of Egyptian interest in Syria, Aziru found it prudent to slide back into his old alliance. The pharaoh accepted his excuses, probably administering no more than a tart reprimand for having wavered under fire.

Even Egypt's indulgence, however, had limits. Now that the pharaoh's government was convinced of Aitakama's disloyalty, it could be persuaded more easily that his attacks on the pharaoh's vassals in Upe served the interests of his new masters, the Hittites. His present behavior, once interpreted as proceeding from the subjection of Kadesh during the "Great Syrian" campaign, led to the inevitable conclusion that Aitakama was a vassal who had revolted. Faced with so grave a challenge to its authority, the empire had to pursue a military solution. In letters written during the later stages of the war in Upe, we hear that an Egyptian force was expected imminently in Syria. Arsawuya of Ruḥizzi, one of Aitakama's "partners in crime," was ordered to cooperate with the invading force and leapt at the opportunity to distance himself from his overbearing neighbor: "Let the archers of the king and his commissioners come here, for I have prepared everything, and I shall follow them everywhere there is war against the king, my lord. We shall capture them! We shall deliver into the hands of the king, our lord, his enemies!"

Beirut, where Rib-Addi was still in exile following his expulsion from Byblos, was also preparing for the army's arrival. Amurru, on the western border of Kadesh, must have figured in any plans for a campaign inland, but Aziru's recent behavior would have complicated matters. Egypt had been an indulgent overlord during his ascent, when it appeared that he might organize Amurru in his suzerain's interests. Now, with the pharaoh's alienation from Aitakama and the chilling of relations with Hatti, the ruler of Amurru found himself obliged to account for his seeming ingratitude. EA 162, addressed to Aziru by an unnamed king of Egypt, fairly bristles with indignation. Why, Aziru is asked, has he presumed to negotiate with the deposed ruler of Byblos without informing his suzerain? And why, especially, has he remained friendly with, and even helped, Aitakama, a man from whom the king of Egypt had turned away? Aziru had been under suspicion for some time, since this same letter reveals that one year previously he had been ordered to present himself in Egypt for questioning but had received, at his own request, a year's grace. Now he was to come immediately, or send his son as a hostage.

83. EA 164-167.
84. EA 191 (= Moran, Amarna, p. 430).
86. EA 162:1–21 (= Moran, Amarna, p. 399).
87. EA 162:22–29 (= Moran, Amarna, p. 400); compare EA 140:20–30, where Rib-Addi's treacherous brother, Ilirabih, accuses Aziru of cooperating with Aitakama against the pharaoh's interests.
88. EA 162:42–54. Helck, Beziehungen², pp. 178–79, dates most of Aziru's activities with Aitakama, as well as his temporizing over the rebuilding of Šumur, to the period following Aziru's return from Egypt. This would be a plausible placement for some of the letters: e.g., EA 159–161 (letters that deal with the rebuilding of Šumur, which is not mentioned in EA 162) or 164–167 (containing Aziru's repeated appeals for a delay in his command appearance in Egypt—which, however, is mentioned in the pharaoh's letter). This last is a minor stumbling block to Helck's dating, and the case becomes even less convincing when it touches Aziru's involvement with Aitakama—particularly since this is the one thing Aziru is called upon to renounce. Unless we are to assume that the Amarna archive
the tone of EA 162, however, it is clear that the prince of Amurru would eventually have to answer for his conduct in person.

Aziru's position was grave, and one wonders if he would have placed himself so totally at the Egyptians' mercy if submission to Hatti had been a viable alternative. The Hittites' engagement on other borders of their empire, however, left Egypt with the advantage in Syria. Moreover, even if Aziru managed to involve the Hittites afresh, his change of allegiance would turn Amurru into a battle ground for the superpowers. Far preferable was to take his chances on a gamble he might hope to win: placing himself in the hands of the pharaoh, even when the case against him seemed blackest, could vindicate his claims of good faith and safeguard the house of Abdi-Ashirta's winnings. In the end, for whatever reason, Aziru did as he was told, and in his absence two of his brothers, Ba'aluya and Beti-ilu, ruled Amurru in his place.

It was probably during Aziru's captivity in Egypt that the Egyptians launched their assault on Kadesh. This war, as with other military activities during the Amarna period, is sparsely documented. Fragments of battle scenes preserved on talatat-sized blocks from Karnak, Luxor, and Medamud have been attributed to Amenhotep IV's early reign, but the evidence is inconclusive. Only one scene in this small corpus can be shown to refer to the heretic—and this is not itself a battle scene, but a composition that shows Amenhotep IV in his chariot, entering a temple (as the accompanying text tells us) to perform a sacrifice. The only bellicose note here is struck, not by anything in the scene itself—for the armed guard is a normal part of the royal entourage—but by a tableau on the jamb of the gate through which the royal chariot enters the temple: this feature, when intact, was shown in unusual detail, decorated with registers of scenes; and on the only one preserved here the king is shown slaying an Asiatic prisoner. This motif, while it does accompany records of actual military activity, is not limited to this

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contains demands for Aziru to present himself in Egypt on two separate occasions, it seems best to date his and Aitakama's war with Biriawaza before the writing of EA 162, which in turn predates Aziru's journey to Egypt. Aziru was already master in Sumur when he received EA 162; but it is unclear whether this letter precedes or follows the group (EA 159–161) in which Aziru is urged to rebuild the city.

89. The pharaoh's letter (EA 162:30–41) intimates as much.
90. See below, nn. 111–13 in this chapter.
91. EA 140:22–24; compare EA 169.
92. A. R. Schulman maintains that these scenes refer to the first of two wars fought with the Hittites under Akhenaten: the first occurring around year 4 (and involving the recapture of Sumur from Abdi-Ashirta); and the second in year 15 (= the first "Amki affair"). For the chronological issues see Appendix 7. For the epigraphic evidence, noted in preliminary discussions by Schulman in JARCE 3 (1964):53–54, and in idem, "'Ankhesenamun, Nofretity and the Amka Affair," JARCE 15 (1978):45–46, see now the extended discussion in idem, ATP II 53–79.
94. Comparanda in reliefs from Akhenaten's reign are scarce, since buildings are rarely drawn on a such large scale; compare, however, the representations of the gateways to the temples at Karnak and Luxor in the Opet Festival reliefs (see previous note).
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environment, however, and its relevance to the case for a Hittite war in the Karnak reliefs of Amenhotep IV is consequently nil. As for the other blocks inscribed with battle reliefs, there are now reasons for thinking that they belonged to a dismantled temple of Tutankhamun. The Amarna letters, also, fail to provide anything concrete about the war itself, and it might even be doubted that the promise of a force from Egypt, mentioned in a number of contemporary letters (see above), was ever kept.

Subsequent events described in the Amarna archive suggest, however, that an Egyptian attack on Kadesh had taken place, and that it had failed. EA 170, written jointly by Aziru's two brothers and addressed to him in Egypt, recounts how Hittite troops, led by a commander named Lupakku, had entered the country of 'Amki—Egyptian territory—and taken its cities. Meanwhile, another Hittite force under its own commander, Zitana, has allegedly entered 'Amki with 90,000 troops, and an attack on Amurru is now expected from Nuhašše as well as from 'Amki itself—although the truth of this report must be verified; but Aziru is assured that Béti-ilu will be sent against the invader, whether he enters Nuhašše or not. An Egyptian attack on Kadesh is the most logical catalyst for this development, especially since another clutch of letters reveals that the Hittites had been joined in raiding the pharaoh's possessions by "the man of Kadesh," Aïtaka—previously conciliatory, but now openly hostile to his former overlords. The involvement of Hittite troops and the pattern of their activities are significant as

96. E.g., J. D. Cooney, Amarna Reliefs from Hermopolis (Brooklyn, 1965), pp. 81–83; and compare again the barges in the Opet Festival reliefs from Luxor (see n. 93 above).
97. Compare, otherwise, Schulman in ATP II, p. 56.
99. The independence of action shown by the writers of EA 170 is more consistent with their presumed status as regents in Aziru's absence than as subordinate field commanders, operating under Aziru himself: see Waterhouse, "Syria in the Amarna Age," p. 153 (n. 73). The political environment of the letter also seems closer to that of EA 169 (surely written when Aziru was in Egypt) than to the rest of Aziru's dossier; and for the rest, the form and contents of the letter are better suited to Aziru as its recipient than to the king of Egypt, as was pointed out long ago by Otto Weber, in Knudtzon, Die El-Amarna Tafeln II 1273. Compare Klengel, Geschichte Syriens II 279–83; Campbell, Chronology of the Amarna Letters, p. 61; Moran, Amarna, p. 411 (n. 1); and M. Dietrich and O. Loretz, "Der Amarna-Brief VAB 2, 170," in Beiträge zur Alten Geschichte und deren Nachleben I, eds. R. and H. E. Stiehl (Berlin, 1969) pp. 14–23.
101. Schulman, JARCE 15 (1978):45, gives the figure as "9,000"; but the text actually says "9 (x) 10,000," i.e., "90,000" (thus Moran, Amarna, p. 410; and see the re-edition of EA 170 by Dietrich and Loretz referred to in n. 99 above).
103. See EA 189, and nn. 56–60 above.
well. Years later, when Shuppiluliuma would order a second raid on Egyptian possessions in “Amki,\textsuperscript{104} it would be prompted by another Egyptian attempt to regain Kadesh; and it would not be all-out war, but a limited retaliatory gesture. It is virtually certain that this earlier raid was made under the same conditions, since, as we see below, neither of these episodes was regarded as having broken the formal state of peace that had existed between Egypt and Hatti before they had locked horns in Syria.\textsuperscript{105} Even so, this episode marks a turning point in the relationship of the two superpowers. Efforts to head off confrontation in Syria had failed, first over Shutatarra’s unexpected refractoriness during the “Great Syrian” campaign, and next with the Egyptians’ isolation of Aitakama. These developments, in hindsight, seem all too predictable, for the Hittites’ invasion of Upe—even in a Mitannian sector—was bound to make Egypt nervous, and Shuppiluliuma, to achieve his objectives, had been forced to put down an Egyptian vassal. The Hittites’ ambivalence over Kadesh—initially respecting Egypt’s sovereignty, unwilling to unleash total war to hold onto it, yet also loath to see it ranged against them—may have been unrealistic in practice, but it indicates some interest in reaching an accommodation that was compatible with their new suzerainty over Mitanni’s former vassals. The anomalous position of Kadesh—forced to be friendly with both superpowers—was, ultimately, something that the pharaoh was unwilling to tolerate. The measures taken to restore full Egyptian authority over her revolted province were not only military, but diplomatic. In removing Aziru,\textsuperscript{106} and leaving his country to a caretaker government, the pharaoh sent a message to other “over-mighty subjects” and reduced the likelihood of Amurru’s defection into the Hittite camp in the event of an Egyptian failure inland.

Amurru’s loyalty to Egypt at this juncture was only prudent. Deprived of its most effective leader, the kingdom built by the sons of Abdi-Ashirta also faced an unprecedented challenge from its neighbors. Aziru’s brothers complain in particular about the Sutu people and the “kings” of Nuḥašše, who had begun making inroads on Amurru on the pretext that Aziru’s brothers had sold him into captivity and he would not return.\textsuperscript{107} Former friends such as Ilirabiḫ of Byblos also wrote denunciations to the pharaoh.\textsuperscript{108} The absence of the ruling strongman, in other words, appeared to signal the breakup of the state he had created, and its enemies were now free to hasten its demise. At about the same time, moreover, Hittite forces appeared on Amurru’s eastern border. The alleged total, 90,000 troops, is manifestly derived from a report that required verification, and Aziru’s brothers had everything to gain by seeking to alarm the Egyptians. Even so, the recent hostility of Nuḥašše and its affiliation with Hatti (shored up, despite earlier wavering, by the presence of Hittite troops) might suggest to Aziru’s brothers and their suzerain that a serious attack was imminent. That scenario is not implausible. Amurru’s neighbors already knew what the kingdom could do under united leadership. Aziru’s absence now gave them the opportunity they needed to undo his work. Hatti might be drawn in by the plausible bogeyman of an Amurru in league with Egypt and aligned against Hittite vassals who were already under pressure from Biriawaza. Aziru’s relapse into the Egyptians’ service had

\textsuperscript{104} The number and dating of Hittite raids in ‘Amki has generated much controversy: see below, n. 113 of this chapter, and compare Appendix 7.

\textsuperscript{105} See below, nn. 163–70.

\textsuperscript{106} For Aziru’s stay in Egypt, see in general Klengel, Geschichte Syriens II 279–85.

\textsuperscript{107} EA 169:16–39.

\textsuperscript{108} EA 139–140.
already defined him as a “rebel” to Hatti. Now that he was a virtual prisoner in Egypt, it was only logical to discount still further the effectiveness he might have had as a Hittite agent in Syria. To move against Amurru now, before the Egyptians could decide whether to depose Aziru or back him up, suited both the Hittites’ and their vassals’ immediate aims. Both Egypt and Hatti, in fact, were to be persuaded that their own best interests lay in giving these Syrian princes what they wanted. On one front, Amurru’s only effective leader would be branded as a traitor and would meet his death in Egypt. On the other, a coalition of Hittites and Syrian princes would join to remove Amurru’s capacity to threaten them. The house of Abdi-Ashirta might well have seemed on its way to an irretrievable defeat.

Amurru, however, was not to fall so easily. Her enemies’ expectations would be disappointed, in the end, by the Hittites’ unwillingness to antagonize Egypt any further. Moreover, there was already in Egypt a body of opinion that saw Aziru as a useful strongman, one who could be encouraged to look after Egyptian imperial interests if allowed to pursue his own. This self-interest, it is true, also made him suspect—but to what degree? This was the decision which the Hittites’ raid on ‘Amki now forced on the pharaoh and his advisers. To get rid of Aziru would oblige Egypt to interfere directly in Amurru, to extend her military establishment beyond its preferred limits with unpredictable results—perhaps even the breakup of Amurru and still more defections to Hatti. To trust Aziru was to gamble on the one man who had shown himself resourceful enough to unite Amurru under his rule. Egypt chose Aziru. If the pharaoh meant to enjoy the advantages of relying on a powerful proxy, he now had little choice but to countenance a strong kingdom of Amurru. And Aziru, now that Hatti was in league with his enemies, had every reason to ally himself with a power whose interests marched with his own. Aziru’s return to Amurru signals the triumph of a faction that believed Egypt could achieve her imperial goals by encouraging local dynasties, investing her own resources only as they seemed to be needed. This policy, however, could be applied successfully only if Egypt possessed a military establishment strong enough, and a military presence in Syria itself that was sufficiently credible, to compel obedience. Only the current reality of this premise made it possible for the Egyptians to allow Aziru’s return, since otherwise it is hard to see how he could be kept from defecting at once to the Hittites. Amurru’s continued loyalty was hostage, moreover, not only to Egypt’s military commitment to Syria, but to the Hittites’ ability to match it. The pharaoh’s decision to trust Aziru makes the best sense if Egypt were still the preponderant power in Syria. Once Hatti could command a solid power base in northern Syria, however, the independence that Egypt had allowed Aziru in her own interest would make it possible for him to change sides once again.

109. Following the interpretation of Klengel, Geschichte Syriens II 279–85; and for the chronology of these events, see Appendix 7 below.

110. This seems more plausible (as noted by Klengel, Geschichte Syriens II 288–93) than the model required by the alleged identity of the ‘Amki campaign in EA 170 with the raid mentioned in the “Deeds of Shuppiluliuma,” which would have Aziru passing from his captivity in Egypt directly into the Hittite camp (thus, for example, Waterhouse, “Syria in the Amarna Age,” pp. 132–39).
The next time the superpowers clashed, it was again over Kadesh. The Egyptians had never accepted the loss of their vassal, but they had made little headway since their first unsuccessful effort to recover it. The situation in Syria during this interval is poorly documented, and only from the posthumous “Deeds of Shuppiluliuma,” in the section that describes the beginning of the six-year “Hurrian war” near the end of Shuppiluliuma’s reign, is it possible to infer anything about it. What is clear, however, is that the Hittites had still not managed to absorb all of the countries that had earlier belonged to Mitanni. At least one major entity, Carchemish, remained defiantly independent, and there were also Hurrian powers (perhaps the “kings” mentioned in the letter that Akizzi of Qatna had sent some years earlier to Akhenaten) who also resisted the Hittites in northern Syria. The leisureliness of the Hittites’ progress in tightening their hold on this region was probably due to more pressing threats to their security: in the “Deeds” the renewed activity in Syria came at the end of at least two years during which Shuppiluliuma was engaged on his other borders in Anatolia. At the start of the third year, while Shuppiluliuma was still at home, his son Telepinu—called “the Priest” in this narrative—inflicted a defeat on a horde of tribal troops, presumably somewhere in the area of the upper Euphrates. As a result, “all the countries of Arziya and Carchemish made peace with him, and the town of Murmuriga made peace with him (too).” Only the urban center of Carchemish now held out against the Hittites, so Telepinu left a garrison in Murmuriga and returned to Hatti to report to his father. In his absence, however, a Hurrian force stronger than the Hittite garrison came and surrounded Murmuriga; and at about the same time, “to the country of Kinza (= Kadesh), which my father had conquered, troops and chariots of Egypt came and attacked the country of Kinza.”

On hearing of the trapped army’s plight, Shuppiluliuma mobilized his home forces and marched south. In Tegarama, the army split into two parts. One wing, led by the crown prince Arnuwanda and another commander named Zita, moved into Hurrian territory, where it eventually met and defeated the enemy. After waiting in Tegarama to cut off any stragglers, Shuppiluliuma proceeded with the rest of the army to reduce Carchemish for once and for all. The Egyptian raid on Kadesh, however, had not been forgotten. Shortly after entering the country of Carchemish, Shuppiluliuma again ordered a retaliatory raid on Egyptian territory in Amki: the expedition this time was led by Lupakku and another officer, Tarḫunta-Zalma, and in due course they “brought deportees, cattle, and sheep” before the king. In the meantime, Shuppiluliuma prepared to besiege Carchemish. The Hittites, it appeared, were ready at last to bring northern Syria under their control.

111. While it is difficult to derive a clear sequence of events or a continuous narrative from the surviving portions, the beginning of the period falls on a single fragment, the best preserved section of the entire text, so that the ordering of the various episodes in this part, at least, is not in doubt: see Güterbock, JCS 10 (1956):90–98 (= Fragment 28) for what follows.

112. See above, n. 52.

Meanwhile, when news of the attack on 'Amki reached the Egyptians, the “Deeds” recalls, they were afraid. “And since, in addition, their lord Nipkhururiya\textsuperscript{114} had (recently) died, therefore, the queen of Egypt, who was Daḥamunzu,\textsuperscript{115} sent a messenger to my father, and wrote to him.” Her proposal—so extraordinary that an astounded Shuppiluliuma exclaimed to his council, “Such a thing has never happened to me in my entire life!”—was that the king of Hatti send one of his many sons to marry the queen of Egypt. The prospect of an unprecedented Hittite sphere of influence, stretching from the Halys and the Euphrates to the Nile, was seemingly within reach. Still, hidden risks might lurk even in such an offer. To gain time and more abundant information Shuppiluliuma sent his chamberlain to Egypt, ostensibly to discuss the queen’s proposal, but with secret orders to discover whether Nipkhururiya had indeed died childless, as was being maintained.\textsuperscript{116}

During that mission to Egypt, Carchemish fell to the Hittites after a short siege, and Shuppiluliuma proceeded to a drastic reorganization of the machinery of the Hittite empire. Its main weakness, to date, had been the apparent inconstancy of its military presence in Syria. Few troops had been left behind as garrisons, probably because they could not be spared from their posts on Hatti’s other borders. Their absence, however, had diminished the effectiveness of Hittite suzerainty over Mitanni’s former vassals: allies who had submitted to Hatti when her armies were near waivered, and Hatti’s enemies in Egypt and the Hurri-land were encouraged. Southern Anatolia was too far a base from which to maintain a watch on northern Syria. Accordingly, Shuppiluliuma placed two important centers in Syria under the direct rule of his sons. Telepinu was moved from his previous post in Kumanni and designated king of Aleppo, while another son, Piyaššili (also called by the Hurrian name of Shari-Kushuh), was made king of Carchemish.\textsuperscript{117} This solution, elegant in its avoidance of the expensive and wasteful option of permanently committing troops from the Hittite homeland to the south, would serve the empire well for more than a century.

These arrangements concluded, Shuppiluliuma returned to Hatti for the winter. In the spring, the Hittite envoy returned from Egypt, bringing with him an Egyptian negotiator, Hani,\textsuperscript{118}

\textsuperscript{114} Surely “Nebkheprure” (= Tutankhamun); see Appendix 7, n. 120.

\textsuperscript{115} In Egyptian, \textit{t3 hmt-nswt}, “the wife of the king”; see W. Federn, “Daḥamunzu (KBo V 6 iii 8),” \textit{JCS} 14 (1960):33.


\textsuperscript{117} KBo VI 28, obv. 6–25 (= Kitchen, \textit{Suppiluliuma and the Amarna Pharaohs}, p. 51); and see Appendix 5 below.

\textsuperscript{118} Probably the same man who is mentioned in the Amarna letters (EA 161:11–34 and EA 162:55–77), where he is referred to as the “king’s messenger” (\textit{wpwty-nswt}). On the name, see Albright, \textit{JNES} 5 (1946):11 (9*).
and another letter from the queen. The official account in the “Deeds of Shuppiluliuma” portrays the Egyptians as being humiliated by their mission and irritated at the suspicion the Hittites’ caution implied. Nonetheless, they repeated their offer, and their indignant protestations of good faith were evidently backed up by the intelligence the Hittite king’s agents had picked up in Egypt, for Shuppiluliuma “complied with the word of the woman and concerned himself with the matter of a son.”

This, in truth, was a major concession by Egypt, which in former times had proudly rejected the king of Babylon’s request for the hand of a princess with the words, “Since forever, no daughter of Egypt has been given to anyone!” Even more, a son of Shuppiluliuma would now ascend the throne of Egypt. It is difficult to say how this entry of a foreigner into the pharaoh’s divine kingship would have been formalized in Egypt. Oracular decisions had been used to legitimate irregular claimants in the past (e.g., Hatshepsut), and it is possible that a similar performance was contemplated in this instance as well.

The Hittite prince may even have been the pharaonic title of “king’s son” in advance of his departure for Egypt. His “reign,” in any case, never even began, for he died in Egyptian hands. His death marked the end of the accord with Egypt, since Shuppiluliuma chose to interpret the news in the worst possible light:

[When] they brought this tablet, they spoke thus: [“The people of Egypt (?)] killed [Zannanza] and brought word; ‘Zannanza [died (?)!’” And when] my father he[ard] of the slaying of Zannanza, he began to lament for [Zanna]nza [and] to the god[s ...] he spoke [th]us: “O gods! I did [no e]vil, [yet] the people of Egy[pt]d[id [this to me], and they (also) [attacked] the frontier of my country!”

Relations between Egypt and Hatti, not surprisingly, took a sharp turn for the worse. Shuppiluliuma

let his anger run away with him, he went to war against Egypt and attacked Egypt. He smote the foot soldiers and the charioteers of the country of Egypt.

The Hattian Storm-god, my lord, by his decision even then let my father (=

121. This was expected on the Hittite side: see fragment 28 of the “Deeds,” A iii 49 (“Maybe ... they do not want a son for kingship!”), A iv 11–2 (“To me he will be husband, but in Egypt he will be king.” = Güterbock, JCS 10 [1956]:96–97).
123. If Liverani is correct (“Zannanza,” SMEA 14 [1971]:161–62), the prince was referred to in the “Deeds of Shuppiluliuma,” not by his name, but as “king’s son” (Zannanza = s3-nswt ) in Egyptian (compare n. 115 above).
124. Fragment 31 of the “Deeds” (Güterbock, JCS 10 [1956]:107–08).
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Shuppiluliuma) prevail; he vanquished and smote the foot soldiers and the charioteers of the country of Egypt.\textsuperscript{125}

We shall probably never know the exact circumstances of Zannanza's death and the situation in Egypt that had led to it. Shuppiluliuma himself believed his son had been murdered, and his conviction would be enshrined thereafter in official records. Even many years later, when Murshili II was to acknowledge that the Hittites had themselves committed the first violation of their oath with Egypt by twice invading 'Amki, he could still say, "when my father gave them one of his sons, they killed him even as they led him there (= to Egypt)."\textsuperscript{126} Although reservations have sometimes been raised,\textsuperscript{127} most historians seem to have accepted the Hittite side of the case, which is that Zannanza was murdered by a faction of Egyptians who opposed his marriage to the queen of Egypt.\textsuperscript{128}

Further light on this episode is shed by what remains of another document that seems to be a draft of a letter in which a Hittite king—almost certainly Shuppiluliuma—complains to a king of Egypt regarding the death of his son.\textsuperscript{129} Although the very poor preservation of this tablet makes a consecutive translation impossible, the general sense of a number of passages can be inferred by careful study of the text. Since, to my knowledge, the contents of this document have not been fully utilized by any previous writer from the Egyptological side of ancient studies,\textsuperscript{130} it seems worthwhile to discuss its implications in some detail.

The tablet is inscribed on both sides, with individual sections set off from one another by horizontal dividing lines. The contents of these "paragraphs," in summary, appear to be as follows:

\textit{Obverse}

1–7 The writer recalls his victories over the Kashka people;

8–15 and his victories over the Hurrians, including the conquest of Carchemish.

\textsuperscript{125} ANET\textsuperscript{3}, p. 395.

\textsuperscript{126} Preceding the passage quoted above (n. 125); and compare the source cited in n. 124.

\textsuperscript{127} Helck, \textit{Beziehungen}\textsuperscript{2}, p. 182.

\textsuperscript{128} See most recently Jan Assmann, "Krieg und Frieden im alten Ägypten: Ramses II. und die Schlacht bei Kadesch," \textit{Mannheimer Forum} 83/84 (1983–84):185–87, 228, who argues that a "war party" in Egypt—the army—was responsible for assassinating Zannanza and for pushing Egypt into a bellicose policy from which it was only extricated by Ramesses II's peace treaty with Hatti.

\textsuperscript{129} KUB XIX 20; partly translated by E. Forrer, \textit{Forschungen} II.1 (Berlin, 1926), pp. 28–30; it has now been republished by A. Hagenbuchner, \textit{Die Korrespondenz der Hethiter} II, Texte der Hethiter 16 (Heidelberg, 1989), pp. 304–09. This document, written in Hittite, is a draft for a final version that would have been translated into Akkadian before it was sent. Although the names of both the addressee and the sender are lost, it is generally ascribed to Shuppiluliuma I, writing under the circumstances described (e.g., Güterbock, \textit{RHA} 66 [1960]:57 and n. 2; Goetze, "Pestgebete," pp. 211, 247; Hagenbuchner, \textit{Korrespondenz} II 308). I am grateful to staff of The Oriental Institute Hittite Dictionary Project, The University of Chicago, for making available a new transcription and the translation, on which these comments are based; and I am indebted to Silvin Košak and especially Richard Beal for bibliography and advice on the translation.

\textsuperscript{130} Although a summary of its contents, apparently based on Forrer's translation, is given by Spalinger, \textit{BES} 1 (1979):78–79.
16–23 A badly broken passage: the writer mentions his son in the first line, then goes on to emphasize his ignorance of certain matters (obv. 16–17, 21). On the fourth line it is possible to read, “You, the king of Egypt (?) continually write.” The following line (obv. 20) again mentions the writer’s son in a broken passage that also contains a verb meaning “to interrogate” or “to ask a question.” The whole paragraph thus seems to refer to previous messages that involved the writer’s son.

24–28 Only the opening of the paragraph is preserved: “[Concerning what you wrote, ‘Your son died ...’]” Damage to the lower part of the tablet reduces the rest to incoherence.

Reverse

1–2 (The bottom of a paragraph:) “[... I held [...]]”

3–11 An argumentative passage. Starting with line 4 it is possible to read, “[... but on account of the death of Zannanza you have written ... My son [I had] sent to you [... he held as being guilty [...] but because my son [...]” (rev. 4–7). In the following lines the writer continues to blame the addressee for an injury despite the latter’s (implied) denials: “... since there was formerly no [bloodshed [...] to do [X] is not right. With (or By?) bloodshed they [...] now even if mine [...] you did [X] and you even killed my son ...” (rev. 8–11).

12–20 The writer then rebuffs what he appears to take as a veiled threat from the addressee, and he submits his case before the Hittite gods: “[... troops and] horses you continually extol. Since I will [...] the troops [...] and encampments. For me, [however, shall come] my lord [...] and the sun goddess of Arinna, my lady, the queen of the lands. It will happen [...] my lord], and the sun goddess of Arinna will judge this. [...] you have said much, in heaven [...] as important (or big) as a pitturi (= functionary?) [...] because we will make it” (rev. 12–18). The paragraph ends with an obscure metaphorical allusion, the gist of which may be that the addressee is more involved in murderous activities than he cares to admit: “it does [...] because a falcon [kills (?) a chick (?) [...] a falcon alone does not hunt” (rev. 19–20).131

21–27 To the addressee’s charge that he would only be looking for a fight, the writer replies that his opponent should bring his case before the gods: “[As for what you have] written [to me], ‘If you come for brawling, I shall be towards you [...]’ you should take (it) away to the Storm-god, my lord [...] and after my [...], who after my death?” (rev. 21–24). The paragraph closes with another apparent challenge: “those who reject [him (?)] for lordship, let them do [...], those who went before you [...]” (rev. 25–27).132

131. The last two lines are translated as questions (used as proverbs) by L. M. Mascheroni, “Il modulo interrogativo in eteo-III: Usi argomentativi,” in Studi orientalistici in ricordo di Franco Pintore, p. 134, as follows: “But what does a falcon [do (?)] with a single chick? [...] is not a falcon by itself [sufficient for] hunting?” (I am grateful to Richard Beal for calling this reference to my attention.)

132. Presumably referring to the Egyptians’ rejection of Zannanza and the (unfavorable) judgment that is expected from the royal ancestors in Egypt.
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28–34 In this badly broken paragraph, with its allusions to "brotherhood" between the two parties, the writer apparently rejects the addressee's overtures: "For brotherhood you are writing, [... but should] I make [brotherhood] against [you]? [... where] for should I write [to you] for brotherhood?"

35–36 Of this paragraph, only one word in the first line, "nothing" (or "no way"), can be read; the rest of the document is destroyed.

Even from these mangled remains, it is clear that KUB XIX 20 is a reply to the letter from Egypt that announced the Hittite prince's death. At least part of the contents of that missive can be reconstructed as follows:

a. "Your son died" (obv. 24)—a very neutral statement! It is left to Shuppiluliuma to raise the question of murder (rev. 11, "and you even killed my son").

b. "[Troops and] horses you continually extol" (rev. 12). This is probably to be seen as an ironic reference to the Egyptian king's customary statement of his own well-being, before he proceeds to wish well on his correspondent's person, family, and possessions. It is not likely to have been the genteel sort of threat that occasionally closes the king of Egypt's letters to his vassals.

c. The king of Egypt disputed the moral force of whatever action Shuppiluliuma might take against him (rev. 21–22, "You would come for brawling ..."), perhaps justifying himself before a divine tribunal (rev. 16, "you have said much, in heaven ...”). Since the first of these passages is obviously a response to a previous threat of force, it follows that this was at least the second letter sent by Shuppiluliuma to Egypt after Zannanza died.

d. Although the pertinent passage (rev. 28–34) is poorly preserved, it appears that the Egyptian king suggested that he and Shuppiluliuma maintain diplomatic relations: thus the references to "brotherhood," which characterizes the condition of two rulers who enjoyed equal status with one another.

KUB XIX 20 is consistent with the remaining Hittite sources for this episode, which also portray Shuppiluliuma as being convinced of the Egyptians' perfidy and aggression. Yet the tone

133. Compare above, n. 124.

134. Compare EA 1:6–9, EA 5:9–12, EA 31:1–6 (all from Amenhotep III to kings in Babylon and Arzawa), and EA 35:1–5 (the king of Alashiya to the king of Egypt). In most other examples of the "royal" letters, the greeting formula is abbreviated, omitting statements regarding the sender's well-being and going on directly to the good wishes expressed for the addressee.

135. E.g., EA 99:21–26: "And you should know that the king is as well as the sun in the sky, (and) the warriors (and) their chariots are very well"; compare EA 162:78–81.

136. For this, see the royal letters from El-Amarna, passim. For an explicit rejection of this status by a Hittite king, writing angrily to an Assyrian, see KUB XXIII 102, in E. Forrer, Reallexikon der Assyriologie I 262–63, with partial translations by Goetze, in CAH3 II.2 258, and by K. A. Kitchen, Pharaoh Triumphant: The Life and Times of Ramesses II, King of Egypt (Warminster, 1982), pp. 63–64.
of the Egyptian letter, insofar as one can reconstruct it from the reply, was far from belligerent. The pharaoh—most probably Ay—was polite and even conciliatory. Although charged with Zannanza’s murder (which is also implied, perhaps, by Shuppiluliuma’s obscure allusion to the hunting of a falcon in KUB XIX 20, rev. 19–20), he maintained simply that the young man “died.” The charge of Egyptian aggression (made in the passage of the “Deeds” quoted above) is similarly “old business.” Since none of the sources indicate that Zannanza’s death was followed by an immediate Egyptian attack on Hittite possessions, the alleged attack on Shuppiluliuma’s frontiers probably refers to the unsuccessful Egyptian raid on Kadesh. The pharaoh, in fact, seems to have tempered any threat of force in his letter by appealing for a continuation of that “brotherhood” which, until now, had existed between the kings of Hatti and Egypt. His overtures were rejected by Shuppiluliuma, who is presented in the “Deeds” as having mistrusted the Egyptians’ motives throughout the entire affair of the Egyptian queen.

Scholars have generally taken this episode at Shuppiluliuma’s valuation of it, and with some reason. Tutankhamun was the last viable member of the Eighteenth Dynasty’s royal family. His death raised the possibility that the next pharaoh might come from the ranks of the army and the civil service. The queen implied as much in both of her letters to Shuppiluliuma, and this would indeed come to pass, in the persons of Horemheb and Ramesses I, if not Ay himself. Given these conditions, we cannot expect wide support for Ankhesenamun’s plan to continue the dynasty by marrying a male of comparably royal status, and the son of a foreign arch-enemy to boot. It is quite credible that opponents of this policy, once they had failed to prevent it, would resort to murder, in which case the Hittites’ reaction would force the government into the very policy the dissidents favored. Yet the official reaction from Egypt—not at all a defiant one—raises doubts, and the truth could be far simpler. When Shuppiluliuma “let his anger run away with him” and attacked Egyptian territory, he brought back prisoners

137. See Kühne, Chronologie, p. 14, n. 63. Shuppiluliuma died at the end of the six-year Hurrian war, i.e., about one and one half to two and one-half years following the outbreak of the plague that the Egyptian prisoners of war brought to Hatti, see Houwink ten Cate, “Mursilis’ Northwestern Campaigns—A Commentary,” Anatolica 1 (1967):58. Since Ay reigned into his fourth year (Urk. IV 2110 bottom), i.e., a minimum of three full years following the death of Tutankhamun (= Nipkhururiya), his death and Shuppiluliuma’s should fall within a short time of one another. Since KUB XIX 20 treats the events with some immediacy, it is hard to escape the conclusion that the addressee was the direct successor of Tutankhamun, Ay himself, rather than Ay’s successor, Horemheb. It is unlikely that the addressee would be the Egyptian queen herself (as suggested by Hagenbuchner, Korrespondenz, p. 308), even if she did claim the throne in Egypt (see Krauss, Ende der Amarnazeit, passim), for Shuppiluliuma would hardly have recognized this self-promotion from someone he otherwise regarded merely as “king’s wife.”

138. I see no justification for Spalinger’s statement (“The Northern Wars of Seti I: An Integrative Study,” JARCE 16 [1979]:39) that “the letter ends by indicating more peaceful relations between the two powers.” The passage to which I assume he refers (rev. 28–34) is admittedly broken, but the context of what precedes, no less than the attitude found in the rest of the official tradition, seems to favor the belligerent attitude I have assumed here.

139. See Appendix 7, n. 114.

who were infected with a plague that would still be rampant in Hatti some twenty years later. Shuppiluliuma and Arnuwanda, his crown prince, both died of it: why not also Zannanza?

Very little is known about the war that ensued. A fragmentary passage in the “Deeds” mentions that Shuppiluliuma “[sent forth] my (i.e., Murshili II’s) brother [Arnuw]anda, [and he (= Arn.)] went ahead [to] Egypt.” At least a temporary Hittite victory is implied by the reference to Egyptian captives in Murshili II’s Plague Prayers. In the end, however, the war had no enduring impact on the fortunes of the two empires in Syria. Its most important casualty was the peace initiative between Egypt and Hatti. So long as it lasted, Egypt had been ready to recognize the new balance of power in Syria. More than that, they had offered to seal the pact, at the start of a new dynasty, with the union of the Hittite and Egyptian royal houses. It is fruitless to speculate whether this arrangement would have lasted, or whether the functionaries who made up the government in Egypt would have allowed the new dynasty to subordinate itself to the Hittites in the same way that the cadet dynasties in Aleppo and Carchemish did. The alliance could have normalized relations between the two powers, however, and it might have formed the basis for an entente cordiale, such as Egypt had maintained with Mitanni and would eventually resume with Hatti. Zannanza’s death, and Shuppiluliuma’s hysterical reaction to it, put an end to that possibility for another three generations.

By this time, certainly, if not before, Shuppiluliuma had also received for a second time the submission of his fair-weather friend of old, that weathercock of the fortunes of empire, Aziru. Hatti’s growing power in northern Syria, and Egypt’s military fecklessness, had finally forced this decision on the king of Amurru. Having come “out of the door of Egypt” as a champion of the pharaoh’s interests in Syria, Aziru now abandoned his military service to the pharaoh. The path of least resistance now led to Hatti, and in return for this additional buffer zone at the southern end of his empire, Shuppiluliuma could overlook any past sins. Aziru thus entered into a long and honorable career as a Hittite vassal. Kadesh and Amurru now stood together in allegiance to Hatti, blocking any Egyptian revanche into the territories she had formerly claimed as her own. Self-interest had led Aziru and Aitakama both to go their separate ways as their overlords’ proxies in Syria. Self-interest now led them to join forces, for the Hittites and against Egypt. The tail, in effect, had wagged the dog. This would not be the last.

141. Goetze, Kleinasiatische Forschungen 1 (1930): passim; compare ANET3, p. 395. For this plague and its scope, see Helck, Beziehungen2, p. 183, and Campbell, Chronology of the Amarna Letters, p. 89 and n. 56.

142. Güterbock, JCS 10 (1956):111 (Fragment 36). The reference to “chariots” in a subsequent, regrettably broken passage, suggests that the crown prince’s mission was warlike. Having engaged the Hurrians at the relief of Murmuriga during the first year of the Hurrian war, he was no stranger to combat, and (pace Spalinger, JARCE 16 [1979]:39-40) it seems most improbable that his father would send another son—and such an important one—on a diplomatic mission in Egypt so soon after Zannanza’s death.

143. On the date, see H. Klengel, “Aziru von Amurru und seine Rolle in der Geschichte der Amarnazeit,” MIO 10 (1964):80, and H. Freydank, “Eine hethitische Fassung des Vertrages zwischen dem Hethiter-König Śuppiluliuma und Aziru von Amurru,” MIO 7 (1959-60):378-79. Amurru is possibly mentioned on Fragment 31 of the “Deeds of Shuppiluliuma,” immediately before the death of Zannanza became known (Güterbock, JCS 10 [1956]:107, with nn. a and 5 to the text), but the passage is too damaged to show whether it was affiliated with Hatti by this time.

144. Klengel, Geschichte Syriens II 206 and 240 (nn. 109-10).
time that Kadesh and Amurru changed sides; and their movements would continue to carry with
them, as before, the delicate balance of harmony and strife between the Hittite and Egyptian
empires.

The death of Shuppiluliuma and the onset of the plague in Anatolia blunted, but did not end,
hostilities with Egypt. In the seventh year of Murshili II (a close contemporary of pharaoh
Horemheb), when Nuḫḫaššu rebelled against the Hittites, Egyptian troops threatened Kadesh, but
were apparently forced to retire. Once again, Egypt had failed to recover her lost provinces,
and her later policy in that area continued to be ineffectual. When Nuḫḫaššu revolted again in
Murshili’s ninth year, this time with the support of Kadesh, Egypt seems not to have been
involved. A major offensive against the Hittite empire during Horemheb’s reign has been
inferred, however, from a controversial inscription, carved onto the rim of a stone libation vessel
that was first seen in the shop of a Cairo antiquities dealer in 1973 and has been sighted in
Europe since then:

Regnal year 16 under the Majesty of the Lord of the Two Lands (nb-t3wy),
Horunemheb (sic), the ruler; corresponding to his first campaign of victory, starting
from Byblos (and) ending at the land of the vile chief of Carchemish ...

There are strong reasons, however, for doubting that this text is authentic. Anomalies in its
composition do not inspire confidence, and the case for authenticity dies if the bowl on which

146. Goetze, Annalen des Muršiliš, pp. 80–87. This event would have fallen in about the tenth year of
Horemheb, if (as argued in n. 137 above) Murshili II and Ay came to the throne at roughly the same
time. For the length of Murshili’s reign, see Goetze, CAH³ II.2 126–27; though compare the
somewhat lower figure suggested by Houwink ten Cate, Anatolica 1 (1967):56–59.
147. Spalinger, BES 1 (1979):56–68. For the documentary evidence, see J. Friedrich, Staatsverträge des
Hatti-Reiches in hethitischer Sprache I, MVAG 31.1 (Leipzig, 1926), pp. 5–9; Weidner,
Politische Dokumente aus Kleinasien, pp. 78–89 = ANET³, p. 203 (treaty of Murshili II with
Duppi-Teshup of Amurru); compare Klengel in MIO 10 (1964):81–83, and idem, “Der Schiedspruch
des Murshili hinsichtlich Barga und seine Übereinkunft mit Duppi-Tesup von Amurru (KBo III 3),”
Helck, Historisch-Biographische Texte der 2. Zwischenzeit und Neue Texte der 18. Dynastie,
149. E.g., the sequence of names and titles: nb t3wy is normally followed by the first, not the second
cartouche; and the spelling of the king’s name, Hr-n-m-hb, is odd, given the omission of the god’s
name that stands at the top of the cartouche in all other examples. The proper reading of the full
name as “Horemheb-Merenamun” has been convincingly demonstrated (see K. C. Seele, “Hawrân-
em-hab or Haremhab?,” JNES 4 [1945]:234–39), and it should not be set aside lightly on the basis of
one suspect example. A recent attempt to interpret the red crown above the Horus-falcon’s back as a
sportive m-h(b) (J.-M. Kruchten, “Que vient faire la couronne de la Basse Egypte dans le second
cartouche d’Horemheb?,” GM 35 [1979]:25–30) is not persuasive. The proper reading (as a simple
variant of n, chosen because a tall sign fit better over the back of the falcon than the flat wavy-n) can
now be demonstrated from contemporary hieroglyphic examples on the northern gateway into the
processional colonnade at the Luxor temple (to be published by the Epigraphic Survey). See J. von
discussion.
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it is inscribed does indeed belong to a period after the New Kingdom. More recent articles have tended to accept the validity of the inscription’s contents even while admitting that it is a modern forgery. While Horemheb may well have fought such a war in Western Asia, this evidence cannot prove it. In fact, there is almost no evidence for contact of any kind between the two superpowers in Egyptian records contemporary with Horemheb and Ramesses I. Given the silence of the Hittite sources after Murshili’s seventh year, moreover, there is no reason to believe that active hostilities continued beyond this point. Perhaps they did. Silence, with such fragmentary sources, means nothing. In any case, the outcome was not to Egypt’s advantage, since she conspicuously failed to reconquer Kadesh and Amurru during this time.

The very silence that hangs over Egypt’s later dealings with Hatti could lend itself, however, to still another interpretation: the resumption of diplomatic relations. For, indeed, relations between the two nations were resumed and were ratified by treaty. This was not the first nor the last time that the two empires would come to terms in this way; but in approaching the situation between Egypt and Hatti at the start of Sety I’s reign we must deal both with the dating and the number of agreements that preceded the enduring treaty they made under Ramesses II. This question is discussed briefly in the following section.

EARLY TREATIES BETWEEN EGYPT AND HATTI

Toward the close of his wedding negotiations with the envoys of the Egyptian queen, Shuppiluliuma asked for the tablet of the treaty again, (in which there was told) how formerly the Storm-god took the people of Kurushtama, sons of Hatti, and carried them to Egypt and made them Egyptians; and how the Storm-god concluded a treaty between the countries of Egypt and Hatti, and how they were continuously friendly with each other. And when they had read aloud the

151. For instance, Redford, “A Head-smitting Scene from the 10th Pylon,” in Fs. Brunner, pp. 363–64 (n. 3), 370–71 (n. 22), argues that the text was copied from a genuine source; and he cites with approval the suggestion of Schulman, JRCE 15 (1978):46–47, that Horemheb might have fought this campaign as a military officer under Akhenaten or one of his immediate successors, and that the dateline is one of Horemheb’s “ambitious distortions,” by which he redated events that fell before his accession to an artificially long reign. (Thus also Pitard, Ancient Damascus, pp. 74–75 with n. 94.)
152. The complex question of the treatment of the Amarna pharaohs by their successors is outside the scope of the present discussion. It should be noted, however, that the locus classicus for Horemheb’s inflated year-numbers is the dateline “regnal year 59” cited in a tomb chapel of the Ramesside age (see G. A. Gaballa, The Memphite Tomb-Chapel of Mose [Warminster, 1977], passim), and that there is no evidence for such a practice at any time before the Nineteenth Dynasty.
153. Nor do the alabaster fragments, inscribed with Horemheb’s name, that were found at Ugarit (Liverani, Storia di Ugarit, pp. 61–62), since we do not know how or when they ended up there. An Egyptian army was indeed active in Western Asia during Murshili II’s seventh year (not his ninth, as stated—no doubt in a slip of the pen—by Liverani, JAOS 109 [1989]:505); but Murshili’s “Annals” suggest that its operations, and eventual defeat, took place on the borders of Nutašše (see n. 146 above), and there is no way of proving that it got any closer to Carchemish on this occasion.
tablet before them, my father then addressed them thus: “Of old, Hattusha and Egypt were friendly with each other, and now this, too, on our behalf, has taken place between [them]! Thus Hatti and Egypt will continuously be friendly with each other!”

This same agreement is referred to in the second of Murshili II’s Plague Prayers, which recalls:

when the Hattian Storm-god had brought people of Kurushtama to the country of Egypt and had made an agreement concerning them with the Hattians so that they were under oath to the Hattian Storm-god—although the Hattians as well as the Egyptians were under oath to the Hattian Storm-god, the Hattians ignored their obligations; the Hattians promptly broke the oath of the gods. My father (i.e., Shuppiluliuma) sent foot soldiers and charioteers who attacked the country of ‘Amka, Egyptian territory. Again he sent troops, and again they attacked it. When the Egyptians became frightened, they asked outright for one of his sons …

The document to which these passages refer is the earliest known treaty between Egypt and Hatti. Only fragments of tablets containing the original text have come down to us, but (with help from later references to it, as in the two passages quoted above) its contents can be reconstructed as follows:

1. Hittite subjects from northern Anatolia were transferred to Egyptian territory and placed under the authority of the king of Egypt. The reason is not specified in any source, but since Kurushtama had belonged intermittently to the Hittites’ Kashkan enemies we may speculate that the Hittite conquerors might have removed a percentage of the native population to make way for new settlers belonging to their own people. If so, these deportees might also have served a double purpose when they were presented to the Egyptians to use in their Asiatic possessions, if not in the Nile Valley itself.

154. Adapted from Güterbock, JCS 10 (1956):98.
155. Adapted from ANET², p. 395.
158. Following Schulman, ATP II 67, with n. 144 (p. 79) on the use of exported Kashkan slaves in other parts of the Near East.
2. Unspecified stipulations concerning the borders of Egyptian and Hittite territory were made.¹⁵⁹

Scholars are divided on the date of this “Kurushtama treaty.” Linguistic considerations, which seem at first to support an early date, are inconclusive. Archaisms in the language of the extant fragments could support a date as early as the Hittite Middle Kingdom,¹⁶⁰ but they might also run into the first part of the reign of Shuppiluliuma I himself.¹⁶¹ Following a recent exegesis of one of Murshili II’s later references to this document, however, it seems most likely that the Kurushtama treaty was made under a king who preceded Shuppiluliuma on the throne of Hatti.¹⁶² The most logical occasion for such an arrangement would be when Egyptian conquests in Syria had created a common border with Hatti, i.e., the reigns of Amenhotep II or Thutmose IV, when the Egyptian empire reached its furthest extension in northern Syria.

It is highly significant that, from Shuppiluliuma’s point of view, this old treaty was still in force when he had it read to the Egyptian queen’s envoys.¹⁶³ Why else, indeed, would it have been relevant at that time? Much later, in the reign of Shuppiluliuma’s son, there would arise a revisionist interpretation,¹⁶⁴ by which the treaty was regarded as having been effectively broken by the Hittites’ first invasion of ‘Amki. This, however, was clearly not the spirit in which this document was presented during the wedding negotiations. Whatever formal instruments there were to ratify Zannanza’s engagement to the queen of Egypt, there is no reason to believe they superseded that treaty.¹⁶⁵ The importance of this distinction will be clearer in the light of our

¹⁵⁹. Not preserved on any of the fragments of the text, but mentioned in a later document in which Murshili II refers to the contents of the treaty: Sürenhagen, Staatsverträge, pp. 31–33. I am not convinced by Schulman’s arguments (ATP II 67–68) which assume that these were unfavorable terms forced on the Hittites by Egypt, nor by Sürenhagen’s case that the existence of clauses, similar to those in the later treaty between Ramesses II and Hattushili III, guaranteed the royal succession (Staatsverträge, pp. 56–63).


¹⁶². Sürenhagen, Staatsverträge, pp. 11–13 (= text of CTH 379 referring to contents of treaty), 19 (with n. 14, where the writer distinguishes between what happened under his father, Shuppiluliuma, and more remote events—including this treaty—that occurred “earlier” under “whichever kings there were”), and pp. 37–38.


¹⁶⁵. Spalinger, BES 1 (1979):76, has based his suggestion of a fresh treaty at this time on fragments 29–30 of the “Deeds” (Güterbock, JCS 10 [1956]:107). This seems doubtful. The wedding, as Shuppiluliuma explains, is something in addition to, not superseding, the previous agreement between Egypt and Hatti. By themselves, moreover, these passages of the “Deeds” are too broken to
only other evidence for treaties made between Egypt and Hatti before Ramesses II—namely, a passage in the Egyptian hieroglyphic version of the treaty between Ramesses II and Hattushili III:166

As for the treaty (nt-  mty)167 that was present (wnw df) in the time of Shuppiluliamma, the Great Prince of Hatti, as well as the treaty that existed (wnw) in the time of Muwatalli, the Great Prince of Hatti, my father,168 I seize hold of it. Behold, Ramessu-Meryamun, the great ruler of Egypt, seizes hold [of it, the peace which he makes (?)] together with us from this day. We seize hold of it, and we act in this agreed fashion (m p3y shr mty).

Two important facts emerge from this overview of the relations leading up to the treaty made by Hattushili III with Ramesses II: first, there had been only two previous treaties between Egypt and Hatti;169 and second, neither one is said to have been enacted by the king under whom it had “existed.”170 Read literally, the text tells us only that they had been in force under those rulers, and thus by implication up until the time they were broken, under Shuppiluliamma and Muwatalli respectively. In other words, the first treaty mentioned here could

prove the case; and the second fragment has been recognized as a duplicate of KBo VII 37, which belongs to the Kurushama treaty; see Kühne, ZA 62 (1972):252-54 (No. 28), and the more recent references in n. 156 above.

166. KRI II 228:1–3. The hieroglyphic text, however, is actually the Hittite version, originally in Akkadian, which was translated into Egyptian after being brought to Egypt on a “tablet of silver”; see, with references to additional bibliography, Spalinger, SAK 9 (1981):299–300, who also maintains that the tablets in Akkadian found at Boghazköy were translated into that language in the Egyptian capital from an Egyptian original (ibid., especially pp. 355–56).

167. See Appendix 1.

168. F. J. Giles, Ikhnaten, Legend and History (London, 1970), p. 195, suggests that “Muwatalli” should be emended here to “Murshili,” who was the actual father of Hattushili III.; compare Sürengahan, Staatsverträge, pp. 27 (= n. 30) and 86, who emends “father” into “brother.” I believe we should accept the text as it stands, understanding jt as “ancestor” (thus frequently in Egyptian, see for now Wb. 1 141:16, and compare Murnane, Ancient Egyptian Coregencies, SAOC 40 [Chicago, 1977], pp. 232–33). The whole question of the use of “father” with relation to past generations is still being studied for publication by Lanny Bell.

169. Sürengahan is perhaps being too literal-minded when he insists (Staatsverträge, pp. 84–86) that only one treaty is referred to in the passage quoted above. The third person singular suffix (.f) that refers back to the treaties in force under Shuppiluliamma and Muwatalli could refer to them individually instead of as a collective (i.e., “I seize hold of it [= each one of them]”); and the earlier reference to an “arrangement” existing from eternity before it was broken under Muwatalli (below, n. 185) is rhetorical, not specific to actual events in the past. While the present treaty might be regarded as merely an extension of the previous arrangements, this is irrelevant to the fact, emphasized by the hieroglyphic text, that relations had been ruptured and renewed twice before.

170. Only Sürengahan (Staatsverträge, pp. 27–28) has drawn the proper conclusions from the text's statement that these agreements only “existed” under the two Hittite rulers named here. Others have assumed that they made these treaties; e.g., Spalinger, BES 1 (1979):87–89; compare idem, SAK 9 (1981):321, 358, n. 93; Schulman, JSSEA 8 (1977–78):117–18. R. O. Faulkner, in “The Wars of Sethos I,” JEA 33 (1947):38, and again in CAH 3 II.2 221, basing himself on this passage, maintained that Muwatalli concluded this treaty with Sety I.
very well be the Kurushtama treaty; for this is the only instrument that was both in force and broken under Shuppiluliuma, and there is no reason to assume that it was omitted from this tally of past treaties between Egypt and Hatti.

The diplomatic implications of this "prehistory"—that the struggle between Egypt and Hatti did not immediately take on the character of total war, and that they maintained relations even while they were jockeying for control over Kadesh—are also consistent with the tone we observe in diplomatic exchanges between Hatti and the Amarna pharaohs. Particularly apposite in this connection is EA 41, written by Shuppiluliuma to a pharaoh he names only as "Khuria." The recipient could be any one of the late Eighteenth Dynasty rulers whose names were formed on the model "(X)-khepru-(Re)." While the letter is generally cordial, the Hittite ruler is clearly piqued. Why, he wants to know, has the new king not sent the customary gifts, as his father had been wont to do? "Nothing, O king, of what your father had formerly spoken did I in any way refuse; and [all] of what I asked of your father did your father in no way deny." Now that "Khuria" has seated himself on the throne of his ancestors, he and Shuppiluliuma should observe the niceties and become good friends. And lest there be any doubt as to what is expected, the Hittite goes on to enumerate a series of expensive presents he desires, before closing with a list of his own gifts—their values pointedly set down—which accompanied this letter to the king of Egypt.

Both the terms of this message and its contents invite closer scrutiny. First, the pharaoh's discourtesy in this matter is not "normal." Diplomacy was personal, between rulers rather than their countries, and the accession of a new king was an occasion for renewing (often in quite


172. Among the possibilities are: (1) Napkhuria = Neferkheprure (= Akhenaten), favored by, inter alia, Weber, in Knudtzon, Die El-Amarna Tafeln II 1092–1093, n. 1; compare Campbell, Chronology of the Amarna Letters, pp. 38–39; (2) Ankkhkheprure (= Nefemefruaten or Smenkhkare), suggested by C. Aldred, Akhenaten, Pharaoh of Egypt (London, 1988), p. 191; (3) Nebkheprure (= Tutankhamun), preferred by, e.g., Houwink ten Cate, Review of Suppiluliuma and the Amarna Pharaohs, by K. A. Kitchen, BiOr 20 (1963):275–76; Kühne, Chronologie, pp. 101–03; (4) Kheperkheprure (= Ay), based on the possible (but very uncertain) reading of the addressee's name at the beginning of EA 16 (Moran, Amarna, p. 108, n. 1); and (5) Djeserkheprure (= Horemheb), who continued to sponsor the cult in the Great Temple of the Aten at El-Amarna during at least part of his reign (as witnessed by fragments of a limestone statue base of his found at the site, see CoA III 12 [26/24, 30, 114–17] and pl. lx, 3, and compare R. Hari, "Quelques remarques sur l'abandon d' Akhetaton," BSEG 9–10 [1984–85]:113–18). The last two seem least likely, since the abandonment of Akhet-Aten by the court (early in Tutankhamun's reign: CoA III 158–60; E. Hornung, Untersuchungen zur Chronologie und Geschichte des Neuen Reichs, AA 11 [Wiesbaden, 1964], pp. 79–94; Krauss, Ende der Amarnazeit, pp. 51–53) should have eliminated any reason for depositing diplomatic correspondence there, even if the site remained partly occupied for some time thereafter (see B. J. Kemp in Amarna Reports I [Cambridge, 1984], pp. 1–13; idem, "The Amarna Workmen's Village in Retrospect," JEA 73 [1974]:41–43; idem, Ancient Egypt: Anatomy of a Civilization [London and New York, 1989], p. 273) and assuming that the king still visited the place.

173. See the references in n. 120 above (= diplomatic marriages, which linked both the royal families and their countries). See also the documents in Edel, "Der Brief des Wesirs Palijara an der Hethiterkönig Ḫattušili und verwandte Keilschriftbriefe," NA WG 4 (1978):120–58; and compare EA 20:14–17: "Now, this year, I will send the wife of my brother ... On that day, Ḫanigalbat and Egypt will be as [one]!"; and EA 24:II, 71–72: "I am the k[ing] of the land of Egypt, and my brother is k[ing] of the Hurrian land!" (both from Tushratta to Amenhotep III during marriage negotiations; Moran, Amarna,
fulsome terms) the ties that had linked his predecessor with his fellow rulers. Nor is it customary to refer to a royal correspondent by his nickname. In Egypt, to be sure, the pharaoh's subjects might employ this colloquial usage with no disrespect, but this was hardly suitable in a more formal environment, and the conventions of royal correspondence in the ancient Near East were very formal indeed. Third, in the salutation of EA 41, Shuppiluliuma employs a form of address—"Thus speaks Writer... Tell Recipient..."—that is at variance with the more usual form that is encountered in the royal letters ("Tell Recipient... Thus speaks Writer..."'). Its similarity to the sequence most frequently used by vassals to their overlords ("<Say> to the king... Message of Writer...") is striking, and it is tempting to view it as an implied insult. Indeed, in another letter to the pharaoh, a king of Hatti—doubtless Shuppiluliuma—complains that his correspondent has taken precisely this high-handed manner towards him. The same sequence, it must be admitted, occurs in other royal letters, but so rarely that one is inclined to take it more seriously than the comparatively frequent reversal of the usual

174. See EA 6, 15–16, 17, 26–27 (on which see further in Appendix 7), and 33.
176. Medinet Habu VIII 636 (note well, not in a solemn ritual context, but in an address uttered by court ladies to the king).
177. See Moran, Amarna, pp. 28–33, for a brief discussion of the conventions, with references.
178. EA 1–3, 6–12, 15–17, 18–21, 23–24, 26–29, 33, 35, 37–40, and 44 (which are practically all the royal letters in the Amarna archive).
179. See, for convenience, Moran, Amarna, pp. 215–568 (= most of the vassal letters, see ibid., pp. 39–41 for the conventions).
180. EA 42 (= Moran, Amarna, pp. 212–13).
181. EA 5 (from Amenhotep III to Kadashman-Enlil I of Babylon), 31 (from the king of Alashiya to the pharaoh), and EA 34 (Amenhotep III to the king of Arzawa).
182. But how was it meant to be received? EA 34 is addressed to a ruler whose rank was arguably lower than the pharaoh's, but the same cannot be said for EA 5 (to the king of Babylon). Since the contents of EA 5 are innocuous, one might interpret the salutation as a careless discourtesy, reflecting no more than the triumphalist attitudes, commonplace in Egyptian inscriptions, that sometimes grated on the pharaoh's correspondents (see EA 4:4–22 [= ibid., pp. 68–69]; and compare Frandsen, "Egyptian Imperialism," pp. 185–87 [nn. 49–50]). To be consistent, however, we must stretch the strand of speculation even further by assuming, in the case of EA 34, that the king of Alashiya is addressing the pharaoh in the same high-handed fashion that had been adopted with him in a previous letter, now lost. This clearly will not do. The ranking that may be implicit in a number of these salutations (see Moran, Amarna, pp. 28–29 with references, especially E. Salonen, Die Gruss- und Höflichkeitsformeln in Babylonisch-Assyrischen Briefen, Studia Orientalia 38 [Helsinki, 1967], p. 63) may not apply in all cases; and in Hittite documents the conventions were apparently different (Moran, ibid., pp. 211 [= n. 1], 213 [= n. 3]; compare J. Nougayrol, "Textes suméro-accadiens des archives et bibliothèques privées d'Ugarit," Ugaritica 5 = Mission de Ras Shamra 16 [Paris, 1968], p. 67). Perhaps the greater acceptability of this variant form (as witnessed by its use in the vassal letters [= below, n. 183] and its increasing frequency at Ugarit [= Salonen, Gruss- und Höflichkeitsformeln, p. 62]) was recognized more slowly in royal correspondence.
EGYPT'S RELATIONS WITH HATTI

sequence in vassal letters. If the salutation of EA 41 is couched in a form that is less polite than the norm—one that the Hittite king found objectionable when the pharaoh had applied it to him—it might well follow that the use of the nickname "Khuria" was also somewhat less than courteous. The pharaoh's full name would not be a secret from the Hittite chancery, and a more light-hearted jocularity seems to be ruled out by the irritation that this letter's message barely conceals. If so, the recipient might not be Akhenaten (whose accession fell before the "Great Syrian" campaign) but one of the later Amarna pharaohs, who assumed power when relations with the Hittites were more strained. In any case, EA 41 illustrates the "cold war" that prevailed between Egypt and Hatti until events brought about a complete break in relations.

The second treaty, "which had existed in the time of Muwatalli," is a shadowy affair. In an earlier passage of Ramesses II's treaty (before the reference to the two earlier agreements), its immediate antecedents are described as follows:

now from the beginning of the limits of eternity, as for the situation of the great ruler of Egypt with the Great Prince of Hatti, the god did not permit hostility to occur between them by means of an arrangement (nt-‘). But in the time of Muwatalli, the Great Prince of Hatti, my brother, he fought with [...], the great ruler of Egypt. But hereafter, from this day, behold, Hattushili, the Great Prince of Hatti, [is under] an arrangement ... in order not to permit hostility to occur between them forever.

It is a pity that the name of Muwatalli's opponent has been broken away, since the Hittite king could be alluding either to his well-known encounter with Ramesses II or to some earlier struggle. Nonetheless, whether he is telescoping the past or not, the clear implication of these words is that the present treaty takes the place of that earlier "arrangement" that had been broken when Muwatalli went to war with Egypt. By default, this must be the second treaty, said to have been "in the time of Muwatalli." The text neither excludes nor proves that this treaty was made by Muwatalli, as has been said above; but the fact that an "arrangement" is said here to have been broken under Muwatalli and (by implication) not mended until the time of Hattushili III lends greater credibility to the interpretation I have proposed, i.e., that the treaties regarded as having been in force until they were broken, under Shuppiluliuma and Muwatalli, respectively.

If Muwatalli himself made (as well as broke) the second treaty, this must have happened early in his reign, since it will be clear from what follows that it cannot have been in effect between the later reign of Sety I and the Battle of Kadesh in the fifth year of his son. There is, however, no serious reason why it could not have been contracted earlier, e.g., by Murshili II

184. See Appendix 7.
186. S. Langdon and Gardiner, in JEA 6 (1920):187, and Wilson, in ANET, p. 199, restore Ramesses II's nomen in the lacuna; but could the royal name have been Sety's?
187. See Chapter 3 below.
and Horemheb. Their last known clash took place in the Hittite king’s seventh year, and while this alone is hardly strong argument for peace, there is indirect evidence for a cooling of the animosity between them. The Second Plague Prayer of Murshili II, composed twenty years after the outbreak of the epidemic that spread to Hatti as a result of the war with Egypt, contains an acknowledgment of the Hittites’ guilt towards Egypt. The intent, to be sure, was penitential, not diplomatic, nor are these strictly historical records. We cannot know whether the attitudes they express had any effect on Hatti’s foreign relations. Yet, surely, such attitudes did not exist in a vacuum. Murshili’s determination of his father’s guilt came only at the end of a long process, as noted in the other prayers. The gods to whom the sin was acknowledged were the same gods who acted as guarantors to Hittite treaties. Such treaties, moreover, were regarded as being oaths to the gods as well as between the contracting parties; and divine “judgments” on such matters were believed to take place within the course of human history. Formal acknowledgment of Hittite war guilt would have removed religious and also emotional barriers to peace, even if it did not lead automatically to a new treaty with Egypt. The fact remains, moreover, that the second treaty—which (according to Hattushili III) had existed in the time of Muwatalli—can be ascribed only to Muwatalli himself or to his immediate predecessor, Murshili II. These limits suggest that we are dealing with an event that followed the crisis over the plague in Hatti, which took place in the middle third of Murshili II’s reign. Egyptian contemporaries of Murshili II and the younger Muwatalli are reduced to three: Horemheb, Ramesses I, and the younger Sety I. In any case, whoever contracted this treaty, it is likely to have been in force by the early years of the Nineteenth Dynasty. This is a probability we must keep in mind when we examine the foreign policy of Sety I in Asia.

189. Thus, quite properly, Spalinger, BES 1 (1979):83–86. In cuneiform sources, a hostile Egypt is frequently mentioned (e.g., del Monte, “Muršili II e l’Egitto,” Fs. Bresciani, pp. 161–67; Kestemont, “Le traité entre Mursil II de Hatti et Niqmepa d’Ugarit,” UF 6 (1974):99–103), but not in dated contexts, and in a generalizing fashion (along with other enemy powers) that leaves open the extent to which this hostility was active.
CHAPTER 2

SETY I'S EARLY WARS IN WESTERN ASIA

With the accession of Sety I, the darkness that surrounds Egypt’s foreign relations during the reign of Horemheb suddenly lifts. An imposing series of reliefs, carved on the exterior walls at the north end of the Great Hypostyle Hall at Karnak, provide a framework for the other monuments that commemorate the king’s foreign victories. It has long been recognized that the Karnak reliefs are our most important source for the wars of Sety I. Disagreements still persist, however, on the sequence of individual campaigns and on the scope of Egyptian strategy. The reexamination of the evidence that accompanied the Epigraphic Survey’s recopying of these well-known scenes is thus timely. The discovery of new data and rethinking of old questions led us in a number of cases to a new assessment of the historical situation that bears on Egyptian policy in Western Asia at the start of the Nineteenth Dynasty.

Much of what follows may be viewed as a commentary to the publication of the battle reliefs by the Epigraphic Survey.1 For the reader’s orientation, the war scenes fall into two groups, lying east and west of the central doorway into the Great Hypostyle Hall, as follows:

<table>
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<th>Eastern group</th>
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<th>Campaign against the Shasu, dated to Sety’s first regnal year.2</th>
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<td></td>
<td>Second register</td>
<td>The Yenoam campaign.3</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Third register</td>
<td>Another campaign, mostly destroyed.4</td>
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<td>Western group</td>
<td>Bottom register</td>
<td>The Hittite campaign.5</td>
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2. Ibid., pls. 2–8. Both the datelines (referring to Sety’s first regnal year) and the general usage in narrative sequences carved on the walls of Egyptian monuments suggest that this is the first register of battle reliefs to be read; see G. A. Gaballa, *Narrative in Egyptian Art* (Mainz, 1976), pp. 103–04.
3. Ibid., pls. 9–14.
4. See ibid., pl. 14 (top) for the few fragments that remain.
5. Ibid., pls. 33–36 (see Chapter 3 below).
6. Ibid., pls. 27–32 (see Appendix 4 below).
7. Ibid., pls. 22–26 (see Chapter 3 below).
THE ROAD TO KADESH

The eastern group is discussed in this chapter, leaving the scenes to the west of the doorway for later sections of this book.8

THE SHASU WAR

Sometime in Sety's first regnal year, a messenger "came to tell His Majesty: 'The Shasu enemies are plotting rebellion! Their tribal leaders are gathered in one place, standing on the foothills of Khor, and they are engaged in turmoil and uproar. Each one of them is killing his fellow. They do not consider the laws of the palace.'" 9 Both the circumstances of these troubles and their locality are worth noting. Although "Khor" is an unsatisfyingly general term for Palestine and Syria,10 the pictorial record of the reliefs is more specific. One battle, at least, took place along the military road from Egypt to Palestine, between the border fortress of Tcharu and a city that has been plausibly identified as Raphia11 (see Map 2, p. 50). The war is defined, moreover, as "the devas[cat]ion that the energetic forearm of Pharaoh ... made against the Shasu enemies, from the fortress of Tcharu to the Canaan,"12 a claim borne out by the second battle scene, which is located near "a town (or the town?) of Canaan"—possibly Gaza.13 These specifications all point to a little war, fought along the "Ways of Horus" and into southern Palestine.14


9. Ibid., pl. 6:3–9.

10. Beginning at the Egyptian border, Khor can extend as far north as the country of Upe; see Gardiner, AEOI 181*:83*; compare Helck, Beziehungen5, pp. 269–70.

11. See Reliefs IV, pls. 4–6. Regarding the identification of the town on pl. 4:21, see Gardiner, JEA 6 (1920):113.

12. Ibid., pl. 3:1–5.

13. Ibid., pl. 3:14; compare Gardiner, JEA 6 (1920):100. The idea that the city represents Gaza was first suggested by Faulkner, JEA 33 (1947):35–36. In this he is followed by Helck, Beziehungen5, p. 196 (although wrongly translating our pl. 3:4–5 as "von der Festung Sile bis zur Stadt [sic] P3-K3n'n"). This identification is also accepted by Giveon, Les Bédouins Shosou des documents égyptiens, Documenta et Monumenta Orientis Antiqui (Leiden, 1971), p. 57 (2), although he argues (ibid., pp. 58–59) that the topography of the city as shown in the Egyptian relief is at variance with the true environs of Gaza. See also Spalinger, JARCE 16 (1979):44, n. 9; and H. J. Katzenstein, "Gaza in the Egyptian Texts of the New Kingdom," JAOS 102 (1982):111–14.

The political environment of the war is also intriguing, for the violence of the wretched Shasu was directed, not against the Egyptians, but one another. The prevalence of "turmoil and uproar" despite the presence of the Shasu tribal leaders "gathered in one place," suggests a state of internecine feuding which these chiefs were powerless to control. What mattered to the Egyptians, though, was the effect these troubles had on communications between Egypt and Palestine, since it is noted that "(as for) the hills of the rebels, they could not be passed on account of the Shasu enemies who were attacking [him] (= i.e., the king)." The terrain that the Shasu had rendered impassable would be the hilly country bordering the main highway between Egypt and Asia, lying south of this road as far as Raphia and following the coastal plain northeast into Palestine. Problems with Shasu marauders had been perennial in southern Palestine, and they would continue to exist under Ramesses II. This is not surprising. Unruliness in a nomadic, pastoral people, living in uneasy balance with the settled Asiatics of the coastal plains, was not unusual in the ancient Near East. To the Egyptians, the Shasu were probably irritating rather than formidable. The disruption of the overland route, with its attendant threat to commercial and military operations in Egypt's Asiatic empire, however, would have been enough to involve the Egyptians in restoring order. A situation of this sort might also explain the curious interpolation of settled Asiatic chieftains—carefully distinguished from the Shasu—who pay homage to a triumphant Sety I as he stands on his chariot. At first glance it would seem that these chieftains are defeated enemies, for in the text above the scene, the king is said to have caused "the chieftains of Khor to cease all the boasting of their mouths." The tribute of ornamental vases that appears in this scene, moreover, is surely the same booty that will be presented to Amun at the end of the campaign, when the king is said to be returning from "the foreign land of Retchenu the vile, the chiefs of foreign countries being living captives, their tribute on their backs, consisting of every precious vase of their countries, (and of) silver, gold and gen[ue] lapis lazuli." Had the archaeological evidence for the nature, dating, and uses of these installations is discussed by E. Oren, "The Ways of Horus" in A. F. Rainey, ed., Egypt, Israel and Sinai (Tel Aviv, 1987), pp. 69–119.

15. Reliefs IV, pl. 6:7–8.


17. Reliefs IV, pl. 5:11–14.


19. For the relevant passages, see the convenient collection in Giveon, Bédouins Shosou, pp. 125–30.


24. Reliefs IV, pl. 4.

25. Ibid., pl. 8:2–6.
princes of the Palestinian towns encouraged the Shasu in their marauding? This seems doubtful, if only because of the bad relations that normally existed between settled communities and their seminomadic neighbors in this part of the Middle East. The wording of the tribute list, rather, reflects a standard phraseology, and not current events. Moreover, while the prisoners who are led before Amun in the tribute scene at the end of the Shasu war originally included both settled Asiatics and Shasu, the former were all recarved into Shasu for the final version of the scene. In other words, the truth that this sequence of reliefs was finally meant to convey is that the Shasu, and the Shasu alone, were Egypt's enemies on this occasion—the prisoners being described only as “[the booty which His Majesty brought away, consisting of Shasu whom His Majesty] himself [destroyed] in regnal year one of the Repeater of Births,” i.e., Sety I himself.

As for the alleged boastfulness of the chieftains of Khor, this is couched in the customary language of Egyptian triumphalism and need not reflect any real hostility between them and Egypt. Given the nature of the trouble that the Shasu caused on this occasion, however, one wonders whether the tribute of the Asiatic chiefs should be regarded as some kind of payment—a baksheesh?—presented to the king once he had restored peace to the area.

**WAR(S) IN PALESTINE AND SYRIA**

The Palestinian campaign in the second register was no doubt described in rhetorical terms that are similar to those used for the war against the Shasu. The loss of the second register’s upper courses, and most of the inscriptions, is partially made up by a victory stela from the town of Beth Shan that sheds light on at least one phase of this campaign:

Regnal year one, third month of the third season (= III $m$, day 10 ... On this day, one came to tell His Majesty, “The vile foe that is in the town of Hammath has gathered unto himself many people and has seized the town of Beth Shan and, having joined (?), those of Pella (Phr), does not allow the prince of Rehob to go out.”

26. References to precious vases (hnww) abound in tribute lists of the Eighteenth Dynasty (e.g., *Urk.* IV 665:14, 666:4, 667:7, 668:14, 707:2, 722:4, 733:6); and at least two passages in rhetorical texts that are similar to this one provide tolerably close antecedents to its phrasing (ibid., pp. 759:17, 1685:8–10). The list of precious minerals in our text is also stereotyped, as is the reference to “Retchenu the vile.”

27. See *Reliefs* IV, p. 25, for this revision of the scene in pl. 8.

28. Ibid., pl. 8:21 and p. 26, n. e; and compare n. 71 below.

29. Ibid., pl. 4:8–9.

30. Compare the comments of Spalinger, *JARCE* 16 (1979):36, who agrees that the products ostensibly brought back from the Shasu war would be incongruous as the tribute of such impoverished people.


SETY'S EARLY WARS IN WESTERN ASIA

Then His Majesty sent the first army of Amun, (called) "Powerful of Bows," against the town of Hammath; the first army of Pre, (called) "Abounding in Valor," against the town of Beth Shan; and the first army of Seth, (called) "Mighty of Bows," against the town of Yenoam. After the duration of a day had passed, they were felled through the power of His Majesty.

Two episodes in this war are treated in the Karnak reliefs: the attack on Yenoam, described on the stela, and the submission of the chiefs of the Lebanon, who obediently hew wood in the presence of the king. The relationship of these tableaux is implied in the portrayal of "the town of Qader in the land of Henem," which is set at the right end of the tree-cutting scene, away from the main action in the relief, but adjoining the attack on Yenoam. The doorposts of Qader have been knocked askew, moreover, while those of the unnamed Lebanese town in the upper left-hand corner of the scene have not. Qader is thus ranged more closely with the fighting in Palestine than with the seemingly peaceful activities in the Lebanon. The submission of the Lebanese chiefs appears to be the rhetorical culmination of the war and the reliefs, if only by their silence, imply that Sety went no further at this time.

The further course of Sety's military strategy following the Yenoam campaign was no doubt described in the third register. Unfortunately, this part of the wall is almost completely gone, and none of the war scenes survive—a regrettable loss, for the campaign is impossible to identify on other grounds. As early as his eighth regnal year, Sety fought a war in Nubia that is memorialized on stelae from Sai and Amara West. There is no reason why this war could not have appeared in the third register, although some scholars have argued that the scenes inscribed there should have supplied a logical bridge between the two wars in the registers below and those on the west wing. If so, a likely candidate is the conflict described in the "second" Beth Shan stela. This was a minor disturbance, however, precipitated by the "Apiru of Yarmuth," and quelled two days after Sety detailed a number of men to turn back into the hill country of Djahy. While it is possible that this skirmish occurred on the fringes of a larger war, neither the date nor the circumstances can be defined any further.

33. Reliefs IV, pls. 10 (= Lebanon), 11 (= Yenoam).
34. Ibid., pl. 10:30, 31 (= two towns).
35. Helck, Beziehungen², pp. 192–93, locates Qader south of the Yarmuk river, east of Yenoam; compare J. Simons, The Geographical and Topographical Texts of the Old Testament (Leiden, 1959), p. 558 (references s.v. Gedor). The Lebanese context of pl. 10 need not rule out this placement. If the contrasts noted in the discussion of this scene are significant, Qader might well be ranged with some Palestinian towns that Sety had chastised before his progress into the Lebanon. Also favoring Helck's proposal is the location nearby of Tell es-Shihab, where another of Sety's victory stelae was found; see PM VII 383; KRI I 117; compare Spalinger, JARCE 16 (1979):45, n. 1. For Yenoam itself, see Rainey, "Yeno'am," Tel Aviv 4 (1977):168–74.
36. Sety's stela from Tyre (KRI I 117), which might belong to this or another of his wars, is all but useless, since neither the date nor anything beyond the opening rhetorical flourishes is preserved.
37. See Appendix 4 below.
39. KRI I 15–16; this idea was also mooted by Spalinger, JARCE 16 (1979):32.
Beyond the battle scenes, however, valuable evidence for Sety I's early wars can still be derived from the lists of name-rings in the great triumphal scenes to the east and west of the central doorway through the north wall. Not all of these toponyms reflect the course of Sety's campaigning. All the African names, for instance, were copied from earlier lists of Thutmose III. The two lists of Asiatic toponyms, by contrast, are stereotyped neither in content nor in sequence. Leaving aside for the moment the "first northern list," with its predominantly central Syrian environment, we find significant points of contact between the eastern battle reliefs and the "final northern list" carved beneath king's feet. Some of the names on this list are already attested in connection with the Yenoam campaign, while others (e.g., Uzu and Beth Anath) occur for the first time in lists of this sort. Moreover, since all of these names were deliberately added to these triumph scenes, it would appear that we are dealing, not with a stereotyped mélange of toponyms drawn from earlier sources, but with a conscious effort to depict a historical reality within the framework of a conventionalized genre.

The historicity of the final northern list permits us to reconstruct at least the extent of Sety's early wars in Asia, if not their chronology or precise line of march. The southern limit of the fighting is defined by Raphia, at the western end of the military road from Egypt. First named on the list, however, are toponyms already found in the battle reliefs and the first Beth Shan stela. Another group of names extends north, to the southern edges of the Lebanon, i.e., Acco, Uzu and Tyre on the coast, and Hazor and Beth Anath inland. Interpolated between Acco and Tyre are two localities that lie still further north: Kumidi, east of the Litani river and northwest of Damascus in the Egyptian-held territory of Upe; and Ullaza, on the coast at Nahr el-Barid.

40. Reliefs IV, pls. 15:54*-70* = 17:49*-65*. Previous studies of this list are: Simons, Handbook, pp. 140, 143 (= Lists XIII and XIV); M. Noth, "Die Wege der Pharaonenheere in Palástina und Syrien," ZDPV 60 (1937):210-29; Helck, Beziehungen 2, pp. 192-93; Aharoni, Land of the Bible, pp. 166-68; and Spalinger, JARCE 16 (1979):37-39 (compare KRI 1 29, 32). All these treatments are handicapped, to some extent, by identifications based on apparent mistakes in earlier readings and by the conviction—found to be erroneous on collation—that these Asiatic names were originally part of the great triumph scenes and were suppressed by the palimpsest African names. For the African toponyms as a whole, see Reliefs IV 55, n. a.
41. See the discussion on the recutting of these name-rings on pls. 15 and 17 in Reliefs IV, pp. 49-50 and 59.
42. The relationship of the names in these lists, however, is in dispute. Noth, ZDPV 60 (1937):228-29, maintains that the sequence in which the toponyms occur reflects their position in the day-books of the campaign, and thus Sety's line of march. As modified by Helck, Beziehungen 2, p. 193 (who sees a grouping of more-or-less contiguous places, not an exact itinerary), this would be a reasonable explanation, but it is by no means certain that all these locations figured in a single campaign (see Spalinger, JARCE 16 [1979]:38).
43. Reliefs IV, pls. 15:70* = 17:65*.
44. Pella, Hammath, Beth Shan, Yenoam (ibid., pls. 15:54*-57* = 17:49*-52*), and Qader (ibid., pl. 15:67* = 17:62*). For Qader, see n. 35 above. Its context in the lists is not clear, for the surrounding toponyms cannot be identified with any certainty. Earlier attempts to identify these places—Tu[…]mu, Kermem, and Kertas (ibid., pls. 15:65*, 66*, 68* = 17:60*, 61*, 63*)—are invalidated by defective readings.
45. Ibid., pls. 15:59*, 62*, 63* = 17:54*, 57*, 58*.
46. Ibid., pls. 15:64*, 69* = 17:59*, 64*. 
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south of Šumur, in the kingdom of Amurru. Both of these places lie well beyond the furthest known extent of the Yenoam campaign; and since they belonged, respectively, to the Egyptian and Hittite spheres of influence at the beginning of Sety's reign, their presence in the context of his earlier wars is a tantalizing puzzle. It might be simplest to assume that the contents of this list are not consistently meaningful, and that these two names refer to Sety's later campaign in Amurru. On the other hand, a probe directed at Ullaza, near the southern edge of Amurru, could also make sense in the context of the campaign that formed the "bridge" between Sety's operations in Palestine and his later wars in Syria, i.e., the war that would have been represented on the third register of the east wing at Karnak. This is all speculative, however, and it is by no means the only possible model. The disturbance noted on the second Beth Shan stela, while of local significance, might not have counted as a major war, nor need it have formed part of a wider series of operations. The later campaigns against Kadesh and Amurru do not require any sort of "bridge," especially if they were precipitated (as we shall see) by forces within those countries. The place of Kumidi and Ullaza in the "final northern list," in the end, may reflect no more than their position—as friend and foe respectively—at the north end of what constituted the Egyptian empire near the beginning of Sety's reign.

THE EARLIEST WARS OF THE NINETEENTH DYNASTY

We may now turn to the vexed question of how the campaigns illustrated in these two registers relate to one another. They could be viewed as separate, unrelated wars, but the scholars who have maintained this point of view so far have been defending a minority position. Most commentators tend to see the campaign described in the first Beth Shan stela as part of a larger Palestinian war that directly followed Sety's mopping up of the Shasu. Support for this interpretation has been drawn from the datelines that accompany the main accounts of these actions, for the Shasu campaign, as well as the quelling of Yenoam, Hammath, and Beth Shan, all took place in the first year of Sety's reign. Fortunately, the first Beth Shan stela records not only the year, but also the day of the month, which enables us to place this action towards the end of the regnal year.

If the Shasu campaign were part of the same war, it could be dated sometime in II $\hat{\text{smw}}$, preceding Sety's other operations in Palestine during the next month.

47. Ibid., pls. 15:60*, 61* = 17:55*, 56*. Despite the skepticism of Helck, Beziehungen, p. 192, bottom, I see no objection to identifying Kmd with Kumidi (thus also Simons, Handbook, p. 215, and Gauthier, Dict. géog. V 155-56). The variant spelling Kmst, which Helck prefers (Beziehungen, pp. 130, 550, 560) is attested only in the early lists of Thutmose III, while several later lists have Kmd (Simons, Handbook, pp. 215, 217). For Ullaza's position in Aziru's kingdom see Klengel, Geschichte Syriens II 286.

48. As noted, without comment, by Klengel, Geschichte Syriens III 12.

49. Maintained, at least implicitly, by Meyer, and later by Faulkner, Helck, and Aharoni (for these references see n. 8 in this chapter), as well as by Spalinger (most recently in JARCE 16 [1979]:31, 33, 37, and 43) and Kitchen (Pharaoh Triumphant, pp. 20, 22). The reverse position is defended by Breasted (in BAR III, 123–31, 133, and p. 40, n. c) and Gaballa, Narrative in Egyptian Art, pp. 103–04.

50. The anniversary of Sety I's accession, and thus the day on which the regnal year number changed, took place sometime between III $\hat{\text{smw}}$ 18 and IV $\hat{\text{smw}}$ 23; see Murnane, "The Accession Date of Sethos I," Serapis 3 (1975–76):23–33; compare Spalinger, JSSEA 9 (1979):233–40.
Following this interpretation, Sety would have returned to Egypt near the end of his first regnal year or quite early in his second.

Two further documents, both from the temple of Karnak, may also be pertinent to this question. One of them, the Alabaster stela, dated to II 3ḥt 1 in Sety’s first regnal year, contains some bellicose rhetoric in praise of the king, but it is mostly concerned with its own dedication as a monument inside the temple of Amun. The other stela, from the temple of Ptah that lies north of the Great Hypostyle Hall, is less specifically dated—merely to “regnal year one”—but it contains allusions to the king’s return “from his first campaign of victory” and to his presence at Thebes, perhaps accompanied by captive foreign chiefs. If Sety did indeed visit Thebes during his first year, after returning from a military action (as this document implies), the Alabaster stela could have been dedicated on this occasion too, and its more generalized rhetoric would also refer to Sety’s “first campaign of victory.” This model imposes certain limits, however, on the king’s movements during his accession year. If the campaigns against the Shasu and against Yenoam follow closely on one another, Sety would be obliged to march into Lebanon after III šmwt 10 (the starting date of his activities in Palestine according to the first Beth Shan stela). After asserting his control over the localities mentioned there, he would then have to return to Egypt, sail posthaste up to Thebes, and then return quickly to Memphis, arriving back at his capital no later than IV šmwt 23 (a date on which he is known to have been there, very early in his second regnal year). Two months later, he would return to Thebes once more, to celebrate the Opet Feast. Is this a realistic timetable? As a test, we offer this hypothetical reconstruction of his itinerary, in which a reasonable minimum for the duration of each episode is adhered to as rigorously as possible.

III šmwt 10 (in year one) News of the disturbance by Hammath, Yenoam, and Pella is brought to Sety, who, for the sake of argument, we locate at Megiddo, about two days’ march from the cities named in the stela.

III šmwt 11 Divisions of the Egyptian army are sent against Hammath, Beth Shan, and Yenoam. Let us assume that Sety leaves for Tyre by way of the coastal road on the same day.

III šmwt 13 Sety arrives at Tyre (ca. 45 miles from Megiddo = three days’ march).

52. Ibid., pp. 40–41.
53. For translations of the pertinent passages from both stelae, along with a discussion of the problems of dating them and similar memorials, see Appendix 2.
55. Compare n. 49 above. Sety left Memphis on his way to Thebes on II 3ḥt 1 of his second regnal year (*KRI* I 247:10), in time to arrive for the opening ceremonies of the Opet Feast in the middle of the month; see S. Schott, *Altägyptische Festdaten*, AAWLM 10 (Wiesbaden, 1950), pp. 84–87.
56. For the rate of the army’s daily march and also for the timings of travel between Memphis and Thebes used in the reconstruction, see Appendix 3. The distances cited are based on the maps in Gardiner, *AEO*, and in Helck, *Beziehungen*; and also on John Bartholomew, ed., *The Times Atlas of the World II, South-West Asia and Russia* (London, 1959), and Survey of Israel (Department of Labour), *Atlas of Israel* (Jerusalem and Amsterdam, 1970).
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III šmw 15 Sety leaves Tyre on his way back to Egypt, after having received the submission of the Lebanese princes on the previous day.

III šmw 24 Sety arrives at Gaza (ca. 135 miles from Tyre = ten days' march).57

IV šmw 5 Sety arrives at the Egyptian border town of Tcharu (ca. 141 miles = eleven days' march).58

IV šmw 8 Sety arrives in Memphis (ca. 90 miles = three days' journey).59

IV šmw 9 Sety departs for Thebes in the morning.

IV šmw 21 Sety arrives in Thebes after a journey of thirteen days.60

IV šmw 23 (in regnal year two) Having presented his booty to Amun on the day before, Sety sets out once more for Memphis; note that the change from the first to the second regnal year takes place, at the latest, on this day.

I šmw 4 Sety is in Memphis (the journey north from Thebes optimistically estimated to be of twelve days' duration).61

It is obvious that this timetable does not square with our documentation. On IV šmw 23, the hypothetical day of his departure from Thebes, we know that Sety was already in Memphis. In assuming a bare minimum for the duration of each episode, moreover, this timetable imposes on events a chronological straitjacket that often seems to defy common sense. It posits, for instance, only the least possible time for the northern extension of the campaign. Is this credible? And why should the Egyptians return to Egypt in such haste, with the army tired from campaigning and laden down with its prisoners and spoil? Why, for that matter, would the king feel obliged to make such a lightning visit to Thebes when he was presumably scheduled to go (and in fact did go) some two months later, in time for the Opet Feast? One seeks in vain any plausible reason for the frenetic activity this reconstruction would force upon the participants. On the other hand, if the campaign(s) into Lebanon and Palestine did not form part of Sety's "first campaign of

57. This figure is a minimum. Note that Thutmose III, on his outward march during his first campaign, covered this distance in about 15 days (Urk. IV 648-57).

58. This was apparently the pace of Thutmose III on his first campaign (Urk. IV 647-48), but the distance can be covered more quickly. In A.D. 70, for instance, the Roman army led by Titus reached Gaza on his fifth day's march from Pelusium on the Egyptian border (Josephus, Jewish War 4.658-61). Both Alexander the Great (Arrian, Anabasis 3.1,1) and Ptolemy IV in 217 B.C. (Polybius 5.80,1-3) took a day longer to cover the same terrain. These faster timings presume that the armies moved by forced marches—as, indeed, the circumstances in those cases might warrant. Sety would be under no such pressure on his return journey. Alternatively, Sety could have returned to Egypt by sea, thus shaving some time from this proposed itinerary. This assumption contradicts, however, the circumstantial—hence believable—account of his triumphal return to Tcharu as seen in the battle scenes at Karnak (Reliefs IV, pl. 6).

59. Again, this assumes a rapid pace. In A.D. 70 Titus covered an equivalent distance with his army (from Nicopolis in the Mendesian nome to Pelusium) in three days (Josephus, Jewish War 4.658-61). It is conceivable that Sety could match this speed by leaving the army at the Egyptian border and proceeding to the capital with a smaller party.

60. See Appendix 3.

61. For the minimum possible duration of this trip with a survey of the timings achieved by nineteenth century travelers before the introduction of motorized shipping on the Nile, see Appendix 3.
victory”—and if this honor goes to a separate Shasu campaign that preceded the war at the end of the first regnal year—then the difficulties disappear.

If this model is accepted, Sety’s Shasu war could have taken place either at the very beginning or in the middle of his first year. Is it possible, however, that it occurred even earlier? Already during the lifetime of his father, Ramesses I, Sety appears to have done some campaigning in Western Asia. Regrettably, the description of this fighting is quite vague. In the text of the stela he set up in his father’s memorial chapel at Abydos, Sety recalls,

I [smote] for [him] the lands of the Fenkhu, and I repelled for him the dissidents who were on the uplands. I protected Egypt for him according to his desire ... I gathered his army and caused it to be of a single heart. I sought out the condition of the Two Lands for him, and I performed my deeds of valor in protecting his limbs upon the foreign countries whose names are not known. I acted as a bold and energetic warrior in his presence, so that he would open his eyes to my goodness.62

It is perhaps this campaign that is also mentioned on two stelae, set up by Ramesses I and Sety I respectively, from the temple of Isis at Buhen. The texts are virtually identical, Sety’s decree being in effect a confirmation of the endowment set up by his father. Ramesses I’s stela is dated to II Prt 20 in his second regnal year and opens with the customary acknowledgments of the gods’ favor—“inasmuch as they have given him valor and victory; all lands being gathered with a single heart, praising your Ka; all lands, all foreign countries and the Nine Bows being slain ... ” The details of the new endowments that follow include a reference to “filling his (= the god’s) workhouse with male and female slaves of His Majesty’s capturing.”63 The dateline on Sety’s stela is IV šmw, last day, just over six months after his father’s decree and near the beginning of his own first regnal year.64 The warlike rhetoric is virtually the same as on the earlier monument, and the fighting it implies could also be the same. Might this have been the Shasu campaign? It could be significant that the Buhen stela and perhaps also the stela from the Ptah temple (dedicated after Sety’s “first campaign of victory”) speak of living captives, which seem to have bulked large in the spoil of the Shasu war.65 This, we must admit, is a very tenuous reconstruction. There is no proof, certainly, that the “living captives” who were transferred to Buhen had been captured recently, and nothing at all to show that they were Shasu. If, in spite of these uncertainties, we still choose to assume that all of these documents refer to the same war, it would have been fought at least six months prior to Sety’s formal accession to the throne. The

63. KRI I 2; restorations in the damaged text are made following the similar passages on Sety I’s stela.
64. Ibid., p. 38. The last five lines of Ramesses I’s stela were erased by Sety and recarved with three lines of his own (see Spalinger, JSSEA 9 [1979]:232), perhaps at a date even later than that on his own stela from Buhen. Note that the new lines refer to the “making for him (= Min-Amun of Buhen) a temple like the horizon of heaven” (KRI I 3:2), while Sety I’s own stela speaks only of establishing divine offerings and providing the stela itself (ibid., p. 38:7, 10).
65. See Reliefs IV, pls. 6 and 8, and pp. 24–25. The identity of the Shasu campaign with the war fought under Ramesses I was first suggested by Faulkner (CAH II.2 217).
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datelines in the battle reliefs (all "regnal year one") would thus be artificial, bringing an earlier event into the compass of a new reign. At Karnak, Sety would then have commemorated this victory on his first visit as king, presumably in II 3ht, when the Alabaster stela (and thus also the monument at the Ptah temple) was set up.

On the other hand, there is no compelling reason for absorbing the Shasu war into operations that Sety might have fought under Ramesses I. A campaign against the Shasu in the Gaza Strip (at the south end of the "lands of the Fenkhu") might have taken less than a month to complete, as the timetable outlined above can show. It could have been conducted shortly after Sety's accession and have been over prior to IV šmw 30, when the endowment of the Buhen temple was renewed with a donation of fresh spoils. Alternatively, the Shasu war might have taken place after Sety's return from Thebes, in the latter part of the inundation season. It would thus have nothing to do with the Fenkhu war mentioned on the Buhen stelae, and conceivably nothing associated with the "first campaign of victory" referred to in the stela from the Ptah temple (assuming that this monument was set up at the same time as the Alabaster stela and refers to the Fenkhu war). On the other hand, if Sety's "first campaign of victory" was in fact the Shasu war, and if this campaign took place in the middle of his first regnal year, the Ptah temple stela could have been dedicated as late as the beginning of the harvest season, perhaps in I šmw, when the king might have been in Thebes to celebrate the Festival of Amun or, perhaps, the Min Feast.

None of these alternatives can be proved, for there is no certainty as to when the Shasu campaign was fought, nor is it clear that Sety's "first campaign of victory" refers to his first military venture as king rather than the earlier war he fought as his father's deputy. In any case, whatever the precise date of the Shasu war, it was officially recognized as the first major operation conducted by Sety I, distinguished not only by the datelines in "regnal year one," but also by the ostentatious emphasis on his Two Ladies name, "Repeater of Births," to dignify the start of a new reign.


67. The opening date on the Alabaster stela, II 3ht 1, falls shortly before the Opf Feast (Murnane, "Opf Feast" in LÄIV 574–75); and we know that Sety left Memphis on his way to Thebes on precisely this date during his second regnal year (KRI I 247:10). Ramesses II also attended the Opf Feast during his first regnal year (ibid., II 325:5–6; Murnane, Ancient Egyptian Coregencies, p. 64).

68. Thus also Spalinger, JSSEA 9 (1979):228, and n. 2, citing earlier studies.

69. Schott, Ältestägische Festdaten, pp. 103–05.

70. The stela from Ramesses I's chapel does offer a few hints to the effect that Sety was not yet king when he fought in the Fenkhu lands; e.g., "Let me proclaim what I did in his presence until I began to rule" (nfrty r hq3, j) ; and his valorous actions "so that he (i.e., Ramesses I) would open his eyes to my goodness" (KRI I 111:8). The statement that Sety "tied on his kingship for him thereby like Horus on the throne of Wenennfer" (ibid., p. 111:11) immediately follows the account of the Asiatic war and could suggest that Sety was promoted to the status of joint ruler as a result of his effective leadership. It appears likely that Sety enjoyed at least a brief coregency with his father; see Murnane, Ancient Egyptian Coregencies, pp. 183–84.

71. Perhaps an allusion to Amenemhet I, the most distinguished king of record to have claimed the epithet prior to this; see Gauthier, LdR I 254–62, especially p. 258, xvi; but compare Kruchten, AIP
Viewed as a whole, the earlier wars of Sety I show him engaged in Egypt’s traditional sphere of influence. The king’s activities can be traced through his first regnal year—i.e., the war with the Shasu (presumably fought near the start of the regnal year) and the Yenoam campaign, from Palestine into Lebanon (at its end)—and into the first half of his second, which was apparently spent at home. Thereafter, however, the track becomes fainter. Operations in Upe and at the southern border of Amurru might be inferred from the “final northern list,” as we have seen, but neither the historicity of this campaign nor its placement in the missing register of the Karnak battle reliefs can be regarded as certain. Given the treaty that, to the best of our knowledge, still sustained the armed peace between Egypt and Hatti, we might question whether Sety would have begun hostilities before he had obtained the significant advantage that marked the opening of the next phase in the contest between Egyptians and Hittites in Syria.

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26 (1982):25–26, who sees lunar symbolism here. For the practice of injecting historical allusions into royal names, see K. A. Kitchen, “Aspects of Ramesside Egypt,” in Acts of the First International Congress of Egyptology, October 2–10, 1976, ed. W. F. Reinecke, Schriften zur Geschichte und Kultur 14 (Berlin, 1979), pp. 383–84; idem, “The Titularies of the Ramesside Kings as Expression of their Ideal Kingship,” ASAE 71 (1987):131–41. The phrase Ḟmt-mswt also occurs in a stela of Horemheb, apparently describing one of the conditions that result from the benefactions performed for the gods (Urk. IV 2131:15). A jar label dated to “regnal year one of Ḟmt-mswt” (Yvan Koenig, Catalogue des étiquettes de jarres hiératiques de Deir el-Médineh, fascicle 1, DFIFAO 21.2 [1979], p. 24 and pl. 14 [no. 6127]), probably belongs in the late Twentieth Dynasty, both on palaeographic grounds and on the basis of the distribution of such materials at this site. (I am indebted to the late Klaus Baer for examining this document with me.)

CHAPTER 3

THE LATER WARS OF SETY I

Sety I’s confrontation with the Hittite empire is recorded on two out of the three registers of battle scenes carved on the west wing of his war monument at Karnak. At the top is the war against Kadesh and Amurru,1 while in the lowest register we find an encounter with the Hittites themselves.2 The depiction of the war in Libya that is shown in the middle register, between these two Asiatic campaigns, was a diversion, unrelated to the main thrust of Sety I’s foreign policy, and it is discussed, along with the Nubian war of year eight, in Appendix 4.

Although it is generally agreed3 that each of the western registers represents a separate campaign, there is considerable uncertainty regarding the order in which they are to be read. The normal sequence—indeed, that which is observed on the east wing—is from the bottom up, which would suggest that the Hittite campaign preceded the attack on Kadesh and Amurru.4 The reverse order has been maintained, however, by a majority of scholars, who see a struggle with the Hittites themselves as proceeding logically from Egypt’s alienation of Hatti’s two southernmost border provinces.5 While recent studies have judged the matter to be an open question, the second alternative is still preferred on external grounds of historical probability.6

The parallels from other narrative compositions inscribed on the walls of Egyptian monuments are, unfortunately, either too scanty or too scattered to resolve this problem by suggesting which sequence would be the more common. Most such narratives occupy only a single register.7 The exceptional cases which occupy several registers, coming as they do from various periods of Egyptian civilization, do not offer a coherent guide to the common usage of any one period. In a tomb from the Old Kingdom, for instance, one sequence—if it has been properly interpreted—does seem to move in the order proposed for the Sety I battle scenes, i.e.,

2. Ibid., pls. 33–36.
7. E.g., Ramesses II’s account of his battle at Kadesh, and the war reliefs of Ramesses III at Medinet Habu.
THE ROAD TO KADESH

up one side and down the other. This, however, is a very isolated example. Closer to home are the ritual scenes on the north wing of the eastern interior wall of the Great Hypostyle Hall at Karnak (carved by Sety I), where at least one group of episodes appears to move from the top down, against the usual direction taken by such sequences. Again, this example can hardly be described as "normal usage"; and the arrangement of episodes on this wall is so difficult to follow that only the most general conclusion (i.e., some variability in vertical arrangement) seems permissible. The same lack of uniformity can be seen in some sequences that observe the usual order of episodes from the bottom up, but in which the horizontal arrangement of the scenes varies. In summary, since the question cannot be answered by appealing only to the internal consistency of comparable source materials, and since we may not impose on Sety's battle reliefs a uniform vertical arrangement on the basis of available parallels, the issue remains open. Our reasons for preferring to read Sety's campaigns on the west wing at Karnak from top to bottom, and for placing the attack on Kadesh and Amurru before the Hittite war, is given below.

THE AMURRU-KADESH CAMPAIGN

The label, "The ascent that Pharaoh ... made in order to destroy the land of Kadesh and the land of Amurru," inscribed on a fortress that represents the city of Kadesh, tersely describes Egypt's opening salvo against the Hittite empire. Although the Egyptian artists went to some pains to illustrate the city's purported surroundings, nothing further about this campaign

8. E.g., the funeral procession of Idu at Giza, where the sequence seems to move up the right jamb, across the lintel, and then down the left jamb. Since there is some disorder in the customary sequence of episodes, however, a case can be made for reading each jamb separately, from the bottom up, with the lintel read last; see W. K. Simpson, The Mastabas of Qar and Idu, Giza Mastabas 2 (Boston, 1977), pp. 21–23 and fig. 35.


10. This variability is first seen in the Old Kingdom, e.g., in the tomb of Qar at Giza, where the funeral procession starts in the upper left-hand corner and finishes at the lower left (Simpson, Mastabas of Qar and Idu, pp. 5–6 and fig. 24). New Kingdom examples, while few, seem definite enough—e.g., the birth scenes at the Luxor temple (Gaballa, Narrative in Egyptian Art, p. 54); jubilee scenes from the temple of Amenhotep IV at Thebes (see Redford, "Preliminary Report on the First Season of Excavations in East Karnak, 1975–76," JARCE 14 [1977]:23 and 31, n. 66; compare ATP I [Warminster, 1976], p. 127, n. 66, and pls. 41–42, with end papers). Another, more enigmatic example may be found on the western face of the western side wall to court I at Karnak, north of the seventh pylon (PM II 132–33 [490]–[495]), where—if the sequence of localities in Merneptah's "Israel Stela" were followed—the battle scenes begin by proceeding boustrophedon from the middle of the bottom register, but end up more erratically distributed between top and bottom at the right end of the wall (see F. J. Yurco, "Merneptah's Canaanite Campaign," JARCE 23 [1986]:189–215, especially p. 191).


12. The identification of the Kadesh represented in these reliefs (ibid., pl. 23:3) with Kadesh on the Orontes, while accepted by most scholars is disputed by Aharoni (The Land of the Bible, p. 68), who argues that the hilly country around the city and its adjoining forest are both inappropriate for this locality. This position has been rebutted by Gardiner, AEO I 140*–41*; and its cogency is
emerges from the battle scene itself, nor from a similar composition that was carved around the corner from this one. Only part of the king’s figure can be made out on this second battle scene, which is mostly hidden by the wall of the first court that was built against it in the Twenty-second Dynasty. Since the mêlée on the north face of the wall takes place at Kadesh, however, the engagement shown on the western side wall most probably belongs in the land of Amurru—a likelihood strengthened by analogy with the episodes on the eastern side wall, where the geographical outer limits of the Shasu and Yenoam campaigns are shown. Other references to this campaign in Egyptian sources are meager and ambiguous. Egypt’s operations against Kadesh and Amurru might be reflected, for example, in the central Syrian toponyms listed both at Karnak and on the bases of two sphinxes from Sety I’s mortuary temple in West Thebes. To say more than this would be unsafe, however, for most of these place names occur in earlier lists from Egypt and lack the combination of novelty and specificity that allows us to make historical use of the “final northern list” in connection with Sety’s earlier wars.

Sety’s conquest of Kadesh was commemorated in a victory stela found there. Only a fragment from the top of this tablet is preserved, but this is enough to show that, though badly weathered, the stela was never defaced, even after Kadesh passed back into Hittite hands a few years later. This would be the last time Kadesh switched sides, for this would become impossible once Ramesses II and Hattushili III had permanently normalized relations between Egypt and Hatti. The rulers of Kadesh would not have known this, however, when they had Sety I’s stela taken down. The trouble they took to preserve it suggests that Kadesh, even as it was defecting, did not regard its submission to Hatti as being final—an interesting comment, given the past history of duplicity and revolt found in both the Hittite and Egyptian spheres of influence.

It is the cuneiform evidence, again, that puts some flesh on these bones. Although there is no single archive to shed even the Amarna letters’ fitful light on the ups and downs of great power diplomacy, a scattering of documents from across the Middle East provides some essential reference points. Particularly useful are the historical preambles of two treaties made by successive Hittite kings with their contemporaries in Amurru, i.e., those of Hattushili III with diminished by the association of Kadesh with Amurru on the label of the scene (Reliefs IV, pl. 23:1). Wooded areas around Kadesh on the Orontes, moreover, had been noted in Egyptian records as early as the reign of Amenhotep II, and they would later play a part in the career of Ramesses II (see Gardiner, The Kadesh Inscriptions of Ramesses II [Oxford, 1960], p. 37, R–11; it is probably this “Wood of Robawi” that is shown here). The hills in the relief, if they are to be taken seriously, might represent the mound, Tell Nebi-Mend, on which the city was built. Possibly relevant in this connection is the term “Kadesh the Old,” in the “Bulletin” of Ramesses II’s battle inscriptions (B–26, 64 = KRI II 108, 115), although the precise identification of this geographic feature remains problematical; for the age of the mounds at Tel Nebi-Mend and the nearby Sefinet Nûh, see Kuschke in LÄ V 27 (s.v. “Qadesch”), 32 (s.v. “Qadesch-Schlacht”).

13. Reliefs IV, pl. 22 and p. 79.
14. Ibid., pls. 10, 23.
15. KRI I 33–35. For the central Syrian localities in Sety I’s topographical lists and their connection to his later activities there, see Spalinger, JARCE 16 (1979):38, and nn. 70–71.
16. PM VII 392.
Benteshina,\textsuperscript{17} and of Tudhaliya IV with Shaushgamuwa.\textsuperscript{18} Both documents agree that the trouble between Hatti and Amurru began when they were ruled, respectively, by Muwatalli and Benteshina. What is notable, however, is the different, and rather gingerly terms, in which Amurru’s defection is treated in both cases. Hattushili III, for example, confines himself to the bald statement that Muwatalli had deprived Benteshina of his throne and carried him off to captivity in Hatti.\textsuperscript{19} Egypt is not mentioned here, and it is from the later treaty\textsuperscript{20} that we learn the details of Benteshina’s ouster:

[In the past] the land of Amurru had not been subdued by means of the arms of the land of Hatti. When Aziru [came] to Shuppiluliuma, the grandfather of my “Sun,” in the land of Hatti, the lands of Amurru were still [enem]y (country); they [were] vassals of the Hurrian king. Even thus was Aziru loyal to him. But he (= Shuppiluliuma) did [not subdue] him unto himself through armed might. Aziru, your grandfather, then protected [Shuppi]luliuma in (his) lordship, and he also protected the [land of Hatt]iti. Thereafter he also protected Murshili in (his) lordship, and he also protected the land of Hatti; and against the land of Hatti he committed not the slightest breach of faith. But when Muwatalli, the brother of the father of my “Sun,” became king, the people of Amurru broke faith with him, and this is what they had to say to him: “From free entities, we became vassals. Now, however, we are your vassals no longer!” And they entered into the following of the king of Egypt. At this, the brother of the father of my “Sun,” Muwatalli, and the king of Egypt, together with the people of Amurru, fought. And Muwatalli triumphed over him and forced the land of Amurru to the ground with weapons and made it subject. Thus in the land of Amurru he installed Shapili as king.\textsuperscript{21}

Following this account of Amurru’s defection during an Egyptian revanche in central Syria, and its subsequent reconquest when Muwatalli defeated the king of Egypt, the text continues the story into the time of the present generation’s immediate predecessors:

But when Muwatalli, the brother of the father of my “Sun,” had become a god, then Hattushili, the father of my “Sun,” became king, and he put Shapili aside (and) made Benteshina, your father, king in the land of Amurru. And he protected the father of my “Sun” and protected the land of Hatti; and against the land of Hatti he committed not the slightest breach of faith.\textsuperscript{22}

\textsuperscript{17} Weidner, \textit{Politische Dokumente aus Kleinasien}, pp. 127–29.
\textsuperscript{18} C. Kühne and H. Otten, \textit{Der Šaušgamuwa-Vertrag}, Studien zu den Boghazköy-Texten 16 (Wiesbaden, 1971).
\textsuperscript{19} Benteshina Treaty, obv. 11–13.
\textsuperscript{20} Shaushgamuwa Treaty, obv. I 13–39.
\textsuperscript{21} The English translations that follow are adapted from Kühne and Otten, \textit{Šaušgamuwa-Vertrag}, pp. 7–9.
\textsuperscript{22} Ibid. (= obv. I 40–48).
Since Shapili's installation as king of Amurru is immediately followed by Muwatalli's death (in the text of the treaty), the defeat of the Egyptian king that is mentioned here can only refer to the Battle of Kadesh in the fifth year of Ramesses II. But when had Amurru "entered into the following of the king of Egypt"? Kitchen has suggested that Benteshina's revolt, mentioned in this treaty, took place in the year before the Battle of Kadesh. Amurru would thus have rebelled twice, once under Sety and then again, after its first return to the Hittite fold, under Ramesses II.\(^{23}\) This, however, seems unlikely. None of the war memorials that Ramesses II set up in Western Asia before the Battle of Kadesh implies that Amurru had to be subdued once more at that time: the Nahr el-Kelb stela\(^{24}\) and the tablet from Byblos\(^{25}\) both lie outside the territory of Amurru, and they tell us nothing of what was happening in the field at this time. During the later Kadesh campaign, moreover, Amurru was still ranged with Egypt,\(^{26}\) and there is no reason to think it had changed sides since it had first been (re)captured by Sety I. That Amurru had remained an Egyptian satellite is actually implied by the Shaushgamuwa Treaty, where Muwatalli's recapture of Amurru after the Battle of Kadesh is treated as his response to this country's first breach of faith since it had become part of the Hittite empire. One might question the comprehensiveness of this text, since it fails to mention the reign of Murshili III (Urhi-Teshup) that intervened between the death of Muwatalli and the accession of Hattushili III. We shall see, however, that there are tendentious reasons for this omission on the part of the treaty's two contracting parties. There are no grounds for supposing that an earlier revolt was simply ignored here. Indeed, given the frankness that prevails in other vassals' treaties with Hatti, this would be highly uncharacteristic.\(^{27}\) Clearly, Benteshina was held responsible for Amurru's revolt and was deprived by Muwatalli of his throne. Just as plainly, moreover, he was later restored to office by Urhi-Teshup, an action that is described elsewhere as one that would have displeased his father.\(^{28}\) Muwatalli's strong resentment against Benteshina makes far better sense as the outcome of a rebellion lasting a decade or more rather than a year's fall from grace.

25. Ibid., p. 224.
26. It is not listed among Egypt's enemies on this occasion; see, for convenience, Gardiner, *Kadesh Inscriptions*, pp. 7, 8, 29. Moreover, the clearest sense of the records of the Battle of Kadesh still seems to point to the arrival of part of the Egyptian army from the coast of Amurru (despite the case against this made by Schulman, most recently in "The N*RN at Kadesh Once Again," *JSSEA* 11 [1981]:7-19, especially pp. 11, 13-18). For pertinent cuneiform sources, see E. Edel, "*KBo* I 15 + 19, ein Brief Ramses' II. mit einer Schilderung der Kadeischlacht," *ZA* n.F. 15 (1949):209 (obv. 27-28) and 212 (KUB XXI 17, 14-21 = KUB XXXI 27, 2-8; revising the readings of Albrecht Goetze, "Zur Schlacht von Qadešt," *OLZ* 32 [1929]:837).
27. Compare, for example, J. Friedrich, *Staatsverträge der Ḫatti-Reiches in hethitischer Sprache* I, MVAG 31.1 (Leipzig, 1926), pp. 7–9; compare Weidner, *Politische Dokumente aus Kleinasien*, pp. 15, 77 (references to "disloyalty" of Kadesh and Amurru at a time when neither was bound by treaty to the Hittite empire).
that—as Kitchen’s own account makes clear—would have been forced on Benteshina by circumstances beyond his control.

We have already observed the degree of circumspection with which the issue of Benteshina’s guilt is treated in both treaties. Benteshina’s own pact with Hattushili III gives no reason for his deposition by Muwatalli, while the Shaushgamuwa Treaty ascribes the revolt to “the people of Amurru,” not to Benteshina himself. While these “oblique and oddly vague terms” have been interpreted as reflecting the Hittites’ sense of tenuousness regarding their claim to Amurru against Egypt,29 we cannot agree. Bonds of loyalty to a rival superpower, however ancient, would surely have been superseded, in the Hittites’ view, by Amurru’s treaties with Hatti over the last three generations.30 Why would the Hittites entertain the opposite notion, even obliquely, when by doing so they would be forced to acknowledge the Egyptians’ claim in full? We may scarcely believe that Hatti gave this argument any more credibility on legal grounds than it did in the field—since, demonstrably, Amurru was not allowed to remain outside the Hittite fold for long. Nonetheless, the gingerly treatment of Benteshina still requires an explanation. I believe it is to be sought in the political climate in which each treaty was drawn up.31

Most of the provisions of the Benteshina and Shaushgamuwa treaties are paralleled in similar contracts between Hatti and her other neighbors. The kings of Amurru agree to abide by Hittite policy in their dealings with other foreign powers.32 They also swear fealty to the Hittite ruling house and receive the appropriate guarantees for their own posterity,33 and they are allied to the Hittite royal house by marriage.34 The only really unusual feature about these two treaties with Amurru is the unwonted delicacy that surrounds their treatment of past history—and in both cases there are grounds for suspecting that the reasons were personal and political. When Benteshina was carried off to Hatti, he had been turned over for safekeeping to the king’s brother, the future Hattushili III, who took him off to his own provincial capital.35

30. On the question of Amurru’s earlier status before her submission to Hatti, and the treatment of this question in Hittite sources, see Appendix 8 below.
32. Weidner, Politische Dokumente aus Kleinasiens, pp. 133–35 (= Benteshina Treaty); Kühne and Otten, Šaušgamuwa-Vertrag, pp. 15–17. This, of course, is a universal in all vassal treaties; e.g., Kestemont, UF6 (1974):99–103 (= treaty of Nigmepa of Ugarit with Murshili II).
33. Kühne and Otten, Šaušgamuwa-Vertrag, pp. 7–9, (= Shaushgamuwa Treaty); Weidner, Politische Dokumente aus Kleinasiens, pp. 129–31 (= Benteshina Treaty); compare ibid., pp. 19 (Shuppiluliuma I’s treaty with Shattiwaza of Mitanni), 87 (Murshili II’s treaty with Talmi-Sharuma of Aleppo), 95 (Muwatalli’s treaty with Shunashshura of Kizzuwatna); Friedrich, Staatsverträge I 13 (Muwatalli’s treaty with Duppi-Teshup of Amurru); ibid., II, MVAG 34.1 (Leipzig, 1930), pp. 55–59 (Murshili II’s treaty with Alakshandu of Wilusha).
34. Kühne and Otten, Šaušgamuwa-Vertrag, pp. 7, 9 and compare p. 11 (Muwatalli made Mashturi of Sheha his brother-in-law); Weidner, Politische Dokumente aus Kleinasiens, p. 129 (= Benteshina Treaty), compare pp. 19 and 53 (treaties between Shuppiluliuma I and Shattiwaza of Mitanni); Friedrich, Staatsverträge I 107 (treaty of Murshili II with Kupanta-KAL of Mira and Kuwaliya), and ibid., pp. 107, 125 (treaty of Shuppiluliuma I and Huqqana of Azzi).
which the exiled ruler became a pawn in the contest between his host and his nephew, Urḫi-Teshup, cannot be known, but we may infer that the young king counted on Benteshina’s goodwill when he restored him to his throne in Amurru. That restoration, however, must have had, if not Hattushili’s outright support, then at least his consent—why else would Hattushili himself later claim to have restored Benteshina to office? Any attempt to chart the relationship between these three men must necessarily cross over into historical fiction. At the very least, however, we may assume that Hattushili III, as king, would have been able to build on whatever personal bond he had established when Benteshina had been his “guest.” That bond would become a dynastic alliance, cemented by treaties and by marriage ties over the next two generations.

Even so, Amurru’s position on the southwestern flank of the Hittite empire gave her a strategic importance that could not be taken for granted. Yet another source of anxiety was that Hattushili III was a usurper. Neither he nor his descendants enjoyed an inborn right to rule—and Urḫi-Teshup, the rightful king of Hatti, had eventually become a refugee in Egypt. Although a direct threat from this quarter would have been neutralized by Hattushili’s treaty with Ramesses II, in which the two kings had agreed to respect the legitimacy of one another’s line, the Egyptians had played this card before, and they might be disposed to do so again. These considerations could explain the care, verging on fussiness, with which Hatti sought to guarantee Amurru’s loyalty to the dynasty of Hattushili III. Whom else but Urḫi-Teshup and his heirs would Tudhaliya IV have had in mind, for example, when he warned the king of Amurru against supporting any usurper to the Hittite throne, even though (as he specifically notes) Tudhaliya’s own father had profited from his vassals’ laxity in this regard? Political expediency, one suspects, was not the least important reason for the favor that the house of Hattushili III showed to Benteshina’s dynasty—and one does not remind a valued ally of his past sins.

Sety I’s conquest of Kadesh and Amurru must have resulted in the immediate abrogation of the treaty which, I have suggested, was in force between Egypt and Hatti earlier in Muwatallī’s


37. A Hittite demand for Urḫi-Teshup’s extradition from Egypt, sometime before the conclusion of the treaty in Ramesses II’s twenty-first year, was refused; see E. Edel, “Die Abfassungszeit des Briefes KBo I.10 und seine Bedeutung für die Chronologie Ramesses’ II.,” JCS 12 (1958):130–32; and Urḫi-Teshup was still in Egypt during the marriage negotiations between Ramesses’ twenty-first and thirty-fourth years (see Helck, “Urḫi-Teshup in Ägypten,” JCS 17 [1963]:87–97); and for this period, also see Ünal, Ḥattušili III, pp. 159–63. See Appendix 5 below for the date of Urḫi-Teshup’s deposition by Hattushili III.

38. See ANET 3, p. 203 (obv. 40 ff. of the Hittite version; perhaps corresponding to a broken passage of the Egyptian text, KRI II 228:12–229 = ANET 3, p. 200, with n. 13). I am grateful to Professor Hayim Tadmor for discussing some of this material and its implications with me. For a discussion of these and other considerations regarding the treaty, see Schulman, JSSEA 8 (1978):117–20, 126–30.

39. Note that Ramesses II, after he had made his treaty with Hattushili III, found it necessary to inform his Asiatic vassals that the Egyptian “line” on Urḫi-Teshup had changed; see B. Meissner, “Die Beziehungen Ägyptens zum Hattireiche nach Hittischen Quellen,” ZDMG 72 (1918):43–44; and compare the references in n. 37 above.

40. Šaus̱gamuwa Treaty (obv. I 12, II 1–48, III 1–28). For the continued influence of Urḫi-Teshup and his sons during the time of Tudhaliya IV, see Ünal, Ḥattušili III, pp. 172–74.
THE ROAD TO KADESH

reign. Amurru probably clung to its new alliance with Egypt for as long the Egyptian military presence made it possible to do so.\(^{41}\) Kadesh, however, must have been reconquered—or returned voluntarily to the Hittite fold?—by some point in Ramesses II’s early reign, at the latest, for it is listed (as Amurru is not) among the enemies of Egypt in the war of year five, and “the vile chief of Kadesh” would go on to play a prominent role in the Hittites’ preparations for battle.\(^{42}\) The presence of Sety I’s victory stela in Kadesh suggests, however, that the city did not change hands again quickly. Perhaps its return to the Hittite alliance was the catalyst that motivated the demonstrations of Egypt’s might that we begin to encounter in Asia during Ramesses II’s fourth year.\(^{43}\) In any case, its defection would surely have constituted a \textit{casus belli} for the major war that erupted in the following year.

THE HITTITE WAR

The Hittites, however, seem not to have waited until the time of Ramesses II to react to their loss of Kadesh and Amurru. A direct clash between Hatti and Egypt under Sety I is attested in the lowest register of battle reliefs on the western wing of his war monument at Karnak.\(^{44}\) The scene of battle is described as “the vile land of the Hittites, among whom His Majesty . . . made a great heap of corpses.” The hieroglyphic texts that accompany these scenes tell us little else about this war, although they are rich in rhetorical flourishes. The king is “a mighty bull, with sharp horns, stout-hearted, who smashes the Asiatics and tramples the Hittites; who slays their chiefs as they lie prostrate in their blood; who enters into them like a blast of fire.”\(^{45}\) The next episode, which illustrates the return march to Egypt with prisoners from the campaign, describes how the king “returned after he had triumphed, after he had destroyed the foreign countries and trampled the land of Hatti.”\(^{46}\) Few historical dividends are paid by this picturesque but stereotyped material, in which the conventional phrases of the inscriptions are sometimes belied by the pictorial record. The prisoners, for example, are all represented as Hittites, even though they are called “the great chiefs of Retchenu the vile, whom His Majesty brought away by his \textit{victories over the foreign countries of Hatti},” and although this wording—together with the prominent reference to “Asiatics” in the battle scene\(^{47}\)—might imply that the brunt of the fighting had been borne, not by the Hittites themselves, but by her Syrian vassals. This is a plausible inference, as we shall see, but the language of these inscriptions is so riddled with

\(^{41}\) It was only during this period, surely, that its major coastal city could have been known as “Şumur of Sēse,” before Amurru fell once more to Hatti; see Fischer-Elfert, \textit{Die satirische Streitschrift des Papyrus Anastasi I}, pp. 261–67, for discussion and references.

\(^{42}\) \textit{KRI} II 3–4, at 4:6–9, 16–18 (= Gardiner, \textit{Kadesh Inscriptions}, pp. 7–8).

\(^{43}\) Ramesses II’s military operations in year four (if such they were) are dated to nearly opposite ends of his regnal year: the Nahr el-Kelb stela to IV \textit{ḥt} 1 (\textit{KRI} II 1:9), and the Byblos stela to IV \textit{snw} (ibid., p. 224:6). For Ramesses II’s accession date (probably in the first half of the season of \textit{ḥt}) see n. 17 in \textit{Appendix 2} below.

\(^{44}\) \textit{Reliefs} IV, pls. 33–36.

\(^{45}\) Ibid., pl. 34:1, 14–19.

\(^{46}\) Ibid., pl. 35:27–28 (compare pl. 36:1–4).

\(^{47}\) Ibid., pl. 36:26–27.

\(^{48}\) Ibid., pl. 34:14.
THE LATER WARS OF SETY I

traditional formulas that it seems rash to read it this closely, or to take it beyond the irreducible claim that Sety had campaigned somewhere in Hittite territory.

Further light on Sety's campaigns is conceivably to be found in the lists of name-rings on the bases of two sphinxes, found at Sety I's mortuary temple, the so-called Qurna temple in West Thebes. These nearly identical lists each fall into three parts, of which the first—consisting of the traditional "Nine Bows"—is of no interest. The second part—North, nos. 11–24 = South, nos. 10–22—corresponds in its arrangement to the "final northern list" of the Karnak battle reliefs, having most of the same Palestinian and Lebanese toponyms found there. An interesting entry that is not present in the preserved versions of this list at Karnak, however, is Ṣumur, which Sety would have reconquered in his war against Kadesh and Amurru. The final part of the list—preserved only on the northern sphinx, nos. 25–43—is central and northern Syrian in its environment. Again, many of the same names appear in the "first northern list" at Karnak, and a number of these lie north of Kadesh and Amurru—for instance, Ardukka, Ukupta lands, Tunip, Pabaḥḫi, and Barga. Kadesh also appears, as do Upper and Lower Retchenu, Naharin, Taḥsy, and Assyria. These last five entries apart, most of the names in the final section of the list from the Qurna temple and in the "first northern lists" from Karnak are not at all commonplace. Very few of them, either in the "first" or "final" lists from Karnak, had appeared in Egyptian topographical lists before the reign of Amenhotep III. The

49. KRII 33–35. Name-ring numbers in the text refer to the north and south sphinx respectively.
50. Reliefs IV, pls. 15:54*–68* = 17:49*–65*.
51. Qurna no. 14 (north and south), reading Dmr for Dmt (compare Spalinger, JARCE 16 [1979]:45, n. 71).
52. Ibid., pls. 15:25*–37* = 17:24*–36*.
53. Qurna no. 39 = Reliefs IV, pls. 15:37* = 17:36*.
54. Qurna no. 28 (Jpḥ) = Reliefs IV, pls. 15:34* = 17:33* (Jqpt). At Qurna the name is more probably to be emended into J<q>pt than read "Upe," as suggested by Spalinger, JARCE 16 (1979):38.
55. Ibid., pls. 15:28* = 17:27* = Qurna nos. 32 + 38.
56. Qurna no. 34 = Reliefs IV, pls. 15:30* = 17:29*.
57. Ibid., pls. 15:35* = 17:34* = Qurna no. 42. For the locations of the northern toponyms in this list see E. Edel, "Neue Identifikationen in den konventionellen Namenzusammenstellungen des Neuen Reiches," SAK 3 (1975):51–54 (Pabaḥḫi), 58–59 (Ardukka), 60–61 (the Ukupta lands). Since, with the exception of Ṣumur, all the above-named localities lie in the north—some of them east of the Euphrates (see Edel's map, ibid., p. 73)—I see no reason why Jṛtg should be interpreted as the Syrian Arazig rather than the more northerly Ardukka, especially since its presence in an Egyptian list might only mean that troops from this area were encountered, and not that an Egyptian army got this far; compare Spalinger, BES 1 (1979):70–72, 84, especially p. 72, n. 54.
58. Qurna no. 31 = Reliefs IV 15:29* = 17:28*.
59. Qurna nos. 25, 26, 30, 33 + 35 (sic), and 37.
60. I.e., Kadesh (Reliefs IV, pls. 15:29* = 17:28*) under Thutmose III (Simons, Handbook, List I); Qatna (Reliefs IV, pls. 15:31* = 17:30*) under Amenhotep II (Simons, Handbook, List VI); Shasu (Reliefs IV, pls. 15:37* = 17:42*) under Thutmose IV (Simons, Handbook, List VIII).
Hittites themselves turn up for the first time in lists of this reign,\(^6\) while still other names enter the lists under Sety I.\(^6\)\(^2\) This distribution makes it likelier that the more recent names in Sety I’s lists had contemporary significance.\(^6\)\(^3\) If so, we cannot simply accept the historical implications of name-rings such as Kadesh, Šumur, and Ullaza (which lie in areas where Sety is known to have operated) while dismissing as meaningless the naming of more northerly localities. While we cannot prove that the Egyptians actually invaded any of these areas, or met contingents from these countries on the field of battle,\(^6\)\(^4\) their presence in these lists cannot be taken lightly. Even if we take a minimalist position and abstain from defining how these places would have been involved in Sety I’s struggle with Hatti, the likeliest context for any engagement with them must be the campaign, recorded at Karnak, against “the vile land of the Hittites.”

In summary, the burden of proof would seem to be on those who would deny that Sety I campaigned on Hittite territory.\(^6\)\(^5\) Did this happen before the conquest of Kadesh and Amurru, however, or afterwards? While the second alternative has always been regarded as the more likely, we should recall that, in his eighth and tenth years, Ramesses II would push beyond the Hittite empire’s southern border to assault the cities of Tunip and Dapur.\(^6\)\(^6\) Though his efforts to establish Egyptian bases there failed, the strategy, i.e., driving a wedge between Kadesh and Amurru, is worth noting; and it is possible that Ramesses II could have been influenced by an earlier use of this device, perhaps even by his father. Sety’s success might then have sufficiently

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62. Tunip (with the spelling Wnwm, in Reliefs IV, pls. 15:28* = 17:27*; it is already attested under Thutmose III with the spelling “Tunip”; Simons, Handbook, p. 219); Ishuwa (= Jsy ? = Reliefs IV, pls. 15:32* = 17:31*); and Jqpt (ibid., pls. 15:34* = 17:33*).

63. The Asiatic names are markedly less stereotyped than the Nubian entries found at Karnak, which—as noted in Reliefs IV, pp. 54 (n. a), 56 (n. a), and 64 (n. a)—were borrowed from earlier lists of Thutmose III. The selectiveness with which the “first northern list” was assembled suggests that these names were carved only after Sety had finished the campaigning described in the adjoining battle scenes. The later addition of the final northern lists (names from Sety’s earliest wars, which were carved in palimpsest over earlier African toponyms, see ibid., pp. 49–50 and 59) could reflect a preliminary decision to stress Sety’s later wars in this composition at the expense of any earlier campaigning (particularly since “Shasu” was already present as one of the “standard” name-rings in the original version of the scenes [ibid., pls. 15:37* = 17:42*]).

64. See n. 57 of this chapter.

65. A serious case for that denial would require that the Hittite war scenes at Karnak be fictitious. While such rhetorical gestures can be found, they are rather rare, and they are not always devoid of substantive foundations. Gardiner (Egypt of the Pharaohs, p. 298) and Faulkner (CAH 3 II.2 243–44), for example, dismiss as anachronisms the Asiatic war scenes of Ramesses III (Medinet Habu II 87–99). The representations of Arzawa (ibid., pl. 87), Tunip (ibid., pl. 88), and Amurru (ibid., pl. 94), however, may have been suggested by passages from the war inscription of year eight: “no land could stand before their arms, from Hatti, Kode, Carchemish, Yereth, and Yeres on, (but they were) cut off at [one time]. A camp [was set up] at one place in Amurru. They desolated its people,” etc. (ibid., I 46:16–17 = W. F. Edgerton and J. A. Wilson, Historical Records of Ramses III, SAOC 12 [1936], p. 53). A somewhat better example of the anachronistic space-filler might be the Libyan campaign that is attested first in the mortuary temple of Sahure at Abusir, with exact copies by Pepi II and Taharqa (see PM 2 III 329, n. 1, for references).

66. Kitchen, Pharaoh Triumphant, pp. 68–70.
destabilized the Hittites' hold on central Syria to persuade the rulers of Kadesh and Amurru to side, once again, with Egypt. Carrying this hypothesis even further, it is conceivable that the people of Amurru, in their panic at the imminent Egyptian danger, might then have stampeded their ruler, Benteshina, into abandoning the Hittite alliance and reentering "the following of the king of Egypt"—thus earning the unfavorable notice that the Shaushgamuwa Treaty would later give to them.

While this is a possible scenario it is not, in my opinion, a convincing one. An Egyptian base in central Syria would be extremely difficult to maintain without the support of Kadesh and Amurru: with its long supply lines, subject to attack on three sides, it would be vulnerable, not only to a direct assault from the north, but to the forces which the Hittites would surely have poured into their border provinces to the east and west. As a strategy for victory it was notably unsuccessful when Ramesses II used it, and it seems not unfair to see it as a desperate measure in his losing war against the Hittites in central Syria. Unlike his son, however, Sety was not compelled to operate in the sure knowledge that Kadesh and Amurru would stand in arms against him. Indeed, Amurru seems eventually to have changed sides of its own accord. For Ramesses II, success in central Syria may have depended on the long chance he took with Tunip and Dapur. For Sety, it did not. Nor does it seem likely that the Hittites would have been provoked into a war before the Egyptian takeover in Kadesh and Amurru. There is no reason to suppose that the Hittites had extended their territory south, into Upe, under Horemheb and Ramesses I, nor any reason for them to have broken the treaty that kept the peace in Syria. Hittite policy in the south was generally defensive. Muwatalli, being occupied with the same northern frontier wars that had plagued his predecessors, would not have embroiled himself on his southern border by gratuitously attacking Egypt's possessions.\(^6\) Sety's earlier operations, against the Shasu and the Palestinian cities, lay inside the Egyptian sphere of influence and did not affect Hatti directly as long as both sides respected the treaty. All this might have changed, of course, as soon as the pharaoh indicated his hostile intentions towards Kadesh and Amurru—but, as we have seen, there is no solid evidence that this occurred before the campaign in which they both were removed from the Hittite to the Egyptian camp.\(^6\)\(^8\)

On the other hand, the Hittites could hardly have acquiesced to the loss of their two most important Syrian provinces, the main buffer zones that protected their satellites, the kingdoms of Aleppo and Carchemish. Their reaction would not be long in coming—certainly not as late as the early years of Sety's successor. It is only logical to see Sety's war with the Hittites as their first reaction to this unfavorable change.\(^6\)\(^9\) Based on the Egyptian sources we have already discussed, it appears that the Hittite army Sety encountered was composed, at least in part, of diverse northern Syrian levies—the "Asiatics" mentioned in the Karnak scenes. The leader of the army may even have been one of the Hittite king's deputies in the south, either the king of Aleppo or the king of Carchemish.\(^7\)\(^0\) There is scarcely any doubt that the Egyptians were

\(^6\) Goetze, CAH\(^3\) II.2 127–28; Spalinger, BES 1 (1979):72–73.

\(^6\)\(^8\) See Appendix 4.

\(^6\)\(^9\) Faulkner, CAH\(^3\) II.2. 221; Goetze, ibid., p. 252; Spalinger, BES 1 (1979):88–89; idem, JARCE 16 (1979):34 and 45 (n. 48).

\(^7\)\(^0\) Spalinger, BES 1 (1979):71–72; idem, "Traces of the Early Career of Ramesses II," JNES 38 (1979):279 (n. 46); idem, JARCE 16 (1979):35. See further in Appendix 5 below.
victorious: one does not often commemorate one's own defeat! Both southern provinces remained in Egyptian hands for the present, even though Kadesh would later defer to renewed Hittite strength by abandoning her Egyptian alliance before Amurru did. No cuneiform sources mention this campaign. Royal year annals, which might have recorded a Hittite setback, do not survive from the time of Muwatalli; nor should we expect penitential literature along the lines of Murshili II's Plague Prayers. Since Muwatalli would later avenge his earlier reverse by defeating Sety's son, it is not surprising that this previous failure was not allowed to mar the triumphant picture that is reflected in later treaties and the similarly tendentious records that were written after the Battle of Kadesh.

The most curious aspect of Sety's later victories, however, is that they happened at all. For the Hittites, who had repeatedly foiled Egypt's attempts to recoup her position in Syria over more than two generations, they were a humiliating and uncharacteristic reversal. The king of Hatti seems not to have met the challenge in person, nor does he appear to have met it in sufficient strength, even after the pharaoh had overrun his two southern border provinces. Does Egypt's triumph, in regaining Kadesh and Amurru, carry with it a presumption of Hittite overconfidence and miscalculation? A revision in the absolute chronology of the ancient Near East gives us reason to think otherwise. It has long been recognized that, by defeating Mitanni, Hatti had unleashed another potential rival in Assyria. Particularly disturbing to the Hittites were Assyrian designs on northern Mesopotamia. After Tushratta's death, Shuppiluliuma had come to terms with Shattiwaza, the son of his old rival, and recognized him as vassal king of a rump Hurrian state, known henceforth as Hanigalbat, that occupied Mitannian territory east of the Euphrates. Possession of this sensitive area, bordering as it did on the Hittites' possessions in Syria, was to be a major bone of contention between Hatti and Assyria in generations to come. This tension reached crisis levels when the Assyrian kingdom succeeded in annexing Hanigalbat, thereby expanding to the banks of the Euphrates, during the reigns of two kings: Adad-nirari I (1305–1274) and Shalmeneser I (1273–1244). Since there is now consensus in favor of placing Ramesses II's accession in 1279 B.C. (in preference to 1304 or 1290, favored by the previous generation of scholars), this downward revision shifts the first phase of Assyria's takeover of Hanigalbat into the reign of Sety I. His contemporary in Assyria was Adad-nirari I, who fought with Hanigalbat on two separate occasions: the first when he compelled its king, Hanigalbat, thereby expanding to the banks of the Euphrates, during the reigns of two kings: Adad-nirari I (1305–1274) and Shalmeneser I (1273–1244). Since there is now consensus in favor of placing Ramesses II's accession in 1279 B.C. (in preference to 1304 or 1290, favored by the previous generation of scholars), this downward revision shifts the first phase of Assyria's takeover of Hanigalbat into the reign of Sety I. His contemporary in Assyria was Adad-nirari I, who fought with Hanigalbat on two separate occasions: the first when he compelled its king,

71. Except, perhaps, in the very specialized manner Ramesses II chose to memorialize the Battle of Kadesh; see Assmann, *Mannheimer Forum* 83/84 (1983–84):207–28; T. von der Way, *Die Textüberlieferung Ramses' II. zur Qades-Schlacht*, HÄB 22 (Hildesheim, 1984), with references.


Shattuara I, to become his vassal; and the second when he punished a rebellion by Ḥanigalbat’s next ruler, Washashata, by deporting the royal family, ravaging the country, and placing it under direct rule from Assyria. While both episodes have sometimes been dated after Muwatalli and Ramesses II had met at Kadesh, it is now likely that even the second war must have taken place earlier. It is not even possible to date Washashata’s defeat to 1275/4 (the year of Adad-nirari’s death, corresponding to Ramesses II’s fifth regnal year) for two reasons: first, because the city of Taidu (which had been destroyed and abandoned as a result of the campaign against Washashata) was later restored by Adad-nirari himself, implying that he continued to reign for some time after the war had ended; and second, because Washashata’s defeat was mentioned in Assyrian inscriptions made during the tenures of at least five year-eponyms during Adad-nirari’s reign. This means that Washashata was defeated no earlier than 1278—five years before Adad-nirari died—and since the number of eponyms known for this king’s reign of thirty-two years is notably incomplete, it is quite likely that the second war in Ḥanigalbat occurred even earlier, during Sety I’s reign.

In light of these factors, Egypt’s resurgence in Syria and the ineffectuality shown by Hatti may both be connected with this new trouble on the eastern flank of the Hittite empire. Assyria’s first invasion of Ḥanigalbat, when Adad-nirari had forced Shattuara I out of his Hittite affiliation, coincided with a period during which we have reason to believe Egypt and Hatti were at peace—bound by the terms of the treaty that would exist until the time of Muwatalli, when Sety I broke it. Nevertheless, even without the distraction of Egyptian hostility, Hatti’s inability to recover Ḥanigalbat by force of arms is striking. The standoff even seems to have led, in time, to her acceptance of the status quo—for Adad-nirari reports that when Washashata rebelled and asked for Hatti’s help against Assyria, the Hittites took his bribes but sent him no assistance. The resulting annexation of Ḥanigalbat was more menacing, however, than the Hittites had anticipated. Hittite possessions in Syria were now at risk from Assyrian bases on the Euphrates, even up to Carchemish itself. Hatti’s displeasure, but also the limits of her power to react, are both implicit in a broken but unmistakably angry letter written by an unnamed Hittite


75. E.g., J. M. Munn-Rankin in CAH 3 II.2 276–79; compare Harrak, Assyria and Hanigalbat, pp. 115–28.

76. As does Kitchen, Pharaoh Triumphant, pp. 63, 240 (chart).

77. Grayson, Assyrian Royal Inscriptions I 61 (Nrs. 3, 4).

78. Harrak, Assyria and Hanigalbat, p. 98.

79. Harrak places it eleven years before Adad-nirari’s death, in about 1285 (ibid., pp. 115–28), although his apparent “agnosticism” with respect to Egyptian chronology (ibid., pp. 33–35) may seem unwarranted and raises difficulties with his reconstruction of events in Western Asia (e.g., see n. 84 below).

80. Grayson, Assyrian Royal Inscriptions I 60.

81. Ibid., pp. 58 (Nr. 1), 60 (Nr. 3). See Munn-Rankin in CAH 3 II.2 279; Harrak, Assyria and Hanigalbat, p. 108.
king to a ruler of Assyria—also not named, but undoubtedly Adad-nirari I.\textsuperscript{82} The Hittite acknowledged the Assyrian king's victory over Washashata, but he bridled over his expressed intention to view the Amanus mountains—a veiled threat—and he rejected in scathing terms an Assyrian offer of "brotherhood," i.e., friendly relations between equals. Notably, though, the letter appears to close with a reference to the expected departure of a Hittite ambassador.\textsuperscript{83} This implies that no war was imminent, but the Hittite king who wrote it must have felt strong enough to refuse, in these insulting terms, any further normalization of relations with his Assyrian neighbor. Muwatalli's authorship (which is virtually certain on purely chronological grounds) has been doubted—first, because his defiance of Adad-nirari seems reckless at a time he also faced the Egyptian menace in Syria;\textsuperscript{84} and second, because Naharin (= Ḥanigalbat) was to be described as a Hittite ally when Ramesses II moved against Muwatalli on his Kadesh campaign.\textsuperscript{85} Given both the lower chronology for Egypt and the uncertainty of dating the kings of Hatti, however, these objections lose their cogency. There is no reason why Muwatalli's reign could not have overlapped Shattuara I's tenure as an Assyrian vassal in Ḥanigalbat. This, surely, is the most logical period during which Ḥanigalbat could be described as an equal among the potentially hostile powers of Egypt, Assyria, and Babylon.\textsuperscript{86} Neither this passage, however, nor any other in the treaty that defines the situation in these terms need imply that these powers were actively hostile at this time. Indeed, even after Ḥanigalbat was absorbed into Assyria following the defeat of Washashata, the king of Hatti's defiance rings curiously hollow in the light of the minimally courteous relations that he continued to maintain with Adad-nirari I. This attitude, I would suggest, is not inconsistent with the situation that we might expect to have existed in about 1285 (= Sety I's fifth regnal year) if the treaty between Egypt and Hatti were not yet broken. Muwatalli, unwilling to antagonize the Assyrians by supporting Washashata, would also hesitate to expose himself to further mischief by declaring war against an enemy that was all the stronger for having annexed Ḥanigalbat. This, however, was not a message likely to deter disgruntled vassals or to discourage a rival who had never accepted Egypt's loss of Kadesh and Amurru. Muwatalli's caution, in the end, may have contributed to the unraveling of the peace in Syria.

This, if it were a mistake, was one that Muwatalli would not repeat when he confronted Egypt again. A necessary preliminary to that encounter must have been the recovery of Ḥanigalbat, which was back in the Hittite camp at the Battle of Kadesh and had to be

\textsuperscript{82} KUB XXIII 102. See most recently Hagenbuchner, Korrespondenz der Hethiter II 261–64; Harrak, Assyria and Hanigalbat, pp. 75–77. For translations of the pertinent passages in more accessible works see Goetze in CAH\textsuperscript{3} II.2, p. 258; Kitchen, Pharaoh Triumphant, pp. 63–64.

\textsuperscript{83} Hagenbuchner, Korrespondenz der Hethiter II 262, 264, reads this man's name as "[Ma]jšamuwa," who is also attested in other contemporary correspondence. This disposes of the alleged synchronism between Washashata's defeat and the reign of Shaushgamuwa of Amurru, whose name was previously read in the badly damaged lower part of the tablet. (For different explanations see Klengel, Geschichte Syriens I 100, n. 145; Harrak, Assyria and Hanigalbat, p. 77.)

\textsuperscript{84} Hagenbuchner, Korrespondenz der Hethiter II 263.

\textsuperscript{85} Harrak, Assyria and Hanigalbat, pp. 88–93.

\textsuperscript{86} In Muwatalli's treaty with Alakshandu of Wilusha (Friedrich, Staatsverträge II 68–69); compare Harrak, Assyria and Hanigalbat, pp. 92–93.
THE LATER WARS OF SETY I

reconquered by Adad-nirari’s successor, Shalmeneser I. Kadesh, too, had been recovered for Hatti’s empire by 1275/4, and on this occasion it was Egypt’s turn to be caught napping. This time, the Hittites’ strength was impressive, their planning flawless, and their strategy almost completely successful. Not even Ramesses II’s propagandists could conceal the extent of the debacle. After the battle, as he allowed the young pharaoh to withdraw his mauled army from the field, Muwatalli might well regard himself as avenged on Sety I.

87. Harrak suggests that Ḫanigalbat defected early in the new king’s reign, when he was occupied with other fighting elsewhere (ibid., p. 166), and he places the reconquest in about 1268 (ibid., p. 188). Ḫanigalbat must have regained its independence, however, by 1275/4, the year of the Battle of Kadesh (compare n. 84 above), before Adad-nirari’s death (thus already M. B. Rowton, “The Background of the Treaty between Ramesses II and Ḫattušiliš III,” JCS 13 [1959]:2–3, unconvincingly disputed by Harrak, Assyria and Hanigalbat, pp. 165–66); and it must have remained independent at least into the earlier reign of Ḫattushili III. The decisive evidence is KBo I 14 (see ibid., pp. 68–75), another letter from a Hittite to an Assyrian king, which mentions a king of Ḫanigalbat in connection with a disputed border territory. The reign of Urḫi-Teshup cannot lie too far in the past, for the text mentions the activities of his messengers in the present tense, as if they were still at their posts (ibid., p. 75, n. 27). Shalmeneser’s reconquest of Ḫanigalbat might thus lie closer to 1258, the year of the treaty between Egypt and Hatti.
SUMMATION

The overthrow of the kingdom of Mitanni and its replacement by the Hittite empire disrupted the peace of Western Asia for the better part of a century. During Mitanni's struggle with Hatti, the normally volatile balance between the states of Syria became even less stable than before. The Hittites, constrained by problems on other fronts, were slow to assert their dominance in the lands that had "belonged" to the Hurrian kings. Once the Egyptians had lost Kadesh, however, they were unable to seize the advantage, whether in pushing their frontiers north or preventing developments that would eventually undermine the empire's northern border. These conditions created a temporary and partial vacuum in Syria—excellent conditions for enterprising local rulers intent on aggrandizing themselves at their neighbors' expense, and who cultivated good relations, now with one of the superpowers, now with the other, while playing on their mutual suspicions.

This vacuum, in the end, would be filled by Hatti, which was better situated than Egypt to dominate Syria.¹ In the meantime, however, Shuppiluliuma's goal of taking Mitanni's place was delayed by the suspicions created by the misfiring of his own policy in northern Syria. Kadesh, which he had not planned to conquer, proved too valuable a prize for the Hittites to give up, and the result was a deepening alienation between Hatti and Egypt. This polarity—partly natural, but sedulously fostered by the vassal princes—must have made it difficult for them to trust one another, let alone come to the same amicable arrangement that had existed between Egypt and Mitanni. Yet, despite these odds, they almost did. At the death of Tutankhamun, Egypt would show herself willing to ratify the Hittites' winnings in Syria, even to the point of accepting the loss of Kadesh and Amurru. The durability of this settlement was never tested, for it failed at the same time as the ambitious dynastic union that was meant to sustain it. Even so, it is significant that the intense hostility that accompanied this debacle gave way, eventually, to a fresh "halt in place," ratified by a new treaty. The two empires had apparently reached their natural limits. Kadesh and Amurru remained Hittite. Nothing seemed likely to change.

Shock waves from this conflict of empires, however, had released forces that each of the superpowers found difficult to control. Despite their proximity to Aleppo and Carchemish, Hatti's satellites in central Syria, both Kadesh and Nuḫāššē, repeatedly tried to detach themselves from the empire. No doubt they were encouraged by the examples of Assyria and

¹. Compare not only the course of the war between Hatti and Egypt under Ramesses II, but also the contest for Coele-Syria between the Ptolemies and the Seleucid monarchs, discussed by H. Heinen, in CAH² VII.1 412-45; compare E. Will, Histoire politique du monde hellénistique (323-30 av. J.-C.)I (Nancy, 1966), pp. 208–33.
Egypt, each of whom was intermittently an unfriendly presence to the east and south of the Hittite empire. The same instability, however, seems also to have affected territories deep within Egypt's sphere of influence. Egypt, it is true, had never presided over a wholly tranquil empire, even at the height of its power. As the Amarna letters show, vassals were kept in line by the threat (and sometimes a show) of force—usually on a small scale, although the Egyptians were capable of mounting larger demonstrations to cope with an Abdi-Ashirta or an Aitakama. Yet, ever since the peace with Mitanni, these operations had been essentially police actions, conducted by Egypt's professional military establishment. The warrior pharaoh, whose image had been forged in battle during the earlier Eighteenth Dynasty, became preeminently a symbolic figure in the fourteenth century. We do not know whether Thutmose IV campaigned personally in Asia, but it is virtually certain that Amenhotep III and Akhenaten never did. The persistence of this pattern during the reigns of Tutankhamun and Ay, as well as its probable demise with the accession of Horemheb, can only be inferred for lack of evidence. By the start of the Nineteenth Dynasty, however, we find the king personally involved in leading the armies of Egypt abroad. Already as Ramesses I's crown prince, Sety I had been sent against the "Fenku lands." Not long afterwards, within his first year as king in his own right, he was again engaged in Palestine—first to chastise the Shasu Bedouin, and a few months later to impose peace in Canaan and the Lebanon. These campaigns, particularly as described in the Beth Shan stelae, are reminiscent of the local ructions that Egypt had been able to control with small numbers of troops during the Amarna period. Yet, even for such "little wars" we now find the king assuming a high profile, either participating in person or claiming that he had done so in triumphalistic propaganda. How are we to explain this heightened personal role, and Sety's part in this process?

Sety has been credited with restoring the influence Egypt had lost in Asia during the Amarna period. This view requires qualification: the Egyptian empire had never collapsed, and even with the loss of its northern provinces it continued to function normally during the extended periods when Egypt and Hatti were at peace. The question was not whether Egypt would

5. The welcoming of the pharaoh at Tcharu, on his return to Egypt (*Reliefs IV*, pl. 6), is circumstantial evidence for Sety's presence on the Shasu campaign. His role in the other war scenes shown at Karnak may be symbolic, however, particularly since the Beth Shan stelae only refer to the movements of various Egyptian forces, not those of the king himself.
continue to rule in her sphere of influence. What mattered, rather, was how large the pharaoh’s empire could be, and the nature of the control he wielded there. These problems, which Egypt and Mitanni had settled to their satisfaction during the fifteenth century, were reopened now that the Hurrian empire had given way to a new and unpredictable superpower like Hatti. Close to a century would pass before both empires could rediscover their practical limits and agree upon a mutually acceptable relationship.

The period of adjustment between Egypt and Hatti was more than half over when Sety I led his armies into Western Asia. On the surface, this was history repeating itself. Sety’s war aims were not new, and the same issues would come back to haunt his successor. The Hittite challenge, however, had wrought some significant changes in the empire of the pharaohs. During the period covered by the Amarna letters, Egypt had maintained a very thin presence in her own bailiwick. On-the-spot supervision was left to an overextended corps of administrators that was backed up only by a small number of Egyptian or Nubian troops. Moreover, the Egyptian military establishment itself placed limits on its role abroad by encouraging the payment of subsidies to local enforcers, who undertook the thankless and constant task of keeping the peace among Egypt’s vassals. This policy was well suited to an imperialism whose aims had been essentially defensive. In practice, however, this policy was undone by its own economy. Egypt’s indifference to conflicts between vassals might allow the pharaoh to limit his commitments in Asia, but it also encouraged local strongmen such as Aziru, and it was less favorable to other vassals than the reciprocal promises that guaranteed their security in Hittite treaties. Moreover, the reliance that the pharaoh’s government had placed on Aziru is what made it possible, in the end, for him to take Amurru out of the empire. While our meager sources do not allow us to assess how fully the Egyptians addressed all these problems, it is clear that the Asiatic empire was run more tightly during the period that followed. This change, which has been described as a transition from “political and economic domination” to “military occupation,” is primarily reflected in the archaeological data illustrating the infrastructure of Egyptian domination. It can be seen in the “governor’s residences,” fortified buildings and magazines that proliferate in Palestine during the late Amarna period and earlier Nineteenth Dynasty. Similar developments in the northern part of the Sinai, where a network of military posts and fortified wells stretched along the road that connected Egypt with Palestine, have been dated to the reign of Sety I himself. Such facilities for expediting an army’s rapid progress into Asia cannot be unconnected to the contemporary resettlement of Avaris, the old Hyksos stronghold in the eastern Delta. Although it had lain deserted for over two-hundred years, the site’s proximity to the main routes into Asia, by land and sea, could not be ignored in an age of

escalating tension abroad, and it was doubtless for this reason that Horemheb reoccupied it. Later, during the Nineteenth and into the Twentieth Dynasties, it would become famous as the Delta residence of the Ramesside pharaohs, but the place also continued to function as a military outpost and depot even after peace with Hatti reduced the need that had brought it back to life. Sety I played an active role in developing this city, for he began building the great palace and at least one of the temples there. His contribution, though it has been known for some time, deserves more than the usual scant notice it has received, for in its own way it emphasizes something that the first rulers of the Nineteenth Dynasty showed so conspicuously by their policies and in their monuments—namely, their commitment to a revitalized Egyptian empire in Western Asia.

Sety I's management of his foreign policy, then, was not uniquely his own. It grew out of the program, begun by his predecessors, that aimed at strengthening Egypt's control over her Asiatic possessions and seizing opportunities to restore the empire to its former borders. To be effective, this policy required that the vassals be shown, and not simply told, just how strong the pharaoh and his armies really were. Princes with expansionist ambitions had to be kept on a shorter leash than before. Little wars had to be energetically prosecuted, so that no one could doubt the seriousness of Egypt's intentions. Taking back Kadesh and Amurru would be the ultimate test of the empire's renewed vigor. This, as it turned out, was foolhardy. Hatti was only temporarily discomfited by Assyria, and she was no less determined than Egypt to stake her empire's health on its success in central Syria. As we have seen, both sides began by seesawing violently between victory and defeat. In essence, however, this was an inconclusive tussle in which nobody won much for very long. Muwatalli, after losing Kadesh and Amurru to Sety I, would recover them both after the Battle of Kadesh. Ramesses II lost Upe in the wake of his Kadesh campaign, but soon regained it. Later efforts to improve on these positions were unsuccessful, and in the end both sides lapsed into about a decade of cold war. That the stalemate favored Hatti was no real loss for Egypt, since her empire functioned well enough without Kadesh and Amurru. Peace between the two powers was thus inhibited, not by geopolitical issues, but by questions of personal honor, particularly for the pharaoh. Although Egypt could not expect to regain her lost provinces, the point could not be conceded without generating the sort of lingering resentment that had fueled Sety's revanche. Hatti's dynastic troubles, and the way they worked to Egypt's advantage, would eventually break the deadlock. Possession of Urḫi-Teshup was probably what enabled Ramesses II to preserve the appearance of a dictated


12. Ibid., p. 211; compare idem, "Ramasesstadt" in LÄ V 129–30. For fragments from sacred buildings at this site bearing the name of Sety I, see E. Uphill, *The Temples of Per-Ramesses* (Warminster, 1984), pp. 163, 175.


peace. Only after this, with Hatti and Egypt truly in agreement, could the neighboring states of Western Asia also know peace—if only for the short time that remained before the coming of the Sea Peoples would more decisively alter the complexion of the Mediterranean world.

15. That Ramesses had compelled Hattushili III to make peace was standard orthodoxy in Egypt not long after the peace was made. Note the highly rhetorical account of past relations with Hatti that precedes the main account of Ramesses II’s first Hittite marriage, *KRI* I 243–48 = *ANET* 3, pp. 267–68, and compare Kitchen, *Pharaoh Triumphant*, pp. 85–88.
APPENDIX 1

**NT-< MTY = “AGREED ARRANGEMENT”**

The sense of *nt-* as being along the lines of “arrangement,” “prescription,” or “ordinance” was recognized by Gardiner in the pioneering discussion of the Egyptian and Akkadian versions of the Hittite-Egyptian treaty. ¹ *Nt-< mty* he rendered as “regular treaty,” *mty* being translated as “regular,” “normal,” almost “traditional.”² This understanding has been accepted in a number of standard translations and studies of the text.³

If, as Spalinger maintains, the Akkadian version of the treaty goes back to an Egyptian original,⁴ the precise meaning of the Egyptian terms is of some significance. The Akkadian text uses three equivalent words: *rikiltu*, meaning “treaty”;⁵ *šemū*, which is the equivalent of the Egyptian *šḥr*, “plan”;⁶ and *parsu*, meaning “(divine) ordinance.”⁷ Since there is no exact


2. Ibid., p. 189, n. 4.


7. Von Soden, *Akkadisches Handwörterbuch* II 385–86, s.v. *parsu(m)*. As Sürenhagen notes (*Staatsverträge*, p. 82), there is no exact equivalent for this term in Egyptian; and, pace Spalinger
equivalent to the Egyptian passages containing \( nt^-\) \( mty \) and \( shr mty \) in the Akkadian text of the treaty, the meaning of \( mty \) is not necessarily elucidated by any of the other parallel passages: thus, lines 8–9 of the Egyptian text employ \( nt^-\), while the equivalent lines 11–13 of the Akkadian use \( temu \); line 9 of the Egyptian has \( nt^-\), paralleled by lines 14–16 of the Akkadian, which have \( rikiltu \). These different equivalences for \( nt^-\) indicate that it is being interpreted, now literally as “arrangement” (= \( temu \) or \( parsu \)), now more freely as “treaty” (= \( rikiltu \)). As for \( mty \), it is at least possible that (despite the spellings used here) it is to be understood as \( mtr \), yielding a sense such as “the witnessed agreement” or the like. The confusion between \( mty \) and \( mtr \) cannot be discussed here. At present, there is no reason to believe that the spellings in the Hittite-Egyptian treaty reflect such a confusion.

Although the root of \( mty \) is generally regarded as meaning “accurate, exact, right,” the standard dictionaries also allow subsidiary meanings, which suggests that the basic sense still eludes us. In a number of cases in Middle Egyptian, the sense appears to be “recognized,” i.e., “understood” or “agreed upon.” The demotic evidence is also in accord with this rendering, as is a passage from a magical text of the New Kingdom that supports the general sense of volition or agreement that emerges from the demotic legal texts. The conventional translation may also be doubted on internal grounds. In the Hittite treaty, for example, it is unlikely that \( mty \) means “traditional,” for even though this sense could fit the two \( nt^-\) \( mty \) in the past, it does not apply to the \( shr mty \) that is the present treaty. Nor, I believe, do the examples cited for the cases where \( mty \) does mean “usual, customary” carry much weight here, since these apply to things or conditions which occur with some regularity, not to a particular instance such as this one. This objection also applies to another variant of the standard meaning, i.e., “exact, precise”—for while the two rulers could logically say that they act “in just this fashion” (\( mp3y \) \( shr mty \)), it makes less sense to refer to “the precise treaty” that had existed in two earlier periods. All in all, given the parallels from other texts and the requirements in this context, the most suitable translations of these terms is likely to be “arrangement” (\( nt^-\)) or “plan” (\( shr \)) that is “agreed” (\( mty \)) between the contracting parties.

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8. Reflected in the entry at \( Wb. \) II 173.
9. Ibid., p. 173; compare Faulkner, \( CD \), p. 120; J. Osing, \( Die Nominalbildung des Ägyptischen I \) (Mainz, 1976), pp. 149–50; ibid., II 643–51.
10. Ibid., II 643–46.
13. \( KRI \) II 228:1–2.
Sety I alludes to the earliest military activities of his reign on two stelae he set up in the precinct of Amun-Re at Karnak. One of them, found at the temple of Ptah, is dated to "regnal year one" and then proceeds as follows:  

Now, as for the Good God, (he is) great of strength like the Son [of Nut, Montu] being on his right side (and) Re on his left side. It is in order to widen his borders that he goes, his face being great (?) through his two strong arms. No foreign land can stand up before him, being fearful on account of his awesomeness. His renown has encompassed the foreign lands, (who say): "Your divine power is in the hearts of the Nine Bows!"

His Majesty returned, his heart being joyful, from his first campaign of victory, his assault against every foreign land having succeeded. He despoiled the rebellious foreign lands by means of the strength of his father Amun, who ordained for him valor and victory, and who has placed him in front of him. His heart is joyful while performing [wond]ers (?) on behalf of his son and bequeathing to him Upper and Lower Egypt, west and east united. The one who violates his frontier is placed in his grasp. No one can oppose him. Their chiefs are brought as living captives, their tribute on their backs, presenting them to his august father Amun together with his Ennead, in order to fill their storehouses with male and female slaves, being the spoil of every foreign land.

Now His Majesty (was) at the town of "The Southern City" (= Thebes), performing what his father, Amun-Re, Lord of the Thrones of the Two Lands praises. Gathered together (are) the chief[tains (?)], ... peace ...

3. The position of the *wr*-biliteral at the top of the group suggests a writing of the plural, such as in ibid., pls. 14:27, 32:37, and 36:34.
The other memorial from Karnak, the Alabaster stela, is dated to II $3ht$ 1, in the first regnal year. Less specific than the stela from the Ptah temple, its warlike rhetoric is nonetheless cut from the same cloth as the fulsome praises that surround it—the king being "one who widens his borders and subdues the land of the Asiatics; (he is) the solar disk, shining at the head of his army, their hearts being filled with the greatness of his strength." The monument commemorates the making for him (= Amun) of a great and noble stela out of pure alabaster at the front of the Mansion of the Prince—a place of appearances for the Majesty of Re, in order to proclaim Re-Harakhti—which His Majesty made with a loving heart in the house of his father Amun, inasmuch as he has given to him the duration of Re and the kingship of Atum, fixed and enduring on the noble Ished Tree in the Mansion of the Benben which is in Heliopolis ...

To what, however, do these two dates refer? The stela from the Ptah temple mentions no fewer than three episodes: the campaign, Sety's return to Egypt, and his presence at Thebes. The date could refer to any one of these, or to all three. On the Alabaster stela, although there are also three events to which the dateline might refer, they are more restricted in time—for the “making” of the stela, on a particular day of a specific month in year one, must refer either to the decree ordaining its manufacture, the date of its completion, or the day on which it was set up at Karnak. Fortunately, neither of these documents is unique. On comparing them with many similar monuments, we may be able to suggest a solution that grows out of the way datelines are used on the monuments themselves.

A number of ancient Egyptian documents record the performance of a certain action on a specific date. In most of these cases, the date and titulary of the king are followed by the expression $hrw$ $pn$, "(on) this day," or by another expression which demonstrates the connection. Subsequent episodes recorded in such documents are of secondary interest, for the


5. The documents selected range in date from the Second Intermediate Period to the end of the New Kingdom. For convenience, they are cited in the handiest publications, e.g., *HHBT* (= W. Helck, *Historisch-biographische Texte der 2. Zwischenzeit und neue Texte der 18. Dynastie, Kleine Ägyptische Texte* [Wiesbaden, 1975]), *Urk.* IV and KRI, with other literature being referred to whenever necessary. Dockets and other short entries in which the relationship between date and action is clearly spelled out have been omitted from this sampling.

6. For example: *HHBT*, pp. 46–47 (inscription of Sobekhotep VIII, recording his visit to the flooded Karnak temple on the fifth epagomenal day of IV $smw$ in his fourth regnal year); ibid., pp. 100–03 (transfer of property on behalf of queen Ahmose-Nofretari on IV $3ht$ 7 in an unknown year of Ahmose); *Urk.* IV 1885–86 (record of a royal audience on an unknown day in II $3ht$ under Amenhotep III); ibid., pp. 1965–80 (earlier proclamation on IV $Prt$ 13 of Akhenaten's year 5); ibid., pp. 2013 (activity in the palace at Memphis on IV $3ht$ 19 under Tutankhamun, possibly in his first regnal year, and perhaps the date on which the restoration decree was issued [= ibid., pp. 2025–31]); ibid., pp. 2078 (royal decree on III $smw$ 16 of an unknown year of Tutankhamun); ibid., p. 2109 (royal decree on III $smw$ 1 of Tutankhamun's third year); *KRI* I 3–4 (private donation on I $smw$ 10 in Ramesses I's first regnal year); ibid., pp. 11–12 (announcement of a rebellion on III $smw$ 10 in year 1 of Sety I); ibid., p. 16 (announcement of a rebellion on an unknown date in the reign of Sety I); ibid., pp. 37–38 (royal decree issued at Memphis on the last day of III $smw$ in Sety I's first regnal year); ibid., pp. 65–67 (visit by Sety I to the area around Wadi Mia on III $smw$ 20 in his ninth regnal year); ibid., p. 79
main emphasis is placed on the first (dated) decree. A far greater number of documents lack the specifying formula "(on) this day," but their contents record events that can be reasonably connected to the initial date. Many of these documents are decrees (defined by the formula wddnswt, "royal ordinance," or a variant thereof). Others are private legal documents, issued under the royal aegis. Still others are couched in a manner that suggests a connection between the date and the action (or actions) involved. One subgenre in this category is what is known as the "Königsnoelle," whereby the king holds an audience on a certain day, summons his courtiers, and announces his plans, often in highly rhetorical language. It can be safely assumed in these cases that the royal audience and the resulting decree are to be dated identically, unless the text provides reason to believe otherwise. By extension, the consecutive operations recorded in occasional memorials such as quarrying inscriptions or grants of royal favor are so closely connected that it seems certain that they occurred in close proximity to one another during the regnal year to which they are assigned.

Many other inscriptions, however, record a number of episodes, all under the heading of a single date. Sometimes, as in Sety I's stela from the Ptah temple at Karnak, this date is simply a regnal year date that, to all appearances, embraces all the activities described in the text. Such documents, giving only the regnal year without the month or the day, are relatively few. Some examples follow.

1. Victory stelae of Kamose.

Following the date, "regnal year 3," and the royal titulary, the narrative can be broken down into the following sections:

a. The royal audience: Kamose announces his intentions;

(q quarrying record from an unknown year of Sety I); ibid., II 226 ff. (Hittite treaty of Ramesses II; date of the arrival of the Hittite envoy bearing the silver tablet of the treaty); ibid., 369–71 (burial dates of the sacred bulls in the sixteenth, twenty-sixth, and thirtieth years of Ramesses II); ibid., pp. 803–06 (judicial proceedings on II 3ht 14 in Ramesses II's forty-sixth year); ibid., pp. 361 ff. (Manshiyet es-Sadr stela; date of Ramesses II's promenade prior to achievement of works mentioned later in the text); ibid., III 464–65 (oracle delivered on III 3ht 25 in Ramesses II's fourteenth regnal year); ibid., V 228 (royal commission issued on III Prt 8 of Ramesses III's sixth year); ibid., p. 230 (activity in Memphis on I smw 24 of year 1[4] + x under Ramesses III); ibid., VI 283 (oracle delivered on III <3ht > 8 in the seventh year of Ramesses VI).


8. For example, HHBT, pp. 11–12, 18–19, 73–74, 122–26, 130, 133 (top, no. 140), 142; U RK. IV 45–49, 193–96, 832, 1737, 2170–71; KRI I 45, 46–58 (at p. 50:12–13), 73 (bottom, no. 36), 74, 85–96 (Nile stelae of Sety I, Ramesses II, Merneptah, and Ramesses III at West Silsila); ibid., II 362–63; ibid., IV 73–74; ibid., V 231, 234–37; ibid., VI 10, 12.

9. E.g., HHBT, pp. 65–69 (the "stele juridique" from Karnak).


12. HHBT, pp. 82–97.
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b. The campaign up to Nefrusi;
c. Kamose’s boastful speech to the Hyksos king;
d. The campaign up to Avaris;
e. The intercepted message of the Hyksos king to the son of the Kushite ruler, and Kamose’s final harrying of the northern country;
f. Kamose and his army arrive in Thebes during the inundation season;
g. Kamose commands the seal bearer Nesha to have his deeds recorded on a public monument.

2. Records of the first Hittite marriage of Ramesses II.13

Following the date, “regnal year 34,” and the king’s titulary, there is a long rhetorical introduction dwelling on the prowess of the king and alluding to his past triumphs. The narrative begins:

a. The Hittite ruler appeals to the king of Egypt for peace “year by year,” but to no avail;
b. Seeing the devastation of his country, the Hittite ruler summons his army and announces his decision to send his daughter to Egypt;
c. News of these events reaches Egypt, and Ramesses makes arrangements to receive the wedding party;
d. Ramesses prays to Seth to ensure good weather for the arriving delegation, and Seth responds favorably;
e. Arrival of the wedding party at Piramesse in “regnal year 34, III Prt”; presentation of the Hittite princess at court;
f. Final state of accord between Egypt and Hatti.

3. Inscription of the first Libyan war of Ramesses III.14

The date, “regnal year 5,” is followed by the king’s full titulary and a long section in praise of his might; then:

a. The plans of the Libyan coalition;
b. Previous arrangements in Libya, frustrated by the present rebellion;
c. Ramesses III defeats the rebellious Libyans;
d. The expedition’s triumphant return to Egypt;
e. Misery of the vanquished Libyans;

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f. Defeat of the "northern countries" (actually, in Ramesses III's eighth regnal year);
g. Final glorification of the king.

4. Inscription of Ramesses III's war against the Sea Peoples.\footnote{Ibid., pls. 45-B, 46.}

After the date, "year 8," there is the usual sequence of titles, names, and rhetoric in praise of the king, followed by:
a. The advance of the Sea Peoples' confederation;
b. Ramesses' preparations by land and sea;
c. Defeat of the invaders;
d. Praises of the champion king.

Most of these narratives could fit quite plausibly within the regnal year that initiates the inscription. The military accounts of Kamose and Ramesses III might be compared with the year annals of Thutmose III, in which the events of the year's campaigning are described under the heading of only one regnal year.\footnote{Urk. IV 685–721 (=fifth through fourteenth campaigns).} The events on the "Marriage stela," also, could all have taken place within the same regnal year—for since the \textit{terminus ante quem} is the arrival in Piramesse of the Hittite marriage party in III \textit{Prt} of year 34, its dispatch from Hatti should also fall within that year even if the month's duration of the journey between Hatti and Egypt were doubled.\footnote{On the duration of this journey, see Edel, "Weitere Briefe aus der Heiratskorrespondenz Ramses' II.: \textit{KUB} III 37 + \textit{KBo} I 17 und \textit{KUB} III 57," in \textit{Geschichte und Altes Testament}, Beiträge zur historischen Theologie 16 (Tübingen, 1953), p. 54. The change in the regnal year under Ramesses II, hence his accession date, has been sought either in the earlier part of the season of 3\textit{ht} (John Larson, "The Date of the Regnal Year Change in the Reign of Ramesses II," \textit{Serapis} 3 [1975–76]:17–22; compare E. F. Wente and C. C. Van Siclen III, "A Chronology of the New Kingdom," in \textit{Fs. Hughes}, p. 234) or near the end of III \textit{šmwt} (W. Helck, "Bemerkungen zu den Thronbesteigungsdaten im Neu en Reich," \textit{Studia Biblica et Orientalia} III: \textit{Oriens Antiquus}, Analecta Biblica 12 [Rome, 1959], pp. 118–20); compare Krauss, \textit{Das Ende der Amarnazeit}, pp. 185–86; Kitchen, \textit{Pharaoh Triumphant}, p. 248, bottom; and Jac. J. Janssen, "Absence from Work by the Necropolis Workmen of Thebes," \textit{SAK} 8 [1980]: 132–33, with n. 22, explicitly critical of Larson's argument). I still find Larson's case for an accession date in 3\textit{ht} more persuasive than the criticisms that have been leveled at it. In any case, though, neither of these dates falls anywhere near the period during which the events described in the Marriage stela took place. Even if the Hittite wedding party took all of three months to reach Piramesse in III \textit{Prt}, it would still have set out in Ramesses II's thirty-fourth regnal year.} The observable regularity in the use of regnal year dates in such long narrative inscriptions, however, is seemingly disrupted by the injection of events from Ramesses III's eighth year into his inscription of year 5. This insertion does not compromise the value of the main text. In fact, it is useful, for it shows that both historical inscriptions were composed and executed following the occurrence of events described in the later narrative. Nonetheless, the mere presence of this material in the inscription of year 5, undistinguishable by any internal criteria from the rest of its contents, raises the possibility that events described in other
narratives (dated to a specific regnal year) might also fall outside the regnal year cited. Kamose’s commissioning of his victory stelae, for instance, could have fallen sometime after the campaign’s end, even in a subsequent regnal year—in our ignorance of Kamose’s accession date and of the immediate sequence of events following his return home, we cannot prove that it did not.

Facing the uncertainties, however, need not result in critical paralysis. The intrusion of later events into the narrative dated to Ramesses III’s fifth year, at any rate, is easily identifiable from other reliefs and inscriptions at Medinet Habu.¹⁸ Nothing of the sort is found in the inscription of year 8, nor can it be demonstrated from anything in the Kamose stelae. Lacking any evidence to the contrary, it is perhaps wisest to opt for the most straightforward explanation that is open to us, unless there is good reason to believe otherwise.¹⁹

To go beyond this, by assuming long intervals between the events on these documents without any internal or external basis for doing so, involves questionable methodology that can only lead to historical fantasy.

Another, more plentiful class of documents are those which are dated to a single day within the regnal year. This date can refer to only one of the several events described, and in the absence of the specifying “(on) this day ...,” it is not always clear how the choice can be made.

5. Inscription of Thutmose I from Seheli.²⁰

“Regnal year 3, I šm 22 under the Majesty of the King of Upper and Lower Egypt, Okheperkare, given life. His Majesty commanded the excavation of this canal, after he had found it blocked with stones, (and) no [boat could] sail [on it]. He went north on it ...”

To what does the dateline refer—the commanding of this task, or its completion? Two other inscriptions from this region supply the answer. Both are dated to I šm 22 in year 3, one stating that “his Majesty returned from Kush, (and) from having overthrown [his] opponent[s]”;²¹ and the other, “His Majesty’s navigation of this canal, in victory and in might, in his returning from overthrowing vile Kush.”²² The war had itself been commemorated over seven months

18. Quarrying for the Medinet Habu temple of Ramesses III began in the very year of his first war against the Libyans; see Champollion, Notice, I 255-57; LD VI, p. 23:6-8; and BAR IV 11-12 (sections 19-20). The carving of this inscription must have followed by some time the events it describes; and the intrusion of the events of year 8 into it reflects only its later composition, after the war with the Sea Peoples had been won. It would seem that most of the work on the Great Temple at Medinet Habu was done in the second half of Ramesses III’s first decade, an impression reinforced by the carving of the year 11 victory festival over the Meshwesh over an earlier part of the calendar (see KRI V 172-73). On all this, compare K. C. Seele, “Some Remarks on the Family of Ramesses III,” in Fs. Grapow, p. 308.

19. For instance, the earlier conditions alluded to by Ramesses II (above, p. 78, 2-a) and by Ramesses III (3-b), which must precede the year of the main narrative.

20. Urk. IV 89-90.

21. Ibid., p. 88 bottom.

22. Ibid., p. 89 top.
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previously, in a rhetorical inscription at Tombos dated to Thutmose I's second year, II 3ḥt 15.\(^{23}\)

The king probably issued the necessary orders on his way south, allowing the canal to be cleared while he was in Nubia. In any event, the date on the Sehel inscription clearly refers to the second of the two events mentioned, i.e., the king's passage through the cleared canal, not to the decree that had commanded the work.

6. Inscription of Thutmose II on the road between Aswan and Philae.\(^{24}\)
   a. Date, "regnal year 1, II 3ḥt 8," and royal titulary;
   b. The king is in his palace, receiving tribute from the Asiatics;
   c. Announcement of the rebellion in Nubia;
   d. Furious reaction of the king;
   e. "Then His Majesty dispatched many troops to Nubia on his first occasion of victory ...";
   f. "Then this army of His Majesty reached vile Kush ...";
   g. "And this army of His Majesty overthrew these foreigners ...";
   h. "Now His Majesty is arisen on the dais while the living captives which this army brought to His Majesty were dragged in ...";
   i. Triumph of Thutmose I ascribed to the favor of Amun.

7. Sehel inscription of Thutmose III.\(^{25}\)
   Dated "year 50, I šmw 22," this text closely parallels the earlier memorial of Thutmose I: "His Majesty commanded the excavation of this canal ... He sailed north on it ..." By analogy with the earlier inscription, the date here should refer to the king's navigation of the canal rather than his command that it be cleared.

8. Stelae of Amenhotep II at Amada and Elephantine.\(^{26}\)
   a. Date, "year 3, III šmw 15" (A), followed by titulary and praises of the king (A and E);
   b. "Now His Majesty is embellishing (snfr) this temple that his father, the King of Upper and Lower Egypt, Menkheperre, made for his fathers, all the gods ...";
   c. Description of Amenhotep II's works in the temple;
   d. "Now His Majesty causes this stela to be made, it being set up in this temple at the Station of the Lord, L.P.H., carved with the great name of the Lord of the Two Lands, the Son of Re, Amenhotep II, in the house of his fathers, the gods,\(^{27}\) after the return of

26. Ibid., pp. 1287-99 = parallel texts of the tablets at Amada (A) and Elephantine (E).
27. Thus A; E has "in the house of his father Khnum, lord of the subterranean waters (qḥḥw)."
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His Majesty from Upper Retchenu, after he had overthrown his enemies while broadening the boundaries of Egypt on his first campaign of victory. His Majesty returned... when he had killed the seven chiefs... who had been in the district of Takhsy, (they) being placed upside down on the prow of the falcon ship of His Majesty... And the six men among these opponents were hung in front of the rampart of Thebes, the hands as well; the other enemy was brought south to Nubia, being hung from the rampart of Napata..."

e. Colophon to the Elephantine stela, dated "year 4," recording a decree for additional improvements in the temple of Khnum.

The meaning of the datelines on both stelae is supported both by the traces of the date on the Elephantine stela and by the date of its colophon, which one would expect to be subsequent to the provisions outlined in the main text. I have already discussed in detail my reasons for believing that the initial date on both stelae refers to the ordering of the stated improvements in both temples (sections b and c) rather than the actual emplacement of the stelae. Since Amenhotep II's "first campaign of victory" took place in his seventh regnal year, the passage that describes how the stela was set up after the first campaign is a digression. It is distinguished from what precedes not only by the length, specificity, and subject of the narrative, but also by its elaborate account of the circumstances surrounding the erection of the stela. Similar passages in other inscriptions are short and go no further than to record the king's command for the making of a stela. Thus, although it is an outside source that supplies, once again, the proof for the separation of the principal episodes in the text, this separation is also indicated internally—not by means of a dateline, but by a detailed account of the circumstances that would have been readily understood by near contemporaries.

9. Sphinx stela of Thutmose IV.

a. Date, "regnal year 1, III 3ḥt 19," and titles of the king;

b. Praises of the king;

c. The king's youth, and his habit of taking exercise in the pyramid fields near Memphis;

d. Prince Thutmose's dream;

e. Awakening and pious response of prince;

29. Ibid., p. 1299.
32. I.e., HHBT, p. 97 (Kamose stela): Urk. IV 675:5 + 1232:11-12 (references to stelae on the Euphrates), 1283:12-14, 1662:12 (visits to sites of stelae commissioned in respective texts); compare ibid., II 153-54 (Decree of Canopus). For private memorials see, for example, ibid., IV 133:13; Berlin, Staatliche Museen, Ägyptische Inschriften aus den Königlichen Museen zu Berlin II (Leipzig, 1924), p. 161:13.
33. Urk. IV 1540-44.
Since there appears not to have been coregency of Thutmose IV with his father, Amenhotep II,\textsuperscript{34} the date must refer to the realization of the pious intentions outlined in the penultimate section of the text, which took place only when the Sphinx’s prophecy had come to pass, i.e., when Thutmose IV had become king (referred to, very probably, in the final, broken lines of the inscription).

10. Konosso stela of Thutmose IV.\textsuperscript{35}
   a. Date, “regnal year 8, III \textit{Prt} 2,” and titles of king;
   b. “Now His Majesty was in the Southern City, at the town of Karnak,” sacrificing to the gods;
   c. Announcement of the rebellion in Nubia;
   d. Oblation to Amun on the next morning;
   e. Sending of the army to crush the rebellion;
   f. The king sets off for Nubia “after this”;
   g. Stop at Edfu for the festival of “washing the image”;
   h. The king joins the army and locates the Nubian enemy;
   i. Finale (text breaks off).

11. Aswan stela of Amenhotep III.\textsuperscript{36}
   a. Date, “year 5, III \textit{3ht} 2,” and titles of king;
   b. Announcement of the rebellion in Nubia;
   c. Suppression of the revolt;
   d. Praises of the victorious king.

Prima facie, it would appear that the dateline is connected with the formula that immediately follows it (\textit{h\textasciitilde t hr hm n Hr} = “appearance by the Majesty of Horus,” i.e., Amenhotep III). But when did this “appearance” take place? The earlier inscription in which this formula was used (see no. 6 above) describes a Nubian campaign under Thutmose II, culminating in the royal victory celebration at the end of the war (\textit{Urk. IV} 137:10, 140:15–141:4). Even though it is not stated, it seems likely that the dateline refers to this climactic event; and this might also be true in this case, as in so many others where the commemorative monument was clearly made after the end of the war. Unfortunately, we have no way of

\textsuperscript{34} Mumane, \textit{Ancient Egyptian Coregencies}, pp. 117–23.
\textsuperscript{35} \textit{Urk. IV} 1545–48.
\textsuperscript{36} Ibid., pp. 1665–66.
\textsuperscript{37} Gardiner, EG § 39 (bottom), with references.
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establishing when Amenhotep III's campaign in Nubia ended, though it seems probable that the dateline of this stela refers to that end. Another stela, on an island in the First Cataract, at Konosso, describes "His Majesty's return, having triumphed in his campaign of victory, from the land of vile Kush ... (and) he establishes the stela of victories at the limit of (r-mn) the Fountain of Horus." Given the proximity of these two monuments, both from Amenhotep III's fifth year and in the same region, it seems likely that they were set up on the same occasion, i.e., the return of the expedition from Nubia, and that both datelines refer to this event.


a. Dated "regnal year 36, II Prt 9" of Amenhotep III;

b. "Now His Majesty (was) in the Southern City, [on the weste]rn [si]de of Thebes. Now it was commissioned unto" Amenmose "to pro[vide turquo]ise, as His Majesty was anticipating a Jubilee";

c. "And [there took place the da]wn of the last day of [...] now [Amenmose set out (?)]";

d. Account of favorable reception of the mining expedition by Hathor, goddess of Sinai;

e. Praises of Amenmose;

f. Previous experience and rewarding of Amenmose by the king;

g. Departure of Amenmose by sea for Egypt;

h. Safe arrival of the expedition at Thebes.

The proper interpretation of this record is made difficult by the very poor preservation of some of its most important lines. It has been demonstrated, however, that the last day of Amenhotep III's Jubilee fell on III šmw 2, and that it had begun on IV Prt 26, just over two months earlier. Although the commissioning of the expedition did not take place during this festival, either on the second or the third celebration by Amenhotep III, however, the dateline could still refer to the date of that commission at Thebes: a few other inscriptions at Sinai lend themselves to just that interpretation; although, since they lack the specifying formula "(on)
APPENDIX 2

this day ...,” these passages could as easily describe the earlier events that led up to a (dated) event in Sinai itself. A useful control, however, can be found in the inscriptions from the Wádi Hammâmât in the second year of Nebtowyre (Montuhotep “IV”). The two “official” tablets begin with a dateline (II 3ht 15), followed at once by a statement of the royal commission. While it would be logical to connect the two, internal evidence in these narratives, as well as the testimony of related monuments nearby, shows that the dateline refers to something that took place in the Wádi Hammâmât itself. On II 3ht 3 occurred the miracle of the pregnant gazelle, at the site of the yet unquarried sarcophagus lid. The dedication of the stelae on II 3ht 15 corresponds to the “bringing” of the sarcophagus itself, followed by the extraction of the lid on II 3ht 27. In this case it is clear the opening dateline refers, not to the royal commission, but to the day on which the memorial was left on the site. The same is likely to be true for many other inscriptions at Sinai and the Wádi Hammâmât. By analogy, the dateline on Amenmose’s stela could also refer to the date on which he left his memorial at Sinai, rather than to the previous royal commands or to the clearly prospective account of his return to Egypt (sections g and h above).

13. Nubian war stelae of Akhenaten (at Buhen and Amada). Both these stelae were found, not at the Egyptian border, but in Nubia. If they were so situated to commemorate an Egyptian victory not far away (as seems likely), this implies further

a. Dates: “[regnal year 1]2, III 3ht 20” (at Buhen), but “[regnal year ...], I 3ht 13” (Amada)

b. The king is in [his palace];
c. Announcement of the rebellion;
d. Commissioning of the viceroy Thutmose to suppress the revolt;
e. Victory over the enemy;
f. Booty from the war;
g. Speech of the viceroy and paean to the king.

Both these stelae were found, not at the Egyptian border, but in Nubia. If they were so situated to commemorate an Egyptian victory not far away (as seems likely), this implies further

46. Ibid., no. 110.
47. Ibid., no. 113:13.
48. Ibid., colophon to no. 192. For translations of all these inscriptions and references to the publications, see W. Schenkel, Memphis, Herakleopolis, Theben, AA 12 (1965), pp. 263-69.
50. Thus Smith, Fortress, p. 126, n. 1; compare A. R. Schulman, “The Nubian War of Akhenaton,” in L’Égyptologie en 1979, p. 301, n. 16—both on the date of the Buhen stela. My examination of the published facsimile suggests that “year 13, IV 3ht” is also a possible restoration of the date, and may even be preferred if the spacing of the numerals is assumed to have been consistent. Could the date on the Amada stela have been the same, i.e., [II]I 3ht 20 (damaged, hence misread “13”)? For a different solution, see Helck, “Ein ‘Feldzug’ unter Amenophis IV. gegen Nubien,” SAK 8 (1980):118.
that the datelines (if these are in fact different dates for what appears to be the same text) refer to some event which took place following the end of the hostilities.

14. Records of Sety I’s Nubian war from Sai and Amara West.51
   a. Date, “regnal year 8, […] Prt 20,”52 and royal titulary;
   b. The king is in Thebes;
   c. Announcement of the rebellion;
   d. Sending of the expedition to Nubia;
   e. “The army of His Majesty reached the fortress (named) <Pacifier of the Two Lands> on <III> Prt 13; one joined with them, the might of the Pharaoh (being) before them like a blast of fire, trampling the hills. (When) the dawn of seven days had come to pass, the might of Menma‘atre was carrying them off, not one of them being missing … (but) he had captured the six wells,” etc.;53
   f. Booty from the campaign.

A literal reading of the passage dealing with the victory (e above) suggests that the hostilities were finished in less than seven days after the expeditionary force had arrived at the fortress. It would be tempting to read the opening dateline as [III] Prt 20, making it the climactic final day of the war, but this is quite uncertain.

15. Libyan victory stela of Merneptah (= “Israel Stela”).54
   a. Date, “year 5, III $mw\ 3,” and titulary of the king;
   b. Glorification of Merneptah;
   c. Paean on the defeat of the Libyans;
   d. Rejoicing in Egypt;
   e. Triumph of Egypt over all foreign lands.

51. KRI I 102-04; compare ibid., VII 8-11.
52. See Appendix 4 for discussion of the year numeral.
53. To the references in n. 51 add the facsimile of the Sai stela by Jean Vercoutter, “Le pays d’Irem et la première pénétration égyptienne en Afrique,” in Livre du Centenaire IFAO, 1880-1980, MIFAO 104 (1980), p. 159, fig. 1. The name of the fortress could be sgr or $gr[ch t3wy]. See Wb. IV 324:7 for this expression, but compare Vercoutter, “Le pays d’Irem,” p. 166, n. 1. In the dateline that follows, two out of the three ticks are visible, and the spacing strongly suggests “III”; the month-name and day-numeral are both clear. (On p. 158 of “Le pays d’Irem,” Vercoutter unaccountably reads ssw 21; on the drawing, however, it is clearly sswفع.) For ts see Wb. V 398:9.
54. KRI IV 13-19.
16. Libyan victory columns of Merneptah. 55
   a. Date, “year 5, II šmw,” and titles of king;
   b. Announcement of the rebellion;
   c. Sending of the army;
   d. Final tally of Libyan casualties.

17. Another Libyan war stela of Merneptah. 56
   a. Date, “year 5, III šmw 3,” and titles of king;
   b. Praises of the victorious Merneptah;
   c. Tally of the spoils.

Documents 15–17 supplement the main account of Merneptah’s Libyan wars from Karnak, which dates the crucial battle of the campaign to III šmw 5; but the expedition must already have been in progress during the previous month, as is evident from the account of its activities prior to the beginning of III šmw, including the notice of its preparations “to join battle in fourteen days.” 57 The date in II šmw on the victory columns (no. 16) must then refer to the start of the war—the announcement of the invasion and the measures taken to cope with it—as other writers have already suspected. 58

18. Stelae of the Nubian war of Merneptah. 59
   a. Date, “year 6, I ḫt 1,” and titulary of king;
   b. Announcement of the rebellion;
   c. “Regnal year 5, III šmw 1, corresponding to the return of the valiant army of His Majesty which had smitten the vile chieftain of Libya”; wretched fate of the Libyans, “the remainder being placed on the stick at the south of Memphis”;
   d. “The fierce lion sent the fiery blast of his mouth against the land of Wawat ...”;
   e. Devastation of the rebels, to ensure that no similar revolt would occur again;
   f. Final praises of the king.

55. Ibid., pp. 23–24, 38.
56. Ibid., pp. 19–22.
57. See ibid., p. 5:8–6:2.
59. KRI IV 33–37.
Some confusion arises here from the dating of the return of the victorious army from Libya, which, as we have seen, could not have been on III šmw 1, as described here (see nos. 15, 17). Assuming that the victory celebrations at Memphis took place in the harvest season, however, the dateline in year 6 must still fall over a year later, near the very end of the regnal year. While the sequence of the text could imply that the army went directly to Nubia after it had finished with the Libyans, the allusion might simply be a reminder of its recent, conspicuous triumph. There is thus no clear indication as to whether the dateline refers to the beginning of the Nubian war or its end.

19. Victory stela of Sethnakht from Elephantine.
   a. Titulary of the king;
   b. Rhetorical account of Egypt's sorry condition;
   c. "[Regnal year] 2, II šmw 10: there are no opponents of His Majesty, L.P.H., in all the lands";
   d. Rhetorical finale.

20. Inscription of Ramesses III's second Libyan war.
   a. Date, "year 11, IV šmw 10 + x," and titulary of king;
   b. "Beginning of the victory of Egypt," followed by praises of the king;
   c. Antecedents of the war;
   d. The expedition sets out;
   e. Capture of the Libyan chieftain and victory of the Egyptians;
   f. Flight and wretched condition of the Meshwesh Libyans;
   g. Triumph of Ramesses III and his speech to his court.

21. Another inscription of the second Libyan war.
   a. Date, "year 11, II Prt 8," and titulary of the king;
   b. Praises of the king and reflections on the abjectness of the foreign countries;
   c. More rhetoric, including an allusion to the first Libyan war;
   d. The second invasion from Libya;
   e. The father of the captured Libyan chief is tricked, and the Libyans are routed;

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60. For the accession day of Merneptah in the early part of the season of 3ḥt, see Wente and Van Sicle in Fs. Hughes, p. 235, and n. 106.
63. Ibid., II 83–86.
f. Rejoicing in Egypt and praises of the king.

In addition to these two dates referring to the war in Ramesses III's eleventh year, there is yet another; namely, a festival day in the calendar of feasts at Medinet Habu—"regnal year 11, first month of 3ht, day 28: the destroy[ing] of the land of the Meshwesh which King Ramesses III did." Since Ramesses III's accession date (and thus the change in regnal year) fell on I šmw 26, these three dates can be placed in their proper sequence:

IV šmw 10 + x (= no. 20)
I 3ht 28 (= Feast of Victory)
II Prt 8 (= no. 21).

Since the first dateline (no. 20) is immediately followed by the phrase, "beginning of the victory of Egypt," it seems not merely impressionistic to place the outbreak of the war here. The Feast of Victory falls one and a half months later, time enough to take it at its face value as the actual date of the Libyans' defeat. Four and a half months later—nearly seven months after the start of the war—Ramesses III had settled the affairs of Libya and was able to celebrate the public triumph that is alluded to, albeit rhetorically, in the first inscription (no. 20-g) and implied in the second (no. 21-f).

This selection of documents, while hardly exhausting the sum of dated inscriptions by New Kingdom pharaohs, illustrates the way in which a single date can precede a narrative with more than one episode. There are also many texts in which a specific dateline is assigned, not to a sequence of events, but to an entirely rhetorical composition. Of these, two are interesting enough to merit discussion.

22. Armant stela of Thutmose III.

a. Titulary, followed by date and introduction, "Regnal year 22, II Prt 10: collection of the occasions of valor and victory which this Good God made, consisting of every effective occasion of energetic action (sp nb mnḫ n prj-')";

b. Generalized deeds of valor; the king splits a copper target;

c. Triumphs at hunting: (i) general; (ii) the elephant hunt at Niya, on the king's return from Naharin; (iii) the rhinoceros hunts in the deserts of Nubia;

d. Expeditions to Djahy: (i) [date? =], the Megiddo campaign; (ii) date, "regnal year 29, IV Prt 10 + x." The remainder of the stela is broken away.

The individual events referred to in this "collection" were grouped under several topical headings. The initial date relates specifically to none of them, although it has been suggested as

64. KRI V 173.
65. Ibid., p. 140 bottom.
66. E.g., Urk. IV 82–85, 806–10, 1228–43; HHBT, p. 143; KRI I 97–98, 100, 117; ibid., II 150, 224, 262, 337; ibid., IV 73; ibid., V 231, 239; ibid., VI 17, 227.
67. Urk. IV 144–47.
THE ROAD TO KADESH

the date on which Thutmose III assumed sole rule in Egypt, after the death of his senior coregent and aunt, Hatshepsut.68 Each of the sections that follow has its own internal consistency: they are not arranged in chronological order, nor is it certain that the same rules govern the internal arrangement of each section. Thus, while the expeditions to Djahy (= d) seem to be in proper order,69 this is not at all clear in the preceding section on hunting (= c). Here, the Asiatic elephant hunt from year 3370 is placed before the rhinoceros hunt during Thutmose III’s “first campaign of victory” in Nubia.71 If we are to understand the principles at work in the composition of the Armant stela’s text, it is necessary to know when Thutmose III dated his first Nubian war.

Thutmose III’s “first campaign” in Nubia has been variously dated by scholars. Some have proposed that it was reckoned as the campaign led during the king’s minority, in the time of Hatshepsut.72 This possibility cannot be set aside at present, but—contrary to the case that had been made for it—no support can be sought in the Armant stela: not only has the topical arrangement of episodes in this document been overlooked, but a false chronological significance had been assumed from the fact that the Nubian war (in section c-iii) is described here before the Megiddo campaign of year 22 (in section d-i), even though the reference to this Nubian war is itself preceded by an allusion to Thutmose III’s eighth campaign, in year 33 (= section c-iii). Earlier scholars tended to place the first Nubian campaign late in Thutmose III’s reign—as late as his forty-seventh year,73 the date of the Gebel Barkal stela.74 This assumes, however, that the stela at Gebel Barkal is to be identified as the stela mentioned in the Armant text, where it is said that “he (= Thutmose III) set up his stela there (= in the Nubian country of Mjw) as he had done behind [the Euphrates].” 75 This wording, if it reflects a historical sequence, would indeed place the campaign sometime after year 33, and the chronological consistency of each section of the Armant stela would be maintained. Säve-Söderbergh’s observation preceded, however, the discovery of the “stelae” that were dedicated at the southern boundary of Egyptian territory in Nubia at Kurgüs.76 The inscription Thutmose III left on the rocky hill of Hagar el-Merwa, beside the equally crude memorial of Thutmose I, is undated. At the lower right, however (under a figure of a lion that has a cartouche with the throne-name of Thutmose I in front of it) there is small, badly damaged inscription: “regnal year

69. I.e., the Megiddo campaign of year 22 (the starting date for which could be broken away on the stela; compare Urk. IV 1246:13; and Drower in The Temples of Armant, p. 183) is followed by the fifth campaign (Urk. IV 685–88).
71. Ibid., pp. 1247 (bottom), 1248.
74. Urk. IV 1228 ff.
75. Ibid., p. 1246:5.
35 under the Majesty [of the King of Upper and Lower Egypt, the Lord of the Two Lands (?),
Menkheperre, ruler of] Thebes,” i.e., Thutmose III. While this date for Thutmose III’s “first
campaign” would also support the chronological integrity of the Armant stela’s sections,
however, this identification is not at all certain. Based on its location, the inscription could have
been added to the memorials on the Hagar el-Merwa; and there is nothing to show this was done
at the same time Thutmose III added his own “stela” beside that of his grandfather. Moreover,
the tribute of Kush and Wawat makes its appearance in Thutmose III’s annals as of year 31, while
a son of the ruler of Irem was brought as a hostage to Egypt in year 34. If Egyptian
military action prompted these gestures, Thutmose III’s campaign is as likely an occasion as
any. Although a firm date still eludes us, the king’s “first campaign” (numbered, as with his
Asiatic wars, after his accession to sole rule) is likely to have fallen between years 25 and 31,
perhaps in one of the years the Egyptian army did not invade Retchenu. With reference to the
Armant stela, this probable dating makes it even likelier that the atemporality of the
composition as a whole extends to its individual sections as well.

23. Aswan stela of Ramesses II.

a. Date, “year 2, III šnw 26,” and titles of the king;

b. Rhetorical text, speaking of his victories over “Asiatics ..., foreigners of the North ..., Libyans ..., ” and also “warriors of the Sea (in or threatening?) Lower Egypt”;

c. Giving praise by an official.

While the dateline probably refers to the ex-voto left in the quarries near Aswan, the
fulsome phrases that intervene are of unusual interest in mentioning the first dated eruption of
the Sea Peoples into the Mediterranean world. The Egyptians’ first brush with them must have
preceeded this date, falling earlier in the time of Ramesses II or near the very end of Sety I’s reign.

excludes any other king of the Eighteenth Dynasty apart from Amenhotep III, who is less likely than
Thutmose III in the region. According to PM VII, “immovable” monuments of Amenhotep III and his
contemporaries are not found south of Gebel Barkal. Moreover, the terminal -W3st is not found in
common spellings of praenomina during the later New Kingdom.

78. Urk. IV 695 ff.

79. Ibid., p. 708:12.

80. KRI II 344–45.

81. Pace John D. Schmidt, Ramesses II: A Chronological Structure for his Reign, Johns Hopkins Near
Eastern Studies 3 (Baltimore, 1973), p. 25, the date is clearly “regnal year 2,” and not “10,” as
verified by this writer, in the company of Labib Habachi and Frank J. Yurco in 1976.

82. See Faulkner in CAH3 II.2 226 (who dates the incursion to the second year of Ramesses II); and
Kitchen, Pharaoh Triumphant, pp. 40–41 (placing it during the later years of Sety I, at the start of
Ramesses II’s royal career).
In all, out of the eighteen dated inscriptions considered here, seven (nos. 5, 7, 9, 15, 17, 19, and 21) bear datelines that clearly refer to the latest episode that is mentioned in the text. The datelines of another five (nos. 11, 12, 13, 14, 23) more probably refer to a later than earlier event in each of the narratives. Three cases (nos. 6, 10, 18) are inconclusive; and the four examples in which the dateline refers to an early episode (nos. 8, 16, 20, 22) are exceptional in a number of ways. Amenhotep II’s texts (no. 8) are mainly concerned with his works in the Amada and Elephantine temples, while the narrative of the “first campaign” is a digression, set off as such in the texts, which helps to define the circumstances of the carving of the stelae at a later date. The date on Merneptah’s victory columns (no. 16) clearly precedes the date of the battle as given in the account of that war at Karnak; and the text itself (following the announcement of the invasion and the despatching of the army) gives only a cursory account of the war itself, as a prologue to the listing of prisoners and spoil. The first inscription dealing with Ramesses III’s second Libyan war (no. 20) emphasizes the early stages of the campaign, both rhetorically and in its narrative. The meaning of the dateline is further defined by the external, but closely related, evidence given by the later dates in the calendar of feasts and in the second inscription (no. 21). Finally, Thutmose III’s stele from Armant (no. 22) is, in its layout, the most curious of all these dated inscriptions: for the initial dateline falls before a number of the events mentioned in the text (see n. 68 above); and the following “summation” of the king’s career is organized along topical rather than strictly chronological lines.

In summary, while these records are not all consistent, it appears that the most frequent practice was to have the dateline refer to the culmination of the events described, that is, to the final episode(s) of the narrative. Joined with the evidence of the first four examples, we may now apply these conclusions to the stela from the temple of Ptah at Karnak. Although certainty eludes us, given the erratic treatment of dates by the ancient Egyptians themselves, we believe that the soundest interpretation of the text is one that would conform to the usage of most similar cases. By this standard, Sety’s first campaign and his subsequent visit to Thebes would both fall during his first regnal year, as implied by a literal reading of the text with its dateline.

The Alabaster stela from Karnak presents a different problem, for its date (II 3ht 1 in regnal year 1) refers to an event that is not precisely spelled out in the text. The reference to “making” the stela can be interpreted in a number of ways—as either its commissioning, its completion, or its emplacement at Karnak. Regrettably, the many parallels that employ the formula jr.n.f m mnw.f ... are equally ambiguous. Whether they are dated only by the regnal year or by a full dateline, they do not specify which stage of the operation is meant. The vast majority of

83. No. 19 is exceptional in that the dateline follows a number of allusions to historical events; it thus refers specifically to the statement immediately following: i.e., Sethnakht is now unopposed, and the civil war is over.
84. Nos. 12 and, especially, 23 are parts of ex-votos left by private officials in their own name at the site of their operations. In the first case, the date may well have fallen in the time of the expedition, which is included among the events described; in the second, however, the date is a terminus post quem for the victories it recounts.
85. E.g., HHBT, pp. 18–19; KRI I 41–43; KRI II 363, 886–87.
86. E.g., HHBT, p. 103; Urk. IV 1228–43 (= Gebel Barkal stela), 1677–78, 1920–21; KRI I 75–76.
examples, of course, are not dated at all and convey little more than the dedication of a building by the king's gift. 87

The interpretation of the date on the Alabaster stela thus remains open. In addition, although the stock phrases of the text define the stela as a royal donation, they tell us nothing about the king's movements—whether he was at Thebes or Memphis, whether he was present when the stela was set up, or indeed anything else that has a bearing on the circumstances defined by the dateline. The material from which the stela is made was not native to Thebes, 88 but the stone could have arrived in its raw state and been shaped in the Amun temple's ateliers. In this, as in everything else about the Alabaster stela, however, there is no certainty: it could have been manufactured in the north, but neither its material nor its contents demonstrate that this was so. 89

For all these uncertainties, however, the dateline on the Alabaster stela cannot be too far from what we may reasonably suppose was Sety's first visit to Thebes as sole ruler. His accession, and hence the death of his father, Ramesses I, had taken place between III šmw 18 and IV šmw 23. 90 If Ramesses I died in Upper or Lower Egypt, thirteen days must be added to the seventy required for the mummification process, allowing the funeral cortege to arrive at Thebes no less than eighty-three days after the old king's death, at the very earliest. 91 This itinerary, at both ends of the range for Sety's accession, can be reconstructed as follows:

87. Usually, these inscriptions mention only the monuments on which they are carved, but an exceptional case is found in Temple of Khonsu II, pl. 43-C:2, where there is a reference to the hewing of Amon's sacred barge. Kitchen, The Third Intermediate Period (Warminster, 1973), p. 252, n. 45, followed by E. F. Wente, in Temple of Khonsu I, p. xiv, suggests that this text was carved in anticipation of the success of the voyage of Wenamun to Byblos in the year 5 of the "Renaissance"; for this narrative, see Wente's translation in W. K. Simpson, ed., The Literature of Ancient Egypt, new edition (New Haven, 1973), pp. 142–55.

88. Alfred Lucas and J. R. Harris, Ancient Egyptian Materials and Industries, 4th ed. (London, 1962), pp. 59–60; sources for alabaster are found in the vicinity of Cairo in the north, and then down to Middle Egypt (Hatnûb); the alabaster found in the western hills at Thebes does not appear to have been worked in antiquity.

89. For a discussion of the contents of the Alabaster stela, with its allusions to the coronation rites, see Spalinger, in JSSEA 9 (1979):234–36.

90. Murmane, Serapis 3 (1975–76):23–33. Contrary to my previous opinion (idem, Ancient Egyptian Coregencies, pp. 80–87), I now believe that the junior partners in Nineteenth Dynasty coregencies began to date by their own regnal years only after their accession to sole rule. Sety I's accession date, as calculated above, would be the day after the death of Ramesses I, not the date of his assumption of the regency with his father. In the case of Ramesses II, III šmw 27 could be the day of his nomination as coregent and the date in 3ḥt that of his accession to sole rule; these points are still to be developed in a separate study.

91. For timings of travel between Upper and Lower Egypt, see Appendix 3. We know that on III šmw 30 of his first regnal year, Sety was in Memphis (KRI I 38:1–5); but since the date lies within the range of uncertainty during which the year change could have taken place, we cannot be sure whether it fell at the beginning or the end of the regnal year.
### THE ROAD TO KADESH

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<th>Date</th>
<th>Event</th>
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<td>III šmw 18</td>
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<td>13 days</td>
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<tr>
<td>III šmw 30</td>
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<tr>
<td>13 days</td>
<td>+ 5 Epagomenal Days</td>
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<td>IV šmw 1</td>
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<td>IV šmw 30</td>
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<td>48 days</td>
<td>+ 5 Epagomenal Days</td>
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<td>IV šmt 1</td>
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<td>IV šmt 30</td>
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<td>78 days</td>
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<td>II šmt 30</td>
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<td>83 days</td>
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<td>III šmt 1</td>
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<td>(30 days)</td>
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<td>III šmt 10</td>
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<td>(83 days)</td>
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Ramesses I's burial at Thebes could thus have occurred on II šmt 6 (at the earliest) or III šmt 11 (at the latest), assuming that he had died in the north. If he died at Thebes, his burial could have taken place thirteen days earlier: on I šmt 22 (at the earliest) or on II šmt 28 (at the latest).

The conclusion to which this demonstration leads is that, if the dateline II šmt 1 on the Alabaster stela has anything to do with Sety's presence at Thebes, he could not have accompanied his father's funeral procession from Memphis. Of course, he could have preceded the cortège to Thebes; and if Ramesses I died there, II šmt 1 would fall within the period of Sety's stay, whether this date fell after the funeral (under the earlier options for Sety's accession) or before it (under the later options). There are too many imponderables here for a firm connection between Ramesses I's funeral and a date for Sety's arrival in Thebes to be established. It seems likely, however, that Sety would have made an effort to be present for the Opet Feast, which fell in the latter half of II šmt. The theme of this celebration, the annual (re)birth of the divine ruler and the reconfirmation of his right to govern, would be singularly appropriate to a king who was about to bury his father and assume his place as sole lord on the Horus Throne of the Living.  

Later, during his second regnal year, we know that Sety I went to Thebes from Memphis at this very time, departing his capital on II šmt 1 and allowing himself a fortnight to reach the Southern City. By analogy, and in view of the elaborate ceremonies that would inaugurate the start of a new reign, the likelihood of his presence at Thebes on II šmt 1 of his accession year seems high. Prior to that date, perhaps, he would have had time for a short campaign against the Shasu in southern Palestine. The triumphal rhetoric on the Alabaster stela could refer to this, although the very generalized phraseology lends little support to this proposition.

In any case, the evidence of both this monument and stela from the Ptah temple, suggests that Sety had already returned from what he regarded as his first campaign when he visited Thebes in his accession year, to attend to the burial of his predecessor and to initiate the benefactions in the Amun temple which are dated to this first regnal year.

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94. Contrast this passage with the references to specific ethnic groups in no. 23.
APPENDIX 3

MOVEMENTS OF ARMIES AND TIMINGS OF TRAVEL IN EGYPT AND THE LEVANT

Such importance is attached to Sety I's movements during his first regnal year that it is appropriate to ask, quite simply, what was possible. How fast, for instance, could an army move? Would it move at its best pace over an extended period of time? In the Nile Valley, what was the fastest rate at which a traveler could cover the distance from Memphis to Thebes, and back again? And what was the customary pace of these journeys, based on the means which the ancient Egyptians had at their disposal, i.e., sailing boats on the river? While the note that follows does not pretend to be exhaustive, it may serve to put the question of Sety's movements on a minimally realistic footing.

The actual pace of an army on the move depended, of course, on the circumstances of each campaign. Since the armies of Greece and Rome operated under the same conditions as their Pharaonic predecessors, our best sources are still the reports on troop movements that bulk so large in the writings of classical authors. At the outset, it is important to distinguish between what the army was normally trained to do, and what it actually could do when faced with extraordinary conditions. Roman recruits were trained to cover as many as 24 Roman miles a day (= 18.4 standard miles) for five hours, roughly equivalent to the current British rate of about three miles per hour.1 Forced marches of up to 40 standard miles a day are sometimes attested,2 but obviously such a pace could not be sustained by an army over a long period of time. Thus, while the entire army of Alexander the Great moved at a maximum known speed of 19.5 miles a day, it generally covered only 13 miles a day—and this pace is calculated over long distances, with allowances for day-long rest halts every five to seven days. Over shorter distances, it moved at 14 miles a day; and with a rest halt one day in seven, this works out to an average of 15 miles per day.3 A rate of 15 miles per day, in fact, also appears to have been

3. Donald W. Engels, Alexander the Great and the Logistics of the Macedonian Army (Berkeley and Los Angeles, 1978), pp. 153–56; these factors are also taken into account in Cook's discussion (see previous note). I am grateful to JoAnn Scurlock for discussing Engel's data with me in the light of more recent comparanda (for which see below).
optimal for the armies of ancient Assyria\textsuperscript{4} and China,\textsuperscript{5} as well as sixteenth century England,\textsuperscript{6} and nineteenth century Prussia.\textsuperscript{7} Given the consistency of these comparanda, we should not be far off target in assuming that Sety I's army also moved at an average rate of about 15 miles per day.

An average rate of speed is more likely to prevail in travel between different points in Egypt. Here, too, we must rely on accounts of actual journeys for our data. Although Herodotus, for example, stated that the distance between Heliopolis and Thebes could be covered in nine days (\textit{Histories}, ii.9), this figure is universally regarded as incorrect. The journey south from the Memphite region, near Cairo, to Thebes (modern Luxor) occupied a minimum of 13 days.\textsuperscript{8} This figure is consistent with the known intervals allowed for this journey in ancient Egyptian sources. Sety I allowed himself two full weeks to reach Thebes from Memphis, departing on II \textit{3ht} 1 in order to arrive at Thebes in time to celebrate the opening ceremonies of the Opet Feast, which took place in the middle of that month.\textsuperscript{9} Similarly, news of Siptah's accession, on IV \textit{3ht} 28, took about three weeks to reach Thebes (on I \textit{Prt} 19), presumably from Piramesse in the Eastern Delta.\textsuperscript{10} These timings could be improved (e.g., if the flotilla going south traveled both day and night). Barring any convincing reason for its having done so, however, we may safely assume that Sety's first journey to Thebes took him the usual minimum of 13 days.

For the return journey, from Thebes to Memphis, a bare minimum is suggested by a contemporary of Wenis in the Fifth Dynasty, who claimed to have reached Memphis from Elephantine in seven days. It is assumed, however, that he would have been traveling at the rate of 3–4 miles per hour, 24 hours a day.\textsuperscript{11} Given ideal conditions, this is not as improbable as it sounds. At the height of the inundation, in September, water that left Aswan arrived in Cairo within five days, as opposed to the 13 days required during the season of low water, in March and April.\textsuperscript{12} Ideal conditions, however, are quite rare on the Nile, where progress to the north can be hampered, and even made dangerous, by high winds. These conditions are especially prevalent in the spring, when the sand-filled \textit{khamsin} blows from the west, but they are apt to occur in the autumn as well. Thus, Caillaud's effort to reach Cairo from Luxor at the greatest possible speed was complicated by high winds and rough waters, with a final duration of 15

\begin{itemize}
  \item[4.] Sources collected by JoAnn Scurlock for a dissertation on the Assyrian army; I am indebted to her also for the references to later sources in the notes that follow.
  \item[6.] C. G. Cruickshank, \textit{Elisabeth's Army} (London, 1966), pp. 61, 164.
  \item[9.] See KRI I 247:10 (= Sety's departure from Memphis) and Schott, \textit{Altägyptische Festdaten}, pp. 84–87.
\end{itemize}
days.\textsuperscript{13} If Sety's return journey took place in IV šmw, it would have fallen in the latter part of October and might have been exposed to similar conditions. The accounts of nineteenth century travelers, traveling down the Nile on \textit{dahabiyahs} powered only by sail, allude more often than not to high winds and slow progress.\textsuperscript{14} True, many of them paused on the way to see the sights, or were delayed by meddlesome local officials; but, if the timings they give are adjusted to eliminate all but climatic delays, the average duration of a journey between Luxor and Cairo is still rather high. Lady Duff Gordon was once to spend 38 days on such a trip.\textsuperscript{15} Both C. Rochford Scott\textsuperscript{16} and John Gadsby\textsuperscript{17} spent about one month en route, with M. de Verninac Saint-Maur not far behind bearing the second obelisk from the Luxor temple, he took 29 traveling days to reach Cairo.\textsuperscript{18} Belzoni's journeys of 1816 and 1819, requiring 24 and 23 days respectively, although fairly long, represent a not unrealistic medium.\textsuperscript{19} At the lower end of the scale, E. de Montule took 17 days for this journey.\textsuperscript{20} The best attested time was made in the 1870s by Villiers Stuart, who finished the journey in 12 days.\textsuperscript{21} We may take this figure as a fair minimum in determining the most favorable possible duration for Sety's return journey to Memphis from Thebes during his first or second regnal year.

\textsuperscript{13} F. Caillaud, \textit{Voyage à Meroe, au fleuve blanc, etc.} I (Paris, 1826), pp. 282–84.

\textsuperscript{14} E.g., R. David, \textit{The Macclesfield Collection of Egyptian Antiquities} (Warminster, 1980), pp. 17–18.


\textsuperscript{20} E. de Montule, \textit{Travels in Egypt during 1818 and 1819} (London, 1821), pp. 53–63.

\textsuperscript{21} Villiers Stuart, \textit{Nile Gleanings} (London, 1879), p. 408. This account is particularly valuable in that it gives daily mileages for the voyage.
Map 3. Egypt and Nubia During the Eighteenth and Nineteenth Dynasties
APPENDIX 4

THE LIBYAN AND NUBIAN CAMPAIGNS

The Libyan war occupies an anomalous position on Sety I's war monument at Karnak. Although it has a register to itself,\(^1\) it has nothing at all to do with the other surviving sequences, all of which refer to Sety's wars in Western Asia. Consequently, it seems best to deal separately with these reliefs, together with the Nubian war (which may not have been represented at Karnak).

Very little, in fact, can be said about the Libyan war.\(^2\) The records at Karnak are stereotyped both in form and content, and lack the sort of specific information that occurs in these accounts of the Shasu, "Yenoam," and Amurrite campaigns. The impression of empty conventionality in these texts is reinforced by what seems to be a careless mistake in their description of the king's return from the campaign, "when he had destroyed Retchenu and kill[ed] the[ir] chiefs."\(^3\) This apparently gratuitous substitution of "Retchenu" for "Libya," however, does not prove that Sety's Libyan war is unhistorical. Instead, the reference to Syria might have been inserted here to "date" the Libyan campaign with reference to an earlier war—perhaps the campaign against Kadesh and Amurru in the register above.\(^4\) Supporting this interpretation is another passage in the register below this one, in which the Hittite campaign is illustrated. In celebrating Sety I's victory, we are told that "Retchenu comes to him in submission, and the Tchehenu land is on its knees; he puts down seed according to his desire in this vile land of the Hittites."\(^5\) The sequence "Syria" (= \(Rtnw\)), "Libya" (= \(Thnw\)), and "Hatti" that emerges from this text mirrors what we have already seen is the most plausible order for the campaigns in the three western registers. Thus far we have made this case largely on the basis of logic.\(^6\) Now, with this support from Sety's war records, we may feel more confident in believing that the reconquest of Kadesh and Amurru triggered the onset of the Hittite campaign that is recorded (as a separate episode altogether) two registers below.

None of Sety I's successors seems to have alluded to this Libyan war, and the archaeological record in Libya is similarly meager. The few scarabs of Sety I owned by the

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1. West wing, middle; see Reliefs IV, pls. 27–32.
4. As Spalinger has suggested, JARCE 16 (1979):34.
5. Reliefs IV, pl. 35:18–21.
Tunis Museum could have come from the ancient cemeteries nearby, which have yielded similar materials, but the presence of such eminently portable objects can support no substantial conclusions. The evidence for Egypt's relations with Libya is not so sparse, however, as to be uninformative. The mere existence of the Karnak battle scenes is noteworthy, for the conflict they describe—conspicuously absent in records of the earlier New Kingdom—became more frequent during the Nineteenth and Twentieth Dynasties. The renewed hostilities indicated by such records are doubtless to be connected with the rising pressure among Libyan peoples that would soon spill over into Egypt. This problem, expensively but inadequately addressed in the generation after Sety, would become acute by the reign of Merneptah and continued to plague his successors. The takeover of the state infrastructure by a resident military elite possessing both Libyan ancestry and identity is a topic that lies outside the range of this survey. Suffice it to say that Sety I's war reliefs help chart the early stages of a problem that would end by overwhelming New Kingdom Egypt.

For Sety I's Nubian war we are entirely dependent on the commemorative stelae he left at Sai and Amara West. The course of the campaign has already been briefly described. Sety was in Thebes when the revolt was first announced, perhaps in the first half of the season of Prt in his eighth regnal year:

One came to tell His Majesty: "The enemies of the foreign country of Irem are plotting rebellion!" (But) then His Majesty put the matter against them aside, in order to hear their plans completely. And His Majesty said to the officials, the Companions and the attendants: "What is (this) vile Irem, that they should transgress in the time of My Majesty? It is my father Amun-Re who will cause them to fall to the knife of My Majesty. (And) I will cause to retreat any

7. PM VII 367 (= ranging from the Fourth into the Twenty-sixth Dynasties).
12. For the season of the war, see ibid. On strictly epigraphic grounds, Vercoutter ("Le pays d'Irem," n. 2) says that the opening year date on the Amara West stela could be 4, 12, or 20, with 8 (suggested by KRI I 104:6) being less probable. I was not able to concur with these suggestions (made on the basis of a photograph) when I examined this document (Brooklyn Museum No. 39424) in the spring of 1982. The numeral occupies one group, of which the bottom half is preserved; and in this space, four complete strokes can be read. The restored complete numeral, then, could hardly be any one of those proposed by Vercoutter, but 8 would be entirely reasonable (with 14, 15, and 16 as less probable alternatives). I am grateful to the authorities at the Brooklyn Museum, and particularly to the curator of the Egyptian collection, Richard Fazzini, for arranging for me to see the stela and for a second opinion on the reading.
Then His Majesty made a plan against them; he ordained devastation against them, and he set obstacles against all their places. And His Majesty sent troops, and also many cavalry. The army of His Majesty reached the fortress (named) <Pacifier of the Two> Lands (?) on <III> Prt 13. One joined (battle) with them (i.e., the enemy), the might of Pharaoh (being) before them like a blast of fire, trampling the hills. (When) the dawn of seven days had come to pass, the might of Menmaʿatre was carrying them off, not one of them being missing, either male or female; (and) he had captured the six wells ...

As these last lines suggest, the Egyptians were bent on deporting, and not exterminating the vanquished on this occasion. The final tally of captives and spoil is damaged on both stelae, and there are discrepancies between the two versions, but the Nubians who were carried off into captivity included over fifty young men of military age ([d3]mw), about sixty maidens (sgmw[t] nfrwt Nhswt) and nearly fifty children (msw), adding up to over 420 souls.

Specific as the narrative of this campaign appears, it is too vague to define the locale in which the fighting took place. Earlier attempts to pinpoint the area of the six wells were inconclusive, and they are pegged to the long-disputed identification of Irem as lying in the region southwest of the Third Cataract, south of Dongola but north of the great bend in the

13. Reading dj.j ht jrf kt h3st jrt m mjtt, following Vercoutter's copy. The parallel version from Amara West seems to have dj.j ht nbt h3st jr mjtt. I did not check this passage in Brooklyn, but on the photograph, which Mr. Fazzini so kindly made available, the basket-sign shows no distinct loop at the right corner. This feature, if it ever existed here, would have been minuscule and could be lost in the slight degree of wear found at the edges of the sign, but even though nb may well be the proper reading here, this is not important given the frequent confusion of nb and k in hieroglyphic inscriptions.


15. Reading sg[r] <3wy>, see the facsimile of the Sai stela in Vercoutter, "Le pays d'Irem," p. 159, fig. 1; the corresponding passage on the tablet from Amara West is destroyed. I would now agree with Vercoutter (ibid., p. 162, with n. 2) that sg[r] is unlikely, although it is not impossible that the h was squeezed between the second group and the determinative. For sgr in the sense of "making quiet children, etc." see Wb. IV 323:8-9.

16. Vercoutter, ibid., p. 159, reads hnmw 6 (?) m h3st Jrm, "six puits dans le pays Irem," which is hardly certain. Following the numeral (= 2 + x) at the end of line 7, there are three groups at the beginning of line 8 before the tally of captives begins. Only the top is preserved in each of these groups, i.e., m ... n ... r ... . This could lend itself to a restoration of m [h3st] n [J]r[m], which may be what Vercoutter had in mind, even though he does not reconstruct the text in this fashion.

17. Following Vercoutter, "Le pays d'Irem," p. 178, n. 2, who sees this figure as being the total number of human captives, rather than Kitchen, "Historical Observations on Ramesside Nubia," in Fs. Hintze, p. 217, who suggests "[cattle/goats(?)]." Given the environment, with its specification of such diverse categories of humans in the preserved portions of the list, Vercoutter's interpretation seems more probable; and since young people already account for 170 persons, the number of adults and elderly people needed to make up the comprehensive total of 420 persons does not seem excessive.
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Nile. A strong case has been made, however, for locating Irem further south, beyond the Fifth Cataract in the Berber-Shendi stretch of the Nile and the adjoining Bayuda Desert (see Map 3, p. 98). Given these uncertainties, as well as a war record that only places the action in an area beyond an otherwise unknown fortress in Nubia, it seems hazardous to go beyond the reasonable hypothesis that would place the fighting around the six "wells" (= watering holes?) somewhere in the desert, outside Egyptian territory.

Two factors stand out in Sety's account of his Nubian war. In essence, first of all, it seems to have been a retaliatory raid. Moreover, if it resembled more than superficially the wars fought in the south under Amenhotep III and Akhenaten, its apparent purpose was to secure Egypt's right to exploit territories on the fringes of her Nilotic empire in Nubia. Apart from security, however, and the uninterrupted flow of trade from Nubia and southern Africa that went with it, there was a second incentive for such razzias, namely, manpower. Forced labor played an important part in supporting Egypt's imperial machine, and nowhere was it more cheaply available than in Nubia. Troublesome eruptions south of the border could be turned to advantage when Nubian captives swelled the ranks of armies, labor forces and other service cadres. In these respects we find Sety I pursuing, once again, a policy that he had inherited from his predecessors. His continuing campaigns against border peoples constituted only the military aspect of this program. Just as important was the organization of the most heavily populated areas adjoining the Nile. The fortified towns of Aksha and Amara West, both founded during Sety's reign, bear witness to his furtherance of a development program in Nubia, conspicuously pursued by the pharaohs of the later Eighteenth Dynasty, that would be carried out on a massive scale by Ramesses II.

21. See the comments of J. C. Darnell, "Irem and the Ghost of Kerma," GM 94 (1986):21-23; but compare n. 16 above.
23. For example, Nubians were recruited as slave labor for the building of the later Nubian temples in the year 44 of Ramesses II; and for other services in the wake of Ramesses III's war in the neighborhood of Irem; see Fs. Hintze, pp. 221, 224-25.
APPENDIX 5

THE KING OF CARCHEMISH IN SETY I’S BATTLE RELIEFS?

In the great battle scene that illustrates Sety I’s Hittite war at Karnak, Sety confronts a figure, larger than those in the rout of fleeing Hittites, who stands with one leg outside his chariot and raises his arms in a gesture of submission. Although he is plainly the Hittite commander, there is no label to identify him as “the great chief (or ‘enemy’) of Hatti.” Since this record does not explicitly identify him as the Hittite king, the figure could be one of his subordinates. Spalinger has already suggested that this figure represented the king of Carchemish, who, as the Hittite king’s deputy in northern Syria, might well have been the first to grapple with an Egyptian onslaught there. Plausible as this proposal is, it is by no means easy to prove. That it begins by basing its case on a misreading is not encouraging: the extended label with which the text of this scene begins actually describes p3 t3 (not ‘3) hs n Ht3, “the vile land (not ‘great one’) of the Hittites.” Moreover, although the figure itself is not identified in the relief, Spalinger goes further by suggesting that, since he is shown transfixed with arrows, this individual was very likely killed in battle; and he tentatively identifies him as [...]-Sharuma, who (he says) was king of Carchemish at an early stage in the reign of Muwatalli, but was replaced later on by one Shahurunuwa, “who is known to have lived under the reign of Muwatallis sometime after the Kadesh war of year five of Ramesses II.”

Not all of this necessarily follows from the data. As Spalinger correctly notes, [...]-Sharuma was appointed king of Carchemish in the ninth year of Murshili II on the unexpected death of his father, Shari-Kushuh. This passage, however, is our sole evidence for the historicity of [...]-Sharuma. During the reign of Muwatalli we hear instead of a king of Carchemish named Shahurunuwa, who appears among the witnesses who guaranteed the authenticity of a newly issued copy of a treaty between Hatti and Aleppo, which had originally been made in the time...
of Murshili II. This is our only contemporary reference to Shahurunuwa, although we know (on the basis of seal inscriptions belonging to his son and successor) that Shahurunuwa also was the son of the king of Carchemish, Shari-Kushuh, who had died in the ninth year of Murshili II!

There is no evidence bearing on the presumed succession of [...]-Sharuma by Shahurunuwa, nor is it clear why the latter should be so specifically dated to the later reign of Muwatalli, following the Battle of Kadesh.

There is reason, moreover, to believe that Shahurunuwa came upon the scene earlier than this. Another of the witnesses to Muwatalli’s reissue of the treaty with Aleppo was the Great Scribe Mitannamuwa, who is known to have been appointed to this post by Murshili II. Mitannamuwa relinquished this post to his son later in the reign of Muwatalli, when he was himself promoted to be the governor of the Hittite capital, Hattusha. By the reign of Urḫi-Teshup, this same man was being described as old and sick, and his family was at low ebb until its fortunes were restored by Hattushili III. In the colophon to the treaty with Aleppo, however, Mitannamuwa appears under his earlier title. Since his promotion took place later during the same reign, this formal reissue of the treaty cannot fall near its end—and indeed, his appointment to the governorship of Hattusha must have taken place before Muwatalli temporarily abandoned the capital, for this had happened many years before the Egyptian campaign. Mitannamuwa’s attendance on the reissue of the treaty with Aleppo must thus be placed quite early in Muwatalli’s reign. If Murshili II reigned for about a quarter-century, Muwatalli’s accession would have fallen in the first decade of the thirteenth century B.C.

7. Weidner, *Politische Dokumente aus Kleinasiien*, pp. 87–89; compare G. F. Del Monte, “‘I testimoni del trattato con Aleppo (KBo I 16),’” *RSO* 49 (1975):1–10. I am indebted to Professor Güterbock for this last reference.


11. I.e., only a few years beyond the twenty-two that are preserved for him in his “Annals” (Goetze, *CAH* III.2, pp. 126–27).

12. The date hinges on the identification of the evil omen that was observed as Murshili II was about to begin a campaign at the start of his tenth regnal year. Despite formalistic objections, this event is generally regarded as an eclipse; see M. C. Astour, *Hittite History and Absolute Chronology for the Bronze Age* (Partille, 1989), pp. 5–8, for a convenient summary of the debate. The date of this eclipse remains in dispute. If 1279 was Ramesses II’s accession year, however, the earlier possibilities (i.e., March, 1335, and January, 1340) are too high to be squared with even the most extended of the possible chronologies for Egypt. As Astour (loc. cit.) has pointed out, moreover, January is an unsuitable month in which to begin a campaign. Later options are June, 1312 (Wente and Van Siclen, *Fs. Hughes*, p. 250) and April, 1308 (G. Wilhelm and J. Boese, “Absolute Chronologie und die hethitische Geschichte des 15. und 14. Jahrhunderts v. Chr.”, in *High, Middle or Low? I 107,* who criticize the 1312 eclipse as being too late in the year to coincide with the season indicated by Murshili’s Annals; compare Astour, *Hittite History and Absolute Chronology*, pp. 7–8). Whichever of the resulting dates is accepted, either one would yield a terminus post quem for Muwatalli’s accession—1297 or 1293 (= year 25 of Murshili II)—that would fall shortly before the Nineteenth Dynasty in Egypt began.
death, although it has been placed as little as one year following the Battle of Kadesh,\(^{13}\) is perhaps more realistically reckoned in about the ninth year of Ramesses II, with the accession of Hattushili III following in approximately his sixteenth regnal year.\(^{14}\)

The joint appearance of Shahurunuwa and Mitannamuwa in the reissued treaty with Aleppo, then, falls most easily in the first part of Muwatalli’s reign, perhaps even before Sery’s accession to the throne. Shahurunuwa would thus have replaced [...]-Sharuma at about this time, or even earlier, in the later reign of Murshili II. But did he? Although these two names have been attributed plausibly enough to two brothers, both sons of Shari-Kushuh,\(^{15}\) they could also be separate Hittite and Hurrian names that belonged to only one person. Carchemish, after all, had been given a new dynasty when Shuppiluliuma had conquered it. The royal family was ethnically Hittite—it’s first king bore the Anatolian name Piyaššili—but this man’s position, as ruler of a state long affiliated with the kingdom of Mitanni, made it prudent for him to affect a “Hurrian” manner; thus, Piyaššili bore a second, Hurrian name, i.e., Shari-Kushuh.\(^{16}\) It is not at all certain, then, that Shahurunuwa “replaced” [...]-Sharuma at all, since they might have been one and the same individual!

When all is said and done, however, it is still plausible to identify Sery’s opponent in the Hittite war, not as the king of Hatti, but as a Syrian ruler. The identification of the prisoners Sery brought home, as “great chiefs of Retchenu (= Syria) the vile, whom his Majesty carried off by his [victo]ries over the foreign countries of Hatti,” indicates, at least, that most of the troops who fought with the Egyptians at this time were Syrians. If the leader of this army was a Syrian prince, and not a general sent down from Hatti, his identity remains mysterious. He could be the king of Carchemish—but it might be more plausible to connect him with the Hittites’ other Syrian satellite, Aleppo, whose territory lay closer to the lands the Hittites had lost to Egypt. Moreover, given the conventions of Egyptian war scenes, we cannot be sure that the Hittite commander who opposed Sery on this occasion was really killed in battle anyway.

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13. Únal, \textit{Hattušili III} I.1, p. 91.
Although foreign affairs are the major concern of the Karnak reliefs, a few of these scenes cast a dim but tantalizing light on the internal politics of the royal house. In no fewer than six cases there appears a distinctively equipped figure who is identified in at least two instances as the “group-marshaler and fan-bearer, Meḥy.” In the three examples on the west wing Meḥy’s figure was inserted into the previously carved relief, where no figure was originally planned. On the east wing, however, Meḥy occupied the space that had been filled initially by another, perhaps anonymous official. His ascendency, however, was brief. In all places, Meḥy’s figure was removed—either it was erased or usurped, either by Sety’s crown prince (the future Ramesses II) or by another official.

The question of Meḥy’s status is one of the great unresolved puzzles in the war reliefs. Of his antecedents, and the military services he presumably rendered before being granted the signal honor of appearing “in the following of his lord” at Karnak, we know nothing. Even his full name cannot be established. “Meḥy,” as we know, is a commonly used abbreviation for names ending in -m-hb, but the identity of the god who would have appeared in the first part of this name (as in “Amenemheb” or “Horemheb”) is unknown. What can be said about him depends on two sources: his titles and the fate he ultimately suffered.

While Meḥy held none of the highest government posts, his titles suggest that he was a person of no small importance. That his orbit was preeminently military is indicated by his first title, ts-pḏwt (“group-marshaler”). Holders of this office, once regarded as one of the lower

1. Reliefs IV, pls. 6, 10, 12, 23, 29 (twice).
2. Ibid., pls. 23:17, 29:9; and perhaps add pl. 10:21.
3. Ibid., pls. 23, 29.
4. Ibid., pp. 19–20 (= pl. 6) and 29–32 (= pl. 10); for the figure in pl. 12 see n. 7.
5. Ibid., pl. 23.
6. Ibid., pls. 6, 29.
7. Ibid., pl. 10. In the final version on pl. 12, the figure wore sandals, as does the prince in pl. 29. The earlier version of the figure was barefoot, as is Meḥy on pl. 29. For the status of the figure, see ibid., p. 37. Since only the feet of the figure on pl. 12 are preserved, we cannot know how this figure was adapted or from what source.
8. See ibid., p. 92, n. 8, for discussion.
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ranks in the military hierarchy, are now recognized as having exercised a number of important functions, which included designating the routes the army would use, coordinating its activities while under way, and perhaps organizing its tactics in battle. Other individuals who are known to have held this title also possessed high military, priestly, and political rank. With the exception of Paramessu (= the future Ramesses I), whose records date to the reign of Horemheb, however, all of these persons date to the reign of Ramesses II or later. Mehy’s second title, 3j-hw, “fanbearer,” is more ubiquitous. While granted to the highest government ministers (usually in an expanded form, “fanbearer on the king’s right hand”), it was most commonly used to indicate its holder’s attendance on the king’s person—and this embraced not only viziers and viceroys, but also the humbler functionaries who carried the king’s palanquin.

At the very least, then, Mehy’s titulary marks him as an important field officer whose duties brought him regularly into the king’s presence. How much more was he? In two provocative studies, Helck maintains that Mehy was nothing less than heir presumptive to Sety I. His insertion into the battle reliefs is not at all “mysterious,” since Mehy would have been the true leader of Sety’s foreign wars (in his capacity of ts-pdwt). This extraordinary honor, and the manner in which Ramesses II withdrew it, both imply that Sety I saw the older man as his eventual successor. Although none of Mehy’s monuments accords him the distinctive title jry-p’t, “hereditary prince,” his service title may have fulfilled this function, marking its holder as “the group-marshaler” and passing with this sense into the princely titulary of Ramesses II’s eldest son. The intended return to the “adoptive” principle used for Horemheb and Ramesses I was to be reversed with the induction of prince Ramesses as heir apparent. This took place, Helck believes, in Sety I’s eleventh year, which is inferred from the retrospective claim that Ramesses II had held administrative functions and acted as chief of the army when he was ten

9. See A. R. Schulman, Military Rank, Title and Organization in the Egyptian New Kingdom, MÄS 6 (Berlin, 1964), pp. 73–74, which was followed rather too trustingly in the first edition of this book (e.g., pp. 164–65, 171).


11. Helck, SAK 15 (1988):145–47. Its holders include one “generalissimo” (jmy-r ms wr), two “generals” (jmy-r mss), two high ranking cavalry officers (jdnw <wr> n tj-nt-htrj), a high priest of Prē, a chief steward of Ramesses II’s temple at Abydos, and two sons of Ramesses II.

12. See Schulman, Military Rank, p. 73.


15. In the scene before Tcharu (Reliefs IV, pl. 6), both the figure following the king and his inscriptions have been altered, the title jry-p’t that begins the titulary was apparently surcharged over something else (see ibid., p. 22, n. l). Since these first columns were carved back less drastically than the last two (which contained the figure’s highest titles and his name), the recarved jry-p’t and the official honorifics that accompany it must belong to the second stage of the usurpation (i.e., when Mehy’s inscription replaced the original text), and only the last two columns would have been recarved subsequently for prince Ramesses. In this instance, however, jry-p’t is used as the conventional opening of an official’s titulary, not in the distinctive fashion that had designated Horemheb and Ramesses I as the intended heirs; see Helck, Der Einfluss der Militärführer in den 18. Ägyptischen Dynastie, UGÄÄ 14 (Leipzig, 1939), pp. 78–86.

years old. Mehî’s political demise, which Helck attributes to the hostile activities of a court faction that promoted prince Ramesses, cemented the dynasty’s return to the hereditary principle that had been abandoned, with such signal success, over the past two generations. The prince’s resentment of his rival’s early success is, of course, patent in the damnatio that obliterated all memory of Mehî for more than thirty-two centuries.

This scenario could be a true reconstruction of what happened, and on a number of points it is completely persuasive. The assumption that Mehî himself directed many of Sety I’s wars makes sense (particularly when one considers the ts-pdjwt’s responsibilities in the field) and it provides a convincing reason for Mehî’s insertion into the battle reliefs. Ramesses II’s claim to have held commanding power at the age of ten is also best interpreted as rhetorical. The fact that it is embodied in a decree issued in Ramesses II’s third year, when he was sole ruler, and within the body of a speech in praise of the king, makes it difficult enough to accept at face value. Moreover, the attribution of this claim to the courtiers (not to Ramesses himself) also conveys an indirect denial of Mehî’s true role by society at large, which is seen here as crediting his functions during the early part of Sety’s reign to the youthful prince. Mendacity on this scale would be an appropriate reaction to the sort of threat Helck sees Mehî to have been for the young Ramesses. On the other hand, we are not persuaded that this model is the only one that can explain the evidence.

The main objection to it is chronological. At first glance, Helck’s case fits nicely with the late emergence of prince Ramesses, for his first dated appearance is in Sety’s ninth year—when, as an unnamed “eldest son” of the king, he is seen supervising the transport of stone. Prince Ramesses, however, cannot have been born so near the end of Sety’s reign. Following the most recent examination of his mummy, Ramesses II was approximately eighty years old when he died. Since he reigned for nearly sixty-seven years, the evidence derived from his mummy suggests that he could have come to the throne at a median age of thirteen, but that this might have happened when he was as young as seven or as old as eighteen. Fortunately, there is some data that can help us to choose among these possibilities. Ramesses II’s war reliefs at Beit el-Wali, which were carved no later than the first half of his second regnal year, show him already as the father of two sons. Even though these children were undoubtedly born to different

19. In the “larger” Aswan stela (*KRI* I 74, especially line 14); see Murnane, *JNES* 34 (1975):189–90. Contrary to earlier belief, Ramesses seems to have had no elder brother (idem, *Ancient Egyptian Coregencies*, pp. 60–61).
mothers and may have been mere babes at this time, their father must have been at least a young teenager when they were conceived. If we assume these sons had been born in the first half of their father’s second regnal year, at the latest, their father would have to have been at least twelve when they were conceived in the previous year. If we go on to assume that Ramesses II began to use his own system of regnal dating only after acceding to sole rule, he would have lived a minimum of about twelve years during the reign of his father. Sety I’s reign lasted at least eleven years, but a fifteen year reign is not impossible, although it has not been proved beyond all doubt. Even if we opt for the longer reign for Sety I, however, prince Ramesses would still have come on the scene no later than his father’s fourth regnal year. Since we are assuming a minimum for Ramesses II’s age coupled with a maximum for the length of his father’s reign, however, it may be more realistic to assume that prince Ramesses was born before his father, or perhaps even his grandfather, mounted the throne.

The existence of a viable king’s son in the earlier part of Sety’s reign is difficult to square with Mehy’s alleged status as heir apparent. Since the adoptive principle of royal succession had


24. Male puberty in ancient Egypt was socially acknowledged by the rite of circumcision, which took place sometime during the boy’s second decade. The age of fourteen has recently been suggested as the most probable, based on the available evidence (thus E. F. Wente, in *X-Ray Atlas of the Royal Mummies*, pp. 236–38). To avoid prejudicing the argument unduly, I am pushing the age for sexual maturity to an earlier, albeit still possible point, and I am assuming an earlier age for marriage in the exceptional case of a royal child.


28. The clinching argument is that the high priest Bakenkhonsu claims to have spent 11 years serving in an installation of Sety I before going on to a career lasting seventy years under Ramesses II, who ostensibly appointed this man’s successor, the high priest Rome-Roy. Apart from the likelihood that the “years” Bakenkhonsu spent in each stage of his career might have been rounded off (see references in n. 26), it is not at all certain that Rome-Roy was elevated to high priest of Amun by Ramesses II. The text (*KRI* V 209:6–9), composed under Amenmesse, observes the pious fiction that Rome-Roy’s advancement was engineered by Amun himself: “He brought me to the attention of the king and my name was mentioned in the presence of the courtiers. He wrote me down (?) for every one of my distinguished offices before the king himself, Userma‘at-Rê-Setepenrê, the bodily son of Amun. He continued rewarding me on account of [my] effectiveness [and made me] Second Prophet. His treasury and his granary worked every benefit for the prosperity of his temple. He gave exceedingly because of (?) my doing good things, and he placed me as chief spokesman in his temple, as First Prophet [of Amun].” As it stands, this narrative is ambiguous. Rome-Roy credits each of his posts to Ramesses II, but in the next clause he appears to be describing a new stage in his career. If so, only the “distinguished offices” Rome-Roy achieved before he was made Second Prophet were the gift of Ramesses II.

only been a stopgap,\textsuperscript{30} and since Ramesses I had already reestablished the hereditary principle in Sety I’s favor, it is not immediately obvious why Sety would have reversed it to the detriment of his own family. Moreover, if Mehy’s career is truly reflected by his appearances in the war scenes, he would have been active during Sety’s first two campaigns,\textsuperscript{31} in the war against Kadesh and Amurru,\textsuperscript{32} and in the Libyan campaign—\textsuperscript{33}that is, from the first year of Sety’s reign to an unspecified point within it. Could Mehy’s career as heir apparent have lasted only until the birth of prince Ramesses, if this occurred as late as Sety’s fourth year? The evidence of the war reliefs makes this improbable. At Karnak, Mehy’s career spans the first group of war scenes (\textsuperscript{34}Shasu and Yenoam wars, in Sety’s year 1) and into the second, where he appears in the Kadesh-Amurru campaign and the Libyan war (\textsuperscript{35}and—perhaps significantly—not in the scenes of the Hittite war). Since Mehy’s figure was added to the war scenes in every instance, however, we must assume that all these campaigns lay in the past when his figure was inserted. Any proposed timetable for these wars is hazardous, but for the sake of argument let us assume a bare minimum—\textsuperscript{36}i.e., that the missing campaign in the third eastern register took place in the latter half of year 2; the campaign to Kadesh and Amurru and the Libyan war both occurred in year 3; and the Hittite war was fought early in year 4. Since the pertinent war scenes all had to be completely carved before Mehy’s figure was added, we can safely assume that this could not have been done much earlier than the end of year 4. In other words, the earliest point at which we can place the decision to memorialize Mehy at Karnak comes uncomfortably close to the latest likely date for the birth of prince Ramesses! As we have seen, moreover, the reconquest of Kadesh and Amurru probably followed the defeat of Washashata, which has been placed in about 1285 (= Sety’s fifth regnal year).\textsuperscript{37} Even if we choose not to rely on this approximation, we have no proof that Sety’s wars were bunched up so tightly in the first few years of his reign.

Mehy’s active career and his subsequent commemoration might thus be pushed even further into the middle or later reign of Sety I. Even if a correspondingly greater overlap with prince Ramesses’ lifetime is assumed, however, these two cannot have shared the limelight for long. From the evidence, Mehy seems to have flourished in the first part of Sety’s reign, while Ramesses’ career first becomes active in the second. A reasonable way of explaining this pattern is that the prince’s extreme youth at the start of the reign had prevented his playing the active role Sety had taken during his father’s brief tenure, and that a mature and experienced field officer had acted in his stead. Later, during the earliest reign of Ramesses II, the young king would go out of his way to claim for himself victories over the same groups—Libyans, Asiatics, and Shasu—that Mehy had fought at Karnak.\textsuperscript{38} Since Ramesses had implicitly claimed these campaigns for himself when he usurped Mehy’s figures at Karnak, some additional propaganda to this effect might be expected. It makes less sense, however, to assume that the

\textsuperscript{30} Begun with the failure of the Eighteenth Dynasty bloodline, and then perpetuated by Horemheb’s childlessness; see especially E. Strouhal, “Queen Mutnodjmet at Memphis: Anthropological and Paleopathological Evidence,” \textit{L’Egyptologie en 1979 I} 317–22.

\textsuperscript{31} \textit{Reliefs IV}, pls. 6, 10, 12.

\textsuperscript{32} Ibid., pl. 23.

\textsuperscript{33} Ibid., pl. 29.

\textsuperscript{34} See Chapter 3 (= pp. 63–64).

\textsuperscript{35} See Beit el-Wali, pls. 11–15.

\textsuperscript{36} As noted already by Spalinger, \textit{JNES} 38 (1979):271–84.
prince had actually fought in all of these campaigns during his father’s reign. In the first place, it cannot be shown that the wars recorded at Beit el-Wali and Karnak were the same. Bedouin, Asians, and Libyans were the common enemies of Egypt at this time, and the stereotyped battle scenes in which they appear at Beit el-Wali are grouped together on one wall, whereas the fuller, more circumstantially “realistic” portrayal of the Nubian war occupies the full length of the facing wall. If any of the war reliefs at Beit el-Wali are to be assigned to Sety I’s reign, the most likely candidate should be the Nubian campaign itself rather than the cursorily treated scenes involving Libyans and Asians. Any conclusions regarding the extent of Mehy’s (and Ramesses’) participation in the Karnak reliefs are bound to be incomplete, moreover, owing to the loss of the two upper registers on the eastern side and the virtual inaccessibility of the western side wall. Inferences from Ramesses’ failure to do more than erase Mehy’s figure from the Kadesh battle scene should not be drawn hastily, since we do not know how any corresponding figures in the third register, eastern side were treated, or why. In addition, since Mehy and Ramesses were both inserted into the Karnak reliefs secondarily, they stand at one remove from the events described there—and the connection is all the weaker in Ramesses’ case, since his usurpation was aimed at replacing the earlier figures with his own. Seen in this light, his claims have no more validity than those of Thutmose I or II when their names are surcharged over those of Hatshepsut. Besides, if Ramesses had been old enough to take a significant part in campaigning from the very beginning of his father’s reign, why would Sety snub his own son by giving the place of honor to a subordinate? And why, if Ramesses did participate in his father’s earliest wars, did he not also claim a place in the later campaigns when, by his own account, we would expect him to be most heavily involved in civil and military administration? It remains possible that Ramesses II chose to represent at Beit el-Wali campaigns that he did not fight, but which he had usurped from Mehy at Karnak—but in the present state of our knowledge, it is hazardous to go any further.

In the end, Mehy continues to be a shadowy figure. His impact on the contemporary record, outside the battle reliefs, is nil. No one who is otherwise known from Sety’s reign, or even that of Ramesses II, can convincingly be identified with him. The reasons for his extraordinary prominence are equally obscure. If, like the relatives of queen Tiyi under Amenhotep III, he owed his rise to his family connections with the royal house, we do not know of them. The presence of a viable heir in prince Ramesses, near the beginning of Sety’s reign, is sufficient to

37. I am grateful to Frank J. Yurco for this suggestion, which also has been mooted by Jean Vercoutter, “Le pays d’Irem,” p. 177, n. 2 (but see Appendix 5). For lack of evidence, however, it is best to regard the war of Sety’s eighth year as separate from that shown by Ramesses II at Beit el-Wali.


39. Reliefs IV, pl. 23.

40. Possible candidates from the time of Sety I are Khnumemheb, a scribe and “overseer of attendants” (KRI I 308), and Horemheb, an official “of the Lord of the Two Lands” (ibid., p. 320, bottom). From the reign of Ramesses II, there is the fanbearer Horemheb (ibid., III 119), the chief steward of the Ramessesum, Horemheb (ibid., pp. 187–91), the charioteer Sutiemheb (ibid., p. 246), the chariotry scribe Amenemheb (ibid., p. 249), and the chief of works, Minemheb (ibid., p. 282). Most of these people have titles quite different from those attested for Mehy; although, in the case of the Horemheb from East Silsila (ibid., I 320), only the final and nondiagnostic part of his title remains. If he were in charge of quarrying at Silsila—not an inappropriate role for a military man like Mehy—the identification is possible, but this is quite speculative.
APPENDIX 6

dispel any thought that Mehy might have been considered, however briefly, as heir apparent by adoption. We may, however, suggest an alternative role for him. Wherever he appears, Mehy’s image is that of a valiant fighter, supporting the warrior king. This in itself was hardly new. Since the beginning of the Eighteenth Dynasty, men had found in the army an avenue to wealth and power. If Mehy fits comfortably into this milieu, however, his appearance in Sety’s war scenes is distinctly anomalous. A commoner, in the privacy of his own tomb, might extol his prowess in battle beside the king, but none had ever figured on a royal monument in quite this way. This extraordinary honor, in my opinion, justifies our viewing Mehy as one of the last in a series of powerful commoners—men like Yuya (Amenhotep III’s father-in-law), Amenhotep, son of Hapu, and the “God’s Father,” Ay—whose low or anomalous titles belied their real influence in the land. While Mehy’s contribution can only be inferred, the extravagance of its acknowledgment suggests at least two things: He played an outstanding role in implementing the new aggressive foreign policy under Sety I and the king felt obliged to give that role an unprecedented public recognition.

The accession of Sety’s son spelled the end, not only for Mehy but for this intimacy between the king and his chief officers. While Ramesses II never concealed his family’s roots in the office-holding class, he could not afford to erase the crucial distance that kings had to maintain from the governed. Mehy himself may have behaved with impeccable loyalty, but what he represented was dangerous to a newly arrived dynasty. Not too long ago, military magnates had taken over the kingship itself. Might this not happen again? A danger perceived in this way, and not merely the envy of the crown prince, is altogether the most probable reason for Mehy’s fate in the battle reliefs. His erasure and overall replacement by prince Ramesses, in turn, cannot be separated from the nearly concurrent featuring of Ramesses II’s own children in his earliest war reliefs—particularly since these boys were almost certainly too young to have taken an active part in the fighting. Since this theme is also as persistent as it is new, one is hard put not to suspect Ramesses of making a deliberate point at the expense of Mehy and anyone else with similar aspirations. In its new prominence, and a profile far higher than the norm during the Eighteenth Dynasty, the royal children now made up a privileged class that intervened between the king and even his highest officials. Both in battle

43. Indeed, it did; see K. A. Kitchen, The Third Intermediate Period in Egypt (1100–650 B.C.) (Warminster, 1973), pp. 248–54, for the military background of the high priests of Amun and the kings of the late Twentieth and early Twenty-first Dynasties.
44. Wente and Harris, X-Ray Atlas, p. 259.
45. For convenience, see KRI II–VI for references to the new ubiquity of the royal family in temple decoration—in the new genre of procession of the king’s sons and daughters, in statues beside colossal figures of their parents, in war and triumph scenes, and in tableaux of ceremonial occasions.
46. E.g., four sons held the title of “generalissimo” (jmy-r mšwr): the first-born heir, Amunherkhepeshef (KRI II 860); Ramessu (ibid., pp. 861, 870:14); the eventual heir, Memeptah (ibid., pp. 902 bottom; 903:1–2, 4, 7, 9, 16; 904:3, 12, 15; 905:14); and Sethherkhepeshef (ibid., p. 915:6). Two others (Préherwenef and Montuherkhepeshef) held high-ranking cavalry posts (ibid.,...
and in his works of peace, moreover, Ramesses II carried to a new level the rhetoric that was already implicit in his father’s war reliefs. Almost single-handedly, with the aid of Amun (and of his sons, in the pictorial record), Ramesses now embodied the superhuman hero, the “fighter for millions who protects his army, a rampart for hundreds of thousands.” Although this rhetoric has been dismissed as mere bombast, what we now know about Mehy’s career and the reaction it provoked may be reason enough to take it more seriously.

Yet another echo of Mehy’s career has been inferred from poetry of the Ramesside age, in which a dashing figure by the same name is mentioned with admiration and desire. Could this Mehy of the love songs be the champion whose figure was erased from Sety I’s battle scenes? Once again, this is an attractive idea, unprovable, but also not easy to dismiss. Since the Mehy of the love poems occurs frequently enough to appear as an archetypal figure, he might well have lived in another age. On the other hand, the trappings of his rank, as described, could be military as well as princely. If this Mehy is indeed the hero who lived under Sety I, his survival in this medium raises interesting questions. Not suffering a total damnatio memoriae at his expulsion from the battle reliefs, he would still shine, in his proper sphere, as the Egyptian embodiment of the hero. Whether this role coexisted easily with the heroic pretensions of the king in the Ramesside age or in subtle antagonism to them are problems too speculative to be discussed in these pages. Whatever the contemporary role we can infer from his brief appearance at Karnak, Mehy remains a phantom outside the battle reliefs of king Sety I.

47. Compare Ramesses’ insistence on his own youth when he had assumed leadership of the army (see n. 17 above); and it is even possible that some of these concerns are echoed in the unflattering portrait of the Egyptian army in the “literary” account of the Battle of Kadesh (e.g., Gardiner, Kadesh Inscriptions, pp. 9–12 (= P 80–95, 110–20, 170–205, 250–75); and note the contrast between the king’s fearlessness and the pusillanimity of his shield-bearer (ibid., pp. 11–12 = P 205–15).


51. Gardiner hazarded that Mehy is “perhaps” a prince because of his chariot and his retinue (Chester Beatty Papyri, p. 32, n. 1); compare P. Smither, “Prince Mehy of the Love Songs,” JEA 34 (1948):116. In ostracon no. 1079, 7 (Posener, Catalogue, p. 44), there is a reference to Mehy with his name in a cartouche, as in no. 1078, verso 4, but followed here with the words ‘nb wd3 snh, jw.f m t3y.f tr[...], “live, prosper, be healthy, while he is in his <fortress> (?)” (= Wb. V 356:1) or perhaps “in his <cabin> (?)” (ibid., p. 356:5; the cabin of a boat is meant). The cartouches written in the Deir el-Medina copies need not be taken seriously; compare the “king” Sapair in the Abbott Papyrus (Pap. B.M. 10221, 3 12 = T. E. Peet, The Great Tomb-Robberies of the Twentieth Egyptian Dynasty [Oxford, 1930], pp. 38 and 43, n. 9), who was thus “promoted” in later memory from his original status of prince (see H. E. Winlock, “The Tombs of the Kings of the Seventeenth Dynasty at Thebes,” JEA 10 [1924]:222, n. 3).
APPENDIX 7

THE CHRONOLOGICAL FRAMEWORK

The evolution of the quarrel between Egypt and Hatti, as presented in the first chapter of this book, derives from an interpretation of a wide range of documents from Western Asia. Nearly all of this material is tendentious in one way or another, and the sense of the entire corpus is sufficiently unclear to allow more than one possible understanding of its meaning. Much of what follows is not new, and the discussion cannot be exhaustive; but my aims are rather modest. A number of previous studies have devoted a great deal of effort and ingenuity to examining the material, particularly the Amarna letters, in an attempt to resolve one big question, i.e., the existence of the alleged coregency of Amenhotep III with Akhenaten. The results, it seems fair to say, have been inconclusive; and owing to the focus of the questions asked so far, rather less attention has been paid to the placement of individual letters, and groups of letters, in relation to major events in the ancient Near East, and also relative to one another within fairly short periods of time. Consideration of these smaller localized problems, I believe, may bring the broader questions into sharper focus, to yield, if not final certainty, at least the grounding for a responsible opinion. To this end, at any rate, I dedicate the following pages.

The date of Shuppiluliuma’s Great Syrian campaign within Akhenaten’s reign can be approximately fixed by means of the Amarna letters written by Tushratta of Mitanni. EA 27, in particular, bears a hieratic docket, the date of which has been variously read “[regnal year] <1>2” (or “[regnal ye]ar 2”), followed by “I Prt 5” (or “6”). The traces of the year

3. For the reading of the day of the month see Černý apud Kühne, Chronologie, p. 44, n. 207.
numeral could lend themselves to either option. Since the contents of EA 27 show that, in his previous letter, “Napkhururiya” had solicited from Tushratta a commitment to the same amity that had existed between Egypt and Mitanni in the time of Amenhotep III, it would appear that the latter had died not too long previously. In the absence of convincing evidence for a long coregency between Amenhotep III and Akhenaten, the most convincing interpretation must be that EA 27 was received at Thebes in the second year of Amenhotep IV, when Tushratta was still king of Mitanni. His reign continued for some time, for in another letter in this dossier Tushratta says that the king of Egypt has had his messengers before him for the past four years. Based on the internal evidence of this letter, together with the other Mitannian correspondence that goes with it (EA 27, 28), it would appear that these four years were calculated from the sending of the messengers who are mentioned in EA 27. EA 29 could thus have been written, at the latest, in the fifth year following the despatch of EA 27, i.e., in Akhenaten’s sixth year. On the other hand, if Tushratta’s reckoning was rough and was meant to include both the present year and that of the original despatch, the interval could be much shorter. The date on EA 27 fell near the anniversary of Akhenaten’s accession, in the early part of December. Tushratta would probably have been reckoning in terms of a calendar on the Babylonian model, which began the year in the spring, the period of four years could have started in the fall of the year in which EA 27 was sent and included, as its terminus, the third spring thereafter. Thus, if the date on EA 27 was at the very beginning of Amenhotep IV’s second regnal year, the four years mentioned in EA 29 could have been reckoned from the dispatch of the letter in year 1, ending in the spring of year 4. If the date on EA 27 falls at the end of the pharaoh’s second regnal year, however, it would have been sent earlier in that same year, and the terminal point

4. The tablet was examined by the author in August, 1985, thanks to the kind cooperation of the authorities of the Bode-Museum in East Berlin and with the assistance of K.-H. Priese. Particular attention was paid to capturing the faint ink traces that survive at the top of the damaged sign that is in dispute. The result is that both $t + sp$ (ligatured, for “[regnal ye]ar 2”) or “10” (for “[regnal year] 12”) are possible. Since the shape of the sign would be slightly odd in either case, there are no paleographic grounds for making a decision. See Murnane, “Three Amarna Datelines,” paper read at the meeting honoring the discovery of the Amarna letters (Chicago, February 1987) and still forthcoming in the publication of those proceedings over three years later.

5. Moran, Amarna, p. 53 with n. 130.

6. Redford, History and Chronology, pp. 88–169, and Murnane, Ancient Egyptian Coregencies, pp. 123–69, 231–33. There has been no material change in the situation since then, although the debate goes on; e.g., Aldred, Akhenaten, King of Egypt, pp. 169–82; W. R. Johnson, “Images of Amenhotep III at Thebes: Styles and Intentions,” in L. M. Berman, ed., The Art of Amenhotep III: Art Historical Analyses (Cleveland, 1990), pp. 42–46; and compare the reply to the foregoing by J. F. Romano, “A Second Look at ‘Images, etc.’,” in ibid., pp. 47–54.


for the four years would be the spring of Akhenaten's fifth year on the throne. While this uncertainty cannot be resolved with the data at our disposal, one thing is clear: the letters in this sequence were written at a time when Tushratta could afford to dicker with Egypt in terms that would have been fatuous after his defeat in the Great Syrian war.\textsuperscript{12} If they were all sent before Shuppiluliuma's raid on Waššukanni, this last event cannot be dated any earlier than the spring of "Napkhururiya's" fourth year.

The next group of Amarna letters that can be placed relative to the Great Syrian war were written by Akizzi of Qatna. Although the date of this man's rise to power is problematical,\textsuperscript{13} most of his correspondence (EA 53, 54, and 56) clearly postdates the war, since it dwells on the subversive activities of the Hittites' most enthusiastic agent, Aitakama of Kadesh, who was now back from his exile in Hatti. This stage also belongs to the reign of Akhenaten, who (= as "Namḫuriya") is the addressee of these letters.\textsuperscript{14} Akizzi's letters mention another of Aitakama's victims, Biriawaza, who was also a contemporary of Amenhotep IV/Akhenaten, although the upper and lower limits of his career are not certain.\textsuperscript{15} The only references to him outside the vassals' letters (e.g., in EA 7, where the king of Babylon complains that Biriawaza has looted one of his caravans) are undatable, either within Akhenaten's reign or with reference to the Great Syrian war.\textsuperscript{16} Most of his own letters, however, as well as the bulk of references to him in other dossiers, are datable to the period of his war with Aitakama, thus after the Great Syrian campaign.\textsuperscript{17} The crucial question of length—both of this period and of time elapsed since the war—remains unclear. In EA 52, written to an unnamed "king of Egypt," Akizzi indicates his loyalty to the pharaoh and Biriawaza, but he also mentions (in an obscure passage) a recent period of three years when caravan traffic between Egyptian territory and Qatna was unsatisfactory.\textsuperscript{18} If this is not merely rhetorical, but refers to the unsettled conditions caused by

\textsuperscript{12} This line of reasoning is not affected by the controversy over the date of Tushratta's death, which some scholars place many years after the fall of Waššukanni, in about the second year of the "Hurrian war" (e.g., Kitchen, \textit{Suppiluliuma}, p. 48, and H. Klengel, \textit{MIO} 10 [1964]:79, n. 25; Wilhelm, \textit{The Hurrians}, pp. 35-37), but others put shortly after his defeat in the Great Syrian war (Waterhouse, "Syria in the Amarna Age," pp. 59-63; Goetze, \textit{CAH} \textsuperscript{3} II.2 14-15; Helck, \textit{Beziehungen"}, p. 180.

\textsuperscript{13} Pace Waterhouse ("Syria in the Amarna Age," pp. 42-43, 53-55), the Great Syrian campaign cannot be identified either as the beginning or the cause of his accession in Qatna.

\textsuperscript{14} See Campbell, \textit{Chronology of the Amarna Letters}, p. 68, for this identification.

\textsuperscript{15} I do not share Hachmann's conviction (\textit{Kamid el-Lôz—Kumidi}, p. 67) that EA 194 was written by Biriawaza at the accession of Amenhotep IV/Akhenaten. Not only is this document (= Moran, \textit{Amarna}, pp. 431-32) brief, one-sided, and unspecific, but (even if it were written to greet a new pharaoh, which the unctuous opening phrases do not prove) the addressee could as easily be one of Akhenaten's successors.

\textsuperscript{16} Kühne, \textit{Chronologie}, pp. 60-62.

\textsuperscript{17} See \textit{Chapter 1}, n. 58 (= p. 13). For EA 194, see above (n. 15), and below (n. 84). Among his other letters (= Moran, \textit{Amarna}, pp. 432-36), EA 196 and 197 contain explicit references to the war against him by (alleged) Hittite sympathizers; and EA 195—to the effect that his troops are ready to join with Egyptian forces—may have been written in anticipation of Egypt's first attack on Kadesh (compare \textit{Chapter 1}, pp. 17-18).

\textsuperscript{18} Moran, \textit{Amarna}, pp. 222-23.
the Great Syrian campaign and its aftermath, we might link this period with the earliest possible date we have established for the war from the Mitannian letters (i.e., the spring of the pharaoh’s fourth year), to arrive at some point within year 6 of Akhenaten for Aitakama’s war with Biriawaza. EA 52 is badly broken, however, and what it says might be just as compatible with the state of affairs that followed the failure of the first attack on Kadesh, when (for all we know) Biriawaza and Akizzi might still have been loyal towards Egypt. Improbable as such a rapid pace for these events might seem, it cannot be ruled out—and even the highest tentative chronology for these events does not take us far.

Another letter from Akizzi to Akhenaten, EA 55, seems to be earlier than the rest of his dossier, and it was certainly written at a time when the effects of the Great Syrian campaign were still felt. The ruler of Qatna refers to the Hittite king’s depredations—including the deportation of the city’s warriors and, more significantly, its gods—as if they lay in the recent past. That these complaints contain an allusion to Shuppiluliuma’s conquest of Qatna seems hard to deny, for they are precisely the troubles one would expect in the wake of the Hittite sack described in the Shattiwaza treaty. Since Akizzi is asking “Namḫuṣara” for gold with which to make another statue for one of these gods, this letter must fall after the Hittites’ departure from Syria, either very late in that same year or in the following spring. The reference to Nuḫašše, which is represented as being wide open if the Egyptians would only bestir themselves, is also indicative of a date soon after the end of the Great Syrian campaign. Although Shuppiluliuma had installed a pro-Hittite government there, the vacuum created by the Hittites’ military withdrawal had a chilling effect on its loyalty. By the time of Aitakama’s war with Biriawaza, Akizzi could also report that Nuḫašše, along with the local rulers who had assumed power in Mitanni following Tushratta’s defeat, were anxious for the Egyptians to intervene. A realistic chronology must allow enough time for everyone to realize that the hand of Hatti would not lie heavily upon Syria, even while it remained sufficiently ominous to persuade the pharaoh against troublesome upstarts like Aitakama. This revival of Syrian confidence could hardly have taken place before the next campaigning season was well advanced, when it would have become clear that the Hittites were not coming south. Perhaps the most realistic timetable for Akizzi’s letters, then, would place EA 55 in the spring of Akhenaten’s fifth year, followed by his other letters.

19. Perhaps to be inferred from the words “he stole them” at the end of line 31 (referring to the Hittite king?); see ibid., p. 223, n. 5.
21. ANET, p. 318 = Weidner, Politische Dokumente, p. 13 (obv. 37); see Waterhouse, “Syria in the Amarna Age,” pp. 42–55, for the situation of Qatna during and after the Great Syrian war, an analysis which I find more convincing than Redford’s suggestion (History and Chronology, pp. 220–23) that Qatna, Ugarit, and Nuḫašše fell to Hatti during a war that followed his Great Syrian campaign.
22. And probably not during the war itself, when Addu-nirari of Nuḫašše had written to the pharaoh, begging for Egyptian help (EA 51 = Moran, Amarna, pp. 221–22; compare Waterhouse, “Syria in the Amarna Age,” p. 52; Helck, Beziehungen, p. 176; and see n. 24 below).
23. See Chapter 1, p. 11 and n. 52.
24. At any event, soon after the end of the Great Syrian war. EA 55 also has been viewed as contemporary with the later phases of the war, with Aziru acting in the Hittites’ interests against Nuḫašše; see Klengel, MIO 10 (1964):73, and Kitchen, Suppiluliuma, p. 44; also H. Freydank, “Eine hethitische Fassung des Vertrages zwischen dem Hethiter-König Suppiluliuma und Aziru von
in the fall of the same year and into year 6. Once again, this is a bare minimum, and it yields nothing of real chronological value.

One way of dating Akizzi’s letters more accurately might proceed from what they report about Aziru, the ruler of Amurru. Only in EA 55 is he mentioned by name: The pharaoh is asked to send silver to ransom men of Qatna whom Aziru has seized and taken out of the country; and his capture is one of the happy results that the timely dispatch of an Egyptian army might achieve. Aziru’s activities bulk large, however, in other groups of letters, many of which refer to the events described in EA 53 and 56. Given the limited chronological help we get from Akizzi’s letters alone, we may turn more usefully to the dossiers of Aziru himself and his inveterate enemy, Rib-Addi of Byblos.

In no fewer than four of his extant letters, Aziru assures the pharaoh and other prominent figures at the Egyptian court of his intention of visiting Egypt. Having received reassurances from the pharaoh, he and the Egyptian envoy Hatib (= Hotpe) are ready to go—but the king of Hatti has come into Nuḫaššē, and Aziru tells Tutu that they will wait until he retires before coming on to Egypt. The other letters in this series were evidently despatched somewhat later, for the Hittite king was now entrenched in Nuḫaššē, a mere two days’ march from Tunip. The identity of this campaign with the Great Syrian war seems beyond question, especially given the notice of the Hittite king’s personal presence in Nuḫaššē, where he is not known to have campaigned at any time later. According to the Shattwaza treaty, Shuppiluliuma’s entry into Nuḫaššē was the penultimate phase of his campaign in Syria. Dating it more precisely is impossible. Given the Hittites’ itinerary, however, it seems unlikely that the Hittites withdrew much before the summer, at the earliest; and it seems more probable that they stayed in Syria until the close of the campaigning season, in the late fall.

Two further points are worth noting. First, Aziru was at some pains to assure the pharaoh that he was not using the invasion of Nuḫaššē as an excuse to dally with the Hittite king even while professing loyalty to Egypt. This protest seems disingenuous. As we have seen, Aziru had already been in touch with Shuppiluliuma—no doubt out of prudent self-interest—before being recalled to heel by Egyptian imperial officers. Second, Aziru’s expressed concern is not

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25. EA 55:23–27 (= Moran, Amarna, p. 227 with n. 4 [p. 228]).
26. EA 164:4–17, 35–42.
29. Thus, Klengel, Geschichte Syriens II 272–73; Goetze, CAH 3 II.2 12; and Kitchen, Suppiluliuma, p. 44. A somewhat later date for these references is suggested by Schulman in JARCE 15 (1978):44–45, but his reconstruction depends on discounting Aziru’s report of the Hittite king’s personal presence in Nuḫaššē and on placing Aziru’s letters to this effect with EA 170, written by Aziru’s brothers, in support of Aziru’s excuses for not appearing in Egypt. EA 170 is more generally regarded, however, as having been written during Aziru’s stay in Egypt (see Chapter 1, n. 99).
30. EA 165:28–32.
31. Chapter 1, pp. 15–17.
only for Amurru, but for Tunip. We know that he took this city at some point in his career—but when? On this score, Aziru’s references to Tunip during the Great Syrian war are ambiguous: it is not clear whether he regarded it as a threatened possession or an independent town on his border. An answer can be sought, however, in EA 59, a letter that the citizens of Tunip addressed to the pharaoh. At that time, clearly, the city was still independent and hostile to Aziru. Its main problem, the absence of an effective ruler, would be solved when the son of Akit-Teshup, who had been living in Egypt, was returned to them. It was normal, of course, for the sons of Asiatic princes to be raised in Egypt and kept there until they could take their fathers’ thrones, but in this case the pharaoh apparently had second thoughts, for the men of Tunip imply that the prince had begun his journey home but was suddenly ordered back to Egypt. This odd behavior may have something to do with the checkered background of Tunip’s relations with Egypt. The letter begins by referring to the time when Tunip had been governed by the pharaoh’s ancestor, Manahpirya, most probably Thutmose III. Later, however, Tunip had returned to Mitanni’s sphere of influence, and this break in relations is referred to evasively in the present letter: Although Egypt’s gods (still) reside in Tunip, the king should ask his elders about the time Tunip did not belong to the pharaoh; and the writers repeatedly insist that they have continued writing to the king, but have been ignored, for twenty years. What these elliptical passages suggest is that Tunip was now returning to the Egyptian fold. During the Great Syrian war, when Nuḫaššu had tried to keep itself outside the Hittite empire, its king had approached the pharaoh in precisely the same terms. Necessary antecedents to such a rapprochement, in both cases, would be the utter collapse of Mitannian power and the concomitant rise of Hatti. With respect to the latter, the writers declare, “now Aziru will learn that in Hittite territory an evil fate has befallen your servant, a man (i.e., a city ruler?), (and) your gardener.” The damage implied by this cryptic remark makes sense only in the wake of the Great Syrian campaign, when a number of the pharaoh’s “servants” had indeed passed into the orbit of Hatti. On this admittedly slender evidence, it appears that Aziru did not conquer Tunip until some time after Shuppiluliuma’s departure from Syria.

Tunip’s independence was only one of the sacrifices Egypt was willing to make in its continued support of its champion in Amurru. When EA 59 was written, Aziru had already taken

33. EA 161:11–16.
35. EA 59:5–8; compare Krauss, Das Ende der Amarnazeit, pp. 151–58.
38. EA 51 (= ibid., pp. 221–22).
39. Meaning that the Hittites have hurt the former Egyptian vassals they conquered, both rulers and commons? See EA 59:21–24 (= Moran, Amarna, p. 232 and n. 6 [p. 233]), which supersedes the translation of this passage in Waterhouse, “Syria in the Amarna Age,” pp. 136 and n. 94 (p. 156). Waterhouse’s interpretation of this letter, which he regards as having been written by the citizens of Tunip while Aziru was on his way to Hatti following his release by the Egyptians (ibid., pp. 135–37 with notes) also is not compelling.
possession of Ṣumur. Rib-Addi was still ruling Byblos when this had happened. His active career must have ended soon afterwards, though, for the same letter that reports the movements of Egyptian refugees from Ṣumur also observes that the city’s conqueror is at peace with “the man of Byblos”—certainly Rib Addi’s treacherous brother, Ilirabih. Since Shuppiluliuma’s campaign and its effects are mentioned in at least one of the letters Rib-Addi wrote before being deposed, all these related events—the Great Syrian war, Aziru’s takeover of Ṣumur and the coup d’état in Byblos—must lie within a fairly short space of time. The Hittite invasion probably came first, for Ṣumur’s fall can be separated from the aftermath described in EA 67 by only a few months, and it is unlikely that Aziru (whom the Egyptians had placed under observation while the Hittite king was in Nuhāššē) would have resumed operations against Byblos immediately thereafter. Provisionally, we may place the Egyptians’ cession of Ṣumur to Aziru no earlier than the spring of the year that followed the Great Syrian campaign. This act, perhaps, ratified the formal arrangement by which Egypt would allow Aziru a free hand, and pay him subsidies, in return for his protection of the pharaoh’s interests in northern Syria. The coup against Rib-Addi took place later in the same year, and at about the same time Tunip—having failed to secure its own ruler from Egypt (sometime after Aziru entered Ṣumur)—was absorbed into the kingdom of Amurru.

The fall of Ṣumur is conceivably the key to a more precise dating of these events within the reign of Akhenaten. In terms of the minimal chronology to which we have adhered so far, its cession to Aziru in the year following the Great Syrian war falls, at the earliest, in Akhenaten’s fifth regnal year. In EA 155, however, Abi-Milki of Tyre remarks that “the king should inform himself, from his commissioner, as to whether Ṣumur is [inhabited].” Since other letters of this man fall rather late during Aziru’s career, this discreetly worded suggestion implies either that Ṣumur is currently beleaguered or has already “fallen” to Aziru. What is significant from a

40. EA 59:34–38; thus Moran (= Amarna, p. 232, “When Aziru entered Ṣumur, he treated them as he wished”), contradicting the opposite understanding by Helck, Beziehungen, p. 176, n. 61.
41. A considerable part of Rib-Addi’s dossier falls prior to this event (EA 98, 102–109, 112, 114, 116, 118), and no fewer than six more of his letters refer to its fall (EA 124, 129, 131–134), with another, indirect reference possible in EA 126:55–57 (“They [= Rib-Addi’s enemies] have taken all the countries of the king,” etc.). Although there have been attempts to date Rib-Addi’s correspondence in terms of the normal traveling time between Egypt and Lebanon, these reconstructions generally assume that each of his letters was sent in response to a reply to his last letter, which may not be justified; see the cautionary remarks of Wente in JNES 28 (1969):277–78, and compare Liverani, Three Amarna Essays, pp. 80–84.
42. EA 67 (= Moran, Amarna, pp. 241–42; thus also Campbell, Chronology of the Amarna Letters, p. 131).
43. EA 126:4–13 (the coast north of Byblos up to Ugarit is closed to Rib-Addi by Aziru and his allies), 51–52 (“... the Hittite troops, and they have burned the land”), 58–61 (“Now they [i.e., Rib-Addi’s enemies] are mobilizing troops of the land of the Hittites in order to gain possession of Byblos.”)
44. EA 157, in which Aziru claims that he had been prevented from entering Egyptian service by “the great ones of Ṣumur” and solicits Egyptian military aid “if the king of Hat[i] advances in war against me,” may be a reaffirmation of the recent pact; see Moran, Amarna, pp. 392–93 (with n. 3).
46. EA 147:61–71 (the rival king of Sidon is in daily communication with “the rebel Aziru”), EA 149:28–40 (Aziru has taken possession of Ṣumur), EA 151:58–70 (Aziru and Aitakama are at war with Biriawaza).
chronological standpoint, however, is that most of EA 155 is taken up with praise for “Mayati,” or Akhenaten’s eldest daughter, Meritaten. Although she was already playing a public role during the earliest years of the reign, this young woman achieved even greater prominence when she became Akhenaten’s official “first lady.” This can only have taken place after her mother, queen Nefertiti, had either died or been promoted to the status of coregent to her husband. Although Meritaten’s elevation has been placed as late as year 15, it may have happened somewhat earlier. Nefertiti and all six of her daughters were alive early in year 12, at the “royal appearance … to receive the gifts (jnw) of Khor (= Syria) and Kush, east and west—(in sum) every foreign country.” Nefertiti was also alive when her second daughter, Meketaten, was buried in the royal tomb at El-Amarna. This could have taken place as early as the latter part of year 12. Although “wine of the Estate of the King’s Daughter Meketaten” was still being delivered to Akhet-Aten in the following year, there is no way to prove whether this foundation was maintained for the use of a living princess or her mortuary cult. In any case, even if Nefertiti’s disappearance cannot be fixed to year 13 or to any subsequent point, a plausible date for Meritaten’s promotion cannot be set before this time. The references to her in letters from Babylon, as well as Abi-Milki’s fawning dedication of himself and his city to “Mayati, my mistress,” must thus be dated no earlier than year 13 (or, perhaps better, year 14, if Meketaten and Nefertiti were still alive in the previous year). This synchronism, while not as telling as one would like, at least helps to push the Great Syrian campaign and its aftermath into the last third of Akhenaten’s reign. At the earliest, if the references to Meritaten in EA 155 are dated to her father’s thirteenth regnal year, Shuppiluliuma’s invasion cannot have occurred before the spring of the previous year.

50. This took place on II Prt 8 in year 12 (Davies, Amarna III, pl. xiii; compare ibid. II, pl. xxxviii), which—assuming Akhenaten became king around 1350 B.C.—would be in late December.
51. G. T. Martin, The Royal Tomb of El-‘Amarna II, EM-EES 39 (London, 1989), pp. 41–48 (in Room Gamma, a separate burial from the one that also was commonly associated with Meketaten in Room Alpha; see ibid., pp. 27–41).
52. CoA III, pl. lxxxvi, docket no. 37.
53. While Helck (n. 47 above) believes that the “Estate of Nefernefruaten-Nefertiti” (last attested in year 11: see CoA I, pl. lxiii, I) was replaced by the “Estate of the Queen” (attested for years 14–17: ibid. I, pl. lxiii, G–K; ibid. III, pls. xcii, 208; xciii, 218, and xciv, 245), indicating that Nefertiti died no later than year 13, his conclusions are disputed by Krauss, Das Ende der Amamazeit, pp. 96–97, who points out that an “Estate of the Queen” coexists with Tiy’s and Sitamun’s personal estates in material from the reign of Amenhotep III.
54. Both letters were sent to Akhenaten: In EA 10 the addressee’s name is broken, but lines 44–45 refer to “your daughter Mayati”; EA 11 is addressed to “Napḫururea” and refers to Mayati (verso 25–26) as “the mistess of <your> house” (see Moran, Amarna, pp. 82–86, with n. 22 [p. 88]).
55. The beginning of the spring campaigning season would have begun towards the middle of the regnal year, Akhenaten’s year 12, no less than three months after the “parade of foreign tribute,” which was held about a month into the twelfth regnal year, in late December (= n. 50 above) during the
APPENDIX 7

Further light on later developments in Western Asia is shed by the final adventures of Rib-Addi. Having attempted a last-ditch resistance to Aziru through an alliance with Ammunira, the prince of Beirut, he found himself locked out of his city by his younger brother, who led a faction that favored accommodation with Amurru. Rib-Addi had taken refuge with Ammunira, and in what is apparently his last letter from his place of exile he indicates that he had been residing in Beirut for the past twelve months. Since Şu'mur’s fall and the coup against Rib-Addi took place only a few months apart, in Akhenaten’s year 13 at the earliest, his exile in Beirut would thus have stretched into the following year. At about the same time, moreover, two letters from Ammunira, Rib-Addi’s host in Beirut, speak of local preparations to receive an army that is expected to arrive from Egypt. Rib-Addi was still in Beirut at this time, and the slow pace of these military preparations may be implicit in what he reports about jeering remarks from his former subjects, about help from Egypt that does not come. This, perhaps, was one of the reasons why Rib-Addi committed the last of his blunders. Also by this time, Rib-Addi’s brother, Ilirabīḫ, had fallen out with his sometime patron, Aziru. Writing at the end of a year’s exile in Beirut (= n. 57 above), Rib-Addi reported that although the citizens of Byblos were divided in their sentiments towards Aziru, they had expelled the Amurrite troops that had been garrisoned there earlier. But the former king of Byblos was now playing both sides of the fence. Even as

previous astronomical year. Unfortunately, the political conditions that lay behind this occasion are too uncertain to permit any firm conclusions to be drawn from it, at least with respect to Egypt’s situation vis-à-vis Western Asia in the first months of year 12. For example, while Hittites are represented among the Asiatic spectators at the ceremony (see Davies, Amarna II, p. 41 and pls. xxxvii, xxxix), they are not differentiated from other Asians there, which could imply a state of relative peace, such as that preceding Shuppiluliuma’s sudden invasion of Mitanni. On the other hand, this tableau makes use of a triumphalist rhetoric that is standard in scenes of this type, and it is by no means obvious that it represented the situation in Asia very accurately.

57. EA 138:20-21 (= Moran, Amarna, p. 362, who tentatively restores the broken passage as follows: “After the re[vol]t of my territory, now sinc[e] [1]2 mo[nth]s, have I not been living in Beirut?”). Other periods of time are mentioned in this letter (i.e., lines 24–25, “I sent a tablet [to the] royal [palac]e. Now, [however, no message?] has gone out to me [for] four months”; lines 75–80, “Although I had sent my son to the palace of the king a few instants after I had arrived in Beirut, for four months he has not obtained an audience with the king”), but they probably lie within this larger interval.
58. EA 141, 142 (= Moran, Amarna, pp. 370–73). Other references to this episode have been collected by Schulman in JARCE 3 (1964):63–64, n. 99; and they also are regarded as referring to one event in Nadav Na’aman’s dissertation, which I have not seen (reference courtesy of Professor Moran). The logistical aspects of such expeditionary forces from Egypt have been discussed at length by F. Pintore, “Transiti di truppe e schemi epistolari nella Siria egiziana dell’età di El-Amarna,” OA 11 (1972):101–31; and idem, “La prassi della marcia armata nella Siria egizia dell’età di El-Amarna,” OA 12 (1973):299–318.
59. He is explicitly mentioned in EA 142:15–24 (= Moran, Amarna, p. 372).
60. EA 138:122–26 (= ibid., p. 364).
61. Aziru was apparently still in Amurru when EA 139 was written, since in lines 29–40 (= Moran, Amarna, p. 368, with n. 7) Ilirabīḫ tells the king to disregard the tribute Aziru sends him, since it all proceeds from his criminal activities.
62. EA 138:51–75, especially lines 71–72 (“Half the city is on the side of the sons of Abdi-Ashšti [sic], and half is on the side of my lord [= the pharaoh?”); see Moran, Amarna, p. 363.
he continued his barrage of letters to the pharaoh, Rib-Addi had entered into negotiations with Aziru, promising a hefty bribe if only the Amurrite strongman would reinstall him in Byblos. This approach, and its unfortunate outcome for Rib-Addi, cannot have come very long after the end of the period of twelve months during which he had stayed in Beirut, i.e., in the latter part of Akhenaten's fourteenth year, at the earliest.

The fate of Rib-Addi is only one of the topics discussed in a sharp letter to Aziru from the king of Egypt. After discussing Rib-Addi's case, with a strong suggestion that Aziru had not been completely honest either with the former prince of Byblos or the pharaoh (lines 1–21), the king goes on to other matters. He complains that Aziru is still at peace with "the man of Kadesh" (i.e., Aitakama) even though this is a man with whom the pharaoh has fought, and he points out that this is not what he expects of a loyal vassal (lines 23–29). The king also reminds Aziru that his enemies are seeking to do him harm, and he warns him that the penalty for disloyalty is death for him and his whole family (lines 30–41). Earlier, Aziru had asked for and received a year of grace, during which he was required neither to obey the king's command that he come to Egypt nor to send his son as a hostage. Now, he should not repeat this request, but either present himself before the pharaoh within this year or send his son (lines 42–54). The letter closes with a list of political prisoners that Aziru, under the terms of a previous letter, had agreed to send on to Egypt, and the assurance—formulaic, but ominous in context—that the king and his armies are very well (lines 55–81).

The contents of this letter look back to the time of Aziru's and Aitakama's war with Biriawaza in Upe. This contest may have developed during Rib-Addi's year of exile in Beirut (i.e., during year 14 of Akhenaten), although it is not among the charges Ilirabiḫ hurling at Aziru while the latter was still in Amurru. Later, however, Ilirabiḫ would insist, "Aziru even [com]mitted an offence [whi]le he was being taken [bef]ore you (= the pharaoh). The offence [was aimed at] us. He sent his men [to] Itakama [sic] [and] he smote all the lands of Amqu, the lands of the king. Now he has sent his men to take over the land of Amqu and <its> territories." This last charge, leveled at Aziru while he was in Egypt, shows Ilirabiḫ's hand. At such a distance, the ruler of Amurru could not be personally responsible for an attack against his suzerain, nor—in his present position—would he wish to appear so. Ilirabiḫ, knowing Aziru's vulnerability, is plainly engaged in character assassination here, stretching the facts so that he can associate his foe with the incursion into the country of 'Amki even while Aziru's brothers were making every possible demonstration of

64. See Moran, Amarna, pp. 399–402, for EA 162.
65. This does not refer back to the similar business in EA 161, where Hani's mission is spoken of in somewhat different terms.
66. Certainly during Akhenaten's reign, at any rate, since Akizzi of Qatna wrote to him about these matters (EA 53, 54, 56); see above, nn. 13–14.
67. Rib-Addi never even mentions Aitakama, either in his letters from Byblos or Beirut; and he refers to Biriawaza only once (EA 129:82–83), in a context that implies he is ineffective against the sons of Abdi-Ashtira.
68. EA 139 (compare n. 61 above).
good faith on his behalf. Aziru’s partnership with Aitakama, even though it was represented as leading up to the present troubles, was probably what earlier reports had said it was: a military alliance, directed against Biriaiwaza, to which Aziru’s contribution was mostly in materiel.

It is not clear how long it took for Aziru’s activities to catch up with him. His other letters are unilluminating in this connection. EA 156 (in which Aziru asks to be allowed to remain in Amurru, but sends two of his sons to Egypt) could have followed the clutch of letters written during the Great Syrian war, when he had been due to go to Egypt; but it could also be a reply to EA 162, in which his avoidance of the hard questions the pharaoh asked is to be mitigated by the hostages he sends. At least a year must have elapsed between the end of the Great Syrian war and Aziru’s final departure for Egypt. Writing in the wake of the war, and after Aziru had entered Șumur, the citizens of Tunip observed that “if his (= the pharaoh’s) troops and his chariots are held back, (then) Aziru will do with us what he has done with Niya.” The date of this implied victory over Amurru’s neighbor to the northeast (see Map 1) is impossible to fix. If Aziru’s operations were tacitly in support of the Hittite strike against Niya, they would have fallen during the Great Syrian war and might represent what was later interpreted as Amurru’s first “submission” to Shuppiluliuma. Aziru’s “rebellion” against Hatti would thus have taken place later in the same war, when he was cowed by the Egyptians during Shuppiluliuma’s reduction of Nuḥaššē. If so, the point of what the citizens of Tunip were saying may be that, in allowing Aziru a free hand, the pharaoh is creating the conditions for the loss of more territory to the Hittites. This attractive scenario raises questions, however, that are not easily squared with subsequent developments. Allegations that Aziru had entertained Hittite envoys were only made later, when he had mastered Tunip. Moreover, it is difficult to see why the Egyptians would trust Aziru, to the extent of making him their proxy in the northwest, if he had already shown himself to be unreliable under pressure. More probably, Aziru took advantage of Niya when the country was weakened both by the after-effects of the Hittite conquest and the withdrawal of Hittite troops after the war—and thus, when he could also claim that he was acting in Egypt’s interest against a Hittite vassal. These operations, which occurred at about the time Aziru took control of Șumur, were followed, first by the conquest of Tunip, and later by the troubles with “the kings of Nuḥaššē” that, Aziru claimed, distracted him from following the pharaoh’s command that he rebuild Șumur. His delay in doing so must have continued for some time. It precipitated, not only the pharaoh’s queries and his defensive replies, but also enough unfavorable comment for Aziru to complain, “[h]ow could [serv]ants li[e] to my lord, [my god]? Look, I am going to (re)build Șumur! … [And with] reference to the city ruler[s, I s]ay:

70. See Chapter 1, pp. 18–20.
72. EA 165–167 (see nn. 26–28 above).
74. See Chapter 1 (= p. 16).
they are all traitors to my lord! [Do not trust] them!" At about the same time, when Abi-Milki of Tyre was protesting that Amurrur and Sidon were both his enemies, and that "[f]or the last year there has been war against me," he would also report (in another letter along the same lines) about another war Aziru was then waging, with Aitakama against Biria wasa.

Since these events on the Lebanese coast—from the "fall" of Sumur through Aziru's war with Tyre, not to mention his other activities inland—can scarcely fit into less than a year's time, it must have taken somewhat longer for Aziru to wear out his reserve of goodwill in Egypt. If the special relationship between Egypt and Amurrur began at the end of the Great Syrian war (say, in October, near the very end of Akhenaten's twelfth regnal year), the transfer of Sumur to Aziru's control could have taken place in the following months (November/December = early in year 13). If Rib-Addi was overthrown soon afterwards (January, year 13?), Rib-Addi's exile must have lasted into the following year (= January, year 14), with his end coming soon thereafter (= February, year 14?). During this time Aziru would have consolidated his position in Amurrur—campaigning against Niya, conquering Tunip and cooperating with his allies on the coast. Aitakama's return to Kadesh can hardly be placed any earlier than the spring following the Hittites' withdrawal from Syria (say, March of year 13), and his war with Biria wasa was under way when Aziru received EA 162 from the pharaoh, reproaching him for engineering Rib-Addi's death (?) and cooperating with Kadesh. Since Akhenaten was still king during the war in between Kadesh and Upe, he is almost certainly the author of this letter. Assuming he wrote on receiving the news of Rib-Addi's demise (= March, year 14), the letter would have arrived in Amurrur no earlier than the following month. The terminus ante quem for all of these events must be the late summer of year 17, which is probably when Akhenaten died.

Even a tentative chronology is difficult to establish beyond this point. For example, if we assume that Aziru set out for Egypt soon after he received EA 162, he would have arrived there no earlier than the summer of year 14. Unfortunately, there is no certainty that the king who received the reports of Akizzi and Abi-Milki was the same pharaoh who forced Aziru to come to Egypt. Akhenaten may have died by this time, and the king who presided over the first attempt to regain Kadesh could have been Nefernefruaten, Smenkhkare, or even Tutankhaten. The Amarna letters are virtually silent about the progress of this war. Biria wasa, in one of his letters to the pharaoh (who, as in most of the vassals' letters, is not named), refers tantalizingly to measures that have been taken "to protect the cities. And his [who's?] expedition, which you have sent to Nahrima (= Mitanni) ... [someone] is very fearful." While this implies that a force—under an unnamed general?—has been sent into territory that was once considered Mitannian, not enough is preserved to give us a clear idea of the struggle.

78. EA 159:8–12, 39–42 (= Moran, Amarna, p. 395).
79. EA 149, especially lines 54–63, 74–75 (= ibid., pp. 382–83).
80. EA 151 (= ibid., pp. 385–86). The dating of these events after Aziru's return from Egypt (Helck, Beziehungen7, p. 179) cannot be proved.
81. For a discussion of the evidence see Krauss, Das Ende der Amarnazeit, pp. 176–78.
82. His departure may be indicated in EA 168 (= Moran, Amarna, p. 408).
83. The extent to which Nefernefruaten and/or Smenkhkare reigned independently of Akhenaten (or one another) is still unclear; see above, nn. 47–48.
85. See Appendix 8.
how long Aziru was kept in Egypt. He had been there for some time when EA 169 arrived at the Egyptian court. Addressed to the chamberlain Tutu (probably from one of Aziru’s sons)\(^8\) it reports that the Nuḫaššē kings have taunted him for having sold his father into captivity, and that there is a consensus in neighboring countries that Aziru will not return; as a result, Amurru’s neighbors have turned to aggression, and only Aziru’s speedy return will restore order. The situation had degenerated further by the time EA 170 was sent. Written by Aziru’s brothers, in all probability to Aziru himself,\(^8\) it reports the presence of one Hittite force in ‘Amki—supported, as it turns out, by Aziru’s old ally, Aitakama of Kadesh\(^8\)—while another army seems poised to enter Nuḫaššē.\(^9\) If the Egyptian expedition against Kadesh, which had provoked this response, took place as Aziru was making his way into captivity, the Hittite response might have come in the same year—as early as the fall of Akhenaten’s year 14, but perhaps (in view of Aziru’s captivity, which cannot have been very brief) more plausibly in the spring of year 15.

A much more definite result could be achieved if we could be certain that these events, as they are described in the Amarna archive, are also reflected in the Hittite sources that recount Shuppiluliuma’s conquest of Carchemish. The coincidences are indeed striking. According to the “Deeds of Shuppiluliuma,” a Hittite invasion of northern Syria, along with a retaliatory raid into the country of ‘Amki, both took place in the year that an Egyptian king called “Nipkhururia” died. If this name is assumed to be a cuneiform transcription of “Neferkheprure” (= Akhenaten), the temptation to equate this incident with the invasion described in EA 170 is very strong.\(^9\) Both accounts also have in common, not only the name of a Hittite commander (Lupakkù), but also the involvement of Kadesh, which (according to Shuppiluliuma’s “Deeds”) had recently survived an attack by Egyptian chariots and foot soldiers. It would be no surprise, following on this, to find Aitakama leading a punitive raid on Egyptian territory, as the other Amarna letters in this sequence show him to be. Since, moreover, the attack could have taken place in the very year Akhenaten died, the resulting time frame—which is quite close to the chronology so laboriously built up from the Amarna letters—looks very convincing indeed. If Akhenaten died in the summer of his seventeenth regnal year,\(^9\) the Egyptian queen’s messengers could have arrived at the Hittite camp before Carchemish in the early autumn. Assuming that Shuppiluliuma’s envoys went to Egypt shortly thereafter, there is still enough time for the Hittites to complete the conquest of Carchemish and then go home for the winter. This view of events, if adopted, would have Shuppiluliuma consolidating his southern border only a few years after the Great Syrian war, rather than waiting for more than a decade to do so. It would also identify the Egyptian queen as Akhenaten’s female successor.\(^9\)

So long as the hieratic docket on EA 27 could be read “[regnal year] 12,” falling at least three years before the start of the Great Syrian war, this solution could be safely rejected on

87. See Chapter 1, p. 19 (n. 99).
88. EA 174–176, 363.
90. Among the most recent advocates of this position, see Redford, *History and Chronology*, pp. 158–60; Krauss, *Das Ende der Amarnazeit*, pp. 1–53 (especially pp. 1–10).
91. See n. 81 above.
92. Either Nefertiti, as argued by J. R. Harris and others (see n. 48 above), or Meritaten (proposed by Krauss, *Das Ende der Amarnazeit*, pp. 33–47, 118–21).
chronological grounds. Now that this reading is no longer certain, however, the case against collapsing Shuppiluliuma’s wars so drastically must be built on other foundations; the internal coherence of the two narratives, the number and length of the Hittite wars in Syria, the situation of the Egyptian queen, and the identity of her husband.

According to the “Deeds,” when Shuppiluliuma was down in the country of Carchemish, “he sent Lupakki and Tarḫunta(?)-Zalma forth into the country of ‘Amki. So they went to attack ‘Amki, and brought back deportees, cattle, and sheep …” This description suggests nothing more than a raid, rapidly executed and designed to inflict punishment rather than a more serious loss. In EA 170, however, the implications are more alarming. Hittite troops under Lupakku have taken cities in ‘Amki, as well as those belonging to another local ruler. Moreover, the writers have heard that Zitana has come with a force of 90,000 foot soldiers, but this they have not been able to verify. As soon as they know where Zitana is—whether in ‘Amki or in Nuḫašše—Bet-ilu will be sent against him. The different names given to the second Hittite commander in the Hittite record and in EA 170 have been explained in various ways, but in the “Deeds” there is still another factor to consider; namely, a high-ranking officer named Zita, who is seen to be operating in the Hurrian lands alongside the crown prince Arnuwanda and not with the main army from which the raiders against ‘Amki were detailed. The identity of this man with the Hittite commander Zitana in EA 170 is at least possible. His appearance as a major participant in the war fought during the year of Nipkhururiya’s death, but in another theater, is thus a factor which cannot be discounted. One might even argue that Tarḫunta(?)-Zalma was named as the second commander in the raid on ‘Amki to distinguish this episode from the earlier raid in which Zita(na) had taken part. Alternatively, however, it might be assumed that Zita, having completed his work in the Hurrian lands, was sent with a supporting force into ‘Amki some time after the main body of raiders had gone there. This would be consistent with the report of his arrival there in EA 170, but nothing of the sort is implied in the “Deeds,” where the raid on ‘Amki is treated as a minor venture. All in all, then, we cannot prove that Zita was anywhere near ‘Amki during the year Nipkhururiya died. If not, then it is at least reasonable to suppose that EA 170 and the “Deeds of Shuppiluliuma” each refer to a separate campaign.

Apart from these internal difficulties, there is the embarrassing fact that, in later Hittite records, Shuppiluliuma was held responsible for no fewer than two attacks on the country of ‘Amki. In his Second Plague Prayer, Murshili II would recall that

My father sent foot soldiers and charioteers who attacked the country of ‘Amki, Egyptian territory. Again he sent troops, and again they attacked it. When the Egyptians became frightened, they asked outright for one of his sons …

93. As it was in the first edition of this book (pp. 197–201, 218–19). See n. 4 above.
94. Adapted from Güterbock, *JCS* 10 (1956):94.
98. *ANET*³, p. 395.
It seems unlikely that separate operations\textsuperscript{99} conducted as part of the same campaign—e.g., the two columns, commanded respectively by Lupakku and Zitana in EA 170—would be described in this fashion, since the violation of Egyptian territory would be one and the same. Consequently, it is hard to identify the first attack on ‘Amki as anything but the invasion mentioned in EA 170. Nothing like this, certainly, can be found in Shuppiluliuma’s earlier career. Although his route during the Great Syrian war took him past Kadesh and into Upe, there is no indication that he attacked the cities or the country of ‘Amki at that time. Indeed, since he had expected to avoid conflict with one known Egyptian vassal (Kadesh), it is hard to see why he would gratuitously attack another possession of Egypt when his real quarrel was with the king of Mitanni.\textsuperscript{100} The text of the Second Plague Prayer states, moreover, that the two violations of ‘Amki both took place before the affair of Zannanza and the Egyptian queen. If the first attack must be that of EA 170 (which fell in the year of Akhenaten’s death or some time later), there is scarcely any time for the second. All in all, equating the raids described in EA 170 and the “Deeds” cannot be done without jettisoning or otherwise explaining away Murshili’s account of past events in his Plague Prayer. As of this writing, there is still no compelling reason to do either.

It has been said that conflating the two campaigns permits a shorter and simpler sequence of events than that which the other option requires. But is this more elegant model actually demanded by the evidence? While other Hittite sources, which are organized by topic rather than on strictly chronological lines, are of limited value, they are not inconsistent with the longer option. Thus KUB XIX 9 (written under Hattushili III) begins with the period during which Shuppiluliuma brought the lost Anatolian territories back under Hittite rule:

\begin{quote}
And he took 20 years until he reconquered them. But when my grandfather Shuppiluliuma entered the Hurri-land, then he vanquished all the Hurri-lands, and he fixed the boundary on yon side, at the land of Kadesh (and) the land of Amurru, and vanquished the king of Egypt. But on this side, he destroyed the country of Irrite (and) the land of Suta and made the Euphrates River his boundary. And these he took into vassalage on the spot. And what was beside the Euphrates River he vanquished by force. And his sons he made kings: in the land of Aleppo he made Telepinu king, and in the land of Carchemish he made Piyaššili king. My grandfather Shuppiluliuma tarried (?) in the land of Hurri (or ‘Amuru’?) because the lands were strong, and he took 6 years until he had reduced them to order.\textsuperscript{101}
\end{quote}

Although this passage could mean that twenty years’ campaigning in Anatolia were followed immediately by six years in the Hurrian lands (embracing the Great Syrian war, the

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{99} As proposed by Krauss and Redford (see n. 96 above). Compare the observations of Houwink ten Cate in BiOr 20 (1963):275; Kitchen, “Further Notes on New Kingdom History and Chronology,” Cde 43 (1968):318–19; and my own in Or. 52 (1983):278–79, along with my comments on the two accounts of the Hittites’ invasion(s) of ‘Amki in the text above.
\item \textsuperscript{100} Assumptions to this effect vitiate the otherwise useful discussion of this issue in Waterhouse, “Syria in the Amarna Age,” especially pp. 44–46.
\item \textsuperscript{101} Adapted from Kitchen, Suppiluliuma, p. 3 with notes.
\end{itemize}
conquest of Carchemish, and its entire aftermath), this is not the only possible interpretation. To begin with, the account of Shuppiluliuma’s Syrian activities that precedes the reference to this period of six years embraces all his accomplishments up to the first year of the “Hurrian” war, including the creation of the satellite kingdoms in Aleppo and Carchemish in the year “Nipkhururiya” died. Some of the events that are lumped together here actually took place at widely separated periods of time; e.g., while Kadesh fell to Shuppiluliuma during the Great Syrian war, it took somewhat longer for Amurru to recognize Hittite suzerainty. Moreover, the assumption that the Anatolian and Syrian campaigns took place in two separate periods does not match the more detailed records in Shuppiluliuma’s “Deeds.” In Fragment 28, which preserves the most continuous narrative in this fragmentary work, Shuppiluliuma is shown as being wholly occupied in Anatolia for at least the two years that preceded the year in which he began his “Hurrian” war by conquering Carchemish. This does not fit the model that has been extrapolated from KUB XIX 9, although it would accord well enough with the Amarna letters, which show the Hittites not directly involved in the south during the years that immediately followed the Great Syrian campaign. This general similarity does not prove, however, that this period is identical with the one preceding the Carchemish campaign in the “Deeds.” It could lead to the opposite conclusion—namely, that Shuppiluliuma, having destroyed Mitannian power, could afford to turn away from the south while he dealt with more pressing matters nearer home. While the Hittites ultimately did tighten their grip on northern Syria, contemporary records are unanimous in showing that this did not happen very soon after the Great Syrian war. These developments might be reflected in KUB XIX 9 as follows:

1. The “twenty years” of Shuppiluliuma’s predominantly “Anatolian” phase, the later stages of which would coincide with his first forays against Mitanni.

2. An extended period, begun when Shuppiluliuma destroyed the Mitannian kingdom and laid the basis for the Hittite empire during the Great Syrian war. His continued campaigning in Anatolia is ignored in this document, which dwells on the more pertinent events in the south, culminating with the Carchemish campaign, the establishment of the satellite regimes in Aleppo and Carchemish, and the extension of Hittite power over Kadesh and Amurru.

3. The six years Shuppiluliuma spent in the south “because the lands were strong” would thus allude to the sustained opposition the Hittites experienced—including revolts in

102. Thus most recently Krauss, Das Ende der Amarnazeit, pp. 54–58.
103. The text’s parallel treatment of both these territories with relation to the Hittite empire does not support the different meanings that Kitchen infers in Suppiluliuma, p. 3 (= n. 2: “including Kadesh and as far as Amurru”).
104. Güterbock, JCS 10 (1956):90–92 (= the wars described early in this section are interrupted twice when Shuppiluliuma returned to his capital for the winter). For the Hittites’ troubles with the Kashka peoples in the north during Shuppiluliuma’s reign and later, see E. von Schuler, Die Kaschäer, pp. 37–66.
northern Syria and the struggle with Assyria over the establishment of Hatti’s client state of Ḫanigalbat—after the conquest of Carchemish.\(^{105}\)

It has been suggested that the interval between the Great Syrian campaign and the “Hurrian war” should not be too long, since it fell during the tenure of Shuppiluliuma’s third and final queen, Tawannana. Seals naming this lady (who survived into the earlier reign of Murshili II) are found on documents from Ugarit that formalize the relationship between Shuppiluliuma and his vassal, Niqmad II—and since Ugarit submitted to Hatti during the Great Syrian campaign, it is assumed that these documents cannot be much later.\(^{106}\) If so, this could be a strong argument for a shorter chronology, since—depending on the date of the Great Syrian war and possible coregencies among the late Amarna pharaohs—an interval of between thirteen and eighteen years is required.\(^{107}\) On the other hand, the assumption that Tawannana lived in Hatti for a quarter-century or more is not incredible. Moreover, the seals that name her alongside her husband\(^{108}\) occur on only some of the tablets from the dossier of Niqmad II’s dealings with Shuppiluliuma; namely, on documents specifying Ugarit’s borders and the annual tribute she pays to Hatti,\(^{109}\) but not on all the tablets in this dossier and (perhaps most significantly) not on the copy of the letter that is almost surely contemporary with the Great Syrian campaign in which Shuppiluliuma invited Niqmad to resist Mukish, Niya, and Nuḫašše by becoming his vassal.\(^{110}\) This pattern suggests that Tawannana’s seal came into use after Ugarit had submitted to Hatti—and since it is conceded that, instead of a formal treaty, Niqmad II subscribed to a number of legal instruments that collectively formalized his vassal status with the Hittites,\(^{111}\) it is not necessary to assume that all of these contracts were made at the same time, or very soon after the Great Syrian war, or even that the copies found in the archives at Ugarit were the originals. The situation remains the same. The shorter chronology, while superficially more plausible, is required neither by KUB XIX 9 itself nor by any of the other sources at our disposal.

Finally, there is the Egyptian queen herself and her situation as it is reported in the “Deeds.”\(^{112}\) If she was Akhenaten’s widow, her initial claim (“My husband has died, a son I

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107. The data is conveniently summarized by Redford, “The Chronology of the Eighteenth Dynasty,” *JNES* 25 (1966):121–22, with Krauss, *Das Ende der Amarnazeit*, pp. 84–94; and see above. Since Akhenaten was still alive during the war against Biriawaza, the Great Syrian campaign falls at the latest in years 14/15, but conceivably as early as year 12 (thus, between three and five years are to be reckoned during this reign). A maximum of four years (but as little as one) can be assigned to the independent reigns of Neferefreutaten and Smenkhkare; and for Tutankhamun, a full nine years (assuming that Shuppiluliuma’s second attack on ‘Amki came in regnal year 10, the year of his death).


110. Ibid., pp. 35–37 (= RS.17.132).


have not") is not too surprising, since she may not have been the mother of either of her husband’s male heirs.113 Her initial denial is elaborated, however, in later stages of the narrative. Shuppiluliuma, fearing that the Egyptians did “have a son of their lord,” sent his chamberlain to Egypt to find out; and on this mission’s return to Hatti, it brought not only another disclaimer from the queen, but an expanded denial from the Egyptian envoy: “Nipkhururiya, who was our lord, died; a son he has not. Our lord’s wife is solitary.” What was important to Shuppiluliuma, and what the Egyptians had finally brought themselves to admit, is that Nipkhururiya had no male heirs from any source whatever. Moreover, as the queen repeatedly says, the Hittite marriage was seen as a more desirable alternative to wedding one of her subjects and (by implication) making him king. This implies that the royal family was depleted, leaving the deceased king’s widow no choice except to marry outside—and it is just this scenario that rings false for the period following Akhenaten’s death. Waiting in the wings at that time, as we know, were two “king’s bodily sons,” Smenkhkare and Tutankhaten, both of whom did eventually ascend the throne.114 Their parentage is unknown, but most scholars believe that they must have been born to Akhenaten115 or Amenhotep III.116 Another possibility, that they were more distant relatives of the royal family who gained the rank of “king’s sons” by

113. On this vexed question see most recently Martin, The Royal Tomb of El-’Amarna II 37–40, 43–45; although, compare the different interpretation of this material by L. Bell, forthcoming in one of the last two volumes of Akten des Vierten Internationalen Ägyptologischen Kongresses München, 1985.

114. See G. Roeder, Amarna-Reliefs aus Hermopolis, Ausgrabungen der Deutschen Hermopolis-Expedition in Hermopolis 1929–39 2 (Hildesheim, 1969), pl. 106 (no. 831-VIII = block from Amarna, found at Hermopolis, naming “the king’s bodily son, beloved of him, Tutankhuaton”). Smenkhkare is generally regarded as an elder brother (Krauss, Das Ende der Amarnazeit, pp. 79–80; but compare Wente, in X-Ray Atlas of the Royal Mummies, p. 257), particularly if he is to be identified as the occupant of Tomb 55 in the Valley of the Kings (ibid., pp. 136–37). The anatomical evidence that is generally available at present suggests that this identification is probably valid, for most indicators seem to show that this person, a close relative of Tutankhamon’s, died in his twenties (see R. G. Harrison, “An Anatomical Examination of the Pharaonic Remains Purporting to be Akhenaten,” JEA 52 [1966]:95–112, and especially p. 111). Thus he is too young to be Akhenaten himself, an identification suggested inter alia by C. Aldred, “The Tomb of Akhenaten at Thebes,” JEA 43 (1961):41–60, with an Appendix (now superseded by Harrison’s article, cited above) by A. T. Sandison, on pp. 60–65. The burial in KV 55 is nonetheless widely regarded as having been intended for Akhenaten; see most recently C. N. Reeves, “A Reappraisal of Tomb 55 in the Valley of the Kings,” JEA 67 (1981):48–56. The age of the mummy found in that burial may also be raised in the light of ongoing study (personal communications from E. F. Wente and James E. Harris), even if the serious doubts raised by Reeves, JEA 67 (1981):54–55, are not sustained.


116. See, for convenience, the citations collected by Wente in Harris and Wente, X-Ray Atlas of the Royal Mummies, p. 136; and compare L. Bell (forthcoming—see “The Epigraphic Survey,” The Oriental Institute 1981–82 Annual Report, pp. 17–18). A recent reevaluation upwards of Tutankhamon’s age at death (personal communication from James E. Harris) now permits this paternity without recourse to a long coregency between Amenhotep III and Akhenaten, which has hitherto seemed necessary to this presumed relationship.
perhaps deserves more serious consideration. In any case, whoever their father was, the existence of these boys would hardly be a state secret. Since their royal birth would have given them a strong competitive claim against any other aspirants to the crown, whether from the ranks of the Egyptian commons or from abroad, it is difficult to believe that the queen could have passed them off to a suspicious Shuppiluliuma as her “subjects,” lower in rank and thus not worth considering as rivals for the kingship.

If, on the other hand, the queen was Ankhesenamun, the widow of Tutankhamun (“Nebkheprure”), her situation as described in the “Deeds” is far more consistent with the rest of the data. The royal couple, to begin with, had no living offspring, and at Tutankhamun’s death no heirs from any branch of the royal family presented themselves—the Eighteenth Dynasty was defunct. In the wings, moreover, were two mature “servants” of the old dynasty, Ay and Horemheb. The fact that both these men eventually assumed the crown surely demonstrates that, by this time, no viable candidate remained within the royal family. Identifying Nipkhururiya with Tutankhamun also lends itself well to the chronology of the negotiations between his widow and Shuppiluliuma. Since Tutankhamun was buried in the spring, his death can be placed in January or (at the very latest) early February. The Egyptian attack on Kadesh could have taken place from some point late in the previous year up to the time of the king’s death or shortly afterwards, perhaps following a plan that Egyptian military leaders were loath to abandon. The first of the queen’s letters could have reached Shuppiluliuma in the late summer or early fall, in plenty of time to allow the return mission to depart for Egypt before the onset of the winter rains, and permitting Shuppiluliuma to complete his conquest of Carchemish and to settle the affairs of northern Syria before returning home for the winter.

Parenthetical to the preceding, but critical nonetheless, is not only the question of who ruled in Egypt during this period, but also who reigned. In Egypt of the pharaohs, the royal myth maintained that on the morning following the death of his predecessor the new king “arose” on
the Horus Throne of the Living. A divine monarchy could not easily tolerate total vacuum at the top. An interregnum, during which no one was pharaoh, might be conceivable, if we assume that Tutankhamun’s death was kept secret until arrangements for his succession could have been made. This scenario, however, is unlikely; since the king could hardly have been kept invisible for the year or more that the Hittite succession required to work itself out, and even attempting to do this would have entailed the cooperation of too many people. If, on the other hand, Tutankhamun had expired in the normal “public” setting, the absence of an heir would have precipitated the very jostling among his “servants” to which his widow referred. The situation was not intrinsically critical, for it was not unprecedented. When royal bloodlines had died out in the past, the obvious and indeed time-honored solution had been to allow a respected commoner to assume the throne and marry into the royal family. Since the Thutmoside succession had furnished such a distinguished precedent, it is hard to imagine that the queen could have resisted it without support from outside the royal family. Obviously she did have supporters (her envoy, “Lord Hani,” could not have been alone), and since nothing suggests that Shuppiluliuma was expected to impose his son on the Egyptian government by force of arms, it must follow that the Hittite marriage—far from being a secret project of the queen’s—enjoyed significant backing. What sort of regime could have sanctioned this initiative while seeming innocuous enough to the king of Hatti?

Among the paintings on the north wall of Tutankhamun’s tomb is an extract from his funeral rites, the “opening of the mouth” of his mummy, performed by king Ay. Analogues of this scene were regularly found in private tombs, where the ritual was performed either by the deceased’s heir or a priest who represented him, but up to this time the “opening of the mouth” had not been included in the decoration of royal tombs, which had stressed the dead king’s otherworldly destiny. The scene in Tutankhamun’s tomb is thus unusual in two ways: it shifts the action from the timeless sphere of the cosmos into the immediate present, and it explicitly portrays the dead king’s earthly successor as the main officiant at his funeral. These anomalies, it is generally agreed, reflect Ay’s irregular position. Since he came from outside the main line of succession, Ay was required to legitimate his kingship by posing as the “heir of burial,” i.e., the person who formally interred the tomb owner and thus became his chief legatee. Another scene that departs from the traditional canon of decoration in royal tombs, on the wall adjoining the “opening of the mouth,” perhaps lends an element of public recognition to Ay’s succession, for it shows the traditional “nine friends” of the deceased—

123. Thus also, inter alia, Helck, Beziehungen, p. 186; J. von Beckerath, “Eje” in LA I 1211–12.
124. PM 2 I.2 570 (8).
126. For the data, with references, see PM 2 I.2 547–62. Rare representations of the “opening of the mouth” ritual in later royal tombs (Otto, Mundöffnungsritual II 173, 2*–3* = Sety I, Tausret) feature an anonymous priest as the celebrant.
127. Thus, for example (with parallels), Kitchen, Third Intermediate Period, pp. 332–33, with n. 498; and compare in general T. Mrsich, “Erbe” in LA I 1235–60.
which in this case would have included the highest officers in the land—pulling his catafalque
toward the tomb. Since Tutankhamun’s burial included objects donated by high-ranking
members of the administration, Ay’s succession must have been officially recognized by the
time his predecessor was laid in his tomb. When had this happened?

If we assume that the statutory seventy-day period of mummification directly followed
Tutankhamun’s death, and that he was buried without delay in the tomb that had been prepared
for him at Thebes, the paintings on the walls of his burial chamber should imply that Ay had
become king and was actually reigning when Ankhnesamun sent her letters to Shuppiluliuma.
Complicating the scenario, however, is the fact that these paintings were executed after
Tutankhamun had been deposited in his sarcophagus and the gilt wooden shrines erected around
it (the shrines had required trimming as they were assembled in the cramped space of the burial
chamber, and drops of paint were found mixed in the wood shavings on the floor).

Unfortunately, the historical significance of this observation is far from clear. Conceivably,
Tutankhamun could have been buried in an unfinished tomb, which was kept open (although
presumably under close guard) until his eventual successor could legitimize his inheritance in
the eyes of the gods. This assumption requires an interregnum, however, during which no one
sat on the Throne of Horus. If Tutankhamun was buried in the spring of the year he died, this
hiatus must have stretched into the next year, when the queen’s second embassy arrived at
Hattusha; and if we add the undetermined length of time that passed until the Hittite prince died,
Ay’s accession could not have come much less than a year following the death of his
predecessor. All this, I repeat, is not impossible; but one wonders whether a public scandal of
this magnitude could have been tolerated for so long, or whether it could have been seen as
worth risking for the sake of attracting an heir who was not only a foreigner, but a scion of
Egypt’s mightiest rival.

On the other hand, the late execution of the paintings in Tutankhamun’s burial chamber can
be explained in more prosaic terms. The heavy pieces of the shrines had to be kept leaning
against the walls until the burial was completed. Since they would surely have damaged the
paintings, a decision could have been made to save time and added trouble by finishing them
virtually at the last minute. Thus, if Tutankhamun’s burial took place within the “normal”
interval after his death, Ay must have been king even as negotiations with Shuppiluliuma were
under way. In Egypt, however, the Hittite marriage might have seemed less threatening if an
Egyptian had already been crowned when Tutankhamun was buried. Zannanza would indeed be
king, as the Egyptian queen promised, but only after a period spent under the tutelage of his
dynastic “father,” Ay. Perhaps most significantly, Ay’s royal nomen included his most

128. PM^{2} 1.2.570 (7).
129. Carter, Tut-ankh-Amen III 83, describes six shawabti figures donated by two high officials—five
from the general Nakhtmin and one from the treasurer Maya. One of Nakhtmin’s donations, along
with a recumbent effigy of Tutankhamun presented by Maya, is published in British Museum,
Treasures of Tutankhamun (London, 1972), nos. 10–11.
131. This might even be implied by the Hittite records if “Zannanza” meant s3-nswt, “king’s son,” as
Liverani has suggested (SMEA 14 [1971]:161–62). Later, Ay would also claim a paternal role vis-à-
vis “his son” Tutankhamun in a temple that he finished for his predecessor at Thebes; see for now O.
162; and compare n. 118 above.
distinctive non-royal title, “God’s Father.” Whatever this had meant earlier in his career, in association with Ay’s kingship it would evoke the historic role played by those earlier “God’s Fathers” whose sons had gone on to found new dynasties. Under these circumstances, the transition would be gradual. The Hittite prince was to be groomed for kingship by learning Egyptian ways, and under the watchful eye of the men who ran the government he could be weaned away from any dangerous attachments to his country of origin. Although Hittite records confirm not one word of this scenario, they do not contradict it either. Shuppiluliuma’s “Deeds,” for example, refer to the queen by her Egyptian title of “king’s wife” and as “our lord’s wife, who is now solitary”; in other words, her own rank was not sovereign, but her husband would be able to become king of Egypt. Other sources, such as Murshili II’s Plague Prayers, confirm that the Egyptians “begged my father repeatedly (?) for one of his sons for kingship” without going into details about how or when this would be done. Nowhere is it said that the young man would be crowned as soon as he arrived in Egypt. Also consistent with the assumption that Zannanza was to be adopted as heir apparent is KUB XIX 20, which was written in reaction to his death—for if the pharaoh was the immediate beneficiary of the Hittite prince’s death, his expressed desire for continued “brotherhood” with Shuppiluliuma would have seemed even more fatuous than it actually was. The affair’s unfortunate outcome, which the Hittite king took deeply to heart, must have influenced the manner in which it was presented in later “official” accounts. If so, we need not be too surprised if they glossed over the potentially embarrassing fact that the normally cautious Shuppiluliuma had sent his son into a country already governed by a mature ruler.

When all is said and done, however, the gaps and uncertainties in our data still prevent us from drawing unequivocal conclusions. Neither the earlier nor the later date proposed for “Nipkhururiya” (identifying him as Akhenaten or Tutankhamun) can be demonstrated or excluded beyond all doubt. Both require some special pleading, however, and I still believe that the later date requires less. Accordingly, the rough chronology outlined below will have to serve until our perplexities can be enlightened by fresh data.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Event</th>
<th>Date</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Great Syrian campaign</td>
<td>At the earliest, late in Akhenaten’s year 12, and in year 14 at the latest.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aziru’s control over Šumur</td>
<td>Contemporary with the floruit of Meritaten as “first lady,” thus no earlier than year 13, but very probably later.</td>
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134. See *Chapter 1*, pp. 25–28.
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<tr>
<th>Event</th>
<th>Date</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>War with Biriawaza</td>
<td>Still during the reign of Akhenaten, no earlier than year 14, but probably closer to year 17.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aziru's exile in Egypt</td>
<td>Late in the reign of Akhenaten or under his ephemeral successors. Egypt's first attack on Kadesh and the Hittites' first retaliatory strike on the 'Amki take place at this time.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Second attack on Kadesh</td>
<td>Late in year 9 of Tutankhamun?</td>
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<tr>
<td>Second Hittite attack on 'Amki</td>
<td>Year 10 of Tutankhamun, occurring around the time of his death.</td>
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APPENDIX 8

THE STATUS OF KADESH AND AMURRU

The relations between Kadesh, Amurru, and the two superpowers, Egypt and Mitanni, are not always clear in the ancient sources, where they are variously claimed, now for one or for the other. In the modern literature, while Amurru is generally regarded as belonging to Egypt’s sphere of influence, it also is said to have been intermittently affiliated with Mitanni. There is even less unanimity on Kadesh: some regard it as having been Egyptian before the Hittites conquered it, while others think Mitanni had wrested Kadesh from Egyptian control before this time. Since the Hittites could only refute Egyptian claims to these provinces by insisting that they conquered them when they replaced Mitanni’s empire with their own, both sides had reason to shape their official histories to suit current purposes. The following review of the evidence may help us to assess the cogency and/or honesty of our sources.

Four generations after Amurru had passed under Hittite suzerainty, in the preamble to a treaty between Hatti and a ruler of Amurru, Tudhaliya IV would claim that “the lands of Amurru were still [enem]y (country); they were vassals of the Hurrian king” before Aziru submitted to Shuppiluliuma. This, however, is not the whole truth, as we see from two earlier Hittite treaties with Amurru. Only a generation earlier, Hattushili III’s accord with Benteshina recalled how the latter’s great-grandfather, “Azira, the king of the land of Amurru, changed [(the?) ... o]f the land of Egypt, and [fell down] at the feet of Shuppilu[liuma], m[y gran]dfather.” Even earlier, in the Hittite version of his own treaty with Shuppiluliuma, moreover, Aziru is said to have come out of “the [borde]r of the land of Egypt” (var., “the door of Egypt”) and to have submitted to the Hittite king in person. Another apparent contradiction to the account in the Shaushgamuwa Treaty is in KUB XIX 9, composed during the reign of

6. Adapted from Weidner, Politische Dokumente, p. 125 (obv. 4–5).
Hattushili III, which tells us that Shuppiluliuma “fixed the boundary on yon side (at) the land of Kadesh (and) the land of Amurru, and vanquished the king of Egypt.”  

Collectively, then, these sources describe Amurru’s adherence to Hatti as following its defection from an earlier vassal relationship with Egypt. The Amarna letters, too, convey a strong impression that both Aziru and his father were subject to Egypt. Their letters to the court\(^9\) are couched in the obsequiously submissive terms regularly used by vassals,\(^10\) and in a letter from Byblos Rib-Addi complains that the Amurrites, aided by elements of the Egyptian army in Syria, “have killed Abdi-Ashirta, whom the king \((of Egypt)\) had set over them, not they themselves.”\(^11\) On a good number of counts, then, the claim that Amurru had been affiliated with Mitanni might well be dismissed.

Some scholars have maintained that Egypt and Mitanni exercised what, for all practical purposes, was a condominium over Amurru, i.e., it was recognized as Egyptian territory, but the pharaoh paid subsidies to Mitanni so that the latter could relieve Egypt of the onus of maintaining discipline in the region.\(^12\) This assertion, based on passages of the “Mitannian Letter,” EA 24, was already hostage to the prevailing uncertainties in understanding the Hurrian language in which this letter was written.\(^13\) It is even less likely at present, for the avowedly provisional modern translations of EA 24 are far from indicating this sort of joint arrangement. The “Mitannian Letter,” written by Tushratta, concerns the upcoming marriage of his daughter Tadukhepa to Amenhotep III. Hearty exaggeration is the order of the day. In one of the purpler passages, Tushratta tells his prospective son-in-law, “I’m the k[ing] of the land of Egypt, and my brother is k[ing] of the Hurrian land!”\(^14\) Most of the references to the alleged condominium in northern Syria, adduced on very doubtful authority,\(^15\) refer instead to the wedding arrangements—gifts,\(^16\) claims of expenses,\(^17\) and the goodwill that is to follow,\(^18\) as in past diplomatic marriages.\(^19\) An alliance between the two kingdoms is mentioned, but it is purely defensive; because, in the event of an attack on Mitannian or Egyptian territory, the injured

\(^{8}\) Kitchen, *Suppiluliuma*, p. 3. Note that it is this document that furnishes the parallel for the completely restored passage in the preamble to Murshili II’s treaty with Talmi-Sharuma of Aleppo that assigns Kadesh and Amurru to the Egyptian sphere of influence; see the reedition by Goetze, “Die historische Einleitung des Aleppo-Vertrages \((KBo\ I, 6)\),” *MAOG* 4 (1928–29):61–62, at obv. 33–36, superseding the version of the text published by Weidner, *Politische Dokumente*, pp. 84–85 ad loc.

\(^{9}\) EA 60–62 (from Abdi-Ashirta), EA 156–168 (from Aziru).

\(^{10}\) See Chapter 1, pp. 14–22, on Aziru’s relationship with Egypt.


\(^{13}\) See Kühne, *Chronologie*, pp. 32–33 and especially n. 149 (bottom). I am grateful to Professor Gene Gragg for advice on this question.

\(^{14}\) EA 24:II 71–72 (= Moran, *Amarna*, p. 142 [§ 15]).

\(^{15}\) For example, since Knudtzon supplies a commentary but no translation of EA 24 \((Die El-Amarna Tafeln I 180–89)\), Giles is dependent on the unreliable translation by S. A. B. Mercer, *The Tell El-Amarna Tablets I* (Toronto, 1939), pp. 96–127.


\(^{17}\) EA 24:III 66–75 (= ibid., p. 146).

\(^{18}\) EA 24:II 68–70 (= ibid., p. 142).

\(^{19}\) EA 24:III 58–60 (= ibid., p. 145).
party would receive his ally's help if it is requested, but that is all. As we have seen, moreover, the pharaoh did not hesitate to use his own forces against Abdi-Ashirta and reestablish Egyptian control over Sumur after his death. The notion of an Egypto-Mitannian condominium in Amurru is thus a fantasy of modern scholarship that supplies no meaningful antecedent to the Hittites' later assertion of Hurrian suzerainty there.

There is, however, another basis for this claim, for we have also seen that Abdi-Ashirta submitted to Tushratta during the "Mitannian counterattack." Amurru was heavily taxed, and Abdi-Ashirta himself was said to have continued harassing his neighbors under Mitannian auspices. Egypt had used force to bring this episode to an end, but we cannot be sure that in doing so she was simply bringing a refractory vassal to heel. If Amurru was recognized as belonging to the pharaoh's empire, the essential question is why Tushratta would have placed Mitanni's valuable entente with Egypt at risk by compelling Amurru's submission in the first place. The answer, I believe, lies in the few passages in the corpus of Amarna letters that show Egypt as less than fully sovereign in Amurru. In EA 157, Aziru tells the pharaoh that "from the beginning I have wished (to be) in the service of the king, my lord, but the Great Ones of Sumur (= the Egyptian commissioners) did not permit it." As others have already noted, this implies that at an earlier point in his career, and very probably at the time this letter was written, Aziru had not been formally subject to the king of Egypt. That relationship, I have suggested above, began after the Great Syrian war, when Aziru was made Egypt's enforcer in the northwestern part of her empire. Viewed in this light, Abdi-Ashirta's earlier defense of his takeover in Sumur sounds like a request that the pharaoh accede to his filling precisely this role in his capacity as ruler of Amurru. While the entire country is usually included in the "northern province" of the Egyptian empire in Syria, firm evidence comes only from a few localities, i.e., Sumur on the coast, and Tunip, which had been claimed as Egyptian territory under Thutmose III, but which could have slipped out of that affiliation afterwards. Amurru's extensive territory included other independent city-states and also semi-nomadic groups whose status is unknown.

Tushratta might thus have been within his rights in asserting lordship over past affiliates of Mitanni that had been absorbed by Abdi-Ashirta's kingdom, and such a claim may lie behind Rib-Addi's report that "the king of Mitanni has surveyed the land of Amurru itself, and he has

21. See Chapter 1, p. 8 with n. 37.
22. See Chapter 1, pp. 6–8.
27. Klengel, Geschichte Syriens II 245–47.
28. The scant and ambiguous data is usefully summarized in ibid., pp. 90–92; and compare Appendix 7, p. 120 above.
said, 'How large your land is! Your land is extensive.' The king of Byblos' subsequent suggestion, that the pharaoh send his commissioner with troops, "so that he may take it for himself," anticipates what eventually happened. We have already suggested that the status of Abdi-Ashirta's kingdom was the real issue here. Once the king of Amurru had been forced to align himself with Mitanni, Egypt could then turn the tables by reclaiming Ṣumur and other local possessions of his. That this enterprise also resulted in Abdi-Ashirta's death and the dismemberment of his kingdom was acceptable to both sides, since it removed the source of conflict between them without compromising what they held. The unified kingdom of Amurru would be revived under Aziru, but it is significant Egypt kept her distance until the question of Mitannian claims was a dead letter.

As we have seen, Aziru began consolidating his rule in Amurru when Tushratta's position in Syria had become too embattled to allow any resistance. Subsequently, when he was caught between the Hittites and Egypt, Aziru had nothing to gain by evoking Amurru's past connections with Mitanni. One disincentive for trumpeting any such ties was surely the fate of Kadesh, his next-door neighbor, while another was Aziru's new relationship with the pharaoh, whose suzerainty over the entire kingdom of Amurru was so profitable to its king. Only when Aziru had made his final decision for Hatti, once he had left "the door of Egypt," would it have made sense for him to even hint at a previous Hurrian affiliation. At that time, in the wake of Hatti's victory, Aziru could present himself as a former vassal of Mitanni who, bowing to the judgment of the gods, was now transferring his allegiance to this empire's successor. While there is no mention of this in the treaties Hatti would make with Aziru and the next two generations of kings in Amurru, such a rationalization is at least implied by the Shaushgamuwa Treaty, as well as by the pairing of Kadesh and Amurru in KUB XIX 9 during the previous reign. In any case, the mixed status of the lands of Amurru before Aziru's time and her checkered career under Abdi-Ashirta must have constituted the grounds, however tenuous, for Hatti to claim that, in accepting the fealty of Amurru, she had only taken over an old affiliate of her defeated enemy, the kingdom of Mitanni.

The case of Kadesh is quite different. Her status as an Egyptian vassal is clearer than Amurru's, and it can be traced back much further. Moreover, toward the end of his reign, Shuppiluliuma would admit in the Shattiwaza Treaty that he had not expected opposition from Kadesh on his way south. Somewhat earlier however, during the negotiations with the Egyptian queen's envoys, he would upbraid them for having "attacked the man of Kinza (= Kadesh), whom I had [taken away (?)] from the king of Hurri-land." The implied contradiction is patent, and it is further heightened by KBO XIX 9, which treats Shuppiluliuma's conquest of both Kadesh and Amurru in the same context as his victory over the king of Egypt. It is unlikely that Kadesh, like Amurru, had developed ties with Mitanni prior to

32. Ibid., lines 32–43.
33. Chapter 1, pp. 7–8.
35. ANET3, p. 318; and see Chapter 1, pp. 10–11.
37. Compare above, n. 8.
the Great Syrian war. A fragmentary letter from Biriawaza to the pharaoh, which refers to “his expedition, which you have sent to Nahrimi (= Mitanni),”38 could refer to the first Egyptian attempt to reconquer Kadesh, but (as we have seen) Akhenaten was also being pressed to extend the war against the Hittites into Nuḫaššu and the Hurri-lands, all of which had been in the Mitannian orbit. Since the locale of these operations does not emerge from the damaged context of this letter, there is no reason to include Kadesh among the quondam possessions of the Mitannian empire. On what grounds, then, could Shuppiluliuma have boldly claimed the opposite?

The answer, I believe, rests not on any legal niceties regarding the city’s past status, but rather on the Hittites’ need to justify their possession of an embarrassing acquisition. When Shuppiluliuma had set out for Upe, near the end of the Great Syrian campaign, he had not expected to fight with Kadesh. This suggests that opposition from that quarter was not anticipated because Kadesh, as an Egyptian vassal, was not expected to champion the Hurrian cause. But king Shutatarru had come out against the Hittites. Why he did this—whether on his own initiative or the orders of his Egyptian overlord—we shall never know. In any case, having ranged himself with Shuppiluliuma’s enemies, the king of Kadesh was treated accordingly. By putting himself in the way of the Hittite juggernaut he had, in effect, acted as a partisan of the Mitannian king. His behavior gave the Hittites a reason to justify their continued sway over Kadesh in later years, when Aitakama was their willing proxy in Syria. Thus, at Carchemish, Shuppiluliuma breezily informed the Egyptian envoys that he had taken Kadesh away from the Hurrian king—for, having behaved as if she were a Mitannian vassal at that time, this was what she had become, and her entry into the Hittite orbit was none of Egypt’s business. The Hittites would feel obliged to maintain this official fiction for as long as they felt the need to make a case against Egypt’s prior claim on Kadesh. Later, with the city in Hittite hands and Egypt estranged from Hatti, it safely could be admitted that, in taking Kadesh, Shuppiluliuma had inflicted a defeat on the king of Egypt.

It is hard to avoid the conclusion that, by acting in this way, the Hittites stumbled onto a path that would lead them into conflict with Egypt. Akhenaten, as we know now, was no pacifist. Egypt had not tolerated the alienation of her possessions in Amurru when her Mitannian ally had been fighting for its life. There was no reason for her to accept the loss of Kadesh now, in the wake of Mitanni’s disintegration. Having first determined which way the wind was blowing, she fought back. Only the loss of an important vassal can explain the king of Egypt’s personal exasperation with Aitakama and Egypt’s persistent attempts to reconquer Kadesh. With the eventual defection of Amurru, of course, the situation became far graver, for Egyptian possessions in Upe and Lebanon were now at risk. Together, they formed an impregnable barrier across the Hittite empire’s southern flank; and it was together that Kadesh and Amurru would defect during the time of Sety I, setting in train the events that led to Ramesses II’s defeat before Kadesh. Only when a definitive peace treaty was concluded in Ramesses II’s twenty-first

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38. EA 194:21–23. While Knudtzon, Die El-Amarna Tafeln I 721, saw this “expedition” as a caravan, and although the word (KASKAL.MES) lends itself to either a commercial or a military environment, the rest of this letter suggests that a military venture is meant. (I am indebted to Robert D. Biggs for advice on this matter.)
year did Egypt give up her claim to these two territories. Coincidentally, it is in the next generation that we first hear of the Hurrian “claim” on Amurru in Hittite sources. A case of forgetfulness, perhaps, or a scribal error? This is possible—but it is more probable that this formulation was deliberate, and that a legalistic quibble, long forgotten, had been raised to the dignity of official history because of its usefulness in sugaring over the fact, so unpalatable to Hatti’s ally, the pharaoh, that Egypt’s northern border provinces had been swallowed up for good by the Hittite empire.

39. By implication in the text of the treaty, which does not deal with border issues in either the Egyptian or Hittite version (ANET3, pp. 199–203). Perhaps the definition of the two spheres of influence was handled in a separate instrument (compare RS.17.340 in Palais Royal d’Ugarit IV.1 48–52).
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